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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on a particular aspect of the international role of the European 
Union (EU), examining the evolution of EU conflict prevention policy in the post- 
Cold War period. In recent years the EU has extended its range of external relations 
policies, and conflict prevention has emerged as a prominent objective on the agenda, 
particularly as the Union faced political and economic instability on its borders. After 
introducing conflict prevention and analysing the EU's external relations and the post- 
Cold War security context, the thesis examines the EU's institutional set-up for 
conflict prevention. The incremental development and institutional structure of the EU 
renders the formulation and implementation of conflict prevention by the EU a 
particular challenge. The thesis then proceeds to an investigation of EU cooperation 
and conflict prevention policy coordination with the security organisations identified 
as the EU's key partners: the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 
While post-Cold War conflict prevention requires a multilateral approach, the 
proliferation of European security organisations and the increasing overlap in their 
objectives makes policy coordination between the EU and other organisations 
particularly important. 
It is concluded that the EU faces fundamental internal coordination problems and 
institutional divisions in its elaboration of conflict prevention policy. Conflict 
prevention is underdeveloped by the EU and is in danger of being marginalised in 
favour of shorter-term crisis management. Furthermore, internal coordination 
problems have a detrimental impact on the organisation's ability to cooperate 
externally with other security organisations. EU external priorities in conflict 
prevention focus on cooperation in crisis management with the UN and NATO, and 
fail to capitalise on the advantages of cooperation with the OSCE. The failure of the 
EU to fully adopt conflict prevention as an external relations priority and to 
coordinate its activities with other organisations could have implications for future 
stability in, and on the borders of, the EU. 
KEY WORDS: EXTERNAL RELATIONS, POLICY COORDINATION, EUROPEAN SECURITY 
Brothers, away from this Europe of graves: 
Let us climb together towards the land 
Where we will be men among men. 
If I'm not for myself, who will be for me? 
If not this way, how? If not now, when? 
Primo Levi 
'Song of the Partisan'IfNot Now, nen? 
Never forget: 
we walk on hell., 
gazing at flowers. 
Issa Kobayashi (tr. Lucien Stryk) 
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CHAPTERI 
Introduction: The Evolution of European Union Conflict Prevention 
Policy 
1.1 Introduction 
In the past fifteen years, the EU has been transformed from a tentative international 
actor to a major player in pan-European security politics, as illustrated by the current 
extent of EU external action designed to promote peace and prevent violent conflict. 
This thesis examines the evolution of the European Union's (EU)1 conflict prevention 
policy during this period of rapid change both in the EU itself and in the European 
security context in which it operates. 
This introductory chapter aims to provide a working definition of conflict prevention, 
a summary of the role of theory in the thesis, and a thesis outline. In further chapters, 
conflict prevention is discussed in the Cold War and post-Cold War context, the 
procedures and institutions of EU external relations are outlined, and the post-Cold 
War European security context is discussed. Proposing that the development of 
conflict prevention has been a particular challenge for EU policy coordination and 
coherence, the thesis then provides a critical analysis of the internal institutional 
development of EU conflict prevention. A further challenge for the EU has been the 
development of a clear, demarcated role for itself in this policy sphere in a Europe of 
multiple actors and overlapping organisational agendas. Identifying inter- 
organisational policy coordination as an important factor in pan-European conflict 
prevention, the thesis then examines EU cooperation with the other three key 
organisations active in pan-European conflict prevention: the United Nations (UN), 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Conclusions are drawn regarding the EU's 
record in conflict prevention to date, the prospects for EU external policy coordination 
for conflict prevention, and the future of the practice of conflict prevention. 
1 The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created in 195 1, and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratorn) in 1957. The 
organisations ran in parallel until 1967 when a Treaty merging the institutions came into effect. After 
this, the organisation was generally known as the European Community (EQ, becoming the European 
Union (EU) in 1993. 
1.2 Defining Conflict Prevention 
Conflict prevention has been widely adopted by the EU, international organisations 
and governments, yet it has remained a nebulous concept because of definitional 
difficulties compounded by its potentially wide-ranging nature. 
Conflict prevention requires the identification of the causes of conflict, and entails 
attempts to address these causes before the outbreak of violence. Most definitions of 
conflict preventiqn do not imply that conflict per se is undesirable: only that the 
resolution of conflict through violence is destructive and does not lead to viable and 
lasting solutions (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999; Wallensteen 2002). As a 
concept, conflict prevention can be understood at various levels of analysis, whether 
at the personal, group or community level, or at a national or international level, and 
applied before, during and after a violent conflict erupts. In this study, conflict 
prevention is analysed at the international level, examining how the concept is applied 
by the European Union as an external security policy. 
Conflict prevention has taken on a particular contemporary meaning that nevertheless 
has several variations and is subject to dispute. In general terms, conflict prevention in 
the international arena is taken to refer to any attempt by third parties to prevent the 
outbreak of violent conflict. Definitions tend to vary with regard to what actions are 
included in conflict prevention, with some analysts focusing entirely on the period 
before the outbreak of violence (e. g. Zartman 2001), and others adopting a broad 
definition, inclusive of strategies to prevent conflict escalation and/or recurrence (e. g. 
Carnegie Commission 1997). This study adopts a broad definition of conflict 
prevention: it is defined as a multi-faceted process ranging from long-term or 
structural policy to project stability, to short-term operational policy (preventive 
diplomacy and civilian or military crisis management) to resolve crises and prevent 
further escalation. It also refers to attempts to stop the recurrence of violence in 
conflict zones. It is primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with the period 
before the outbreak of war. For the purposes of this analysis, the practice of conflict 
prevention is divided into three stages: structural or long-term; early warning and 
analysis; and operational (see below, pp. 81-83). This categorisation is necessary to 
bring order and structure to the investigation, although it is not intended to suggest 
that conflicts follow linear patterns requiring structural policy, followed by early 
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warning and analysis then crisis management. Conflicts may require policy from all 
three 'stages' simultaneously, or move between categories. This categorisation of 
conflict prevention is used as an ordering device in the chapters examining EU 
conflict prevention, and EU cooperation in conflict prevention with the UN, the 
OSCE and NATO. 
The value of conflict prevention as a policy is undermined by a simplification of its 
complexity. Yet since the policy, at least in this study, is categorised as embracing a 
wide number of concerns, it requires a high degree of internal and external 
organisational policy coordination for credible implementation. The utility of the 
categorisation adopted will be considered in the concluding chapter. 
1.3 The Role of Theory: A Framework for Analysis 
This thesis does not approach the evidence from a particular theoretical perspective. 
Rather, the thesis is informed by contemporary conceptual debates in European Union 
integration/foreign policy-making, International Relations theory and Peace Research. 
The research presented is discussed in the context of theory in the early part of the 
thesis, and the concluding chapter returns to these debates. 
The dynamics of European integration have consistently defied traditional 
interpretation and no general theory on EU foreign policy-making has been developed 
(Smith, S. 2000: 3, Smith, K. E. 2004: 12). International Relations theory, long stuck 
in the neo-realist/neo-liberal institutionalist cul-de-sac, has been challenged in recent 
years by 'reflectivist" approaches focusing less on the behaviour of states, and more 
on non-state actors and the impact of cultures, norms and identities (Wendt 1992; 
Katzenstein 1996). Peace Research has traditionally emphasised alternative 
interpretations and solutions to conflict, and places institutions at the core of conflict 
prevention (Boulding 1992; Miall, Ramsbotham. and Woodhouse 1999). These 
debates are discussed in the context of post-Cold War European security and 
international organisations in chapter 4. 
While this thesis does not adopt the tenets of one particular theory, it does, by 
necessity, make some assumptions about the political world. The study draws loosely 
on concepts of cooperation established in neo-liberal institutionalist literature and on 
3 
neo-liberal/ constructivist concepts of the autonomy and behaviour of international 
organisations. Studies in cooperation tend to focus on why state actors cooperate in 
institutions at the regional or international level (Keohane 1984; Keohane and 
Axelrod 1985). Similarly, and drawing on the same economic theories, liberal 
intergovernmentalisin seeks to explain EU Member State policy coordination in ternis 
of preferences and bargaining, advancing ideas developed in the neo-functionalist 
sphere (Moravcsik 1993). Cooperation in these studies is framed in terms of state- 
state and/or state-institution interaction. The thesis draws on definitions of 
cooperation established in this literature, contending that cooperation occurs as a 
result of potential or actual discord between [organisational rather than state) actors, 
leading to a process of policy coordination (Keohane 1984: 5 1). It is contended that 
cooperation between organisational actors was sought to offset the actual or potential 
discord created by parallel and overlapping conflict prevention policies and operations 
in the post-Cold War era. 
In examining internal and external organisational policy coordination, it is assumed 
that international organisations have an institutional life of their own, with distinct 
institutional characters and priorities (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 699). It is not 
assumed, as in neo-realist interpretations of international relations, that organisations 
exist solely to serve the interests of their members (Mearsheimer 1995; Waltz 1979). 
As established in the neo-liberal institutionalist tradition, it is contended that 
institutions do 'matter', and that international organisations play an important role in 
establishing and upholding international values and commitments (Keohane 1989). 
However, it is not assumed that organisations are actors entirely independent of their 
members. Rather, a middle ground is explored in which it is accepted that states often 
constrain organisations, yet cannot entirely control institutional processes (Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999: 699). 
The common link between neo-liberal institutionalists and neo-realists is the 
assumption that international organisations exist to serve the interests of states. In 
making this assumption, analysts tend to pay little attention to the impact of internal 
organisational politics on the behaviour and impact of organisations (Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999: 706). Moreover, scholars of international organisation have tended 
to pay less attention to the impact of international organisations on world politics in 
4 
general, and their limitations in tackling global problems in particular (Gallaroti 1991: 
185; Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 715). In establishing the relative autonomy, 
influence (and limitations) of organisational actors, as recognised in sociological and 
constructivist approaches to international organisations (Checkel 1999; Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999) we create a framework in which to examine the internal institutions 
of the EU in the planning and application of conflict prevention policy. Organisations, 
like states, are bureaucracies, with their own internal cultures and practices subject to 
the kind of 'bureaucratic politics' and 'organisational processes' explored by Graham 
Allison (1972) in reference to the US government. There is likely therefore to be 
internal organisational competition and inefficiency because of conflict over material 
resources, and differences in organisational cultures. 
The establishment of conflict prevention as an area for cooperation between the EU 
and other organisations involves a complex interplay between states, organisational 
personnel and other interested parties, such as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). While this study focuses to a large part on the internal institutional workings 
of the EU, EU cooperation with other European security organisations brings in the 
impact of external pressures on the evolution of EU conflict prevention policy: to 
what extent was EU policy progress driven by the activities of, and increasingly 
necessary cooperation with, the UN, OSCE and NATO? Conflict prevention is an 
interesting area of internal and inter-institutional cooperation because the institutional 
logic of policy coordination for conflict prevention often fails to result in concerted 
and coordinated action. Why is this the case? Despite the adoption of the language of 
conflict prevention by every organisation featured in this study, policy coordination is 
not extensive. Evidently, this is the result of the complexity of the policy itself, and of 
the difficult theatres where it is practiced. Yet it is also the result of bureaucratic 
cultures and politics: intra-EU and inter-institutional conflict, ambition, competition, 
incoherence and confusion. The thesis considers the impact of these factors on the 
evolution of EU conflict prevention and EU external cooperation for conflict 
prevention - probing the conflict and cooperation at the heart of the politics of 
European security. 
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
The chapters of the thesis are outlined below together with their primary objectives 
and the questions they address. Figure 1.1 illustrates the thesis structure in a flow 
diagram. 
1.4.1 Chapter 2: Conflict Prevention in Contemporary Perspective 
This chapter aims to introduce conflict prevention as idea and practice in the post- 
Second World War context. The chapter addresses the following questions: 
How was conflict prevention developed and practiced in the context of the 
Cold War? 
How has conflict prevention progressed in the post-Cold War era, and what 
are the problems associated with the implementation of conflict prevention 
poliCY9 
1.4.2 Chapter 3: The External Relations of the European Union 
The objective of this chapter is to outline the EU's external relations institutions and 
procedures that form the basis of the EUs conflict prevention policy. Since EU 
conflict prevention relies on policy deriving from both the intergovernmental CFSP 
'pillar' and the supranational EC 'pillar', we focus in particular on the legacy of the 
EU's divided external relations system. 
* What are the origins of EU foreign policy and development cooperation? 
* How did the EU's role in external relations develop in the post-Cold War 
period, and what are the key institutions? 
1.4.3 Chapter 4: Post-Cold War European Security and Conflict Prevention 
This chapter examines the context of the development of EU conflict prevention, 
exploring the policy as a post-Cold War security strategy. 
* What are the features of the post-Cold War European security enviromnent, and 
where does the EU fit in? 
How does conflict prevention concur with the EU's new security role? 
* Why is policy coordination important for post-Cold War conflict prevention? 
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1.4.4 Chapter 5: The EU's Conflict Prevention Policy 
Focusing in detail on the EU's institutional development of conflict development, this 
chapter outlines and analyses the policies that comprise EU conflict prevention. 
9 How has conflict prevention policy developed in the EU context? 
9 Do internal institutional coordination problems impact on EU conflict prevention? 
1.4.5 Chapters 6,7 and 8: The EU and the United Nations (UN); The EU and 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); The EU and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
Having established that the OSCE, UN and NATO are the EU's institutional partners 
in conflict prevention in the post-Cold War era; that together they make up the post- 
Cold War security architecture; and that policy coordination between the EU and the 
other organisations is a key factor in EU conflict prevention, these three chapters 
examine the developing dialogue and policy coordination between the EU and the 
UN, OSCE and NATO in the conflict prevention field. Each chapter addresses the 
same research questions: 
9 How has the EU's relationship with the UN, OSCE and NATO developed? 
9 What is the extent of conflict prevention policy coordination between the EU and 
the UN, OSCE and NATO? 
9 What is the impact of internal EU coordination on external coordination with the 
UN, OSCE and NATO? 
Chapter 9: Conclusions 
Chapter 9 surnmarises the main findings of the thesis, assessing the evolution of EU 
conflict prevention and the development of external coordination in conflict 
prevention policy with the UN, OSCE and NATO. The chapter addresses the 
following questions: 
9 What are the prospects for EU conflict prevention? 
9 How far does EU - UN, OSCE and NATO coordination contribute to, or detract 
from, the practice of conflict prevention? 
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9 What are the definitional and conceptual implications of the thesis' findings? 
Having caught the attention of pan-European security organisations, what is the 
future of conflict prevention as a security strategy? 
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CHAPTER 2 
Conflict Prevention in Contemporary Perspective 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses conflict prevention in contemporary perspective: we first 
explore conflict prevention in the context of the Cold War, charting its development 
as theory and practice. Conflict prevention in the post-Cold War period is examined in 
detail in the context of the European Union (EU) in the rest of this thesis. This chapter 
focuses secondly, therefore, on the more general problems of post-Cold War conflict 
prevention policy elaboration and implementation that were to impact on the EU's 
adoption of conflict prevention as an external policy objective. 
The prevention of war has been a central objective of international relations 
throughout history, and is closely linked to the history of international organisation in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Claude 1971; Hinsley 1963). For the purposes 
of this thesis, conflict prevention is examined as a concept and practice in 
international politics in the post-1945 period: its rise to prominence in the post-Cold 
War era cannot be understood without reference to this formative period. Section 2.2 
examines conflict prevention during the Cold War period. The prevention of conflict 
during the Cold War was firstly associated with the avoidance of war between the US 
and the USSR. The prevention of war became the concern of diplomats and 
strategists, who developed theories of deterrence and crisis management in order to 
prevent recourse to the nuclear trigger. We examine this debate, and argue that this 
rather narrow definition of, and approach to, conflict led to the birth of alternative 
views in the fields of Conflict and Peace Research. 
Conflict prevention during the Cold War is also associated with the development of 
innovative instruments to prevent violent conflict within the UN system. While the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) pioneered conflict prevention through 
economic integration, the UN developed instruments for applied conflict prevention in 
its groundbreaking approach to the problem of inter- and intra-state conflict. The Cold 
War superpower confrontation hampered the UN's efforts: both the US and the USSR 
possessed a veto in the UN Security Council and interfered in inter-state and regional 
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conflicts outside Europe. Nevertheless, the UN's development of peacekeeping and 
preventive diplomacy laid the ground for the adoption of conflict prevention by other 
international organisations in the post-Cold War period, as well as the further 
advancement of conflict prevention in the UN. 
Strategies for conflict prevention rose to prominence in the post-Cold War era as a 
number of new violent conflicts broke out in Europe and Africa. This renewed interest 
in conflict prevention can be explained by drawing on various factors, including 
improved international cooperation in the UN Security Council, a broadening of the 
concept of security, and the increased prevalence of intra-state conflict. The post-Cold 
War security context will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. Section 2.3 examines 
some of the problems associated with turning conflict prevention theory, as developed 
during and after the Cold War, into practice. The post-Cold War debate on conflict 
patterns and conflict prevention terminology is examined. Finally, we address the 
practical and normative difficulties associated with the implementation of conflict 
prevention policy. 
2.2 Conflict Prevention during the Cold War 
Conflict prevention during the Cold War can be associated with, firstly, the overriding 
need to prevent conflict between the US and the USSR (Wallensteen 2002: 214), and 
secondly, the development of strategies to prevent conflict, or its escalation, by the 
UN (Claude 1971: 312). The two processes were, of course, closely linked: the period 
is a good illustration of Claude's contention that "international organisation affects 
international politics, but it is even more affected by international politics" (Claude 
1971: vii). 
2.2.1 The prevention of superpower conflict 
Hostility between the USSR and the US had been simmering since the Russian 
Revolution of 1917, and the ideological and geographical divisions of the Cold War 
were visible by the final months of the Second World War (Cox 1990: 26). Despite 
the emergence of the US as the most powerful military and economic power in the 
world, fear of further Communist territorial expansion and ideological infiltration set 
the scene for 40 years of mutual distrust and competition. The onset of nuclear rivalry 
in the 1950s made the prevention of conflict between the superpowers even more 
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essential. With Europe divided into rival spheres of influence, the potential for and 
likely impact of conflict in Europe was considerable and would have been 
devastating. The Third World and Asia, however, became the theatre for most Cold 
War conflict as the superpowers intervened in regional and internal wars on the 
periphery (McMahon 2003: 56). Local conflicts during the Cold War period therefore 
often had an inter-state element: strategic/ideological rivalry between the superpowers 
led to attempts to control governments in third countries - for example, in Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia in the 1950s and 1960s, and in Central and South America in the 
1970s and 1980s (Wallensteen 2002: 87). Conflict prevention as an objective of 
superpower foreign policy and strategy must be distinguished from conflict 
prevention as an approach to the problem of conflict and the pursuit of peace. This 
section links these two developments: the narrow debate about security exemplified 
by superpower crisis management acted as a catalyst for the emergence of alternative 
approaches in the US and Europe. Conflict prevention, as understood in the context of 
Peace and Conflict Research 2, developed partly as a reaction to the arms race and 
superpower crisis management, and was the subject of more popular and academic 
interest in the climate of d6tente and with the eventual demise of superpower rivalry 
(Rogers and Ramsbotham 1999: 742; Dunn 1991: 56; Salmon and Alkadari 1992: 
123). 
Theories related to the creation of international peace developed in the context of 
international organisation, such as disarmament, collective security, and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes were coloured by the Cold War. Collective security, originally 
envisaged as a shared commitment to world order, and underlined by the indivisibility 
of peace (Claude 1971: 247), became more associated with military alliances and 
deterrence, symbolised by the overwhelming military power of two opposing military 
alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact). Arms control as a means of war prevention 
emerged with renewed vigour, but a series of US-USSR strategic arms limitation 
treaties (SALT) in the 1970s, while politically significant, did not halt the arms race 
(McMahon 2003: 128). The build up of conventional and nuclear forces was seen as 
relevant to the prevention of US/USSR conflict. Reduction of nuclear forces did not 
2 Pioneered in the 1940s and advancing in the 1950s and 60s with the establishment of the Journal of 
Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan in 1957 and the Journal ofPeace Research in 1964 
(Rogers and Ramsbotharn 1999: 743). 
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come about until the late 1980s (Dorman and Treacher 1995: 16). The superpowers 
largely managed their own Cold War crises, with the UN being either bypassed (e. g. 
the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962) or manipulated by the superpowers in the settlement 
of disputes (e. g. the Congo in the 1960s). Since no real attempts were made to reduce 
tensions until the 1960s, the prevention of conflict was initially narrowly associated 
with superpower 'crisis management, ' the foreign policy catchphrase of the Cold War. 
As Wallensteen has contended, "prevention was connected to imminent crisis" (2002: 
272). 
Strategies for the avoidance of nuclear war as a result of superpower confrontation 
concerned a wide range of diplomats, academics and practitioners. Academics in the 
emerging International Relations field, particularly foreign policy analysts and those 
of the Strategic Studies school, were concerned with the control of superpower crises, 
and the prevention of nuclear war, developing theories on deterrence, crisis 
management and limited war (Strachey 1962; Brodie 1970; Williams 1976). 
Traditional concepts of strategy shifted from the pursuit of national objectives through 
war, to the careful extension of influence and power without resorting to war (Garnett 
1975). War, according to some, was an inevitable feature of the international system, 
but the advent of nuclear weapons rendered the resort to war "unacceptable" 
(Strachey 1962: 3). Crisis management was the key tactic in averting the escalation of 
conflict between the superpowers - particularly after the apparently successful 
defusing of the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, when the US and USSR clashed over the 
installation of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. While the objective was to prevent 
conflict, it was a short-term strategy, paying scant attention to the causes of the crisis 
in question. A cynical interpretation of the technique was concerned with how to 
extract maximum gain from a crisis situation, using tactics such as brinksmanship and 
coercive bargaining (Schelling 1960). Questioning of such tactics prompted the 
development of alternative perspectives on crisis management, particularly after 
reassessments of the Cuban Missile Crisis resulted in doubts being expressed over the 
risk posed by the incident. Analysts of the Behavioural School emphasised the impact 
of stress and threat perception in crisis situations, challenging the contention that 
crisis situations could be so carefully controlled and manipulated (Hermann 1972; 
Lebow 1981). Nevertheless, the superpowers did develop crisis management 
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conventions, including a direct line of communication, in order to avoid 
misunderstandings that could lead to war. 
The idea of crisis or conflict prevention rather than crisis management gained ground 
in the climate of d6tente, which led to more prospects of cooperation between the 
superpowers (Salmon and Alkadari 1992). The prevalence of crisis management as a 
tactic for preventing the outbreak of war reflected the fact that underlying causes of 
conflicts were more often than not ignored. The UN Charter was interpreted narrowly 
during the Cold War, with little focus on the domestic sources of conflict and threats 
coming from within states (MacFarlane 2002: 35). This was recognised by UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair in a speech made in Chicago in 1999 during the Kosovo crisis: 
"twenty years ago we would not have been fighting in Kosovo. We would have turned 
our backs on it.,, 3 The norm of non-interference during the Cold War, however, suited 
the superpowers (who nevertheless abused it) and the growing number of newly 
independent ex-colonial states. There was, however, a concurrent growth of normative 
interest in the "international dimension of human rights, " within the UN and in 
academia (MacFarlane 2002: 34). 
A wider approach to conflict and its sources emerged in the expanding academic 
fields of Conflict Resolution and Peace Research. These disciplines drew on the 
earlier themes and research methods of analysts such as Quincy Wright (whose A 
Study of War was first published in 1942) and Lewis Richardson (who compiled the 
Statistics ofDeadly Quarrels, published posthumously in 1960). Central to these 
fields was the rejection of nuclear weapons and deterrence as a way of preventing war 
(Dunn 1991: 63). Drawing on the ideas proposed by Richardson and Wright, peace 
researchers were striving for a "policy for peace, not defence"(Boulding 1990: 47). 
Kenneth Boulding, founder of the Journal of Conj7ict Resolution in 1957 and the 
Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan in 1959, 
was an early advocate of conflict prevention through the development of research and 
early warning systems (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 43). 
3 'The Blair Doctrine' ht! p: //www. pbs. org/newshour/bb/intemational/ian-iune99/blair doctrine4- 
23. html. Page 3. Accessed 18/04/05. 
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In Europe, Johan Galtung founded a research unit on conflict and peace at the 
University of Oslo (now PRIO, the International Peace Research Institute) in 1960, 
and the Journal ofPeace Research in 1964. Both American and European variants 
widened the scope of conflict studies by including concerns over human rights, 
justice, equality and ecology as contributing to conflict - whether inter- or intra-state. 
Galtung's work in particular widened the scope of peace research beyond the 
immediate prevention of war. He was concerned with violence in general - at the state 
level ('structural' violence) and on an ideological level ('cultural' violence). The 
concept of structural violence identified problems in state structures and systems as 
precipitating violence in individuals, while cultural violence is, for example, 
nationalist, or religious aspects of culture used to justify direct or structural forms of 
violence (Galtung 1990). The key distinction is the difference between positive and 
negative peace; the former being classified as the removal of structural and cultural 
violence, while the latter as merely the removal of direct violence - the immediate 
cessation of hostilities (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 43). These ideas 
were developed by practitioners and academics, and gained credence with the rise of 
the anti-nuclear peace movement in the 1970s and 1980s (Burton and Dukes 1990). 
Nevertheless, Burton's (1984) assertion that change in the international system and in 
the domestic structure of states was needed to tackle the root causes of inter and intra- 
state conflict, was not widely welcomed, nor accepted. The rise of conflict prevention 
as a policy rather than just an idea would have to wait until the fundamental changes 
that came with the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. A further dimension of 
conflict prevention, which we turn to next, was conflict prevention as a technique in 
the context of the United Nations. If Cold War conflict prevention was more often 
than not associated with superpower military and nuclear defence, then the UN was 
instrumental in developing conflict prevention as grounds for international 
intervention. 
2.2.2 Conflict prevention and the United Nations 
The United Nations was stifled by the superpower clash and veto in the Security 
Council, but "the realities of international politics did not prevent UN involvement in 
the affairs of dozens of countries across the world" (Simons 1994: 106). According to 
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the Uppsala Data ProjeCt4' the number of violent armed conflicts rose steadily 
throughout the Cold War period with a peak in the late 1960s, probably as a result of 
decolonisation (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 620). There was therefore no shortage of violent 
Conflicts to concern the UN in the decades following the end of the Second World 
War. Intra-state conflict has been the most common form of warfare since the late 
1950s (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 623). The removal of colonial rule by European powers 
in the 1950s and 1960s led to internal instability and competition between rival 
factions in some of the newly independent African countries. The other notable arena 
for intra-state conflict during the period was Central and Southern America, with civil 
wars in Colombia and Guatemala, and state violence and terror in Chile, Bolivia and 
Argentina. The major inter-state wars of the period (the Korean war in the 1950s, the 
Vietnam war' in the 1960s and the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s) each resulted in more 
than a million battle deaths (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 623), while a series of smaller, but 
no less intractable inter-state conflicts broke out in the Middle East and Asia. 
The UN Charter, based on the post-war balance of power, and limited in its 
mechanisms, was not primarily designed to prevent the outbreak of all conflict, nor 
did the UN have expertise in conflict resolution. The rather narrow interpretation of 
threats to international peace and security that was prevalent both within the UN and 
in the governments of its members meant that conflict prevention, particularly in the 
case of civil wars, was not a prime interest of the UN (Mack and Furlong 2004: 59). 
According to John Burton 6, of the delegates at the UN foundation conference in San 
Francisco in 1945, "few ... had any clear ideas on the 
handling of conflict situations 
outside the traditional law-and-order and power framework ... The goal was to prevent 
aggression of the German, Italian and Japanese type. Few were educated to ask why 
this aggression had occurred, what were the background circumstances, and were 
there problems that could have been solved" (Burton 1986: 43-44). 
It is certainly the case that conflict prevention featured on the agenda of the UN only 
after the restraints of the Cold War were removed, (Mack and Furlong 2004: 60) and 
4 The Uppsala Conflict Data Project is based in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at 
Uppsala University. 
5 The Vietnam war was also intra-state. 
6 John Burton attended the conference as part of the Australian delegation, and later became one of the 
founder-figures of the Peace and Conflict Research fields (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 
45). 
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arguably after the UN had adopted conflict prevention and resolution techniques 
developed by academics and practitioners. Nevertheless, key developments within the 
organisation were important in establishing a foothold for international organisation in 
conflict that was to be further developed in the post-Cold War period. The most 
important UN innovations in this regard were preventive diplomacy and 
peacekeeping. Preventive diplomacy was developed by the second UN Secretary 
General Dag Hammarskj6ld as a strategy for intervening to prevent the outbreak or 
the escalation of violent conflict, either between or within states (Hampson 2002: 
139). The strategy was developed particularly as a way of making the UN relevant in 
the Cold War struggle; intervention was considered in areas either outside of, or 
marginal to, superpower spheres of influence, and "was designed to forestall the 
competitive intrusion of rival power blocs into that area" (Claude 1971: 313). 
Preventive diplomacy in the UN entailed action by the Secretary-General and the 
Security Council, including mediation, fact-finding missions, good offices and 
economic assistance (Lund 1996: 33). It was further developed and extended in the 
post-Cold War era by the UN, particularly after its revival by Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros Ghali in his 1992 Agenda For Peace (UN 1992). In the 1960s, 
however, preventive diplomacy was most often interpreted as a synonym for 
peacekeeping, which became the most visible preventive tactic (Claude 1971: 314). 
Neither preventive diplomacy nor peacekeeping featured in the UN Charter, but were 
developed as a result of the UN's operational experience (Claude 1971: 312). The UN 
had sent personnel into conflict situations before preventive diplomacy became a 
familiar term - notably by sending a UN mediator to Israel in 1948 7; a controversial 
UN military observer group, then a military force under US command to Korea8 in 
1950; and a UN emergency force to Egypt (Suez) after the illegal invasion by France, 
Israel and the UK in 1956. The latter was the UN's first peacekeeping experience 
(Simons 1994: 123). The UN's first complex law and order peacekeeping mission 
7 Count Folke Bernadotte, president of the Swedish Red Cross, along with a UN observer, were 
assassinated by Zionists 4 month later (Simons 1994: 108). 
8 Korea, subject to Japanese occupation during the Second World War, was occupied by the 
superpowers after the defeat of Japan in 1945. When North Korean troops invaded South Korea in 
1950, the US, fearing the establishment of a communist regime, defended South Korea, and became 
embroiled in a conflict with North Korean and Chinese forces. Korea was partitioned in 1953. The UN 
was largely kept out of the subsequent conflict in Vietnam. 
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(ONUC)9 was dispatched to the Congolo, Central Africa, in 1960, in response to a 
request for assistance from the new government after independence was gained from 
Belgium. With no preparation for self-government having taken place, Belgium then 
intervened militarily and was asked to leave by the UN Security Council. The key 
objective of UN intervention was to prevent civil war, and also to prevent intervention 
by the superpowers (Claude 1971: 319; MacFarlane 2002: 43). Difficulties with 
agreeing on and maintaining a mandate for intervention in a civil war situation soon 
arose: a problem that the UN faced forty years later in the former Yugoslavia. The 
impact of the 20,000 strong UN force (operating from 1960-1964) in establishing 
stability was marginal in light of the internal chaos and external disagreements 
(particularly the USSR's withdrawal of support of the operation): at best the UN 
prevented the conflict from escalating into a major superpower confrontation (Claude 
1971: 326-327). It terms of the size of the operation, only the force sent to Cyprus in 
the 1964 was comparable during the Cold War period (Claude 1971: 316). However, 
peacekeeping became firmly established as a UN competence as a result of this early 
action and experience. Conflict in the Middle East continued through the 1960s, 70s 
and 80s, and the UN gained further experience in trying to ensure Israeli withdrawal 
from areas of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. As the Cold War came to an end, 
peacekeeping was increasingly fundamental in the organisation's response to conflict 
(Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 14 1). 
2.3 Conflict Prevention and the Post-Cold War Era 
The concept of conflict prevention gained support in Europe and the US in the 1970s 
and 1980s, partly as a result of developments in international politics, and partly as a 
result of advances made in the fields of Conflict and Peace Research. The concept 
gained greater attention as the Cold war drew to a close and international cooperation 
improved. The persistence of old conflicts, the difficulties of conflict resolution in 
peace processes, and the outbreak of a number of new conflicts across the world all 
contributed to the new appeal of conflict prevention. 
9A UN emergency force (UNEF)was sent to the Egypt-Israeli border in 1956 in response to the attack 
on Egypt by Israel, France and the UK. 
'0 The Congo (formerly Belgian Congo) was renamed Zaire in 197 1, then became the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1997 (Smith, D. 2003: 90). 
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_The 
first question to address in looking at post-Cold War conflict prevention is what 
was the nature of the conflict that international actors were trying to prevent? Conflict 
patterns after the Cold War are outlined and analysed. The contemporary period has 
seen an explosion of terms related to the prevention, management and resolution of 
violent conflict, of which conflict prevention is but one. However, there is no 
consensus on terms and meanings. We examine the terminological debate. Finally, the 
array of practical and analytical difficulties with conflict prevention related to conflict 
prediction, motivating preventive intervention, and proving policy success are 
explored. Normative problems concerning assumptions on root causes and the ethics 
of intervention have led to criticism of conflict prevention ethos, and discrepancies 
between the intention of conflict prevention policy and the likely outcomes of the 
Policy paths followed. 
2.3.1 Conflict after the Cold War 
The perception that the nature and frequency of violent conflict had changed in the 
post-Cold War period was widespread (Carnegie Commission 1997: 25; SIPRI- 
UNESCO 1998: 13; Cahill 2000: XIII; Wallensteen 2002: 26; Kaldor 2001: 1). As the 
Cold War ended and the USSR disintegrated, conflict broke out in Yugoslavia and in 
Georgia, Moldova and the Nagorno-Karabakh territory between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia in the fonner Soviet Union. In Africa, Somalia was disintegrating, violence 
in Rwanda was escalating and civil war raged on in Sudan. Classical inter-state war 
had practically disappeared (SIPRI-UNESCO 1998: 13). Instead, the international 
community faced a number of complex, intra-state or regional conflicts, characterised 
by the targeting and expulsion of civilians, and resulting in acute refugee and 
humanitarian emergencies (Carnegie Commission 1997: xvii). These 'new wars' were 
a distinctive kind of organised, political violence in a globalised era (Kaldor 2001: 1- 
2). Some realist analysts lamented the end of Cold War stability, and predicted an 
upward trend in conflict within and between communities (Mearshiemer 1990; 
Huntington 1991). 
In terms of the frequency of conflict, the pessimism of realist commentators was 
overplayed: while conflict trends show an increase in conflict frequency at the 
beginning of the post-Cold War era, data shows an overall global reduction in armed 
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conflict from 1989 to 1997 (Wallensteen 2002: 26; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 
2001: 630; Smith, D. 2001: 2). " 
However, European and American analysts were responding to the return of violent 
conflict to Europe in particular, which "account[ed] for two-thirds of the increase in 
the annual incidence of war in the early 1990s" (Smith, D. 2001: 3). Intra-state 
conflict was prevalent, but this was a trend that dated back to well before the end of 
the Cold War (Wallensteen 2002: 76; Booth 1998: 43). Post-Cold War conflicts were, 
however, characterised by their complexity in terms of the number of actors involved 
in conflicts (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001: 633). The interdependency of security 
between regional states, or regional 'security complexes' (Buzan 1991: 190), is well 
illustrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans. The proliferation of state and non- 
state actors in post-Cold War conflicts add a further layer of complexity to mediation 
and prevention efforts (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998: 633). There is also a trend 
in intra-state conflict of rapid escalation to full-blown war, which makes crisis 
prediction more difficult, and reduces the time available for international 
organisations or other parties to act (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000: 640). 
Lederach (1997: 9) warned of the growing willingness of non-state actors to take up 
arms in the pursuit of political and social goals. Rapid escalation and the proliferation 
of small arms (a particular problem in South Eastern Europe and parts of the former 
Soviet Union) bring further difficult challenges for conflict prevention. 
The continued trend of intra-state conflict, and more importantly, the recognition that 
intra-state conflict could be a threat to international peace and security, led to calls for 
greater international attempts to intervene earlier to prevent armed conflict, 
accelerating greater interest in conflict prevention techniques (Miall, Ramsbotharn 
and Woodhouse 1999: 109; Wallensteen 2002: 27). However, tackling the roots of a 
violent conflict requires an understanding of conflict causes and, where there are 
multiple actors involved, a consensus on these causes. During the Cold War, research 
on conflict causes tended to focus on inter-state, not intra-state conflict (Smith, D. 
2001: 5). Theories on the causes of intra-state conflict in particular were therefore 
" The Uppsala Conflict Data Project defines armed conflict as "a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state" (Gleditsch 
et al. 2002: 618-619). 
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underdeveloped and highly contested in the post-Cold War period. Intra-state conflict 
was frequently explained as a result of the removal of restraints imposed by the Cold 
War bipolar system, especially by neo-realist commentators (Mearshiemer 1990; 
Huntington 1991). Certainly this is one explanatory factor, but a rather narrow one. 
The causes of conflict are more likely to be complex and multiple. For example, the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia into rival ethnic groups may have been facilitated by the 
removal of the Soviet threat, but equally the political and economic crisis leading to 
Slovenian and Croatian succession had its origins in the 1980s (Woodward 1995). 
Those that rejected Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' (1991) thesis and 
Mearsheimer's (1990) pessimism and nostalgia for the stability of the Cold War era 
predicted an upward trend in conflict proliferation as the result of population growth, 
environmental degradation, and the growing disparity in wealth and resources 
between the countries of the Northern and Southern hemispheres (Rogers and Dando 
1992; Hansen 2000). 
The trend to label many of the intra-state wars of the period as 'ethnic' is not always 
helpful, and can mask fundamental causes of conflict by failing to identify the 
politicisation of ethnicity (Smith, D. 2001: 6). Conflict between groups is not 
necessarily rooted in ethnicity: intra-state war is more likely to be rooted in issues of 
political legitimacy and/or poor economic conditions (Smith, D. 2001: 7). 'Identity 
politics', a term used by Kaldor (2001) to refer to "movements which mobilise around 
ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power" (2001: 76), 
is a better label to attach to such conflicts. Concern over ethnic/identity-based 
violence may provide a catalyst for conflict prevention efforts. Yet despite the 
publicity of 'ethnic' conflict in the post-Cold War years, it remains the case that the 
majority of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world are not at war (Smith, D. 
2003: 16). Very little is known about the factors that trigger ethnic conflict when it 
does occur (Brown 2001: 218). Being too hasty to identify ethnicity as a root cause of 
conflict can certainly hamper attempts to prevent and manage conflict (Lederach 
1997: 8). Susan Woodward (2000: 153) identifies 'Balkan determinism' as a key error 
in American and European analyses of the conflict in Former Yugoslavia. Lamenting 
that international mediation could not overcome historic ethnic enmity, diplomats 
missed the opportunity to prevent further escalation of the political crisis in 1990. 
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The causes of conflict are notoriously subjective (Smith, D. 2001; 2003), as are, to a 
lesser extent, empirical trends, which, by necessity, require subjective choices about 
definitions, categorisation and inclusion of evidence (see Gleditsch et al. 2002: 625- 
626). Nevertheless, renewed interest and research on conflict in the 1990s has 
undoubtedly contributed to the rise of and interest in conflict prevention. The outbreak 
of complex crises on the edge of the EU, characterised by the targeting of civilians, 
rapid escalation, regional security complexes and the proliferation of small arms has 
called for a response from European security organisations. The EU in particular can 
be accused of raising unrealistic expectations that it could respond to such conflicts 
(Hill 1993). Nevertheless, the prevention of further conflict has gained support in the 
EU, the UN and the OSCE in particular, as the basis of this response. This consensus, 
however, was not matched by a consensus on terms and meanings. 
2.3.2 Problems with prevention: terminological confusion 
The first problem with prevention addressed is the confusing number of tenns 
associated with conflict and its prevention and management. 
We have seen a move from the use of war more to the widespread use of conj7ict in 
the post-Cold War period, although this was common before then in UN parlance, 
(Miall 1992: 37) signifying a dispute not necessarily between states (symmetric 
disputes between actors of parity) but between varied and/or unequal actors 
(asymmetric disputes, such as revolts or civil war) (Miall, Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse 1999: 12). This concurs with a widening of the nature of violent clashes 
and number of actors involved in conflict, a trend visible since the end of the Second 
World War. The term conj7ict therefore denotes more general human activity, and 
comes about "when two people wish to carry out acts which are mutually 
inconsistent" (Nicholson 1970: 2). This is a general rule, and while referring to 
personal individual conflict, can be applied equally to international or intra-state 
conflicts. Conflict is not always violent and is not necessarily undesirable in itself 
(Miall, Ramsbotharn and Woodhouse 1999: 96). Further qualification is necessary - 
hence the use of violent or armed conflict. Violent conflict between two or more 
parties changes a normal non-violent conflict (e. g. between a union and an employer) 
into a situation where negotiation is more difficult, since at the inception of violent 
conflict or war, both sides want victory, not compromise (Nicholson 1970: 4). Armed 
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conflict is similar, but specifically denotes the use of weaponry. Deadly conflict, a 
term adopted by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, refers to 
the bloody and intractable disputes of the 1990s, characterised by mass violence and 
genocide, the victims mostly civilian. This can be seen as an updating of Lewis 
Richardson's deadly quarrels. 
This classification of conflict seems clear enough, but conflict prevention is more 
problematic, and confusion over terminology when referring to conflict prevention 
and other related terms continues unabated. Following on from Burton's pedantic 
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invention ofprovention (1990: 233) to signify true structural conflict prevention, 
commentators have used coercive prevention, preventive statecraft (Jentleson 2000: 5; 
2001: 249) as well as the more popular preventive diplomacy (Lund 1996: 4; Cahill 
2000: XIV, Jentleson 2000b: 3) as generally meaning conflict prevention. Coercive 
prevention simply denotes the use or threat of military force as part of a preventive 
strategy (Jentleson 2000: 5), while preventive statecraft is an extended preventive 
diplomacy practiced by the state (Jentleson 2001: 249). The proliferation of terms 
(especially by the same commentator) has been unnecessary, especially since conflict 
prevention can (as this thesis asserts), incorporate long-term strategies, as well as 
shorter-term military measures. A clearer definition of conflict prevention (broadly 
adopted in this thesis - see chapter 1) featured in the Carnegie Commission's Report, 
Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997). Operational prevention covers strategies in the 
face of conflict, while structural prevention covers strategies to address the root 
causes of conflict (Carnegie Commission 1997: xix). 
Preventive diplomacy has advanced from its Cold War definition, but is still subject to 
dispute. According to Zartman, preventive diplomacy can mean anything "from broad 
structural measures to remove grievances to crisis diplomacy to bring conflict to an 
end" (Zartman 2001: 139). In the early 1990s, preventive diplomacy was a widely 
used term, particularly after it was revived and extended in UN Secretary General 
Boutros-Ghali's 1992 Agendafor Peace, the blueprint for the UN response to the new 
international security context. 12 This definition significantly extended the Cold War 
12 6, Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing 
disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. " An Agenda 
fior Peace (LJN 1992). 
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meaning of preventive diplomacy: it aimed to prevent all types of violent conflict; it 
envisaged preventive diplomacy being carried out by all parts of the UN system, not 
'just the Secretary-General and Security Council; and it introduced new instruments 
such as preventive deployment and early warning (Lund 1996: 34). The extension of 
the concept indicated a sea change in the UN's approach to violent conflict, and 
reflected a new era of cooperation in the Security Council. UN peacekeeping costs 
increased twelve-fold to nearly $3,000 million between 1986 and 1993 (Boutros- 
Ghali 2000: 190): clearly new instruments were required to address violent conflicts 
'before the need for UN peacekeeping, particularly in the case of complex intra-state 
conflicts. By the end of the twentieth century, conflict prevention was popular 
Parlance in the UN, incorporating preventive diplomacy strategies, but also bringing 
in strategies to address root causes of conflict (Mack and Furlong 2004: 60). 
The ternipeacebuilding has been classified as being effectively the same as structural 
conflict prevention (Wallensteen 2002: 286). Nevertheless, it has post-conflict 
connotations and has been defined by others as action in the aftermath of conflict 
(SIPRI-UNESCO 1998: 39; UN 1992: 15). However, Boutros-Ghali later refined the 
UN definition to make a distinction between preventive peacebuilding and post- 
con apeacebuilding, emphasising that while the strategies are applied at different Ifli 
stages of conflict, they amount to the same variety of institutional, economic, and 
social activities (Boutros-Ghali 2000: 193). This illustrates the difficulty in 
establishing clear terminological classification of conflict resolution terms. 
Peacebuilding is the same process as long-term conflict prevention to stop the 
recurrence of conflict, and is effectively the same as structural prevention in conflict- 
prone areas, whether pre- or post-conflict. So while the different phases of conflict 
require different approaches, these phases cannot be kept separate, and a particular 
conflict can move back and forward between stages (Chayes and Chayes 1996: 6). 
While analysts have invented and reworked terms in an attempt to spell out what they 
mean, the overall effect of this has been confusion rather than clarification. 
Definitions seem to be widely variable, and there is no clear consensus on meanings. 
International organisations notoriously use vague definitions in order to reach a 
necessary consensus and satisfy all members' interpretations of a phrase or term used. 
This tendency is visible in the EU, as well as the UN and the OSCE; clearly it is not 
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-politically expedient for the advancement and clarification of conflict prevention 
(Cohen 1999). Terms are often used interchangeably and without qualification. 
Unfortunately, this does not provide the concept with a coherent and comprehensible 
focus. 
These definitional problems reflect the complexity of conflict, which, as argued 
above, is greater in the post-Cold War period. It is often difficult to apply patterns and 
processes to situations that are vastly different, with different causal variables, and 
multiple actors. This is why debates about conflict prevention are ofien intertwined 
with theories of conflict in general, particularly in the post-Cold War period (see 
above). Deeper problems with the concept concern normative and practical setbacks 
to preventive policy application. 
2.4.3 Problems with prevention: prediction, motivation, and proving policy 
SUccess 
Confusion over the barrage of terms which accompany any discussion of conflict 
prevention is an obvious obstacle to effective analysis, understanding and policy- 
making. However, there are more fundamental problems with the concept that act as 
greater impediments. The first of these concerns problems with predicting conflict, 
Motivating actors, and establishing that conflict prevention can actually work. 
]Predicting conflict at the early stages is notoriously difficult, particularly in the case 
Of internal war (Wallensteen 2002: 276). Establishing the likelihood of escalation to 
violence is complex and can lead to false alarms. Outside actors may not want to 
obstruct constructive change, or fear that intervention could increase rather than 
decrease tensions (Wallensteen 2002: 276). The lack of media and other interest in 
successfully defused conflict 13 reinforces the perception that since scholars failed to 
predict events such as the break-up of the Soviet Union, there is little chance of 
successful conflict prediction in domestic cases. Such views are typified by Stedman 
(1995), who argues that the track record in prediction is not a basis for optimism, and 
that policyý-makers do not have crystal balls (Stedman 1995: 16). The trend of rapid 
13 For example, the disputes between Slovakia and Hungary (1993-1997) over the Hungarian minority 
in Slovakia and a hydroelectric plant on the Danube; UN mediation of the governmental dispute in 
Burundi (1994-1997); and the UN preventive deployment in Macedonia (1993-1999) (Wallensteen 
2002). 
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escalation to violence, as already mentioned, means that early prediction may be even 
more crucial in post-Cold War crises, and thus "early warning systems focusing on 
signs of impending conflicts are still most valuable" (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 
2000: 640). 
Unfortunately, the sophistication of early warning systems does not make up for the 
lack of will or motivation to act. Another major problem with conflict prevention 
concerns the mobilisation of outside actors when there is no pressing need to 
intervene or immediate threat to international security (Lund 1996: 27-28). Post-Cold 
War threats to international security are complex and diffuse, and the persistence of 
some realist mindsets in governments and international organisations leads to a 
reluctance to reconsider international norms on non-interference and sovereignty, and 
a lack of interest in far-flung conflict in regions of little strategic interest (Lund 1996: 
28; Jentleson 2000b: 5). The US Clinton administration in the 1990s did place greater 
emphasis on a preventive approach to foreign policy (Lund 1996: 5-6), and by 1999 
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair was outlining a new 'doctrine of the international 
community', based on the recognition that "national interest is to a significant extent 
governed by international collaboration. " 14 Nevertheless, this type of rhetoric of 
intervention for peaceful purposes is often undermined by the selectivity of the trend, 
as well as the ulterior motives of powerful states that often lie, or are perceived to lie, 
beneath it (see below). 
In any case, there is still significant resistance to the conflict prevention approach. It is 
berated by its critics as costly, risky, and potentially counter-productive (Stedman 
1995). Supporters, on the other hand, argue for the realism of conflict prevention, 
asserting that the costs of prevention are overestimated, and the assessment of what 
constitutes interests is too narrow (Jentleson 2000b; Wallensteen 2002). This assertion 
is supported by the high costs to the international community of reconstruction in 
South Eastern Europe, and the ramifications of, for example, US support of distant 
terrorist movements that later become a threat to American security. National 
priorities tend to be based on short-term domestic political gains rather than long-term 
14 Speech by Tony Blair to Chicago International Forurn, April 22,1999. 'The Blair Doctrine' 
hqp: //www. pbs. ori-, /newshour/bb/intemational/ian-iune99/blair__doctrine4-23. html. Page 4. Accessed 
18/04/05. 
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commitments to international peace. This observation is neither novel, (cf Burton 
1990, who argued for domestic solutions to international conflict) nor easily changed, 
however. 
The cost of prevention is nonetheless disputed, since at the early stages of conflict 
prevention the financial commitment necessary is often hýrd to estimate. A lack of 
international agreement on how to act often leads to a 'wait and see' approach 
(Wallensteen 2002: 276). However, logically the cost of military intervention in most 
cases far outweighs the cost of early prevention (Lund 1996; Brown and Rosecrance 
1999; Griffin 2001). The real problem goes back to mobilisation. Decision-making 
processes in governments and international organisations are not conducive to conflict 
prevention, as argued above. While lack of action is often attributed to political will, 
some analysts place budget over will in explaining the lack of priority given to 
conflict prevention policy (Evans 2001; Ouellette 2002). The definitional problems 
discussed do not make conflict prevention an attractive option for policy-makers, nor 
does the wide nature of the concept translate into policy of "chewable chunks" with 
identifiable exit strategies (Ouellette 2002: 72). Governments face the same problem 
as international organisations: that of planning long-term policy with yearly budgets, 
and balancing urgent affairs with less pressing but equally important matters. 
Even if the cost analysis supports early action, the problem of when to intervene 
remains. As we have seen, there is often no motivation to act early on in a conflict 
situation, and there is the fear that intervention may exacerbate tensions. The idea of a 
ripe moment for resolution, when intervention is deemed to have a high chance of 
success, could be helpful for outside actors (Zartman 1989; 2001). This moment 
usually comes at a stage after the outbreak of violence, when the actors involved reach 
a point where further violence will not aid their cause. It is therefore more concerned 
with conflict resolution, rather than earlier conflict prevention. It would be ludicrous 
to suggest a conflict preventive technique that sits back to allow for the parties to 
reach a "mutual, hurting stalemate" (Zartman 1989: 272). Nevertheless, since conflict 
prevention may be attempted at various stages of a conflict cycle, it could be 
important for identifying fruitful mediation moments in situations of recurring 
violence and unstable peace. On the other hand, the concept of ripeness has been 
criticised as too simplistic (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 163), and could 
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discourage policy-makers from attempting earlier mediation, allowing for conflict 
escalation. These contesting views complicate decision-making processes, once again 
-_ making early intervention, and therefore conflict prevention, an unattractive option for 
- Policy-makers. 
I Another fundamental problem with prevention, which is closely linked both to the 
failure to mobilise third parties to act, and to the difficulty in predicting conflict 
escalation, is proving that conflict prevention policy has been a success. If success 
can't be proven, and therefore precedents established, how can we gauge whether a 
conflict is likely to become violent, or persuade governments and organisations to 
Practice conflict prevention? It is difficult to prove that preventive action, rather than 
other factors, stopped the outbreak of a violent conflict (Wallensteen 2002: 279). 
Perhaps internal dynamics in a domestic conflict changed, or the parties involved 
decided to resolve the conflict themselves. A preventive approach also assumes that 
the parties want to resolve the dispute; if not, then perhaps no amount of preventive 
Policy will halt impending violence (Wallensteen 2002: 277). These problems do not 
undermine conflict preventive efforts, but make policy choices and the prediction of 
policy outcomes a complex undertaking. 
2.3.4 Problems with prevention: competing assumptions about causation 
Conflict prevention policy has to be based on assumptions about the causes of war 
and the conditions for peace. False interpretation of the causes of conflict can lead to 
ineffective conflict prevention policies. While there seems to be a vague consensus 
that poverty, lack of resources, and problems of governance and political legitimacy 
lead to instability (Smith, D. 2001; Levy 2001; Wallensteen 2002), there is much 
debate about how much these difficulties contribute to the outbreak of conflict, and 
how they should be tackled. So while a general consensus on the desirability of 
preventing violent conflict exists, there is a lack of consensus on the conditions that 
cause this conflict (Dwan 2001: 9; Levy 2001: 56). This makes the application of 
structural conj7ict prevention difficult to qualify and motivate. 
Identifying root causes is therefore highly normative, and it is in this policy-making 
stage that the international consensus on conflict prevention begins to show cracks. 
While there is a wide belief in the notion of democratic peace, this is largely a 
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-Western norm, Conflicts over governance and political legitimacy can certainly be 
felieved by the strengthening of democratic institutions. However, for the purposes of 
conflict prevention, a lack of democracy, or equally, human rights violations, are not 
conflict indicators in authoritarian states where such things are common place 
(Wallensteen 2002: 278). The problems in establishing links between poverty, politics 
and conflict have already been mentioned. Indicators for structural conflict prevention 
ihat are too general only have limited effect. By the turn of the twenty-first century, 
ihe UN and the EU were adopting regional and country-specific strategies in order to 
improve their response to complex root causes of conflict (see chapters 5 and 6). 
Long-term conflict preventive approaches are closely linked to development policy. 
The extent to which this type of policy tackles root causes of conflict is again highly 
debatable (Stokke 1997; Addison 2000; Wallensteen 2002). The linkage between 
development and security is a post-Cold War phenomenon that remains relatively 
underdeveloped (Barth Eide and Ronnfeldt 1998: 153). Political conditionality in 
terms of democratic practice and human rights is now common in EU trade and aid 
policies, and can do much to encourage stability in developing or transitional 
countries. However, this can be paradoxical in effect. Countries in the most need of 
help, for instance, fail to receive EU and other financial help because their 
governments don't meet the stringent conditions on democracy and human rights 
(Stedman 1995: 19). 
Economic conditionality is equally questionable in the promotion of longer-term 
stability. There is no guarantee that the enforcement of neo-liberal ideals (i. e. the free 
market, and economic development divorced from state control) by international 
organisations and financial institutions will promote stability and peace in developing 
countries (Dickson 2000; Thomas and Reader 2001; Sens 2004: 147). This leaves 
international organisations and governments open to the charge of projecting Western 
Models sanctioned by international financial institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, rather than projecting stability (Stiglitz 
2002). 
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ý. 3.5 Problems with prevention: the ethics of intervention 
Problems of legitimacy and the ethics of intervention remain a stumbling block for the 
promotion of conflict prevention, particularly in intra-state conflict. The interpretation 
M Of sovereignty became the "key normative challenge of the 1990s" ( acFarlane 2002: 
5 1). In what circumstances is it legitimate for the UN or other actors to intervene in 
the internal affairs of a state to prevent conflict? The norms of sovereignty and non- 
interference may have been questioned by analysts and politicians in Europe and the 
US in cases of human rights abuses in particular, but they are guarded by governments 
and enshrined in the UN Charter. Developing countries such as India, Pakistan, 
Algeria and Egypt are suspicious of the principle of prevention, seeing it as an excuse 
'for external interference (Griffin 2001: 486). Similarly, some third world countries 
equate short-term preventive diplomacy with Western intervention (Swedish Institute 
of International Affairs 2000: 23). The legitimacy of intervention, whether structural 
in the form of conditional development aid, or direct in the form of civilian or military 
intervention, is a fundamental problem for conflict prevention. 
During the Cold War, the UN's room to intervene was limited, and when it did 
intervene in a preventive capacity, it was generally invited. Of course, intervention 
was used by both superpowers to enhance their strategic positions, and they were not 
significantly held back by normative considerations (MacFarlance 2002: 45). Post- 
Cold War intervention changed in form and content - unilateralism gave way (to some 
extent) to multilateraliSM15 , raising the 
legitimacy stakes (MacFarlane 2002: 5 1) and 
heralding a period of new interventionism (Mayall 1996: 3). Motives and outcomes in 
post-Cold War interventions have been increasingly scrutinised and called into 
question. The military intervention in Kosovo by NATO in 1999 was not only 
criticised for triggering the humanitarian disaster it claimed to be preventing, but has 
been labelled as the beginning of a Western trend of neo-imperialistic disregard of 
international law (Chomsky 1999: 11). The selective nature of this trend is morally 
questionable. The rise of a new principle of acceptable limited intervention has been 
suggested in light of the Kosovo crisis in particular (Ortega 2001: 29). While strict 
15 MacFarlane (2002) argues that the early post-Cold War trend in multilateralism may give way to a 
new trend of US unilateralism if the US administration fails to get multilateralist authorisation for 
interventions under the 'War on Terror' rubric (MacFarlane 2002: 83). 
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conditions, such as a humanitarian catastrophe and the exhaustion of diplomatic 
efforts must be met before collective military intervention is acceptable, the emerging 
Principle presents a wide interpretation of the UN Charter that does not contradict its 
tenets (Ortega 2001). Ortega's suggestions were echoed in the conclusions of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. In 2000, in the wake 
of the unauthorised intervention in Kosovo by NATO, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan called for the international community to forge a consensus on the right of 
humanitarian intervention, and an international commission duly reported its findings 
in a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect in December 2001. The Committee 
concluded that "state sovereignty implies responsibility" and that the international 
community should have the right of humanitarian intervention "where a population is 
suffering serious harm" (The Responsibility to Protect, UN 2001b: IX). However, 
clearly states are reluctant to curtail their options by establishing unambiguous ru les 
on intervention. Despite the Committee's clear consensus and recommendations, 
j many UN member states would prefer its conclusions to be quietly buried; indeed, the 4 
;j recent interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 show the continued lack 
I -, - 
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of international consensus. They also weaken the case for conflict prevention 
interventions by associating them with unsanctioned pre-emption. 
The decision to intervene is fraught with ethical difficulties. Initially, it could be 
unethical to intervene too early, and therefore prevent necessary change, or equally 
unethical to intervene too late, allowing for the escalation of violence and the loss of 
civilian life (Wallensteen 2002: 279). In deciding to intervene, there is always a moral 
question to ask, and there will always be those who disagree with the action taken or 
1- 
question the final consequences (Wallensteen 2002: 279). Post-Cold War 
interventions to nrevent or manaize violent conflict have been haMDered bv moblems 
16 of impartiality. Neutrality is crucial if outside intervention is to help create a viable 
Peace. Yet this can be particularly difficult for outside parties to maintain or achieve 
in internal war situations, and international organisations can be open to the charge of 
favouring one group over another (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 146). 
16 See Ali (2000) (ed. ) for a critique of the 1999 NATO Kosovo intervention, for example. 
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The consequences of intervention in violent conflict can be unpredictable. While 
outside actors may be able to stop the violence, the long-term viability of 
internationally imposed peace is dubious. Even after a cease-fire or peace agreement, 
unless international intervention addresses the underlying causes of conflict, violent 
conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, as well as in Chechnya can be said to have 
been suspended rather than ended (Smith, D. 2001: 3). Peacebuilding projects have 
continued in Bosnia since the internationally-brokered 1995 Dayton Peace 
Agreement, but outside assistance has failed to lead to a significant reconstruction of 
community relations between the divided groups (Chandler 1999). In Kosovo, conflict 
between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serb population will simmer until the roots of 
the conflict (the political status of the province) is adequately addressed. Clearly 
peace cannot be imposed from outside: its maintenance "has to be primarily the task 
of former adversaries supported by external assistance" (Jeong 2003: 3 01). 17 
International organisations, like the EU in the context of the Cotonou Agreement with 
the ACP countries, 18 have increasingly recognised this. In a phrase borrowed from the 
informal diplomacy practiced by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) ('track-two 
diplomacy'), the 'ownership' principle, stating that peace is the ultimate responsibility 
of the community itself, is stressed when promoting conflict prevention or 
peacebuilding. Nevertheless, the trade policy that is often at the heart of projects 
sponsored by the EU, the World Bank and the IMF undermines the ownership 
principle by removing national and local government control over social and 
economic policy. Enforced rapid privatisation and trade liberalisation in developing 
countries, for example, can result in a dearth of previously government-administered 
services and greater poverty and unemployment (Stiglitz 2002: 55). Again, the ethics 
of such practice reflects a gap between rhetoric and the true ramifications of policy. 
These examples serve to illustrate the lack of international consensus on how conflict 
prevention should be carried out (Griffin 2001; UN 2001). The UN Secretary-General, 
Kofi Annan in his Report Prevention ofArmed Conflict (UN 2001) reported that while 
the majority of UN Security Council members expressed overall support for conflict 
17 Emphasis added. 18 The 2000 Cotonou Agreement replaced the EU-ACP preferential trade agreement known as the 
Lom6 Convention. In the new agreement, "the principle of trade liberalization has effectively replaced 
that of non-reciprocal privileged access... [signaling]... a paradigmatic shift in the focus and direction 
of EU-ACP relations" (Holland 2002: 219). 
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prevention, most had different views about the priorities for action. There is little 
indication that these opinions have changed in recent years. UN member states' views 
on conflict prevention did not feature prominently in the 2004 Report of the High- 
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A more secure world., our shared 
responsibilities), although the states' 'responsibility to protect' was cited as an 
" emerging norm" which, if reneged, justifies UN intervention to prevent intra-state 
violence (UN 2004: 57). Despite evidence of shifting norms pertaining to 
intervention, the vague nature of the consensus on conflict prevention still hides the 
varied views on international norms and priorities, and hampers practical policy 
application (Dwan 200 1: 10). Paradoxically, consensus can be seen as a liability as 
well as a strength for conflict prevention (Dwan 2000: 9). All actors trying to carry 
out conflict prevention policy planning and application face these problems. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined conflict prevention in contemporary perspective, 
identifying the prevention of superpower conflict and conflict prevention by the UN 
as key Cold War precursors to post-Cold War conflict prevention. Reaction against 
the superpower nuclear confrontation and associated management strategies 
contributed to the emergence of conflict prevention theory in the Peace Research and 
Conflict Resolution fields, and these ideas gained credence as public opinion in 
Europe and America increasingly turned against the policies of nuclear deterrence and 
crisis management pursued by the superpowers. Developments in Peace and Conflict 
Research laid the foundations for an expansion of interest in conflict prevention in the 
post-Cold War era. The UN and its Secretary-Generals pioneered conflict prevention, 
in the guise of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, as a policy of multilateral 
intervention. Both concepts were firmly established as UN competences during the 
Cold War period, enabling their further development as conflict prevention strategies 
in the post-Cold War years. 
The problems associated with the implementation of post-Cold War conflict 
prevention were then outlined. The upheavals of the early post-Cold War period 
brought complex conflicts back onto the European continent. Conflict prevention 
emerged as an approach to violent conflict in the new climate of cooperation, but 
debates about the changing nature of conflict, trends in intra-state conflict, regional 
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complexity and arms proliferation, were to render post-Cold War conflicts difficult to 
prevent. Definitional difficulties did not help to make conflict prevention an 
identifiable and applicable policy. Additionally, gaining acceptance for a policy with 
inherent difficulties of policy prediction, actor motivation, legitimacy, and 
demonstrating policy success was to be a challenge for the EU and other actors. Yet 
the EU's place in the emerging security environment of the post-Cold War period (see 
chapter 4) would accelerate the organisation's policy responses, conflict prevention in 
particular, onto center stage. 
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CHAPTER3 
The External Relations of the European Union 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter charts the origins and development of European Union (EU) external 
felations from the beginning of the European integration project in the 1950s, to the 
4evelopment of external relations policy and rudimentary foreign policy with 
F-uropean Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s and 1980s, and finally to the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) in the 1990s. European Union foreign policy is a post-Cold War 
phenomenon, but has a legacy of at least two decades in the CFSP's precursor, EPC. 
From the early 1970s, the EU practiced diplomacy and gained an international voice 
through Member State foreign policy cooperation. In terms of development policy, 
EU trade and aid relations with third countries date back to the beginning of the 
Union, and originate in EU Member State relations with former colonies. 
Jn order to understand the context of post-Cold War EU conflict prevention, we 
therefore examine the history and development of EU external relations, focusing in 
particular on the EUs early aptitude for external stability projection through EPC and 
development policy. The problem of EU external relations coherence and 
coordination, identified as a particular issue for EU conflict prevention because of its 
cross-pillar nature, is introduced and explained in terms of the incremental 
development of EU external relations responsibilities and the different procedures and 
divisions between the two main EU institutions: the European Commission and the 
Council of the EU. 
3.2 The Origins of EU External Relations 
3.2.1 The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSQ, the precursor to today's European 
Union, was one of a number of regional and international institutions established after 
the end of the Second World War in response to the growing complexities of 
twentieth century government (Robertson 1973: 1). The ECSC was born out of the 
need for institutionalised relations between European states to allow for post-war 
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economic construction. Post-war plans for a united and peaceful Europe promoted by 
the European movement, (a disparate collection of individuals and groups that 
supported the idea of European unity (Dinan 1994: 11)) led initially to the creation of 
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1947 to administer 
US-donated Marshall Plan aid, and the Council of Europe in 1949, an 
intergovernmental forum that fell short of the mark for supporters of a federal Europe 
(Smith, H. 2002: 39; Nugent 1999: 13). 
The impetus for more substantial European integration came from France - arguably 
the country most at risk from the prospect of unfettered German economic and 
military revival. French politicians and diplomats Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman 
were the central figures in the planning of the ECSC, ratified in 1952. The signatories 
(France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg) established a supranational High Authority, with Monnet as president. 
Monnet's insistence on shared sovereignty proved to be the stumbling block for 
British participation, but made the organisation the unique and sometimes 
controversial body its successor still is today. 
The increasingly clear division between Western and Eastern Europe as the Cold War 
bi-polar system took shape provided a further impetus for Western European 
economic integration (Dinan 1994: 16). However, Cold War Europe had developed, by 
the mid-1950s, not only a geographical division, but a separation between economic 
and defence/foreign policy - the latter being overseen by the United States in the West 
and the USSR in the East (Smith, H. 2002: 39). While both Schuman and Monnet saw 
economic cooperation as just the beginning of the European project, further plans for 
Political cooperation were stifled by the international climate and by the real 
disagreements between the Member States over the pace and form of integration 
(Nugent 1999: 21). Plans for a European Defence Community and a European 
Political Community foundered in the 1950s, but proposals to expand the remit of the 
ECSC were accepted by the six original signatories, leading to the creation of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in 1957. These institutions ran in parallel until 1967 when a merger Treaty 
came into effect. After this, the organisation was generally known as the European 
Community (EQ, and eventually the EU. 
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The institutional skeleton of the current EU was put in place, with a Commission, 
'Council of Ministers, a Court of Justice and a small (as yet unelected) parliamentary 
assembly. The agreement to create a common market, with the removal of internal 
trade restrictions, a common external tariff, and dialogue on a common agriculture 
and transport policy, became the focus of European integration. 
3.2.2 The origins of development policy 
International institutional initiatives in development policy are a post- 1945 
phenomena, generally associated with the United Nations system (Luard 1977: 240). 
The EU, however, is a major contributor of development aid, and this legacy dates 
back to the origins of the Union. 
Economic integration in Western Europe had external implications for third countries, 
particularly those that had colonial ties to ECSC/EC Member States (generally known 
as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries). As a result, associate status 
for overseas dependencies, (on the insistence of the French government) was granted 
in the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC (Holland 2002: 26; Smith, H. 2002: 
183). This special relationship brought dependencies under the same economic rules 
as EEC Member States, discriminating against other developing countries, and 
creating a special EEC assistance fund, the European Development Fund (EDF) (Feld 
1983: 105; Holland 2002: 26). The rules were reviewed in the 1960s as dependencies 
began to achieve independence, leading to the first of many conventions (Yaound6 
Conventions, later the Lom6 conventions and now the Cotonou agreement) governing 
the relationship between the EEC and the former colonies (Holland 2002: 27). The 
privileges were extended to include ex-colonies and overseas territories of new EEC 
Member States - notably those connected to the United Kingdom after the first 
enlargement in 1973. Development cooperation was gradually extended to non- 
associated developing countries, with Asia and Latin America receiving assistance 
from 1976 (Smith, H. 2002: 207; 218). 
Until the end of the Cold War, EU connections with developing countries were 
generally confined to trade and development issues, and primarily the remit of the 
European Commission (Smith, H. 2002: 22 1). Security issues in developing regions, 
apart from the few incidences of EPC engagement (see below), came to the fore in the 
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post-Cold War period as the EU expanded its international vision. Development 
cooperation was increasingly politicised by being linked to CFSP objectives, and 
featuring political conditionality clauses. From the origins of EU development 
cooperation, to today's advanced EU development and humanitarian provisions, the 
EU has been subject to criticism both for perpetuating colonial dependency and for 
not achieving stated development objectives (Holland 2002: 27; Smith, H. 2002: 195). 
However, the EUs role in development cooperation was to form a key element of its 
post-Cold War conflict prevention policy. 
3.2.3 European Political Cooperation 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established with the Luxembourg Report 
of 1970, but has its origins in decades of debate about the form, function and 
, advantages of creating a European political community (Nuttall 1992: 30) 
Initiatives during the 1950s and 1960s to create a European Defence Community and 
European Political Community stumbled, firstly because the French Assembly failed 
to ratify them, and then secondly because President de Gaulle opposed any further 
suPranational integration (Allen and Wallace 1982: 22). His attempt to instigate 
regular meetings of Foreign Ministers raised fears among other EEC members that 
national cooperation would undermine the Community and jeopardise the NATO 
alliance (Allen and Wallace 1982: 22-23). Defence issues were therefore to remain 
predominantly the domain of NATO, established in 1949, and the Western European 
Union (WEU), an organisation of states that had signed the Brussels Pact in 1948 
(UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), an alliance against 
Germany. Established in 1955, the WEU incorporated a mutual defence agreement 
and prepared the ground for wider discussions on defence cooperation. 
The breakthrough for political cooperation was to come after President de Gaulle 
stepped down as French President in 1969. By this time, the EEC was under 
increasing pressure to act politically as well as economically. De Gaulle's successor, 
Pompidou, adopted a more flexible approach which allowed for progress in political 
cooperation and the accession of the UK to the EEC, blocked by de Gaulle on two 
previous occasions (Nuttall 1992: 47). Decisions made by Member States at a 
conference in The Hague in 1969 were confirmed in the 1970 Luxembourg Report, 
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which established European Political Cooperation (EPC). EPC was to entail regular 
intergovernmental contact and dialogue between Foreign Ministers of the Member 
States; it remained divorced from the Community both to satisfy the French 
- requirement for intergovernmentalism, and to allay the Dutch fear that 
institutionalisation of Heads of Government meetings would undermine Community 
institutions (Nuttall 1992: 48). The officials from Member State foreign ministries 
that drafted the report became the Political Committee, the main EPC body, meeting 
four times a year initially to prepare the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. The bi- 
annual Ministerial Meetings were to be chaired by the Foreign Minister of the state 
holding the Presidency of the Community (Nuttall 1992: 54). The Copenhagen Report 
of 1973 allowed the Political Committee to meet as often as was necessary, and 
formalised the role of Working Groups in the elaboration of EPC (Nuttall 1992: 76). 
The London Report of 1981 further extended EPC by outlining the 'Troika' 
procedure, (by which the Presidency would be assisted in political cooperation duties 
by officials from the preceding and succeeding presidencies), by creating a crisis 
procedure to allow the Political Committee to convene within 48 hours, and by finally 
fully associating the European Commission with EPC procedures (Nuttall 1992: 179- 
180). The Single European Act of 1986 brought EPC into the same legal and 
institutional framework as the EC, "paving the way ultimately to a single Treaty [the 
TEU]" (Nuttall 1992: 248). By this time, EPC had more than 20 Working Groups and 
was establishing a dedicated Secretariat (Nuttall 1992: 17). Institutional proliferation 
and Complexity established EPC as a unique type of intergovernmental process before 
the inauguration of the CFSP (Bonvicini 1988: 52). Its development is doubly 
significant since the TEU did not fundamentally change the form and character of 
political cooperation. 
As Nuttall contends, the association of EPC with the Community framework was not 
a foregone conclusion in the negotiations running up to the SEA (1992: 248). 
However, the acceptance that the EC and the EPC were part of the same project did 
not lead to a rationalisation of external relations procedures. Synergy may have been 
increasingly sought between economic and political policy, but parallel procedures 
made this a complex task, especially since Member States were reluctant for 
Community involvement in EPC for different reasons (either because they feared 
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-_ supranational contamination of EPC, orintergovernmental contamination of the 
Community) (Nuttall 1992: 260). 
3.2.4 EPC: an aptitude for preventive diplomacy? 
EPC in the 1970s gave the EC a voice in international affairs when Member States 
could agree, and, by the 1980s was practicing "quiet, long-term, preventive 
diplomacy" in the context of East-West relations, the Middle East and Southern 
Europe (Hill 1992: 136). EPC was better known for reacting to situations and crises as 
they happened (Allen 1982: 69). However, longer-term considerations were 
increasingly prominent as EPC decisions became more closely linked to Community 
competences. EC economic clout was more and more employed in support of EPC 
decisions (e. g. sanctions), and the economic implications of foreign policy decisions 
were recognised (Bovinici 1988: 62). 
Political cooperation in the early 1970s focused on issues with a direct impact on 
Western Europe: the Middle East and the development of the Conference for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Nuttall 1992: 56). The CSCE process reflected a 
More cooperative turn in East-West European relations in the climate of d6tente, 
especially in tandem with the West German government's policy of recognition and 
reconciliation towards East Germany. The pan-European conference gave EC 
Member States the opportunity, through EPC, to develop a collective European 
Position outside the Atlantic Alliance (Nuttall 1992: 57). The scope of the CSCE 
negotiations, inclusive of economics, science, technology and the environment, 
required the involvement of the Community, and therefore early contact and a degree 
of coordination between the parallel EPC-Community procedures (Von Groll 1982: 
61). Close cooperation between Member States not only advanced the cause and 
procedures of EPC, but led to a leadership role for the EC in the CSCE which 
enhanced its international status, and which tested inter-pillar coordination and 
coherence (see below) (Von Groll 1982: 68). EC coordinated initiatives to establish a 
cooperative relationship between Eastern and Western Europe, through the CSCE 
process and other initiatives, can arguably be seen as preventive diplomacy, and a 
forerunner of the conflict prevention role that the EU was to adopt in the 1990s. 
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The EC, through EPC, established dialogue with the group of Arab States in the 
Middle East known as the 'Arab League' in 1973-74 ('Euro-Arab Dialogue). 
Dialogue with the EC was sought by the Arab League in the aftermath of the Yom 
Kippur war (during which Egypt and Syria tried, and failed to regain territory 
occupied by Israel) and the oil-producing states' subsequent oil embargo and massive 
price increase aimed at states supporting Israel (Allen 1982: 69). EC Member States' 
views on the Middle East were traditionally divergent, and, in 1973 complicated by 
- _- 
the different treatment they received from the oil-producing states (the UK and France 
were unaffected, some states had their oil supply reduced, and the Netherlands, like 
the US, suffered a total oil embargo) (Allen 1982: 70; Nuttall 1992: 94). Controversy 
over the oil crisis, conflict in the Middle East, and the US negative reaction to EPC 
negotiation with the Arab League (as well as continued Member State disagreements) 
'meant that these issues were ruled out by Member States as topics for discussion in 
EC-Arab League dialogue (Allen 1982: 72). While discussion was narrow in scope, 
this situation opened the door for the involvement of the European Commission in the 
dialogue, thereby facilitating EPC-Community cooperation (Allen 1982: 74). EC 
to develop a political role in the Middle East continued to falter under US and 
(Smith, H. 2002: 168), and this 'Israeli resistance and Member State divergences 
situation did not change fundamentally in the post-Cold War era. 
EPC was generally reactive to crises in Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain and Greece) 
in the first half of the 1970s, but extended aid to post-revolutionary Portugal to help 
promote democracy and made diplomatic d6marches to Cyprus to encourage a 
political settlement between Greece and Turkey (Van Praag 1982). It gained valuable 
experience in traditional diplomacy during these crises, generally regarded as an 
'guninstitutionalised' environment when compared to EPC progress in the context of 
the CSCE, the UN, or Euro-Arab dialogue (Van Praag 1982: 104). Additionally, 
enlargement to Spain, Portugal and Greece in the 1980s had a conflict prevention 
'dimension that foreshadowed the EU's post-Cold War relationship with the 
transitional states in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Chris Hill recognised the EC's conflict prevention potential when he argued that "its 
comparative advantage is in the long-term effort to change the environments out of 
which crises tend to spring - so as to inoculate against them" (1992: 146). However, 
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the EU's potential in conflict prevention was constrained by the Cold War system, 
and by a lack of shared external relations objectives by the Member States. The EC 
struggled to emerge from the shadow of US diplomacy, and its actions were inhibited 
by attempts to draw dividing lines between the political and economic spheres. 
Furthermore, European defence cooperation was inhibited by disagreements between 
Member States and by a fear that it could damage the Atlantic Alliance, and the US 
security guarantee it signified. Nevertheless, the EC did develop a second, distinctive 
Western voice that did not always agree with the US (Hill 1992). EPC established a 
foothold for the EC in foreign policy, and also demonstrated its potential for 
projecting stability beyond its borders. 
3.3 The Post-Cold War European Union: External Relations Procedures and 
Institutions 
3.3.1 Treaty reforms: From EPC to CFSP 
EPC was legally codified in the SEA of 1986, although not incorporated into the EC 
treaty (Nugent 1999: 50). The SEA aimed to create a European Union, an objective 
that was the result of years of debates and initiatives throughout the 1980s (Smith, H. 
2002: 85). The issue of consistency between EPC and the Community was formally 
recognised, but was to remain a fundamental problem (see below) (Smith, H. 2002: 
92). By 1989-1990, the EC's drive to create an economic and monetary union was 
affected by the dramatic international events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
and Member States therefore convened a parallel intergoverninental conference (IGC) 
on political union (Nugent 1999: 6 1). The result was the declaration of a 'common 
foreign and security policy', which superseded EPC and was brought into the single 
institutional framework in the 1991/2 Treaty on European Union (TEU; signed in 
February 1992 and coming into force in November 1993). 
The TEU created a European Union of three 'pillars', although the structure of the EU 
was not referred to like this officially (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 15). The new 
Treaty incorporated the European Community (pillar one), the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (pillar two) and Justice and Home Affairs (pillar three). While 
Member State governments could largely agree on bringing foreign policy and 
cooperation injustice and home affairs within the ambit of EU responsibilities, they 
could not agree on relinquishing these policy areas to the 'Community' method of 
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policy-making and implementation, which gives considerable power to the European 
Commission and does not rely on unanimity among Member States at Council level. 
The pillar system was therefore established as a compromise, which allowed Member 
States to cooperate, but remain in national control of the development of the CFSP 
and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Holland 1997: 1). The CFSP did 
not include any legal instruments, and was not subject to rulings by the European 
Court of Justice. Community decision-making bodies are the European Commission, 
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Decision-making in the CFSP 
and JHA pillars is carried out by the Council of Ministers and Member States, with 
the Commission and European Parliament playing lesser roles. 
Community external relations underwent revision in light of the increased demand for 
EU development and humanitarian aid. The legal basis and objectives of development 
cooperation were fully outlined for the first time in the TEU. Community policy was 
to foster sustainable economic and social development, integrate developing countries 
into the world economy, and tackle poverty (TEU, Title II, Article 130u). The fall of 
the Berlin wall was to have a significant consequence for EU development 
cooperation: EU financial assistance was increasingly diverted from the South to the 
East (Holland 2002: 9). Political conditionality increasingly featured in EU trade and 
aid agreements (see chapter 5). Humanitarian aid was not explicitly mentioned in EU 
treaties, but had been a feature of EU external relations under the development banner 
since the 1960s. It underwent reform and centralisation in 1992 with the creation of 
the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and the Union's 
humanitarian objectives were finally fully outlined in a 1996 Council Regulation 
(1257/96). 
The machinery of CFSP incorporated existing EPC structures (meetings of Foreign 
Ministers and Political Committee; working groups and secretariat), but also included 
some new procedures. Member States could agree on a 'common position', which 
specifies Union objectives, and with which national positions should conform. They 
could also adopt a 'joint action' in the CFSP field, agreeing on a certain course of 
action, from which Member States could opt out (Smith, K. 2004: 10). 
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As critics of the CFSP pointed out during the 1990s, the common element of the 
policy was misleading (Rosecrance 1998: 15). It was, at any rate, over-optimistic: the 
EU did not have a single common foreign policy (the CFSP sits alongside Member 
State national foreign policies), and neither was there enough common ground 
between Member States to plan or implement a coherent policy (Holland 1997: 5; 
Rummel and Wiedemann 1998: 53). Analysts identified a gap between the 
expectations of CFSP and its actual capabilities (Hill 1993), particularly in the case of 
--ý EU disarray during the crises in Former Yugoslavia in 1991, and during the 
subsequent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. The EU was too hasty in proclaiming its 
ability to deal with the complex succession crises in Slovenia and Croatia before the 
CFSP reforms of the TEU were even in place, and suffered a blow to its reputation as 
its diplomacy failed, violent conflict erupted, and EU institutions and decision-making 
creaked under the pressure (Peterson 1998: 6). Nevertheless, early optimism was 
tempered by experience, and expectations, both within and outside the EU, became 
more realistic about what the EU could achieve in foreign policy (Hill 1998: 3 1). The 
conflict in Former Yugoslavia was to influence the CFSP reforms in the 1997 Treaty 
of Amsterdam, with an emphasis on operational capacities, coherent foreign policy 
representation, and planning and analysis competences. 
The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (ratified in 1999) revised the TEU to iron out some 
institutional difficulties, including problems with planning and implementing the 
CFSP. The Treaty was widely regarded as a disappointing result after the long-winded 
IGC negotiations; it lacked the necessary focus on institutional reforms needed for 
enlargement (Cameron 1999: 68; Nugent 1999: 81). However, progress was made in 
the CFSP area, with qualified majority voting (QMV) being extended to the CFSP 
(albeit with caveats to allow for Member States to block decision-making by QMV, 
and to abstain) (Nugent 1999: 85-86). Furthermore, the post of High Representative 
for CFSP was created within the Council of the EU to assist the Presidency in all 
CFSP matters (the post-holder would also be the Secretary-General of the Council). 
The High Representative was also tasked with heading the new Policy Planning and 
Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) in the Council Secretariat, a small team of staff 
charged with monitoring and assessing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP, 
providing early warning of potential crises and producing policy options for the 
Council (Declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning 
44 
unit' Treaty ofAmsterdam 1997). The Union's operational tasks were outlined by 
referring to the WEU's 'Petersberg Tasks', including "humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking" (Article J. 7 (2), Treaty ofAmsterdam 1997). The Member States were 
divided over the proposed incorporation of the WEU into the EU, and therefore the 
WEU remained the arena for defence cooperation until the breakthrough in 1998 
when the new UK Labour government agreed to pursue crisis management tasks 
under EU auspices. Finally, the treaty dealt with CFSP financing by charging CFSP 
expenditure (apart from operations with military or defence implications) to the EC 
budget. 
CFSP refonn was not on the agenda of the 2000 Nice Treaty (ratified in 2003), 
although the failure to fully address the institutional issues arising from the impending 
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe were to have serious repercussions for the 
Union. At the Laeken European Council of December 2001, Member States agreed to 
convene the 'Convention on the Future of Europe, ' appointing Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing as chairman. The Convention was designed to facilitate a more open 
discussion on institutional reform and the future shape of the EU than was usual in 
IGCs. The resulting Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe of 2003 was 
finally agreed by Member State heads of government after more negotiations towards 
the end of 2004, but faces an uncertain future because of ratification problems in a 
number of Member States. The Treaty includes some important CFSP reforms that 
address lingering problems of coordination and coherency - notably the role of 
European Foreign Minister, a post bringing together the responsibilities of High 
Representative for CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations in order to 
improve external relations coherency. As Jolyon Howorth has pointed out, this post is 
the "first time in the history of the European project that the supranational and the 
intergovernmental functions have been merged in a single individual" (Howorth 2004: 
502). Whether this would result in Council consolidation of power over the 
Commission, greater Community input into the CFSP, or a more equal institutional 
partnership, remains to be seen, as does the future of the Treaty itself. The post 
certainly has the capacity to increase inter-pillar and inter-institutional external 
relations coordination (see chapter 5). 
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At any rate, CFSP reforms during the 1990s did consolidate the Council's domination 
of the foreign policy field, while the Commission's external reach remained 
unmatched by institutional influence in foreign affairs. The incremental development 
of EU external relations resulted in a complex institutional set-up, with external duties 
being partly the responsibility of the European Commission through its development 
and trade policies, and partly the responsibility of the Council of the EU. The roles of 
the key institutions in external relations (the European Commission, the Council of 
the EU and the European Parliament) are outlined below. 
3.3.2 The European Commission's role in external relations 
The Commission's underdeveloped role in foreign policy does not reflect its powerful 
role in the EU as a whole. The institution is at the centre of EU policy initiation and 
development (Nugent 1999). It is responsible for initiating policy exclusively for 
matters under EC jurisdiction, and jointly with Member States with policy under the 
intergovernmental pillars two and three (CFSP and JHA). The Commission is then 
responsible for overseeing the implementation of policy after decisions are made by 
the Council of Ministers. The institution has a hierarchical structure, with 
Commissioners at the top (led by the President), supported by personal cabinets, 
responsible for twenty-six policy-specific Directorates-General (DGs) and nine 
services, which in turn are divided into directorates and directorates into units. 19 With 
its powers largely concentrated in the economic sphere, the Commission was 
traditionally not associated with foreign policy. However, a strict division of policy 
responsibilities became increasingly difficult to maintain in contemporary times. 
Indeed, the European Commission's range of external responsibilities has expanded 
since the end of the Cold War. This reflects the increasing politicisation of the EU in 
the aftermath of the Cold War, as it had to respond to the changing political situation 
in Europe, and also a recognition of the interconnectedness of economic and political 
policies. In a security context where economic, enviromnental, social and political 
upheavals were viewed as threats to the stability of the EU, it became imperative to 
expand the scope of Commission activity. Economic policy was increasingly 
recognised as being a crucial facet of a comprehensive, joined-up foreign policy. 
19 European Conunission website, 
hjjp: //wAw. euroj2a. eu. int/co im/atwork/basicfacts/index en. htm#structured. Accessed 27/07/05. 
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Moreover, the Commission's role in coordinating Western aid to the fonner Soviet 
countries, and subsequently negotiating association and accession agreements, gave 
the institution a key role in enlargement and the politics of the new Europe. This was 
not matched by a strong politico-security role, however. It was the US that dealt with 
the problems of the legacy of nuclear weapons in the Baltic states after the break up of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. 
The gradual extension of Commission responsibilities has not taken place without a 
considerable amount of resentment from Member States, and institutional in-fighting. 
The Commission is meant to stand for general EU interests rather than Member State 
interests, and as such represents a supranationalist agenda that often sits uneasily with 
national interests. Foreign policy is closely linked to national identities and issues of 
Member State sovereignty. The pooling of foreign policy decision-making at 
European level was always going to hit a brick wall of Member State recalcitrance 
and fear of supranationalism. The inauguration of foreign policy cooperation, as we 
have seen, was a reaction to the drive for internal integration and to international 
developments - d6tente as well as decolonisation, and political developments in the 
Mediterranean (Regelsberger 1988). These events were to have ramifications for the 
European Community that the Commission could not easily be divorced from; for 
example, the special relationship with former colonial countries and enlargement 
negotiations with Greece, Spain and Portugal. Nevertheless, despite the Commission's 
role in external economic affairs and the role of Commission delegations in third 
countries, the Commission was kept at arms length, being "more than an 
observer ... but less than a full participant" (Nuttall 1988: 104). 
The Commission wasfully associated with the CFSP in the TEU. A Commission 
representative attends Council meetings at all levels, with increasing involvement 
commensurate with the creation of new structures for CFSP/ESDP since the late 
1990s. While the Commission does not have the monopoly on policy proposals as in 
pillar one, it could now make foreign policy proposals like a Member State (although 
it has been reluctant to employ this right because of a fear of intergovernmentalising 
the EC pillar (Ginsberg 1997: 26)). Former areas of difficulty, like sanctions policy 
(relying on Member State political decisions outside the EC framework) were 
rationalised, leading to a more joined-up external relations policy, and the opportunity 
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to present to the world a single, coordinated EU voice. The Commission's overseas 
delegations, (originally established to give technical assistance to developing 
countries under the Lom6 Convention) gave the Commission a global reach, 
increasingly not confined to the economic sphere. By 2004, there were 130 
delegations (Allen and Smith 2004: 95), playing a role in the CFSP and managing 
development assistance. Commission external responsibilities have been subject to 
continual reorganisation in the 1990s, spread over 4 directorate generals - external 
relations (CFSP and non-ACP development), development (ACP development and 
ECHO), enlargement and trade (see Figure 3.1). This reflects an a lack of consensus 
on the best way to organise Commission external relations responsibilities (Nugent 
and Saurugger 2002: 348). 
Figure 3.1: European Commission: External Affairs Directorates-General 1999-2004 
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The European Parliament (EP), originating in the Assembly of the ECSC, and directly 
elected by European citizens since 1979, has a limited role in the mechanics of EU 
foreign policy. However, it has, since the Amsterdam reforms, joint control over the 
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CFSP budget with the Council. It has the right to be consulted and informed, and can 
influence policy in the early stages of its formation. The EU Presidency is tasked with 
presenting a report to the Parliament on EU foreign policy, and Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) can put questions to the Presidency on a monthly basis 
(Smith, H. 2002: 111). The Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Committee has 
been influential in its lobbying of the Council of the EU and the European 
Commission on foreign policy and external relations issues, and was instrumental in 
the initiative to set up the 1997 Conflict Prevention Network (CPN). In 1999, drawing 
on a report from the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), the EP 
recommended that the Council of the EU conduct a feasibility study on the 
establishment of an EU Civil Peace Corps, to carry out conflict prevention tasks in 
cooperation with NGOs (European Parliament 2000a). As yet, the proposal for an 
integrated civilian force has not been taken up by EU Presidencies. The EU is still 
developing civilian crisis management competences based on pledged contributions 
from Member States. 
While the European Parliament's input into the CFSP is limited, it has been a vocal 
critic of the CFSP's lack of democratic accountability and the CFSP pillar structure 
(Monar 1997: 40). In 2001, a European Parliament Briefing Note 20 (Instruments of 
Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management Available to the European 
Union) concluded that the EU should "shift its focus from crisis management to 
conflict prevention, including structural preventive measures", and work closely with 
NGOs and other regional and international organisations in order to make an effective 
contribution to conflict prevention (European Parliament 2001: 12). A number of 
MEPs have contributed to the debate on EU conflict prevention. 21 The Parliament's 
role as watchdog on the development of ESDP, however, continues to be constrained 
by limited access to sensitive ESDP documents (see Tappert 2003b). 
The Parliament's influence is also visible in external relations in the context of 
development policy, since this Community policy is subject to the rules of the co- 
'0 Written by an independent researcher and therefore not necessarily expressing the official view of the European Parliament. 
21 For example, German Green MEP, Elisabeth Schroedter has been a vocal commentator (see 'Kultur 
der Prdvention - Anspruch und Wirklichkeit' [Culture of Prevention - Expectation and Reality] in Wissenschaft und Frieden, February 2004. 
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decision procedure, in which the Parliament has the right to amend and veto certain 
legislative proposals (Nugent 1999). In particular, it has the right to veto EU 
association and cooperation agreements with third countries, which gives it the power 
to influence political conditionality clauses, flexing its muscles in the field of human 
rights and good governance. The Parliament has been instrumental in instigating 
debates and policy on a number of development issues, including the role of women 
in development, healthcare issues and refugees (Holland 2002: 13). 
3.3.4 The role of the Council of the EU in foreign policy 
The Council has the upper hand in external relations: it is the most powerful EU 
institution, and CFSP procedures largely rely on the unanimous decisions of Member 
States. The pillar framework brings foreign policy inside the EU, yet it remains a 
hybrid policy area, being neither entirely intergovernmental, nor subject to the rules 
and procedures of Community policy-making. As such, the Council has had to adapt 
to formally accommodate the CFSP, and ensure coordination and coherency with 
Community external relations (Galloway 1995: 211). The CFSP mirrors the nature of 
the Council: it is both an intergovernmental institution representing the interests of 
Member States, and a supranational institution with its own identity and Treaty 
provisions, increasingly taking decisions by qualified majority voting (QMV) rather 
than by unanimity (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 8). 
As the key decision-making body of the EU, the Council operates in various formats: 
0 the European Council, consisting of heads of state; 22 
9 the Council of Ministers, consisting of ministers of Member State governments; 
0 the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), consisting of national 
delegations; 
9 the Council bureaucratic arm, the General Secretariat; 
* Council working groups. 
Each has a key role in the development of the CFSP. The bi-annual European Council 
sets politico-security priorities and guidelines. Formally institutionalised since 1974, 
22 The European Council is officially a separate institution. 
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the European Council provides leadership and direction, underlining the key role of 
national governments in the institutional structure of the EU. The Council of Ministers 
consists of 9 (formerly 20) sectoral councils, with the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC; formerly General Affairs Council, GAC) being at the top 
of the hierarchy (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 11). The GAERC makes final policy 
decisions on the basis of overall objectives set by heads of state. 
The work of the GAERC is prepared by COREPER, a permanent Brussels institution 
consisting of career diplomats and officials from Member States (Westlake 1995). 
Initially seen as an intergovernmental intruder on the Community process, COREPER 
can be regarded as being instrumental in the Brusselisation of European foreign 
policy (Allen 1999: 56), since its job is to negotiate a consensus between Member 
State positions - effectively to create a workable EU stance on 
foreign policy issues 
before the Council of Ministers level. Operating as two committees since 1962, 
COREPER I is concerned with technical issues, while COREPER II prepares 
meetings of the GAERC, the second most influential sectoral council, the Economic 
and Finance Council (ECOFIN), and also the European Council (Westlake 1995). 
The General Secretariat of the Council consists of approximately 3000 staff working 
in nine Directorates-General (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 347; 354). As well as 
DGs dealing with CFSP issues, ESDP, defence and civilian crisis management, the 
General Secretariat houses the new CFSP/ESDP bodies (PPEVY'U, Situation Centre, 
Police Unit) and is headed by a Secretary-General, who is also the High 
Representative for CFSP. It is mainly responsible for preparation, record-keeping, 
processing and circulating documentation, translating, and providing legal services 
(Nugent 1999). In particular, it drafts reports of working group meetings during the 
first stage of the policy-making process (after a proposal from the Commission is 
received) (Westlake 1995). 
The Council is also served by a number of senior policy committees and working 
parties. These bodies had grown to over 400 by the time the Council first released 
details of them in 1999, but have now been reduced to around 160 (Westlake and 
Galloway 2004: 217). The growth of Council responsibilities has gradually taken 
some preparatory power away from COREPER. Specialist policy committees are 
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established by treaties or by Council decisions, and include, in the CFSP sphere, the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) as an example of the former, and the EU 
Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management (CIVCOM) as examples of the latter (Westlake and Galloway 2004: 
217). Working groups (or parties) are described as the "life blood" of the Council 
(Westlake 1995: 312). Consisting of Member State experts and a Commission 
representative, they fall at the bottom of the preparatory hierarchy, and tend to be 
standing committees of a specialist nature. They are presided over by the Presidency, 
who has an important administrative role in the policy-making process, being 
responsible for arranging and chairing all Council meetings. The office is held on a 
rotational basis by Member States for six-monthly periods, during which the 
Presidency also represents the EU abroad in CFSP matters, including the diplomatic 
troika. 
, 3.3.5 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
The European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) emerged as a central element of 
the CFSP, demonstrating the EU's will to become fully operational in (primarily) 
external crisis management. The acronym "has come to cover both a specific policy 
and a set of dedicated institutions" (Ortega 2004: 58). As Brian White has pointed out, 
the emphasis was on 'security' rather than 'defence' (White 2001: 149). The 
emergence of an autonomous EU policy was stalled by Member State disagreements, 
the ambiguous stance of the US, and the consolidation of NATO as the prime 
European security organisation (Sjursen 1999: 6). Progress came in 1994 when the 
NATO Council accepted the idea of a European Security and Defence 'Identity' 
(ESDI), and in 1996 allowed for WEU (still regarded as the EU's defence wing) 
command and control of the new rapid response military outfit - the Combined Joint 
Task Forces (CJTF) for European operations (Ginsberg 1997: 3 1; Sjursen 1999: 6). 
However, these developments brought the EU closer to, and dependent on NATO, and 
were widely regarded as a victory for the 'Atlanticist' camp, led by the UK (Sjursen 
1999: 6; White 2001: 149). 
Throughout the 1990s, the EU's CFSP had been criticised for its weak institutions, its 
lack of identity, and the differing approaches and interests of EU Member States 
(Edwards 1997; Rosecrance 1998; Zielonka 1998). By the beginning of the twentyý- 
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first century, however, analysts were commenting on the rapid progress made in 
ESDP (Duke 2001; Deighton 2002; Cornish and Edwards 2001), and the EU High 
Representative for CFSP had produced an EU Security Strategy to guide external 
action. The breakthrough for ESDP came at the 1998 St. Malo Anglo-French summit, 
when the new British Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, agreed to the development 
of an autonomous EU crisis management force. This initiative gained further impetus 
from the failure to formulate a coherent EU response to the Kosovo crisis in 1999, as 
well as a gradual convergence of EU Member State foreign policy positions 
(Andreani, Bertram and Grant 2001: 12-13). The initial emphasis was on the military 
aspects of ESDP, and from 1999, after the appointment of Javier Solana as High 
Representative for CFSP and the decisions made at the Cologne and Helsinki 
European Councils, this dimension developed at a fast and ambitious rate. 
Progress has developed on the basis of a consensus among Member State 
governments that an autonomous EU military capacity would not duplicate or 
challenge the role of NATO as Europe's primary defence organisation. The 'defence' 
element was misleading, as the focus was on external crisis response, not defence in 
the traditional sense. The collective defence clause in the increasingly defunct WEU 
(Article 5) was maintained, in part because neutral members of the EU could not 
accept its amalgamation into the EU and because the EU could not be seen to be 
duplicating NATO's role. Neither was there much progress made in defence industry 
cooperation, although this was changing by November 2003, when the Council 
decided to create an Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, 
research, acquisition and armaments, under the responsibility of the Defence 
Ministers (Council of the EU 2003e). The Agency was established by a CFSP Joint 
Action in July 2004, and will contribute to crisis management by improving defence 
capabilities and defining longer-term capability requirements. 
Key decisions were taken, and concrete targets set, at the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki 
European Councils. EU leaders agreed to create an EU crisis management force, 
commonly called the 'European rapid reaction force (ERRF)' to undertake military 
Petersberg tasks. The target was a force of 50-60 000 troops to be deployable within 
60 days, for a minimum period of one year. Capability action plans and Member State 
commitment conferences followed. ESDP was declared operational at the December 
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2001 Laeken European Council. Member State Ministers of Defence played an 
increasing role in the development of the headline goal, leading to separate Defence 
Ministers Council meetings in the GAERC by May 2002. By December 2002, the 
Union was preparing to replace the UN Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina with 
an EU-Ied operation. The EU's first autonomous military operation (ARTEMIS), 
carried out in Bunia, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRQ was 
successfully completed on Is' September 2003. The Headline Goal was declared met 
in 2003, and a new goal was adopted at the June 2004 European Council (Headline 
Goal 2010). The 2010 Headline Goal focuses on the quality of EU civilian and 
military capabilities, and includes the development of EU battle groups, consisting of 
highly skilled battalion sized groups (of 1,500 soldiers each), available for 
peacekeeping operations. The EU launched its most ambitious military operation to 
date in December 2004, when it took over NATO peacekeeping tasks in Bosnia 
(Operation ALTHEA). 
Decisions made at the 1999 Cologne European Council also led to WEU crisis 
management functions being transferred to the EU. WEU military personnel joined 
EU military structures, and the WEU Satellite Center and Institute for Security 
Studies became agencies of the CFSP. 
After WEU capacities in crisis management were transferred to the EU, dialogue 
began between the EU and NATO about protocols for EU use of NATO European 
operational headquarters and other assets. These facilities would be required for more 
ambitious military Petersberg operations. Negotiations, beginning in 1999 and leading 
to an agreement with NATO by the end of 2002, were known as the 'Berlin-Plus' 
arrangements. Agreement on EU use of NATO assets was reached by the December 
2002 Copenhagen European Council, and the first Berlin-Plus military operation 
(CONCORDIA) was launched in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) on 3 I't March 2003, and completed on 15th December 2003. Operation 
ALTHEA in Bosnia uses NATO common assets and capabilities. 
The Council of the EU has seen considerable institutional development to support the 
ESDP (see Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2: Council crisis management structures 
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New decision-making bodies were required to enable the EU to carry out Petersberg 
operations. Most importantly, the EU needed a body to provide strategic and political 
control of EU-led military and civilian operations - the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC). Established as an interim body (based in the Council of the EU) in 
March 2000 after commitments made at the 1999 Cologne European Council, the PSC 
became a permanent body in January 2001, and is composed of Member State 
representatives with political and security expertise. The EU lacked the necessary 
military expertise to undertake crisis management operations. The Military 
Committee (MC), supported by Military Staff (MS), were therefore established as 
interim bodies in the Council until becoming permanent in April and June 2001 
respectively. The Military Committee, composed of Member State military experts, 
was tasked with providing military advice to the PSC. The Military Staff supports the 
work of the Committee, and is mandated to provide early warning through the 
integrated civil/military Situation Centre (SITCEN), linked to the PPEWU. 
The development of civilian crisis management mechanisms followed the military 
emphasis, and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), 
was created in May 2000 as a Council working group. Reporting to COREPER and 
assisting the PSC, its aim is to advise these bodies on civilian crisis management 
operations and "to ensure a higher degree of inter-pillar coherence in the EU's civilian 
crisis management" (Council of the EU 2000a). Civilian crisis management 
capabilities progressed in four priority areas: police, rule of law, civilian 
administration and civilian protection operations (see chapter 5). ESDP was 
developing capabilities and institutions, but lacked a strategy until the High 
Representative for CFSP presented the European Security Strategy (ESS) at the June 
2003 Thessaloniki European Council. The immediate catalyst was the major rift 
between EU Member States over the US-led military attack on Iraq (Cameron and 
Quille 2004: 8). This followed previous patterns of progress in EU security policy 
being made in the aftermath of actual and perceived failures in cooperation and/or 
policy (e. g. Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo). Adopted with revisions in December 2003, 
the strategy identified international terrorism, failed states, regional conflicts, 
organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the 
key threats to European security, and outlined EU responses aimed at tackling these 
threats. These included a commitment to multilateralism, policy to build security in 
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the EU's neighbours, and working with partners (European Security Strategy, EU 
2003). Overall, the EU was to be more active, more capable and more coherent, and 
an emphasis was placed on preventive engagement (as opposed to the controversial 
pre-emptive engagement in the first draft) (ibid. EU 2003). 
The ESS outlined a firm European commitment to multilateral solutions to security 
risks that contrasted with the unilateral leanings of the US National Security Strategy 
(Wallace 2003: 3; Cameron and Quille 2004: 8). However, critics doubted whether 
Member States could live up to the aspirations for a more active and coherent EU laid 
out by the High Representative (Wallace 2003: 4; Gourlay 2003: 17). 
These doubts about the viability of the ESS feed into the wider debate about 
unresolved issues in the elaboration of the ESDP. There is no clear indication of the 
geographical scope of ESDP, nor a consensus on the appropriate use of force 
(Cameron and Quille 2004: 11; Biscop 2004: 527). This ambiguity is exacerbated by 
the EU's often uneasy partnership with NATO (see chapter 8). ESDP missions to date 
have been relatively small, and critics still question the political will of Member 
States in the context of crisis response (ICG 2005: 2; Gourlay 2005: 8). 
3.3.6 Coherence in EU external relations 
The unique and particular history and development of EU external relations has 
resulted in a complex policy area that spans EU institutions and decision-making 
procedures. 
The issue of coherence, and the related issues of consistency and coordination in EU 
external relations policy were identified as problematic back in the early days of EPC, 
and have increasingly received attention from analysts as the scope of EU external 
relations has widened and as the procedural duality persisted (Bonvicini 1982; 
Krenzler and Schneider 1997; Missiroli 2001). Consistency was raised in the SEA of 
1986, when it was declared that the "external policies of the EC and the policies 
agreed in EPC must be consistent" (quoted in Krenzler and Schneider 1997: 134). The 
artificial division between foreign and economic policy had been maintained as a 
result of Member State opposition to supranationalisation of foreign policy 
cooperation, and also Community distrust of intergovernmentalism. 
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The scope for coherency and coordination between economic and political policies 
was increased as foreign policy cooperation was brought into the framework of the 
Union in the TEU. COREPER was tasked with preparing the meetings of the Foreign 
Ministers in the General Affairs Council (now General Affairs and External Relations 
Council -GAERC), and was well qualified to link the EU's external political and 
economic policies and objectives (Ginsberg 1997: 17) As well as institutional 
arrangements to enhance consistency and coherence, the Council and the Commission 
were specifically cited in the TEU as being responsible for ensuring EU policy 
consistency (horizontal consistency)23 (Nuttall 2000: 182). However, the fundamental 
procedural division between CFSP and Community policies was retained, and the 
intergovernmental hold over foreign policy did not loosen significantly (Ginsberg 
1997: 25). 
The expansion of EU external relations responsibilities in the post-Cold War period 
and the necessary institutional proliferation has meant that problems of consistency 
and coherency have become acute. The EU is active in a number of policy areas in 
many countries and regions across the world. It is important for the Union's 
reputation, as well as best practice, to ensure that policies reinforce rather than 
contradict each other, and that EU action is visible, well-planned and efficiently 
executed. Missiroli (2001) argues that while consistency between policies has 
increased (i. e. economic and foreign policies are less contradictory), coherence still 
"leaves much to be desired" (2001: 3). Coherence often relies on the coordination of 
policy within and between units or bodies of an organisation. As a classic study 
showed, policy coordination in organisations can be negatively affected by conflict 
and competition (or 'bureaucratic politics') between institutions and organisational 
processes within institutions (Allison 197 1). The long history of conflict within the 
EU between its key institutions (and between its Member States) over the procedures 
governing external relations is likely to continue to make the pursuit of coherence, 
and coordination, problematic in this wide policy area. 
23 Vertical consistency refers to consistency between the policies of the EU and those of the Member 
States (Krenzler and Schneider 1997: 136). 
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3.4 Conclusion 
The EU's external relations procedures and responsibilities date back to the origins of 
the Union in the 1940s and 1950s, and have seen considerable incremental 
development to create the institutions and policies of today. The establishment of 
external economic relationships with countries and regions of the world contributed to 
the drive towards foreign policy cooperation as it became increasingly difficult to 
separate economic and political policies. EPC established a basis for EU external 
political action, and this was increasingly linked to the EU's external economic 
action, enhancing the EU's status and influence. Furthermore, early EPC experience 
showed considerable potential in projecting stability beyond the borders of the EU, an 
objective that became central in the EU's post-Cold War external relations agenda. 
EPC laid the foundations for the TEU's CFSP, and while frequently criticised during 
the 1990s, CFSP has seen considerable progress with the development of ESDP. 
Many of the problems with the CFSP have been addressed: the EU has developed 
planning and analysis capabilities, military competences, and has agreed on a strategy 
to guide external actions and objectives. The EU has proved itself to be a capable 
actor in external crisis management, and has seen an unprecedented institutional 
expansion in support of the Union's role. Additionally, the European Commission's 
external relations responsibilities have expanded, and it now has an established 
reputation as an actor in development policy and humanitarian aid. 
The legacy of the EU's complex history and incremental development is, however, a 
continuing challenge for the organisation's elaboration of a coherent and coordinated 
external relations policy. The traditional divide between those Member States that 
favour intergovernmental cooperation in foreign policy, and those that push for more 
supranationalism, persists, and contributes to a certain amount of tension and 
competition between the European Commission and the Council of the EU. These 
ideological and institutional problems are further explored in an analysis of the EU's 
conflict prevention policy (chapter 5). They were also to have a bearing on the EUs 
ability to respond to the complex security challenges of the post-Cold War era, to 
which we turn to next. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Post-Cold War European Security and Conflict Prevention 
"In the new Europe, it is already clear that three organisations will play a decisive role 
in shaping the contours of the evolving security system: the European Community, 
NATO and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The precise 
nature of the new security system will depend to a large extent on what sort of 
relationships develop between these three bodies" (Hyde-Price 1992: 39). 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to locate the European Union in the institutional security 
order of post-Cold War Europe. Conflict prevention is explored as an EU strategy 
developed as a response to new security challenges, and the EU's organisational 
partners in conflict prevention are identified. What are the features of the post-Cold 
War security environment, and where does the EU fit in? The EU was arguably 
unprepared for the rapid and extensive changes in wider Europe following the fall of 
the Berlin wall. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) developed with 
conflict prevention as a core objective largely as a result of experience gained after 
policy failures, particularly in the management of the 1991-95 Yugoslav conflict and 
the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Conflict prevention increasingly came to represent the EU's 
comprehensive new security role, which, by the late 1990s, included ambitions in 
military crisis management. 
We start by examining the changing perceptions of security in a transformed Europe: 
what was the nature of post-Cold War European security? We then explore the debate 
on sovereignty that accompanied an expansion of security concerns: did this offer a 
new challenge for international organisations? Turning to the EU's response to the 
post-Cold War security environment, established concepts of the EU as a 'civilian' 
and 'military' power are examined, and conflict prevention is discussed as a policy 
with the potential to combine these roles. Finally, we explore the institutional 
complexity of post-Cold War Europe, and the adoption of conflict prevention as a 
shared objective. The UN, OSCE and NATO are identified as the EU's main partners 
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in conflict prevention, and together as forming the new European security 
architecture. The need for organisations to cooperate in conflict prevention was clear, 
but is there a need for a deeper process of policy coordination? Hyde-Price (1992: 39) 
predicted that the nature of the post-Cold War European security system would be 
shaped by the emerging relationships between the EU, NATO and the OSCE. For 
conflict prevention in the pan-European area, cooperative relationships between these 
organisations, and the UN, was, and continues to be, crucial. 
4.2 The Post-Cold War European Security Environment 
The EU, like other international organisations, has had to adapt to a new set of 
challenges in the post-Cold War world. The demise of a world system dominated by 
the United States and the USSR has brought new opportunities in the field of 
international diplomacy and has increased expectations of the EU's international role 
(Peterson & Sjursen 1998: 170). The fall of Communism in Eastern Europe appeared 
to herald a new era of peace and optimism. Commentators predicted the 'end of 
history' (Fukuyama 1990) as the great ideological battle of the twentieth century 
crumbled and was replaced by a scramble towards free markets and liberal 
democracies. This sense of optimism is reflected in the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), signed in February 1992, in which the new 'European Union' proclaimed a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the possibility of a common 
defence, and agreed to create a European Monetary Union (EMU) and cooperate in 
the area of Justice and Home Affairs QHA). Yet clearly, as Chris Hill (1993) has 
argued convincingly, the EU's capabilities did not match growing expectations that 
the organisation would form the lynchpin of post-Cold War European security. 
In the early 1990s, as the states of Central and Eastern Europe emerged as new 
democracies, the Soviet Union collapsed and Yugoslavia began to disintegrate into its 
constituent parts, European security commentators reported a sense of uncertainty 
over the parameters of the new Europe, perceptions of security threats, and the likely 
future of the institutional architecture (Buzan et al. 1990; Booth and Wheeler 1992; 
Miall 1993). Not only did policy makers and academics fail to predict the end of the 
Cold War, but the future shape of Europe was by no means clear. Various scenarios 
were discussed. Would the NATO alliance survive the removal of the Soviet threat? 
Would European security be based on a more cooperative and broad collective system 
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under the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)? Would the EU 
emerge as a strong federal force, embracing the whole of Europe? Or would nation 
states reassert themselves in a multipolar Europe? (Hyde-Price 1992). The system 
emerging by the end of the 1990s was characterised by a complex interplay between 
states and international organisations and an unprecedented expansion of the EU's 
security role. This section examines the new concepts of European security, the role 
of European states and organisations, and the adaptation of the EU in the face of these 
developments. 
4.2.1 European security transformed 
Changing attitudes to security and the acceptability of war can be traced throughout 
the twentieth century, but can be seen as accelerating in Europe after the historic 
revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989/90, and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 199 1. During the Cold War years the term 'security' was primarily 
used in Western Europe to denote military defence against the perceived Soviet threat. 
In the discipline of Strategic Studies, dominated by realist interpretations of 
international politics, national security was supreme, and the state remained the 
central level of analysis. Security was defined in rather narrow terms, essentially 
referring to national territorial defence, and it depended on adequate nuclear 
deterrence, since, as the neo-realist argument went, the anarchic nature of the 
international system meant that conflict between states was inevitable (Waltz 1979). 
This interpretation of security had always had its challengers, particularly in the 
discipline of Peace Research, but was increasingly contested in the aftermath of the 
Cold War (Buzan 199 1). 
The transformation of Europe led to the questioning of traditional definitions, but not 
necessarily a consensus on new meanings. Defining 'Europe' was problematic in the 
post-Cold war period as old points of reference became obsolete. Europe during the 
Cold War was a divided continent, with little contact between blocs until detente in 
the 1970s. With the end of the East-West divide in 1989, came also a questioning of 
traditional assumptions; the new developments "shifted mental as well as territorial 
boundaries" (Miall 1993: 18). As the two halves of Germany reunited, the prospect of 
a united Europe became possible, while, at the same time, the differences between the 
integrated and economically successful states in the EU and the insecure states on its 
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borders were stark. Nevertheless, an enlarged EU, bringing in the states of Central and 
Eastern Europe, became possible for the first time in fifty years. Although a consensus 
on the meaning of Europe was difficult to identify, it was increasingly synonymous 
with the political institutions of Western Europe, and of the EU in particular (Wallace 
1999; Smith and Timmins 2001). 
'Security' became a difficult term, as what was to be secured, and the nature of the 
threat, lacked Cold War clarity. While non-military factors such as social, political, 
and environmental upheavals were recognised as security threats, the concept of 
security remained inadequately defined (Waever 1996: 105). According to Dorman 
and Treacher (1995: 72), the years 1989-1994 were marked by constantly shifting 
perceptions of security. Military issues retained their immediate saliency in light of 
Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe, the dispersal of nuclear weapons across 
the disintegrating USSR, and the military response from the US and allies to Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait. The 'peace dividend' as a result of defence cuts was a false 
promise; Western European states modernised and professionalised annies as more 
pressure fell on Europe to contribute to UN and NATO operations in former 
Yugoslavia and elsewhere (Dorman and Treacher 1995: 63). Historically neutral 
states - Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria, were encouraged to rethink their status 
(Dorman and Treacher 1995: 63). The continued importance of military security 
coincides with the awareness of wider security concerns and the possibility of non- 
military solutions to perceived threats. This realisation gained ground in a (Western) 
Europe confronted with dual prospects of institutional cooperation and peripheral 
conflict in the early 1990s. The notion that security concerns had expanded from 
military considerations to include more diverse political, economic, and 
environmental issues therefore became widespread in the aftermath of the Cold war 
(Buzan et al. 1990; Booth and Wheeler 1992). Nevertheless, notions of security 
outside the state context were conceptually problematic. An expansion of security to 
include every upset considered detrimental to the way of life in Western Europe was 
not necessary a positive development (Waever 1996: 106). 'Security' could be used to 
justify secrecy, and if immigrants were considered to be a threat to security, a harsh 
asylum policy and public hostility towards non-nationals. The linkage between 
immigration and terrorism perpetuates this. 
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Despite different interpretations of security and threats, European states tended to 
agree that many of the threats of the 1990s required a collective response. 
Transnational crime, environmental risks, and the overspill effects of conflict could 
not be adequately addressed at the state level. This has led to a debate (see below) 
about how security threats and perceptions have challenged the role and interests of 
the state and established notions of sovereignty. 
4.2.2 States, sovereignty and intervention 
Traditional state-centrism in Security Studies has, to some extent, been challenged by 
the increasing importance of the role of international organisations and non-state 
actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and terrorist groups. With the 
changing perception of security, came the questioning of the state as the key actor in 
the international politics of peace and security. Security was no longer solely about 
territorial defence, and could no longer be best tackled at the national level. Therefore, 
with the internationalisation of security, came the internationalisation of sovereignty 
(Gow 2000: 296). 
The principle of sovereignty underpins traditional international politics, and is upheld 
in international law through the UN Charter. As an established convention protecting 
the sovereign rights of governments, sovereignty protected states from external 
interference in domestic affairs. Territorial integrity could be upheld, with the UN (in 
the post-1945 period) arbitrating in cases of disputes between states. In practice, 
states continued to apply the rule of sovereignty selectively: intervention (especially 
by the United States) continued covertly and unhindered throughout the twentieth 
century, although it was increasingly considered to be against established convention 
(MacFarlane 2002). 
The questioning of traditional notions of sovereignty accelerated in a post-Cold War 
world characterised by a widening concept of security and a trend towards intra-state 
rather than inter-state conflict, the victims mainly civilian (Gow 2000; Deng 2000). 
Calls for humanitarian intervention within states were backed by the realisation that 
conflict and human rights abuses had an international impact. International peace and 
security was threatened by events within states - such as ethnic conflict leading to 
refugees, or the economic effects of political instability, or transnational effects of 
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small weapon proliferation or environmental disasters. Additionally, Europe's mixed 
cultural and ethnic heritage, cutting across national boundaries, means that internal 
conflict between communities has the potential to turn into inter-state disputes, 
24 
especially with the loosening of superpower control . These problems are 
exacerbated by the fact that interdependence is an expanding feature of modem life; 
disruptions on a global scale can have far-reaching domestic implications, and vice- 
versa. Keohane and Nye (1989), amongst others, explored this phenomenon before 
the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, James Rosenau (1997: 4) has 
explored the "new and wide political space" that, in his analysis, replaces the porous 
domestic-foreign boundary. In a time of rapid change, states not only "seem ever 
more vulnerable to the demands of both domestic constituents and international 
organisations, but they also have to contend with the advent of new global actors and 
processes that confound their roles, constrain the limits of their authority, and 
undermine their territorial appeal" (Rosenau 1997: 219). 
Closely linked to changing notions of sovereignty is the increasing emphasis on 
human rights, or individual human security. Debates in the UN Security Council, and 
statements by national leaders 25 , show that the rights of 
individuals increasingly can 
take precedence over sovereign rights (although this remains a distinctly selective 
trend, acted on, according to Gow (2000) only when a state threatens to destabilise the 
international order). Sovereignty can therefore be said to have been 'individualised' 
rather than internationalised (Griffin 2000: 425) - although clearly a renewed global 
concern over good governance of states and the rights of people within them signifies 
that both terms are valid. Commentators (notably, Liotta 2002; Rosenau 1997) have 
argued for a convergence of national and human security, leading, it is argued, to a 
blurring of domestic and foreign policy concerns. 
As with theories pertaining to war, the primacy of human rights over state security has 
a tradition outside the field of International Relations: in Peace and Conflict Research. 
John Burton's (1972) human needs theory showed a move from state-centric research 
24 For example, those of Russian origin living in states of the Former Soviet Union; Albanians in the 
countries of Former Yugoslavia; the long-running dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus. 25 Notably, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, in a speech in Chicago in 1999. 'The Blair Doctrine' 
lair doctrine4-23. html. Accessed 18/04/05. 
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in the 1970s (Halliday 1994: 53), while Johan Galtung (1990) was concerned with the 
effect of state violence on the individual. The questioning of the prime role of the 
state has a longer legacy than may at first be clear. Nevertheless, sovereign rule has 
been increasingly debated during the 1990s, in the context of the right to intervene in 
the domestic affairs of other states (as in Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003), and in an 
integrating Europe pooling sovereignty at the EU level. 
The claim that Western Europe is emerging as a "post-sovereign regional system" 
(Wallace 1999: 223) or a "post-modem world ... collapsing into greater order" (Cooper 
2004: 26) must, however, be qualified by the struggle for sovereignty to be granted in 
wider Europe - such as in Kosovo, Abkhazia and Chechnya. Clearly, sovereignty 
remains of prime importance for those that don't possess it, since gaining statehood is 
perceived to ensure the protection of cultural, religious and ethnic rights when these 
are under threat from a hostile or indifferent regime. Sovereignty remains a central 
issue in Western Europe too; in Britain arguments against further EU integration warn 
that British sovereignty will be passed to Brussels. Analysts of the realist school of 
International Relations insist that national security remains of prime importance 
(Wylie 1997). Other critics maintain that internal wars signify the continuing 
importance of the state, not its demise (Knudsen 2001: 362-363). 
International organisations have risen to a new prominence in the post-Cold War era, 
although it is debatable how much this indicates an erosion of state-centrism. Analysts 
of different schools of thought disagree as to the significance of this development. 
Neo-realists predicted the disintegration of regional organisations such as NATO and 
the EU after the Cold War (Mearshiemer 1990), but then justified their continuation 
as being due to their utility in the pursuit of the national interests of states (Waltz 
2000). Mearsheimer further argued that international organisations are a "false 
promise", wrongly held up as a cause for peace by academics and policy-makers 
(1995: 47). Mearsheimer conveniently omits the legacy of the EU as an institution 
fostering peace and, in citing Bosnia as an example of the failure of institutions, falls 
prey to the narrow and simplistic argumentation that he claims to be exposing in 
institutionalism. Nevertheless, the endurance of the EU has led to various theories 
about the role of the state in modem Europe. Alan Milward (1994), for example, 
argues that European integration has progressed as a way of maintaining the primacy 
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of the state in a complex world. Integration occurs when states can't manage certain 
policy dilemmas on their own. 
While states clearly have the power to stall progress in international policy-making, 
the role of international organisation (and the EU in particular), cannot simply be 
explained by the pursuit of state interest. Neo-liberal institutionalists (e. g. Keohane 
1984) concede that states are driven by national interest, but claim that organisations 
moderate the conflictual nature of state interaction, leading to cooperation over 
common interests (Terriff et al. 1999). This approach best explains the state- 
institution interaction that characterises the EU; it accepts the autonomy of the state 
and the institution (Smith, M. 1996: 11). Social constructivists are interested in levels 
of analysis other than the state, such as domestic structures (Terriff et al. 1999), and 
recognise the importance of international organisations in agenda and norm-setting. In 
particular, international organisations form the basis of security communities (Adler 
1998). Influenced by behaviouralism, and generally put under the neo-liberalism 
heading is the work of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1989), who developed the 
theory of complex interdependence. Questioning the one-dimensionalism of realism, 
Keohane and Nye emphasise the importance of informal transnational interactions and 
the falling importance of military issues in relations between states (Keohane and Nye 
1989). In such an interdependent system, international organisations have a key role 
in setting the international agenda, helping to form coalitions, and launching political 
initiatives (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1989). 
The idea that the state has been either significantly weakened or strengthened in the 
post-Cold War era is clearly a simplification of the complexities of contemporary 
political processes (Webber 2001: 34). Issues of identity and nationhood have become 
security issues, perhaps as a reaction to political integration in Western Europe, and as 
a result of state-building in multi-national/ethnic communities in Eastern Europe. 
Waever (1996: 114) identifies a 'decoupling' of notions of state and nation in the 
West, and a simultaneous 'recoupling' in Eastern Europe. In the latter case, this has 
led to conflicts of identity and the rise of nationalism. The state maintains its place as 
the key actor in international politics, and as a source of conflict where nationality and 
statehood don't coincide. International organisational activity cannot necessarily be 
interpreted as an erosion of nation state influence. It is more accurate to concede that 
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the concept of statehood has differing implications and wider interpretations in the 
post-Cold War period; importantly, the integrity of statehood is no longer 
automatically protected by the convention of non-interference in international law. 
Moreover, the pooling of sovereignty at the supranational level may not indicate the 
demise of sovereignty, but nation state adaptation in an interdependent, complex 
international order. The emergence of the EU as a security actor is an interesting 
example of this trend. 
4.2.3 The EU as a new security actor 
We now investigate the links between the new security environment and the 
adaptation of the EU as a security actor. Certainly, the dramatic revision of European 
security had broad implications for the EU and the development of the CFSP. The 
EU's place was uncertain in the new Europe; previously it had had a distinct role, 
with clear boundaries represented by the Cold War division of Europe (Smith 1996). 
Security threats to Western Europe became less about conventional and nuclear war 
and more about the spill-over effects of political and economic instability in the new 
states of Eastern and Central Europe (Dorman and Treacher 1995). The EU, a civilian 
organisation with economic and diplomatic strength, was uniquely qualified to 
develop non-military security solutions, and had pressing reasons to project stability 
in an expanded Europe. As the 1990s progressed, the EU played a key economic and 
political role in the new Eastern democracies and induced peaceful change and the 
protection of minorities in the new states through a greater emphasis on political 
conditionality for future EU membership (Rummel 1996; Pinder 1996). Former EU 
Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, later argued that the projection of 
stability was the EU's 'essential mission', and that enlargement "is the single greatest 
contribution the Union can make to European - even to global - stability" (Patten 
2000: 19). 
Early setbacks, however, undermined the EU's ambitions. The CFSP was tested 
before the TEU was even signed, when the EU took initial responsibility for trying to 
find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Yugoslavia towards the end of 199 I. The 
decision, pushed by a newly reunited Germany under strong domestic pressure, to 
officially recognise Croatia and Slovenia, was widely perceived to have accelerated 
the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and led to a dejected EU ceding responsibility 
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for the management of the Bosnian crisis to the UN, and eventually to NATO (Cohen 
1993; Woodward 1995; Zucconi 1996). The failure of EU diplomacy in Yugoslavia 
was a setback, but also was to become a catalyst for the development of EU 
mechanisms to prevent and manage conflict (Bildt 1998; Hill 2001). The development 
of mechanisms was slow because of the lack of common objectives in foreign policy, 
and a lack of consensus on the creation of EU military competences. Yet progress in 
the development of the CFSP was a necessity, not an option. As argued in chapter 3, 
the EU's subsequent disarray in the face of the crises in Albania in 1995 and Kosovo 
in 1999 led to significant progress in the ESDP. 
The EU's adaptation can be seen in the context of extensive institutional activity at 
this time. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; from 1995, 
Organisation for Security and in Europe, OSCE), despite its wide membership and 
agenda, did not become the leading security institution, but developed recognised 
expertise in the protection of minority rights (Forster and Niblett 2001: 29). The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) survived the removal of the USSR, and 
expanded its role to include the military management of post-Cold War crises. NATO 
undertook its first ever military operation in 1995 in Bosnia, with the bombing of Serb 
targets that contributed to the ending of the Bosnian war (Forster and Wallace 2001b: 
107). The United Nations (UN), for the first time in its history, launched a 
humanitarian and peacekeeping mission on the European continent, but was to 
encounter difficulties in adapting its practices to the complexities of the Yugoslav 
conflict (Woodward 2000), and in the ongoing conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda and 
elsewhere. Despite suffering criticism over its role in the Yugoslav conflict, the UN, 
on the whole, retained its legitimacy. By the end of the 1990s, analysts argued that the 
EU and NATO had emerged as the principal European security organisations (Cottey 
1998; Flockart and Wyn Rees 1998), although this can also be interpreted as 
signifying reluctance on the part of EU/NATO Member States for fundamental 
change (Forster and Niblett 2001: 5 1). Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s, the EU 
had embarked on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), sparking a 
renewed debate about its civilian identity and possible military role. It is to these 
debates that we turn to next. 
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4.2.4 Civilian and military power EU? 
The EU's shift in recent years from an organisation with civilian competences, to one 
acquiring military means, has provoked an extensive debate (Whitman 1998; Smith, 
K. E. 2000; Andreani, Bertram and Grant 2001; Bono 2002; Deighton 2002; Ehrhart 
2002; Sangiovanni 2003; Treacher 2004; Cameron and Quille 2004). Paradoxically, 
while non-military security solutions and issues characterised early post-Cold War 
European security, by the late 1990s EU Member States 26 had agreed that 'soft' 
(politico-diplomatic) security policies were not sufficient if the organisation was to 
tackle the full range of security challenges and undertake 'harder' (i. e. military) 
Petersberg tasks (White 2001: 150; Haine 2004: 43). The initial emphasis was on 
capability-building, with EU Member States laying the debate about the EU's military 
doctrine to one side (Ortega 2004: 73). 
The EU's identity as civilian power was largely dictated by the Cold War 
international system. After the failed attempt to create a European Defence 
Community in the 1950s, Western Europe's security identity was unequivocally 
linked to the United States through NATO. The Atlantic Alliance provided the 
military security that Western Europe required. The concept of 'civilian power' 
Europe was suggested by Duch8ne in the 1970s and referred to the political value of 
economic and diplomatic power as an alternative to military power (Duch8ne 1972). 
As outlined in chapter 3, European Political Cooperation (EPC) indeed played a 
significant role in the 1970s and 1980s in establishing an EC political identity based 
on low-key (and often lowest common denominator) diplomacy. Galtung (1973) did 
not welcome the emergence of the EC as a 'superpower in the making'. Other 
commentators argued that the EC could not be considered a significant actor until it 
gained military power; civilian power Europe was a "contradiction in terms" (Bull 
1982: 149). 
The end of the Cold War freed the EU from its previous constraints, and the 
possibility of a common defence was raised in the TEU, as outlined in chapter 3. 
The military role of the EU can now be characterised as one of military crisis 
response, linked increasingly to defence cooperation and armaments procurement 
26 At the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki European Councils. 
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(Missiroli 2004a: 69). The EU has a much wider civilian remit, ranging from 
traditional development and aid, to diplomacy and new competences in civilian crisis 
management and other measures (see chapter 5). The new military and the new and 
existing civilian roles of EU security have often been juxtaposed in post-Cold War 
European security commentary (Smith 2000: 11). However, these roles are not 
necessarily mutually incompatible for the EU. 
There are many sound reasons for reconsidering the traditional civilian-military 
dichotomy in relation to the EU and other actors. After the perceived ending of the 
Bosnian conflict with military means, the lack of an EU collective response to the 
1995 Albanian crisis, and the subsequent military response to the 1999 Kosovo crisis, 
it was widely believed that military solutions were necessary when civilian power 
failed. Traditional operational distinctions between types of interventions are, in any 
case, increasingly difficult to validate (Griffin 2000: 423). Military-civilian 
cooperation between military organisations such as NATO and civilian organisations 
like the OSCE and NGOs has characterised the post-Cold War period. Peacekeeping 
operations, particularly in internal war situations, such as in Bosnia, have come close 
to peace enforcement, if not war fighting. Conflicts of the 1990s have been typified by 
a crossing-over of military and civilian operations, such as the Kosovo crisis of 1999 
(Pugh 2000). This is reflected in the development of the NATO civil-military 
cooperation (CIMIC) concept to facilitate partnerships between the growing number 
of actors involved in conflict management and peacebuilding projects. Military- 
civilian synergy is increasingly important in the EU as the ESDP project develops. 
This type of cooperation has been particularly important in the aftermath of war in 
Southeastern Europe. 
Despite the advantages of military-civilian partnerships, the relationship between 
military units and civilian organisations such as NGOs is problematic. The 
humanitarian tradition of political impartiality has been challenged by cooperation 
with military units, and different approaches by civilian organisations and the military 
on the ground are exacerbated by different organisational structures and different 
objectives (Ehrhart 2002: 54-55). Nevertheless, civil-military synergy is valuable in 
Complex crisis situations, and is now an important factor in the EU context as the 
Union takes on more conflict prevention/crisis management tasks. The Union is also 
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in a good position, with its civilian and military competences, to bring these different 
operational cultures together at the headquarters and field level. 
The security challenges of the 1990s therefore require a rethinking of the EU's 
traditional security identity that surpasses notions of 'military' and 'civilian'. As 
civilian crisis workers relied on military protection, and military forces undertook 
humanitarian tasks, it became more important to develop comprehensive responses to 
crises, incorporating military and civilian personnel. The EU's foreign policy has 
developed in this climate of changing responses to crises. In particular, the EU's 
conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms developed as a response to the 
failure of the EU to prevent and then manage the conflicts in Banner Yugoslavia 
during the 1990s. 
Recent EU documentation reflects this. The European Security Strategy (EU 2003), 
prepared by the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, in 2003, and developed 
by the Member States, framed the EU's development of civilian and military 
compctenccs as a comprehensive response to the security challenges facing the EU 
(Haine 2004; Cameron and Quille 2004). The strategy was important in that it 
represented the first clear and relatively detailed outline of security threats (namely, 
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and failed states), and a 
consensus on EU responses to these threats (the creation of a 'zone of security' 
around the EU, support of multilateral institutions, and conflict and threat prevention). 
Preventive engagement emerged as one of the key themes in a strategy encompassing 
both a civilian and military role for the EU in international politics. The Constitutional 
Treaty, signed by Member State governments in 2004, sought to extend the Petersberg 
tasks to include conflict prevention, joint disarmament, military advice and assistance, 
and post-conflict stabilisation tasks, 27 binding the EU's civilian and military 
operational roles together in one article. While the future of the Treaty is currently in 
doubt after rejection by referendum in France and the Netherlands, this is unlikely to 
27 The tasks read as follows: "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military 
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may 
contribute to the fight against terrorism, including supporting third countries in combating terrorism in 
their territories. " Constitutional Treaty, Article 111-309. 
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derail the extension of the Petersberg tasks, or the EU's present and future civilian and 
military operations. 
In conceptual rather than pragmatic terms, the EU's emergence as a military actor is 
undoubtedly a turning point. The development of military means and objectives by the 
EU may represent the adoption of 'state-like' characteristics that diverge from, or 
even undermine the EU as a legitimate security actor (Smith 2000: 27; Treacher 2004: 
66). The difference between the EU and a state, however, is that EU military action is 
governed by collective decision-making, underpinned by shared values and 
interpretations of appropriate security solutions. The development of institutional 
support for effective military missions, and commitment to the common strategies set 
out in the European Security Strategy, will therefore be crucial if the EU is to 
maintain its legitimacy outside the civilian sphere. The commitment to work with 
other multilateral organisations towards common goals will further enhance the EU's 
prospects as a military actor. Conflict prevention is therefore not only a useful EU 
policy, but also, potentially, provides a normative framework for EU military activity. 
4.2.5 Conflict prevention: a new EU norm? 
EU conflict prevention, it can be argued, is a policy that binds together the 
traditionally disparate notions of military and civilian power into a comprehensive 
strategy to deal with the complex security problems of the post-Cold War era (Hill 
2001: 315). Its rise to prominence is closely linked to the nature of new security 
threats, which have widened the perception of state interests in the 1990s to include 
conflict and disruptions in the EU's neighbours; and in the wider world. This change 
has been reflected in states' goals to protect human rights, and willingness to 
contribute resources for humanitarian intervention (Weiss 2000). Most European 
states have recognised that not only is conflict prevention best practiced at the 
multilateral level, but that international organisations are the most legitimate actors to 
question sovereignty in failing states. 28 
28 The commitment to 'effective multilateralism' is stated in the European Security Strategy and in 
recent European Commission documents e. g The European Union and the United Nations: The choice 
of multilateralism (EU Comission 2003c). 
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Conflict prevention has emerged as a pragmatic response to the security challenges 
facing the EU. As a new expectation, or standard, conflict prevention also has a 
normative element. Norms are considered to be prescribed standards of behaviour that 
not only regulate the conduct of an actor, but that partly represent, or constitute, an 
actors' identity (Katzenstein 1996: 5). The power of values and ideas in changing 
political landscapes was underlined by the peaceful internal implosions of the 
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe (Manners 2002: 238). Moreover, conflicts of 
the 1990s have demonstrated that civilian and military intervention in a crisis zone is 
likely to be limited in effect without a corresponding commitment to fostering regime 
legitimacy and support through the promotion of shared values such as the protection 
of human rights and the rule of law (Smith, K. 2003: 203). The EU's civilian role has 
long been seen to support certain behaviour and values (Duchene 1973), most recently 
by Manners (2002), who argues for a greater consideration of 'normative power 
Europe' in conceptualising the EU's international role. Certainly, conflict prevention 
is a EU commitment that sits alongside, and is intimately linked to, EU values such as 
human rights, good governance and multilateralism. It undoubtedly has a normative 
basis, since it is underpinned by values such as non-violence and peaceful change. 
Conflict prevention is not a neutral term; in prescriptive form, it promotes an 
approach to national and international society based on respect for human needs, 
dialogue, and compromise. The promotion of conflict prevention by the EU has 
therefore been interpreted as the outcome of normative changes in the European 
security discourse (Bj6rkdahl 2002b: 148). 
Whether conflict prevention can be considered an emerging international norm, as 
Bj6rkdahl (2002b) suggests, is, however, questionable. While not denying that norms 
do matter in international politics, and particularly in the multilateral context, the 
consensus on conflict prevention isn't solid enough to justify this claim. Certainly, 
rhetorical support of the idea of conflict prevention from diplomats and policy- 
makers is a trend that shows a more proactive approach to violent conflict in recent 
years. The inevitability of war is no longer widely accepted; instead questions arise as 
to why conflict was not prevented, and who is to blame for this (Lund 2000) - for 
example, after the genocide in Rwanda - an atrocity that permeates all arguments 
making the case for conflict prevention. It could be conceded therefore, that a norm in 
support of the principle of conflict prevention is gaining more ground in an 
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international community that expects international organisations to act to prevent, or 
at least manage, conflict (Lund 2000: 24). This expectation no doubt arises from 
increased media coverage of violent conflicts across the world, followed by domestic 
pressure to act. However, domestic support for conflict prevention is not widespread 
or influential enough to transform policy-planning practices at national and 
international levels. Missed opportunities to prevent conflict (the Kosovo crisis being 
the best European example 29), suggest that conflict prevention is not a "settled" norm 
(Bj6rkdahl 2002b: 190). Additionally, it would be difficult to claim that the conflict 
prevention ethos has permeated the thinking of the majority of national governments. 
As outlined in chapter 2, governments are not always effective in long-term planning, 
and, in any case, many governments consider conflict prevention as a Western idea 
that could be used to justify intervention. Even in Europe, the 1990s were 
characterised by preoccupation with domestic and regional concerns such as 
unemployment and the reunification of Germany (Forster and Niblett 2001). 
It is difficult to argue that conflict prevention has emerged as an established European 
norm in this climate of "denial rather than reconceptualisation" (Forster and Wallace 
2001: 124). Nevertheless, the very visibility of conflict prevention in the post-Cold 
War period does point to a re-evaluation of state interests and the role of 
organisations. This cannot be fully explained in terms of the self-interest of states. 
While the development of post-Cold War norms has to be set against the continuation 
and endurance of Cold War security thinking (Booth 1998: 29), the influence of 
conflict prevention as a normative force both driving external EU action, and 
representing a fundamental aspect of EU international identity, is considerable. 
Commitment to conflict prevention at the institutional and normative levels serves to 
justify the EU's transition from civilian to integrated civilian-military actor. Its further 
adoption by a range of security organisations also indicates conflict prevention's 
practical and normative appeal. 
29 See Stefan Troebst (1998) 'Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? ' ECMI Working Paper #1. 
Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), and Marc Weller (2001) 'Missed 
Opportunities of Conflict Prevention in Kosovo: 1987-1999' in L. van de Goor and M. Huber (eds. ) 
Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention. CPN Yearbook 2000101. Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft. 
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4.3 Conflict Prevention and International Organisations in the Post-Cold War 
Period 
The prominence of international organisations reflects a move away from the 
superpower domination of conflict resolution during the Cold War, to more collective 
solutions being attempted in the post-Cold War period. International organisations 
have emerged in the 1990s as important actors in their own right, partly as a result of 
the changing perceptions of security and state interests, leading to a consensus among 
states that many security threats and problems could no longer be properly addressed 
at state level. In this final section, the institutional architecture of post-1989 Europe is 
explored: with organisational enlargements and adaptations, Europe has become the 
most institutionalised region in the world. We examine conflict prevention as a shared 
priority among international organisations, identifying the UN, OSCE and NATO as 
the EU's main institutional partners. Finally, the desirability of policy coordination 
between these actors is introduced as an important factor in pan-European conflict 
prevention. 
4.3.1 Institutional complexity 
The future shape of Europe's institutional order at the beginning of the 1990s was 
unclear (Hyde-Price 1992). Analysts expected Cold War institutions to disband, or 
one organisation to dominate. The adaptation of organisations was complicated by 
major political developments, such as the reunification of Germany and the collapse 
of the USSR, although the growing importance of non-military security considerations 
increased the visibility of international organisations (Imber 1992: 175). The 
institutional complexity emerged therefore not as a result of grand design or 
consensus, but as a result of the short-term political decisions and preferences of 
national governments. Unlike the initially questionable future of NATO, the EU 
clearly had a key role to play in the reshaping of Europe; it was the nature and extent 
of the EU role that was in question. The OSCE lost its centrality after it presided over 
the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) arms reduction Treaty by 
members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The UN's role in European security was 
underlined by its involvement in the Yugoslav conflict. All organisations responded 
to the new environment with institutional proliferation - creating new units and 
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mechanisms - and by expanding their jurisdiction and objectives. However, 
adaptation was not accompanied by a division of tasks or labour. 
Expanding memberships led to a redefinition of actual, as well as conceptual and 
institutional boundaries (Smith 1996: 21). Membership of organisations for the new 
democracies was important in symbolic and practical terms, and institutional 
memberships were to undergo frequent revisions during the 1990s. The OSCE 
immediately enlarged to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Countries (Commonwealth of Independent States - CIS), and NATO 
and the EU drew in a reunited Germany. The EU started the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe on a long road towards membership, and absorbed Sweden, Finland 
and Austria in 1995. The first NATO post-Cold War enlargement proper brought in 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999. Finally, the dual EU-NATO 
enlargement of May 2004 absorbed Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Cyprus, Slovakia and Malta into the EU; Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia into both 
organisations; and Romania and Bulgaria into NATO. The EU and NATO now share 
19 European members out of a NATO total of 26, and an EU total of 25. Similarly, 
EU states now dominate the OSCE, and have become a larger faction in the UN 
General Assembly (see Figure 4.1). 
The overlapping institutional memberships illustrated below might suggest that the 
OSCE is the most important European organisation, since it embraces a pan-European 
and transatlantic membership. Inclusiveness does not translate into influence, 
however, and the slowing down of enlargements of the EU and NATO may produce a 
permanent institutional line of division, excluding most of the CIS. NATO and the EU 
are reluctant to state their geographical limits, but the EU's objective of a &zone of 
stability' around the EU (as outlined in the 'European Neighbourhood Policy (ENPy30 
and the European Security Strategy) may be difficult to achieve if enlargement to 
certain states is ruled out. 
30 The European Neighbourhood Policy arose in the run up to the May 2004 enlargement, after which 
the EU would border Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. Outlined in a GAERC report in June 2003 
('Wider Europe - New Neighbourhood'), the policy was expanded to include the Southern Mediterranean and aimed to launch a long-term, integrated approach to these countries by offering 
partnership and cooperation without necessarily offering future EU membership. (See Batt et. al 2003). 
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Figure 4.1. Overlapping Institutional Memberships (adapted from diagram in SIPRI- 
UNESCO Handbook 1998). 
I TIV 
- -1- OSCE 
NATO 
Canada Albania Bosnia-Herzegovina 
USA Macedonia* Serbia-Montenegro 
Iceland Croatia* Switzerland 
Norway 
Turkey* 
Romania* 
Bulgaria* 
EU cis 
Denmark Austria Armenia 
Netherlands Finland Azerbaijan 
UK Sweden Belarus 
France Ireland Uzbekistan 
Belgium Cyprus Georgia 
Germany Malta Kazakstan 
Luxembourg Kyrgystan 
Greece Moldova 
Italy Russia 
Portugal Turkmenistan 
Spain Ukraine 
Czech Republic 
Poland 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Estonia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
*EU applicants 
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Certainly, the 2004 enlargement of the world's most powerful military alliance and 
the world's most economically successful regional organisation, and their shared 
membership, have undoubtedly contributed to the endurance and influence of NATO 
and the EU. The lack of parity between membership of NATO and the WEU 
complicated the early stages of the development of the EU security and defence 
identity (ESDI), and then EU access to NATO assets at the end of the 1990s. 
However, overlapping membership is not always conducive to fast and effective 
responses to crises. Member States may choose to work through a particular 
organisation for political reasons, rather than choosing the organisation best suited to 
the job (e. g. the US promoting political change in the Ukraine through NATO rather 
than the OSCE). This is a particular post-Cold War problem because overlapping 
institutional membership has been accompanied by overlapping objectives and 
competences. The OSCE's wide membership, including Russia, has, for example led 
to the comparative underdevelopment of the organisation, as powerful states such as 
the US choose to work through NATO, or avoid the multilateral route all together. 
This is a result not only of realpolitik, but also a recognition that a consensus will not 
be found among OSCE participating states (or, in future, among NATO member 
nations). 
Expanding security concerns also led to increasingly overlapping organisational 
agendas and the development of parallel security objectives and mechanisms. The 
overlapping of organisational memberships and competences is a new development in 
European politics. During the post-Second World War period, the competences of 
international organisations were clearly separated. NATO was concerned with 
military security and the EC was largely concerned with economic integration in 
Western Europe, and trade and development relations with the third world. The UN 
was the universal organisation responsible for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, with the CSCE (from 1975) facilitating a pan-European forum in the 
field of civil, political, and minority rights. The international system was dominated 
by the superpowers, and, as argued in chapter 2, the ability of the UN to carry out its 
central objective to maintain international peace was seriously curtailed because of the 
superpower clash in the Security Council. While there was inevitably some 
overlapping of security concerns during the Cold War, especially with growing 
Political integration at the European level, the separation of responsibilities meant that 
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coordination was rarely an issue. Mitrany (quoted in Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970: 
5 1) emphasised the difference between the UN and the EC/EU` as international actors, 
citing the EC's 'divisive' role internationally as precluding any role in the prevention 
of war. While the EU remained a regional actor in the post-Cold War era, its role was 
nevertheless transformed. The European Union and its representatives were, by the 
early 2000s, citing conflict prevention as one of the organisation's main external 
objectives (Patten 2000; EUProgrammefor the Prevention of Violent Conflicts 
(Council of the EU 2001b). Differences and dividing lines between roles and 
responsibilities were no longer clear. The need to adapt from the particularities and 
predictability of the Cold War era to meet the security challenges of the 1990s was 
urgent. Yet adaptation was in danger of leading to a clash of organisations rather than 
a process of dialogue and coordination. 
4.3.2 Conflict prevention as a shared priority 
As conflict returned to the European continent as an actual or potential threat, crisis 
response became an expanding institutional policy area. The difficulties of post- 
conflict reconstruction in South-Eastern Europe led to a widespread approval of 
conflict prevention in particular as an approach preferable to dealing with the 
financial and human costs of violent conflict. By the late 1990s, international 
organisations had taken notice of influential reports such as the Carnegie 
Commission's Final Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997), and related studies 
providing empirical evidence of the cost-effectiveness of conflict prevention in the 
cases of Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia (Brown and Rosecrance 1998). In Europe, 
studies on conflict prevention proliferated (e. g. Munuera 1994; Rummel 1996; 
Clement 1997; Hill 2001; Van Tongeren, Van de Veen and Verhoeven 2002; 
Bj6rkdahl 2002b), and the EU sponsored the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) of 
academics to develop conflict prevention policy recommendations (e. g. CPN 
Yearbooks, 1997-2001). 
By the late 1990s, conflict prevention had therefore become a common stated goal for 
a plethora of organisations. While the UN has continued to play the primary role in 
maintaining international peace and security, its objective of conflict prevention (as 
understood in the post-Cold War period) has been adopted by regional organisations 
in Europe. This was not necessarily an unwelcome development: the organisation, 
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facing an increased demand for its services and a simultaneous crisis in funding, has 
encouraged the transference of burdens to regional organisations. In South-Eastern 
Europe especially, the UN and a number of regional organisations (the EU, NATO 
and OSCE) have all been involved, all with the common objective of preventing 
further conflict. Cooperation between organisations has become a new necessity in 
the politics of European security. Additionally, the number of international non- 
governmental organisations QNGOs) involved in conflict prevention has exploded in 
recent years, adding greater complexity. Many of the INGOs concerned with the 
prevention of violent conflict were established in the late 1980s as a response to the 
changing international situation and the continued prevalence of intra and inter-state 
war. 31 
Figure 4.2 shows the stages of conflict prevention, from structural conj7ict prevention 
through to early warning and analysis and operational activities, and the 
organisations with the mandate for conflict prevention tasks under these broad 
categories. This categorisation provides the template for the examination of EU 
conflict prevention in chapter 5, and EU cooperation in conflict prevention with the 
UN, the OSCE and NATO in chapters 6,7 and 8. The conflict prevention process has 
been simplified and divided into clear pre-and post-conflict stages. While this belies 
the complexity of conflict prevention, it is helpful to have a visual representation of 
the similar tasks carried out by different organisations. 
Structural conflict prevention in the form of development aid is a central feature of 
EU conflict prevention, as is also practiced by the UN. The tendency to identify all 
aid as contributing to conflict prevention means it can be difficult to identify aid 
allocated to prevent conflict in a specific country or region, although both 
organisations have developed particular conflict prevention funding mechanisms in 
recent years. Longer-term conflict prevention is not limited to aid, but includes the 
promotion of democracy and human rights by other means - such as membership 
criteria, diplomacy, or inclusion in programmes or forums. 
31 These include Saferworld, International Alert, International Crisis Group, and field organisations 
such as the International Red Cross. 
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Figure 4.2. Overlapping Organisational Competences 
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This is clearly a feature of EU external relations, but is also practiced by the UN, 
NATO and the OSCE. NATO has been included because its expanding agenda 
includes these concerns, although the extent of NATO contribution is debatable (see 
chapter 8). 
The EU gathers and assesses information and intelligence for early warning and 
analysis purposes, as do the other three organisations (although competences do vary 
considerably). While this would seem to confirm the maxim that it is early action 
rather than early warning that is the problem, it must be pointed out that most of the 
organisations rely on their members to supply information. The reluctance of 
members to share national intelligence precludes the building of a comprehensive 
early warning system within and between organisations. Nevertheless, all the 
organisations do have personnel in the field that can provide valuable information on 
likely conflicts, and most have access to a body of information for analytical and 
predictive purposes. 
The situation becomes more complex at the operational level. This is not surprising, 
since organisations and governments have a tendency to act only when a crisis can no 
longer be ignored. At the early operational stage, EU preventive diplomacy 
competenccs are mirrored in the UN and the OSCE. Civilian crisis management is 
also carried out by the UN and OSCE as well as the EU. This broad category covers a 
wide range of activities which may not always be applied in the pre-conflict stage e. g. 
election monitoring and police missions. The line between civilian and military crisis 
management is admittedly blurred, but some attempt has been made to distinguish 
between the two in order to increase the clarity of organisational activity. Civilian in 
this context means 'non-military' but does not necessary mean unarmed, since police 
missions, (inclusive of maintaining order and training local personnel) arc likely to be 
anned. The EU has been developing a role in civilian crisis management, in the form 
of cease-fire monitors (in former Yugoslavia), administrative roles (in the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo - UNMIK) police missions (Macedonia and Bosnia), and 
a rule of law mission in Georgia. This activity mirrors similar civilian police, 
administrative and military monitoring personnel in the UN. Military crisis 
management covers peacekeeping, peace enforcement, preventive deployment, 
military sanction enforcement and close air support. Broadly, peacekeeping activities 
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are now carried out by the EU and NATO, as well as the UN. 
In a study of international organisation, Pentland (1976) predicted increasing 
"conflicts over organisational jurisdiction" (1976: 65 8) and problems with attempts to 
coordinate, rationalise and restructure international institutions as a result. This 
analysis seems prescient in a post-Cold War Europe of crowded actors and 
overlapping policies. The adoption of conflict prevention tasks by all these 
organisations raises problems of duplication, competition and coordination. What is 
the extent of cooperation underway to counter these developments? 
4.3.3 The problem of policy coordination 
The EU and other organisations have adopted conflict prevention rhetoric and 
mechanisms as a strategy to address post-Cold War security, and have identified the 
policy, best practiced at the multilateral level, as a key area for cooperation. Yet has 
cooperation between the EU and other organisations in conflict prevention led to a 
deeper process of policy coordination? This entails considerably more than 
declarations to cooperate in official documents and infrequent meetings between 
officials. It requires dialogue and cooperation between institutional personnel and 
member states at all stages of the conflict prevention process illustrated above: from 
the structural to the operational. It requires a consensus on the root causes of conflict 
to ensure that organisations are working towards the same objectives with local 
partners. It requires complementary rather than competing strategies. 
While the tasks of different organisations can be grouped around conflict prevention 
stages, the variation in organisational structures and priorities between the EU and the 
other organisations does not necessarily lead to shared definitions or understandings 
of conflict prevention. The EU's practice of conflict prevention outside its 
membership area gives it considerably more leverage than the OSCE or the UN, who 
have to develop a consensual approach in order to ensure cooperation from their 
members. The EU may find itself with a different agenda from other organisations if 
dialogue is not actively sought - for example if the EU is preparing a country for 
enlargement, technical and economic considerations may be at odds with the OSCE's 
agenda to foster better long-term community relations. Policy coordination between 
the EU and the other organisations is therefore particularly important in conflict 
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prevention not only because all organisations claim to practice it, but because lack of 
coordination between the organisations in the same country/region can lead to 
conflicting policy aims and practices (e. g. in the Baltic countries - see Birckenbach 
2000 and Van Elsuwege 2002). 
Policy coordination is a problem at all levels of government - local, national and 
international. Coordination is normally defined as "working together harmoniously" 
(Collins English Dictionary). In a seminal study of political cooperation, Keohane 
contends that if harmony existed between actors, there would be no discord, and 
therefore no need for cooperation to improve policy coordination (1984: 12). 
Cooperation "requires that the actions of separate individuals or organisations - which 
are not in pre-existent han-nony - be brought into conformity with one another 
through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as policy coordination" 
(Keohane 1984: 5 1). Clearly, cooperation for conflict prevention has been on the 
agenda of the EU and other organisations since the early 1990s, as the possibility of 
competing and conflicting agendas arose. What is not clear is how much this 
cooperation has led to a process of policy coordination. Keohane suggests that the 
"impact of cooperation could be evaluated by measuring the difference between the 
actual outcome and the situation that would have obtained in the absence of 
coordination" (Keohane 1988: 380). The outcome of coordination for conflict 
prevention (or much else, for that matter) cannot be measured in this way. As argued 
in chapter 2, one of the main difficulties with conflict prevention as a policy is that it 
is impossible to know if the implementation of a certain policy prevented a specific 
conflict. Therefore, we cannot predict the outcome in the absence of coordination: a 
conflict may have been prevented by the action of one organisation alone, by 
coordinated organisational policies, or some other factor located at the domestic or 
regional level. Nevertheless, it can be suggested that coordinated effort on the part of 
organisations will increase the chance of a positive, non-violent outcome. If 
organisations are to practice this policy, reinforcement is preferable to contradiction. 
The number of organisations responding to crises, particularly in the Balkan region, 
has meant that cooperation between the EU and other actors has become common 
practice. The EU has been developing cooperative partnerships with the UN, OSCE 
and NATO in recent years, and particularly in the post- 1999 ESDP period. 
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Operational partnerships began as an ad hoc necessity in the early 1990s, and have 
become more formaliscd in recent years. The UN first began meeting with regional 
organisations biennially in 1994 in order to improve cooperation (biennial LJN- 
Regional Organisation Meetings (UN 1996)), and the OSCE, in its 1999 Charterfor 
European Security, adopted the Platform for Cooperative Security as a blueprint for 
strengthened cooperation between the OSCE and its partners (OSCE 1999). 
While there is a vast amount of rhetoric in the documents of the EU and the other 
three organisations on 'working with partners' and 'international cooperation' 
(European Commission 2001 and 2003c; Council of the EU 2001 a and 2001b; OSCE 
1999; UN 1992 and 1996) it is not clear that the lessons of inter-organisational 
disunity in the 1990s have been sufficiently heeded. The tendency, as in the cases of 
Bosnia and Kosovo, for states to resort to the creation of additional decision-making 
bodies (the Contact Group) led by national governments indicates a failure of 
organisational cooperation - either on the part of the member states, or within an 
organisation, or both. There has also been more organisational cooperation in the 
aftermath of conflict (i. e. for post conflict reconstruction) rather than in the pre- 
conflict stages: for example the administration of Kosovo (UNMIK). This suggests 
that crisis response, decision-making and dialogue between organisations is too slow 
and cumbersome in the pre-conflict stage. 
For the EU, it is not only policy coordination with other organisations that is 
problematic for conflict prevention. Intra-EU policy coordination not only mirrors the 
need for inter-organisational coordination, but may be a prerequisite for its success. 
Luard (1977), in his study of the United Nations, highlighted the lack of coordination 
between the UN and associated agencies in the 1970s. He argued that the growing 
complexity of the international system and the demands on the UN required "a clear 
definition of the responsibility of each agency in particular fields, and regular 
consultations to overcome any overlap that may arise" (1977: 278). Coordination in 
this context meant not merely the "avoidance of any overlap and duplication" but 
more broadly the "attempt to establish a conscious and deliberate order and 
relationship among various activities [of government] ... to impose a pattern of 
priorities among a multiplicity of programmes ... to draw up an overallplanfor the 
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whole system" (1977: 278-279)32. If this was required for the UN system in the 1970s, 
it is even more essential for a multi-institutional organisation like the EU today, 
which, as explained in chapter 3, has different procedures for decisions under 
different pillars. Moreover, the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention mechanisms 
depends to a large extent upon the avoidance of overlap and duplication, the 
establishment of order and relationship between EU institutions, and the drawing up 
of overall strategies within and between EU institutions through a process of 
consultation for the achievement of common and compatible goals. Chapter 5 
analyses EU conflict prevention policy and also examines how the pillar structure of 
the EU, inter-institutional problems and internal institutional problems impact on 
intra-EU conflict prevention coherency and coordination. Chapters 6,7 and 8 examine 
EU cooperation in conflict prevention with the UN, the OSCE and NATO, and also 
assess the impact that shortcomings in intra-EU coordination have on policy 
coordination with the three organisations. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the post-Cold War security context, focusing particularly 
on the impact of the new security environment on the development of the EU as a 
security actor. It has also identified the UN, the OSCE and NATO as the EU's key 
partners in post-Cold War conflict prevention. Ideas about European security were 
transformed in the aftermath of the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Perceptions of security and security threats underwent 
major revision, and, as a result, the role of international organisations was enhanced. 
The role of the EU in Europe became crucial in the development of peace and stability 
in the wider Europe. By the end of the 1990s, the Union had started to develop a 
comprehensive approach to security, surpassing its traditional role as a civilian 
organisation. While the development of the EU as a military actor has been 
controversial, it can be seen as a pragmatic response to European security challenges. 
Conflict prevention as a policy encapsulates the Union's international aims and 
identity, and its normative basis serves to rationalise the EU's military role. Its 
adoption by the EU therefore undoubtedly reflects normative trends in the European 
security discourse, although in practice it has not necessarily become a 'settled' norm. 
32 Emphasis added. 
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The European continent, inclusive of transatlantic partners, is the most institutionally 
complex region in the world. A general consensus on security concerns has led to the 
development of shared priorities and parallel mechanisms in crisis response. The 
rhetorical success of conflict prevention as a security strategy has resulted in a 
situation in which the EU has to pursue its objectives alongside three other major 
organisations. This indicates positive progress in organisational approach to the 
problem of violent conflict in the post-Cold war era, and a renewed desire for 
legitimacy and multilateralism. However, while organisations have been obliged to 
cooperate, it is less clear that this has resulted in a process of policy coordination of 
conflict prevention efforts. The trend to resort to ad hoc partnerships and short-term 
military solutions suggests that mechanisms for coordinating long-term preventive 
action are lacking, despite the apparent international consensus on long-term security 
solutions. 
The next step is to investigate the institutional evolution of EU conflict prevention. 
Crucially, the following chapter also examines the impact of the EU's complex 
external relations policies and procedures (as described in chapter 3) on intra-EU 
conflict prevention policy coordination. We then move on to EU external cooperation 
with the three organisations identified in this chapter as the EU's key partners in 
conflict prevention. What is the extent of cooperation in conflict prevention between 
the EU and the UN, the OSCE and NATO, and how do internal EU procedures impact 
on the Union's ability to implement a process of conflict prevention policy 
coordination with these organisations? 
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CHAPTER 5 
European Union Conflict Prevention 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses in detail on the development of EU conflict prevention policy. 
The competences and mechanisms that comprise EU conflict prevention policy 
(inclusive of crisis management mechanisms) are described, and the development of 
the policy within the EU institutions is explained. Conflict prevention policy 
combines the EU's external economic competences i. e. development and 
humanitarian aid, with the 'high' politics of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It therefore presents a 
particular challenge at the EU level, despite the establishment of the single 
institutional framework in the 1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU), which brought 
foreign policy cooperation into the formal institutional set-up. 
As explained in chapter 3, the EU is the product of a fifty-year evolutionary process 
based on pragmatism, negotiation and compromise. Inevitably, this has not resulted in 
the development of an optimal set of institutions and procedures with mechanisms to 
coordinate policy across an increasingly wide array of policy agendas. Efforts to 
establish conflict prevention as a policy priority at the EU level during the post-Cold 
War period highlight the difficulties resulting from this incremental institutional 
development. EU ambitions to forge a role as conflict preventor reflect, moreover, the 
influence of external developments and rising expectations of EU abilities. The 
attempt to run before it could walk in the early 1990s, particularly in former 
Yugoslavia, left the EU with a tarnished reputation on the international stage, which 
has tended to overshadow the efforts made to overcome its foreign policy 'paralysis' 
(Zielonka 1998). 
In fact, considerable progress in the development of foreign policy mechanisms has 
been made since the early 1990s, when the Union was frequently criticised for having 
neither a foreign policy, nor the clear strategic objectives needed to develop one. The 
EU now has policy competences, planning and analysis capabilities, operational 
mechanisms and a security strategy to guide external action. In the EU Programme 
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for the Prevention of Violent Conj7icts, adopted at the G6teborg European Council in 
June 2001, the commitment was made to "pursue conflict prevention as one of the 
main objectives of the EU's external relations" (Council of the EU 2001b: 
l/paragraph 5). Preventive engagement subsequently emerged as one of the key 
objectives of the EU Security Strategy, prepared by Javier Solana, EU Secretary 
General/High Representative for CFSP (SG/HR) and adopted in December 2003. 
Conflict prevention capacities are categorised as long-term (structural) policy aimed 
at addressing root causes of conflict, medium-term early warning and analysis 
competences, and finally short-term preventive diplomacy and civilian and/or military 
crisis management (operational). The EU has developed mechanisms to contribute to 
external conflict prevention in each of these areas, and the chapter examines the EU's 
competences in these fields in turn. Identifying EU mechanisms highlights the fact 
that the development of conflict prevention policy has involved EU institutions with 
different approaches and decision-making procedures. The final section of the chapter 
addresses some of the key implications of this set-up. Policy-making is divided 
between the European Commission and the Council of the EU, which not only 
complicates the planning and formulation of policy, but also requires sufficient 
dialogue, coordination of policy, and shared objectives. The difficulty in creating a 
coordinated conflict prevention policy at the EU level is primarily due to this 
fragmentation of policy across different pillars and institutions. This is compounded 
by the lack of coordination between civilian and military approaches and mechanisms. 
Lack of internal coordination has two serious implications: the EU's reputation as an 
international actor in conflict prevention is undermined; and the ability of the EU to 
practice external policy coordination in conflict prevention with the international 
organisations identified as the EU's key partners in chapter 4- the United Nations 
(UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) - is compromised. 
5.2 The Emergence of EU Conflict Prevention Discourse 
The emergence of conflict prevention in the EU external relations discourse is 
intimately connected to Western Europe's desire for stability on its periphery, and the 
development of the CFSP. Table 5.1 ('The Emergence of EU Conflict Prevention 
Discourse') shows some key extracts from EU documents pertinent to the rise of 
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conflict prevention and crisis management as EU foreign policy objectives. Analysis 
of EU documents shows conflict prevention to be an implicit aim of the CFSP in the 
1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU). Listed as objectives of the CFSP are "to 
preserve peace and strengthen international security" and "to develop and consolidate 
democracy" (see extract 1, Table 5.1). This link between democracy and peace is 
frequently emphasised by the EU, reflecting a consensus on the democraticpeace 
thesis, underscored by the history of European integration. Indeed, the promotion of 
democracy was central to early foreign policy initiatives under European Political 
Cooperation (EPC), particularly in Portugal and Spain, where the transition to 
democracy was linked to EC aid and trade agreements in the 1970s (Van Praag 1982). 
The EU's intention of being part of a wider European security system is reflected in 
the objective to "promote international cooperation" for these ends. The actual 
substance of the CFSP is vague, particularly in the context of a future common 
defence (see Article JA in extract 1). The Western European Union (WEU) is put 
forward as the potential 'operational' wing of the EU. The lack of clarity over defence 
and the role of the WEU indicated a lack of Member State consensus on these issues. 
By the June 1992 Lisbon European Council, conflict prevention became an explicit 
stated objective of the CFSP (see extract 2, Table 5.1). While still tentative ("the likely 
development of the CFSP") the Presidency report suggests for the first time that the 
EU should have the capacity to tackle root causes of conflict. Moreover, EU interests 
were being framed in terms of "the creation of a more favourable international 
environment". In light of the Union's failure to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis 
in Yugoslavia, the refocusing of CFSP objectives towards "contributing to the 
prevention and settlement of conflicts" and "contributing to a more effective 
international coordination in dealing with emergency situations" was understandably 
seen to be important in establishing some credibility for EU foreign policy. The 
geographical focus of CFSP action was henceforth to be Central and Eastern Europe, 
the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Stability on the borders of EU 
territory was paramount, and conflict prevention was at the core of EU efforts. 
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Table 5.1 The Emergence of EU Conflict Prevention Discourse 
Document Extract 
A rticle J. I 
1.1991 Trea1y o 
European Union. Title V: 2. The objectives ofthe commonforeign and securitypolicy 
Provisions on a Common shall be: 
Foreign and Security - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests 
Policy. and independence of the Union; 
- to strengthen the security ofthe Union and its Member 
states in all ways; 
- to preserve peace and strengthen international 
security, in accordance with the principles ofthe 
United Nations Charter as well as theprinciples ofthe 
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives ofthe Paris 
Charter,, 
- to promote international cooperation; 
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of 
law, and respect human rights andfundamental 
freedoms. 
ArticleJ4 
1. The common foreign and security policy shall include 
all questions related to the security ofthe Union, 
including the eventualframing ofa common defence 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. 
2. June 1992 Lisbon European Annex IReport to the European Council in Lisbon on the likely 
Council Presidency Conclusions development of the CFSP 
3 ... the CFSP should contribute to ensuring that the Union's 
external action is less reactive to events in the outside world, 
and more active in the pursuit ofthe interests of the Union and 
in the creation ofa morefavourable international environment. 
This will enable the European Union to have an improved 
capacity to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate 
the outbreak oftrises. 
10. For each area, the Union should define specific objectives in 
order to elect the issues in whichjoint action may be envisaged. 
These specific objectives may be inter alia: 
- strengthening democratic principles and institutions, 
and respectfor human and minority rights; 
- promoting regional stability... 
- contributing to the prevention and settlement of 
conflicts; 
- contributing to a more effective international 
coordination in dealing with emergency situations; 
- strengthening existing cooperation in issues of 
international interest such as thefight against arms 
proliferation, terrorism and the traffic in illicit drugs; 
- promoting and supporting good government. 
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3. December 1994 Essen The European Union is making an essential contribution to 
European Council Presidency overcoming the legacy ofpast divisions, andpromoting peace, 
Conclusions security and stability in and around Europe. 
4. June 1999 Cologne European Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European 
Council Presidency Conclusions Policy on Security and Defence 
I.... The development ofan EU military crisis management 
capacity is to be seen as an activity within theframework of the 
CFSP (Title V of the TE U)... The atlantic alliance remains the 
foundation ofthe collective defence of its members. 
5. December 2000 Nice Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence 
European Council Presidency Policy 
Conclusions 
The aim ofthe efforts made since the Cologne, Helsinki and 
Feira European Councils is to give the European Union the 
means ofplaying its rolefully on the international stage and of 
assuming its responsibilities in theface on crises by adding to 
the range of instruments already at its disposal an autonomous 
capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defence 
field... 
6. AVIil 2001 Commission The ever-growing list ofcauses ofcorflicts callsfor 
Communication on Conflict international cooperation and multilateral action ofa new 
Prevention order. The EQ, itsetran on-going exercise in makingpeace and 
prosperity, has a big role to play in global effortsfor conflict 
prevention. For this, it has at its disposal a wide range of 
instrumentsfor long term or short term action. 
7. June 2001 G6teborg EuroRea 52. Yhe European Council endorsed the EU Programmefor the 
Council Presidency Conclusions Prevention of Violent Conflicts which will improve the Union's 
capacity to undertake coherent early warning, analysis and 
action. Conflict prevention is one ofthe main objectives ofthe 
Union's external relations and should be integrated in all its 
relevant aspects, including the European Security and Defence 
Policy, development cooperation and trade. 
The EU will: 
8. June 2001 EU Programme for 
the Prevention of Violent set clearprioritiesfor preventive actions, 
Conflicts improve its early warning, action andpolicy coherence 
enhance its instrumentsfor long and short-term 
prevention, and 
build effective partnershipsfor prevention. 
9. December 2003 Thessaloniki ... we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict 
European prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early. 
Security Strategy 
We need to be able to act before countries around us 
deteriorate, when signs ofproliferation are detected, and before 
humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can 
uture. 
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The 1993 Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions introduced the EU's 
draft Pact on Stability in Europe as an initiative designed to prevent conflict in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The Pact is generally viewed as being one of the most 
comprehensive and successful early CFSP joint actions (Cameron 1998). By 1994, as 
stated in the Essen European Council Presidency Conclusions, the EU saw itself as 
"making an essential contribution to ... promoting peace, security and stability 
in and 
around Europe" (extract 3, Table 5.1). By the mid-1990s, wider interpretations of the 
causes of conflict prompted the European Commission to link development aid to 
political conditions, and to promote the 'mainstreaming' of conflict prevention 
considerations into EU policy-making. The development context became the basis for 
EU structural conflict prevention. The Commission was also keen to play a role in the 
development and elucidation of non-military crisis management mechanisms to 
ensure its involvement in operational aspects of conflict prevention and to 
complement its role in structural prevention. 
In the wake of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (ratified 1999), the EU had made 
marginal improvements in the CFSP by creating a planning and analysis unit in the 
Council Secretariat, and the role of High Representative for the CFSP. Additionally, 
the EU's operational capacity was defined in terms of "humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking" (the Petersberg tasks: Treaty of Amsterdam, Title V, Article J. 7 (2)). 
The year 1999 saw considerable progress in the development of an EU military 
capacity also as the result of the 1998 Franco-British St Malo Summit, during which 
the UK government indicated that it would no longer object to an autonomous EU 
crisis management force. The June 1999 Cologne European Council stressed that the 
development of the 'Common European Policy on Security and Defence' came under 
the CFSP umbrella, and reiterated the British position with regard to the continued 
supremacy of NATO in European defence (see extract 4, Table 5.1). The Helsinki and 
Nice European Councils outlined new bodies to manage and develop the EU's roles in 
military and civilian crisis management, and set a target for the development of an EU 
rapid reaction force. These were designed to allow the Union to play "its full role on 
the international stage ... 
in the face of crises... " (see extract 5, Table 5.1). 
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The publicity that the development of a potential European army attracted tended to 
overshadow the progress made by the European Commission in elucidating the EVS 
interpretation of conflict prevention. The 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention 
linked the EU's legacy of peace with external relations policy objectives in conflict 
prevention (see extract 6, Table 5.1), and outlined a vast number of long and short- 
term EU instruments. This was the first time that a clear definition of conflict 
prevention, distinguishing between long-term structural prevention ('projecting 
stability') and short-term prevention ('reacting quickly to nascent conflicts') had 
appeared in an EU document (European Commission 2001 a: 6). The evolution of the 
term in EU documents and parlance reflects confusion surrounding this and related 
terminology such as preventive diplomacy, crisis response and crisis management. 
After the Commission adopted this holistic definition, the institution's website still 
defined conflict prevention as "actions undertaken over the short term to reduce 
manifest tensions and/or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict. ', 33 
This confusion was not confined to the EU; as discussed in chapter 2, academics and 
practitioners define conflict prevention in a number of different ways. By 2001-02, 
the EU had adopted a wide definition of conflict prevention, in contrast to its earlier 
association (in the EU and elsewhere) with narrow preventive diplomacy (Cottey 
1998: 4). 
Progress in conflict prevention was encouraged by the Swedish Presidency, which 
was instrumental in the drafting of the 2001 EUProgrammefor the Prevention of 
Violent Conflict. The four pledges for a more effective EU prevention policy 
(reproduced in extract 8, Table 5.1) pick up on key areas of perceived EU 
shortcomings: priority setting; early warning, action and policy coherence; enhanced 
long and short-term prevention; and effective partnership-building. The document 
calls mainly on Council institutions to implement these improvements, particularly the 
European Council, COREPER and the High Representative. Conflict prevention 
emerged as a central theme in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), confirming 
its rhetorical success in EU security discourse (see extract 9, Table 5.1). 
33 
telopment/prevention/definition. htm. Accessed IOM02. 
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EU publications on conflict prevention and military and non-military crisis 
management mushroomed after 2000 (see Figure 5.1). The bar chart shows the result 
of a search of Council documents from 1999 through to 2003 to include the term 
sconflict prevention' in the text. From 10+ documents in 2000, the figure rises to 35+ 
in 2001, to 40+ in 2002. The increase from 2001 indicates that conflict prevention 
considerations were increasingly taken into account (or at least recognised) across a 
range of EU policy areas. This evidence provides rhetorical support for the stated 
objective at the 2001 G6teborg European Council to integrate conflict prevention into 
ESDP, development cooperation and trade (see extract 7, Table 5.1). It also shows 
that the institutional focus for conflict prevention had shifted from the Commission to 
the Council as new units and committees were created in the Council of the EU to 
support the ESDP. EU developments were also clearly influenced by parallel 
developments at the UN and OSCE level, and efforts to cooperate with these bodies in 
conflict prevention is increasingly stated as an objective in EU documents, especially 
by the 2001 G6teborg European Council Presidency report on the European Security 
and Defence Policy. Negotiations with NATO over the use of NATO assets for EU 
crisis management became increasingly crucial as a possible EU mission in 
Macedonia was discussed. 
The explosion of EU interest in establishing conflict prevention as a guiding principle 
in foreign policy follows on from a rise in academic interest in the EU's conflict 
prevention role. A search of aj ournal database (JSTOR) for articles containing the 
phrases 'conflict prevention' and 'European Union' shows an increase over the 1990s. 
Figure 5.2 shows the result of this search. It is important to note that the development 
of conflict prevention mechanisms at the EU level is far from divorced from a wider 
interest in conflict prevention as a new security strategy in academia, research 
institutes and other international/regional organisations and NGOs. Not only was the 
EU influenced by external perceptions of where the organisation had previously 
'failed' in its foreign policy, but it was also quick to construct its international 
presence and objectives in a way that was acceptable to its Member States and its 
critics. Moreover, the EU advanced its role at a time when conflict prevention was 
increasingly on multilateral and national agendas. We now move on to a detailed 
inventory of the EU's conflict prevention policy, divided here into structural, early 
warning and analysis, and operational. 
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Figure 5.1 Number of documents published 1999-2003 with the term 'conflict prevention' in EU texts 
available on the Public Register of Council Documents. (A Consilium simple search was performed on 
1/8/03). 
Figure 5.2 Number of articles published with the terms 'conflict prevention' and 'European Union' in 
the text available on JSTOR. (An advanced search was performed on 1/8/03. JSTOR is an electronic 
database which searches a large number of political journals including: British Journal ofPolitical 
Science, Comparative Politics, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 
International Organisation, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of 
Peace Research, Journal ofPolitics, Midwest Journal ofPolitical Science, PS, Political Science 
Quarterly, Public Opinion Quarterly, Western Political Quarterly, World Politics, MERIP Reports, 
Political Theory, International Security, Political Behavior, Conj7ict Resolution, Political Science and 
Politics, Political Research Quarterly, Journal of the British Institute ofInternational Affairs, Journal 
ofthe Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 1931-1939), International Affairs Review Supplement. Most journal articles are available from 
the inception of the journal to between 3-5 years before present. The last 3-5 years are often 
unavailable, being restricted by fixed or moving walls to protect copyright, hence the fall in the number 
of records from 2000 onwards. ) 
97 
5.3 Structural Conflict Prevention: The Commission's Domain 
The European Commission is largely responsible for structural, or long-term conflict 
prevention, as it manages the EU's external aid programmes. Aid contributes to the 
tackling of root causes of conflict caused by poverty, inequality and economic 
underdevelopment. Additionally, the EU promotes basic conflict prevention tenets 
like democracy, human rights and good governance through political conditionality in 
aid and trade agreements. Enlargement is another form of structural conflict 
prevention largely managed by the Commission (subject to Council agreement). The 
extensive acquis communitaire 34 requires candidate countries to meet economic and 
political criteria, inclusive of respect for human rights and minorities. The following 
section examines the roles of development cooperation, political conditionality and 
humanitarian aid in EU conflict prevention. 
5.3.1 Development cooperation 
The connection between development aid and strategies to prevent conflict is a post- 
Cold War phenomenon, linked to the politicisation of development aid. While the 
targets of assistance, (typically economic and social development), are obviously 
crucial in establishing the basis of a conflict-free society, the link between the two 
issues is complex and often controversial. This is largely due to the frequent inability 
to predict the impact of aid on situations with unique and different political, social and 
economic variables. The controversy arises from moral questions about the 
application of conditionality and the conflicting nature of external policies. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the EU has a long history in the promotion of development 
in third world countries. Legal agreements with third countries on aid, trade and 
economic issues form the backbone of Community external relations (e. g. 
Cooperation, Association, or Accession Agreements). While always implicitly 
political, these agreements increasingly include overtly stated political conditions to 
be met by the third country, reflecting the Union's commitment to human rights, 
democracy and good governance, for example. The type of agreement concluded with 
the Union also reflects a hierarchy of privilege, with future members and/or 
peripheral countries receiving preferential treatment (Smith, K. 2003: 56). The fact 
34 The laws and policies already adopted by the EU. 
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that political commitments don't always square with economic policy is not 
something that the Union is unaware of The increasing call for coherence and 
consistency across EU policy and pillars reflects a recognition of the possible 
contradiction between the promotion of free trade in third countries and the 
protectionism of the Common Agricultural Policy, for example (Smith, K. 2003: 65), 
or the discrepancies between development/conflict prevention objectives and Member 
State arms sales to developing countries. 
The context of Community development policy changed dramatically with the end of 
the Cold War. The traditional assumptions of EC policy and strategy in the 
development sphere came increasingly under pressure in a world vastly changed in 
economic and political terms. Holland (2002: 9) cites the fall of the Berlin Wall as 
precipitating a redefinition of the development context, resulting in a rerouting of aid 
from the Africa to Eastern and Central Europe. Griffin, citing foreign aid as a product 
of the ideological confrontation of the Cold War, correctly predicted a fall in the 
levels of official development assistance, but continuing widespread support for 
disaster relief and emergency aid (1991: 670-671). The process of change is 
exemplified by the renegotiation of the Lom6 Convention, a unique EU cooperation 
agreement with the ACP countries, linked originally to EU members through colonial 
ties. The 2000 Cotonou Agreement reduces economic privileges for ACP countries, 
includes new political conditions, and reflects the trade liberalisation agenda of the 
big players on the global economic stage. This revision of the aid hierarchy is no 
short-term development either, since it is questionable whether current aid levels can 
be sustained in light of EU enlargement to states that are economically poor by 
Western standards (Holland 2002: 9). 
Inconsistency and confusion over EU development objectives undoubtedly reflects the 
'aid fatigue' of the 1990s, and the widely held conclusion that aid just wasn't 
working. The influx of aid to developing countries over the preceding decades had not 
resulted in a widespread move towards political and economic stability. The 
restructuring of EC external affairs and reforms in the implementation of aid in recent 
years was a response to this. This realisation was also to fuel a new wave of 'second 
generation' conditionality, designed to improve the targeting and effectiveness of aid: 
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political conditionality. 35 The linking of stability enhancing instruments with foreign 
policy objectives became increasingly visible, enabling the Union to seek greater 
coherence in its external policies. It is widely believed that linking aid to political 
objectives is an effective way the EU can contribute to preventing conflict (Barth Eide 
and Ronnfeldt 1998; Eavis and Kefford 2002; Smith, K. E. 2003). Development 
policies and aid can be controversial, however, when linked to strategic and political 
policies. 
5.3.2 The objectives of development: where does conflict prevention come in? 
The European Union (inclusive of Member State bilateral programmes) is the world's 
largest donor of development aid, and therefore has a key role to play in structural 
conflict prevention. Examining the objectives of development aid throws up some 
paradoxes. Despite the Commission's emphasis on structural conj7ict prevention, little 
mention is made of conflict prevention in development policy documents. Table 5.2 
('EU Conflict Prevention: Development, Early Warning and Operational') begins 
with some extracts from EU documents pertaining to development cooperation. The 
1992 Treaty on European Union outlined development objectives as centered on 
sustainable economic development and the eradication of poverty in developing 
countries. Additionally, development cooperation would contribute to the wider 
objectives of "developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of 
law ... respecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms" (see extract I in Table 5.2). 
The Union's inclusion of political conditionality clauses in development and trade 
agreements with third countries was increasingly visible in support of this objective. 
Conflict prevention was emerging as an issue in the EC development sphere by the 
mid- I 990s, particularly in the African context, in the aftermath of violent conflicts in 
Somalia and Rwanda. Lying on the boundary between development and security, 
conflict prevention gained support as a way of managing change in Africa in 
particular. 36 The EU (as recently confirmed in the European Security Strategy) 
recognises that "development depends on peace and peace depends on development" 
(Stokke 1997: 196); stability in recipient countries is paramount if aid is to be 
35 Political conditionality can be defined as entailing "the linkage, by a state or international 
organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid), to the fulfilmcnt of conditions relating 
to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic principles" (Smith, K. 1998: 256). 
36 Interview with European Commission official, 25/10/04. 
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effective in assisting social and economic development. Development 
Commissioner's were vocal about the contribution the EU could make to conflict 
prevention. According to Poul Nielson, development cooperation is the greatest 
contribution to conflict prevention that the EU can make in developing countries, 
where the threat of EU military intervention is less credible. More controversially, he 
cites the Community method as the only way that the EU can establish a credible and 
common foreign policy. 37 Former Development Commissioner Joao de Deus Pinheiro 
in 1998 cited the new 'peace-oriented approach' to development cooperation as the 
primary reason behind the enhancement of Commission policy planning and analysis 
initiatives. 38 By the year 2000, the Commission's Communication on Development 
Policy focused on poverty reduction as the overall aim of EU development policY39 , 
and this was reiterated by the Council and the Commission in a November 2000 
statement (see extract 2 in Table 5.2). Conflict prevention was increasingly mentioned 
as an issue to be mainstreamed into Community programming (European Commission 
2004a). 
While there was clearly recognition that the effectiveness of development 
cooperation, with poverty reduction as its main objective, relies on stability within 
countries receiving aid, and states that the strategy "must contribute to strengthening 
democracy, to the consolidation of peace and the prevention of conflict" (extract 2, 
Table 5.2), these issues were less visible. Moreover, strategies to reduce poverty will 
not necessarily contribute to strengthening democracy and preventing conflict. 
Economic and social development designed to alleviate poverty may incite conflict in 
communities, depending on which social, sectoral or ethnic groups are favoured. The 
primary focus on poverty reduction doesn't directly address issues of inequality 
(whether economic, political or cultural)40 in developing countries, which may be 
more likely to fuel conflict than poverty (Addison 2000: 405). Poverty reduction also 
sits uneasily beside the parallel insistence by international financial institutions and 
the EU on trade liberalisation and privatisation in developing countries. 
37 Poul Nielson, 'Building Credibility: The Role of European Development Policy in preventing 
conflicts. ' Speech made at the Foreign Policy Centre, London, 8 February 200 1. 
39 Joao de Deus Pinheiro 'Can EU development assistance contribute to peace and security? ' Speech to 
CESD/ISIS Conference of "The future of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy". Brussels, 24 
September 1998. www. europa. eu. int/comm/develol2ment/si)eeches/en/980924. htm. Accessed 29/9/02 
39 In line with the UN's Millennium Development Goals. 
40 i. e. horizontal inequalities, as identified by Frances Stewart (2002). 
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Table 5.2 EU Conflict Prevention: Development Cooperation, Early Warning 
and Operational 
1.1992 Trea1y on 1. Community Policy in the sphere ofdevelopment cooperation, which shall 
European Union, be complementary to thepolicies pursued by the member states, shall 
Title XVII, Article foster: 
130u. Maastricht. - the sustainable economic and social development of the 
developing 
countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged 
among them; 
- the smooth and gradual integration of the developing 
countries into 
the world economy; 
- the campaign againstpoverty in the developing countries. 
2. Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of 
developing and consolidating democracy and the rule oflaw, and to that of 
respecting human rights andfundamentalfreedoms. 
2. November 2000 The principal aim of the Community's development policy is to reduce 
Statement by the poverty with a view to its eventual eradication. 
Council and the 
Commission. The Poverty ... resultsfrom manyJactors. The 
Community is therefore 
European determined to supportpoverty reduction strategies which integrate these 
Community's many dimensions and are based on the analysis ofconstraints and 
Development Policy opportunities in individual developing countries. These strategies must 
contribute to strengthening democracy, to the consolidation ofpeace and 
the prevention ofconflict, to gradual integration into the world economy, to 
more awareness of the social and environmental aspects with a view to 
sustainable development, to equality between men and women and to public 
andprivate capacity-building. 
3. April 2001 
Commission The pursuit of effective linkage is not simply a matter of ensuring a smooth 
Communication on transitionfrom emergency to development assistance. It must be seen in a 
Linking Relief, broader context, as part ofan integrated approach towards preventing 
Rehabilitation and crises and disasters, in particular through disaster preparedness, as well as 
Development - An preventing and resolving conflicts... 
Assessment 
4.1997 Trea! y of Part III. Declarations 
Amsterdam 
Title V: Provisions 6. Declaration on the establishment ofa policyplanning and early warning 
on a Cornmon unit Foreign and Security 
Policy. The Conference agrees that: 
1. A policy planning and early warning unitshall be establishedin the 
General Secretariat of the Council under the responsibility of its Secretary- 
General, High Representativefor the CFSP. Appropriate cooperation shall 
be established with the Commission in order to ensurefull coherence with 
the Union's external economic and developmentpolicies. 
2. The tasks of the unit shall include thefollowing: 
(a) monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP, - 
(b) providing assessments ofthe Union'sforeign and securitypolicy 
interests and identifying areas where the CFSP couldfocus infuture, 
(c) providing timely assessments and early warning of events or situations 
which may have significant repercussionsfor the Union'sforeign and 
securitypolicy, including potential political crises; 
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(d) producing, at the request ofeither the Councilor the Presidenc oron y 
its own initiative, arguedpolicY options papers to be presented under the 
responsibility ofthe Presidency as a contribution to policyformulation in 
the Council, and which may contain analyses, recommendations and 
strategiesfor the CFSP. 
3. The unit shall consist ofpersonnel drawnfrom the General Secretariat, 
the Member States, the Commission and the WEU. 
4. Any Member State or the Commission may make suggestions to the unit 
for work to be undertaken. 
5. Member States and the Commission shall assist the policy planning 
process byproviding, to thefullest extentpossible, relevant information, 
including confidential information. 
5. June 1999 Cologne Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on 
European Council Security and Defence 
Presideric 
Conclusions 3. Decision Making 
.. necessary arrangements must 
be made in order to ensure political control 
and strategic direction ofEU-1ed Petersberg operations.. 
Furthermore, the EU will need a capacityfor analysis ofsituations, sources 
of intelligence, and a capacityfor relevant strategic planning. 
This may require in particular: 
- regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the GAC, as appropriate including 
Defence 
Ministers; 
-a permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee) 
consisting of 
representatives with politicallmilitary expertise, 
- an EUMilitary Committee consisting ofMilitary Representatives making 
recommendations to the Political and Security Committee; 
- an EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre; 
- other resources such as a Satellite Centre, Institutefor Security Studies. 
6.30 November 2000 
GAC Contributian by 2. In order to ensure consistency between the instruments available to the 
the Secretary Union, it is essential that a single body should have access to all the 
General/ High information, proposals and initiatives relating to the crisis involved in 
Representative: order to make a global assessment; following the conclusions ofthe 
reference framework Helsinki European Council, this role wouldfall to the Political and 
for crisis Security Committee. 
management 
7. December 2000 Key recommendations in the short term [selected] 
Nice Eurol2ea 
Council -Early consideration ofconflict prevention by the GAC ... periodic Improving the identification ofpriority areasfor EU action; 
Coherence and -SG1HR and Commission to assist in overseeing implementation ofpolicies; 
Effectiveness of the -The Political andSecurity Committee invited to develop role asfocalpoint 
European Union in in developing conj7ict prevention policies in CFSP and CSDP, - 
the Field of Conflict -Better coordination of information sources available to the Union and 
Prevention. Report-by regularpreparation by the Policy Unit and by the Commission ofpapers on 
the Secretary- conflict prevention issuesfor consideration bypolicy makers. 
GeneraL/High 
Representative and 
the Commission. 
8. June 2001 EU In order to ensure early warning, action andpolicy coherence: 
Pro2ramme for the 
Prevention of Violent - Coreper will continue to ensure coherence between differentpolicy areas 
Conflicts of the Union, paying specific attention to the question ofcoherent 
preventive activities, 
The PSC willfurther strengthen its role in developing and monitoring 
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conflict prevention policies within the CTSP and the ESDP... 
-Member States, their Heads ofMission, EU Special Representatives, 
EC 
delegations and other representatives of the Commission, as well as the 
Council Secretariat, including the PPEJJV and the EUMS, shouldprovide 
regular information on developments ofjootential conflict situations... 
- Full use will be made of information fromfield basedpersonnel of the 
UN 
and the OSCE, as well as other international organisations and civil 
society, 
- Increased exchange of information between the Member States and the 
Commission is encouraged... I 
- Full use will be made of the Guidelinesfor strengthening operational 
coordination between the Community, represented by the Commission, and 
the Member States in thefield of external assistance... 
9. December 1999 Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Policy on 
Helsinki European Security and Defence 
Council Presidengy 
Conclusions A common European headline goal will he adoptedfor readily deployable 
military capabilities and collective capability goals in thefields of 
command and control, intelligence and strategic transport will be 
developed rapidly, to be achieved through voluntary coordinated national 
and multi-national efforts, for carrying out thefull range ofPetersberg 
tasks. 
... by theyear 
2003, cooperating together voluntarily they [member states] 
will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustainforces capable of thefull 
range ofPetersberg tasks ... including the most demanding, in operations up 
to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). 
Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European 
Union 
The Presidency was mandated ... to continue the work on all aspects of 
security including the enhancement and better coordination ofthe Union's 
and the Member States'non-military crisis response tools. Developments 
inter alia in Kosovo havefor their part underlined the importance ofthis 
task. 
10. June 2000 Feira Presidency Report on Strengthening the CESDP Appendix 3: 'Study of 
European Council Concrete Targets on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management' 
Presidenc 
Conclusions The reinforcement ofthe Union's capabilities in civilian aspects oftrisis 
management should, above all, provide it with adequate means tojace 
complex political crises by: 
- acting to prevent the eruption or escalation ofconflicts; 
- consolidating peace and internal stability in periods oftransition; 
- ensuring complementarity between the military and civilian aspects of 
crisis management 
covering thefull range ofPetersberg tasks. 
11. December 2002 Fact-finding missions have an importance and a value, which may-go 
Council of the EU beyond those ofa mere information-gathering and assessment tool. They 
'EU crisis are also a signal which may be considered highly politically sensitive with 
management and respect to the host country, the neighbours in the region and the 
conflict prevention - international community. Injact, FFMs will generallyprove to the 
Guidelines on fact- international community the EUs awareness ofa given crisis, they will 
finding missions' point out that the EU is seriously concerned with the situation in the crisis 
area, and they may indicate a potential willingness actively to manage that 
crisis. 
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These policies often result in greater poverty and inequality for the majority, again 
fuelling conflict (Addison 2000: 405). The fact that the bulk of EC aid is now not 
going to the poorest countries also serves to undermine the poverty reduction 
objective (Smith, K. 2003: 59). This is largely as a result of the prioritisation of the 
EU's near neighbours. It is far from certain that political conditionality is the answer 
to development failures, especially since conditions are not properly monitored or 
consistently applied (Kanbur 2000; Smith, K. E. 2003). The suspension of 
agreements in response to violations of human rights or democratic principles relies 
on a series of cross-pillar and inter-institutional mechanisms, and the institutions are 
not always in agreement with each other or the Member States on the proposed 
action. Member States appear to have the upper hand in the employment of blocking 
proposals and delaying tactics. In a study of EU political conditionality, Karen Smith 
found that in some cases, strategic and/or economic interests overrode concerns over 
political conditions, and neither positive nor negative measures were applied 
consistently (Smith 1998). This self-interest undermines the principles that the EU 
claims to be promoting. Upholding the EU's stance on human rights and democracy, 
whilejustifying aid cuts, the conditionality debate exemplifies thel990s paradox of 
political rhetoric for aid in a climate of falling levels of overseas aid (Th6rien and 
Lloyd 2000: 2 1). Narrow poverty reduction strategies and inconsistent political 
conditionality do not indicate a commitment to 'peace-oriented' development. 
Indeed, the Conflict Prevention Newsletter, published by a group of NGOs (The 
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation) argued that the 2000 
Communication on Development Policy relegated conflict prevention in the priority 
stakes, and focused instead on trade liberalisation and foreign investment as key to 
economic growth in developing countries . 
41 Conflict prevention is not cited as a clear 
priority in EC development cooperation, and the 'mainstreaming' of conflict 
prevention will only succeed if development staff are properly trained. According to 
a Commission official, staff across a range of external policy areas subject to 
mainstrearning (including delegations) lack conflict prevention expertise. 42 
41 'Conflict prevention and the new EC Development Policy: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? ' 
Outlook on Brussels, Conflict Prevention Newsletter 3 (2), 2000. 42 Interview with European Commission official, 25/10/04. 
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The inconsistent record of conflict prevention in EU development documents 
undoubtedly reflects difficulties in defining the concept and tying it in with other 
pressing development objectives. Internal Commission politics also provides an 
explanation. The reorganisation of Commission portfolios in 1999 meant that conflict 
prevention expanded from its base in DG Development, where it had originated. The 
EuropeAid Cooperation Office, established in 2001 to handle the planning, 
management and implementation of EC aid downsized DG Development's 
responsibilities, as did the decentralisation of aid management, gradually transferred 
to EC delegations in developing countries. 
Crucially, the waning record of conflict prevention in development documents 
described above coincides with the establishment of the Conflict Prevention and 
Crisis Management Unit in the Commission's DG External Relations in 2000. DG 
External Relations were far better placed to utilise conflict prevention as an 
instrument of foreign policy linked to the CFSP project. The link with development 
cooperation was aided by the fragmentation of development in the Commission - with 
DG Development dealing only with the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) 
countries, and DG External Relations responsible for development in other countries 
apart from the candidate countries (the responsibility of DG Enlargement). 
Additionally, DG External Relations were henceforth responsible for ACP political 
issues. A certain marginalisation of DG Development resulted in the ascendancy of 
DG External Relations, headed by Chris Patten. Interestingly, Patten seized on the 
idea of conflict prevention as enhancing the role of the Commission in the CFSP, 
having previously regarded the concept as beyond the scope of Commission activity 
(Bj6rkdahl 2002: 118). DG External Relations were henceforth to develop the 
Commission's long-term approach to conflict prevention: the Country Strategy 
Papers, Country Conflict Assessments, and the Check List for Root Causes of 
Conflict. 
5.3.3 Country Strategy Papers, Conflict Assessments and Check List for Root 
Causes of Conflict 
Located in the CFSP Directorate of DG External Relations, the Conflict Prevention 
and Crisis Management Unit developed the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), Country 
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Conflict Assessments (CCAs) and Check List as key tools in structural conflict 
prevention. The production of Country/Regional Strategy Papers is ongoing, with 
more than 100 drafted by March 2002 43 (they are subject to approval by the 
Commission and Member States). In July 2005,56 CSPs and 10 Regional Strategy 
Papers were available to download from the Commission's website. 44 Country 
Conflict Assessments are drawn up on a yearly basis, and remain confidential 
documents. The Check List for Root Causes of Conflict provides a set of conflict 
indicators used when drawing up the political analysis section of the CSPs, and the 
CCAs, which then helps in the targeting of aid. The Check List utilises a series of 
questions grouped under the following headings: 
" Legitimacy of the state 
" Rule of law 
" Respect for fundamental rights 
" Civil society and media 
" Relations between communities and dispute-solving mechanisms 
" Sound economic management 
" Social and regional inequalities 
" Geopolitical situation45 
The Check List represents EU-wide agreement on root causes of conflict, and 
encourages the comprehensive inspection of social, political and economic conditions 
in third countries. Internal consensus was not problematic because the Commission 
was given a free hand by the Member States. 46 The Conflict Prevention Network 
(CpN)47, founded in 1997 after a joint European Parliament - Commission initiative, 
48 assisted with the early stages of the drafting process, and the UN was consulted . 
The 
CPN project, which provided a vital link between academics and policy-makers, was 
axed prematurely by the Commission (without consultation with the Parliament) at the 
43 'One Year On: the Commission's Conflict Prevention Policy' 
httl2: Heuropa. eu. int/comm/extemal relations/cpcin/g/1rep. htin. Accessed 22/1/04 
44 hM2: //europa. eu. int/comm/extemal relations/sp/index. htm. Accessed 29/7/05. 45 hU: Heuropa. eu. int/comm/extemal relations/cpcm/cp/list. htm. Accessed 25/6/03 46 Interview with Corninission official, 25/10/04. 47 A network of acadernic experts, practitioners and NGOs, headed by the think-tank Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin from 2000. 48 Interview with Comiriission official, 25/10/04. 
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end of 2001. A note on the CPN website 'setting the record straight' denied the 
accusations of unprofessionalism that Commissioner Patten had used to justify the 
termination of the project. Lack of communication and poor Commission 
management and understanding of the project are cited by former CPN director 
Reinhardt Rummel as particular problems. 49 After 3 years, CPN is now under new 
tender as a pilot project funded by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office. 50 
The Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) bring together all the various instruments and 
agreements the EU has with a particular country, assesses economic, political and 
social developments, and outlines an EU strategy and approach. In theory, both the 
Check List and Strategy Papers assist in the mainstreaming of conflict prevention 
considerations, and provide opportunities for the better targeting of aid and political 
dialogue. In general, analysis of political/societal conflict (whether potential or 
ongoing) is thin. More attention is paid to economic and financial issues, and points 
raised in the Check List, such as civil society and political legitimacy, are not dealt 
with in any depth. In the case of Georgia, for example, a country split by two 
unresolved internal conflicts from the early 1990s, the primary EU objective is "to 
establish a business climate conducive to foreign and domestic investments. " 
(European Commission 2002a) While the conflicts are mentioned as impediments to 
Georgia's development, no concrete EU role in conflict resolution is outlined, nor is 
political conditionality a key tool in aid implementation. In stark contrast, the Country 
Strategy Paper for Macedonia cites conflict prevention and resolution as key 
objectives in EU cooperation with the country. This lack of consistency reflects a 
selectivity based on geographical and political priorities. If conflict 
prevention/management generally emerges as a minimal concern, the value of the 
Check List is compromised. The new inter-service 'Quality Support Group', which 
brings together human rights, trade, economic and conflict prevention experts5l are 
tasked with the coordination of Community provisions in the drafting of CSPs, yet a 
balancing of these considerations is not evident. The CCAs are evidently more 
relevant for conflict prevention, but the confidential nature of these documents does 
49 CPN Note, 12 November 2001, "Setting the Record Straight" http: //www. sm-berlin. orgLcpn. 
Accessed 16/02/02. The webpage is no longer available. An official in the Conflict Prevention Unit 
described the CPN project as insignificant in terms of Commission-sponsored research in 
correspondence with the author in February 2004. 50httl2: //europa. eu. int/comm/europeaid/t)roiects/eidhr/cpf en. htm. Accessed 01/03/05. 51 TU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update' ICG Issues Briefing Paper, 29 April 2002, Brussels. 
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not permit any assessment of their utility. Moreover, there is little indication that 
information and strategies outlined in the CCAs have informed the drafting of many 
of the CSPs. 
The impact of initiatives originating in the Conflict Prevention and Crisis 
Management Unit, with a staff of around 12 (two working specifically on conflict 
prevention), are minimal when it is noted that up to 5 000 Commission staff are 
involved in external relations (Mfiller-Wille 2002: 7 1). 52 This means that an integrated 
and consistent conflict prevention approach relies on dialogue and coordination 
between the DGs and desks within DGs. The Check List is distributed to geographical 
desks and delegations. The more comprehensive 'Conflict Prevention Handbook' 
promised by the Commission several years ago, never materialised 53 - probably 
because of the axing of CPN. 
The politicisation of development aid and the key role of DG External Relations in 
conflict prevention has led to a concurrent depoliticisation of humanitarian aid. 
Conceptually, humanitarian aid is deemed to be apolitical in ethos, and institutionally, 
political issues have been effectively removed from the DG responsible for 
humanitarian assistance - DG Development. Keeping politics out of humanitarian aid 
in crisis situations, is however, problematic, and inconsistencies in the EUs position 
are liable to undermine its role in crisis response. 
5.3.4 Humanitarian aid 
Like development assistance, the post-Cold War humanitarian context demanded a 
better response from Western Europe, and an opportunity for the EU to advance itself 
as an international actor (Holland 2002: 101). The European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was established in 1992 to provide an efficient and 
effective EU response to humanitarian emergencies, natural or man-made. 54 In 2002, 
the Office distributed more than C500 million (European Commission 2002b) making 
the EU (inclusive of Member States' bilateral aid) the world's largest donor of 
52 Four DGs have external relations responsibilities: External Relations, Development, Trade and 
Enlargement. 
53 Interview with Commission official 25/10/04. 
54 The Office provides and coordinates funds to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and UN 
agencies. It employs an average of 151 staff and around 40 field experts who are independent 
consultants (ECHO Annual Review 2002). 
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humanitarian aid (Holland 2002: 105). Run by its own Commissioner, Emma Bonino 
until 1999, the Office was under the jurisdiction of the Development Commissioner, 
55 Poul Neilson until 2004. 
Since its inception, ECHO has been caught up in a debate about its core mandate. On 
the one hand, the Commission has recognised the need to link short-term relief 
projects with the objectives of longer-term development projects. This is designed to 
fill the aid gap between short-term emergency assistance and longer-term 
development assistance in order to improve the consistency and effectiveness of aid 
granted. The 2001 Communication from the Commission, Linking Relief, 
Rehabilitation and Development (European Commission 200 1 d) explained the 
Commission's position. The Commission emphasised that the transition from 
emergency to development assistance must be part of an overall strategy to prevent 
crises (see extract 3 in Table 5.2). Bringing ECHO under the jurisdiction of the 
Development Commissioner in 1999 was an attempt to make this linkage more visible 
and effective. 
At the same time, the apolitical nature of ECHO has been consistently emphasised, 
and it has been urged to concentrate on emergency relief as its core mandate. A 2003 
report from the Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit stressed, "EC 
humanitarian assistance cannot be considered a crisis management tool" (European 
Commission 2003a). This contradicts an earlier paper from the Council Secretariat and 
the Commission, which included humanitarian assistance in a list of crisis 
management activities (Council of the EU 1999a). Obviously, humanitarian assistance 
is part of the response to man-made crises, and cannot easily be separated from 
subsequent or concurring crisis management actions; "when international assistance is 
given in the context of a violent conflict, it becomes a part of that context and thus 
also of the conflict" (Anderson 1999: 145). The linkage of humanitarian aid with 
development assistance does not concur with this drive to depoliticise ECHO, and 
reflects a certain amount of conflict within the Commission about the role of 
humanitarian aid as a crisis response tool. If the objective is to make ECHO truly 
apolitical, then humanitarian aid provided to conflict zones must be distinguished 
5s Louis Michel heads Development and Humanitarian Aid in the new Barroso Commission 
110 
from emergency relief in response to natural disasters. The objective of aid on the 
basis of need is not therefore jeopardised, but the role of humanitarian assistance can 
be better integrated into an overall response to a conflict, with the possible 
political/military implications of aid delivery and distribution given due consideration. 
The current line of political linkage and simultaneous political detachment only serves 
to undermine the Union's rhetoric of consistency and coherency. The confused 
message reflects internal Commission divisions. According to one Commission 
official, ECHO is striving to maintain its impartiality in order to continue to support 
the main humanitarian crises in Africa, and has resisted pressure to reroute aid to 
56 Afghanistan and Iraq. The downgrading of DG Development and ECHO's apolitical 
nature has allowed DG External Relations to take central stage in conflict prevention. 
5.3.5 Defining conflict prevention: From structural to operational? 
While the prevention of conflict was tentatively included in the 1992 Lisbon 
European Council Presidency Conclusions as one likely area for CFSP activities, EU 
progress in structural conflict prevention came primarily during the mid-1990s from 
DG Development in relation to Africa. Evidence suggests that by the late 1990s 
conflict prevention at the EU level lost its association with the development sphere 
(and therefore its structural emphasis) and became more and more linked to 
operational ESDP issues. 
This is supported by Olsen (2002), who argues that in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, 
the EU as a whole increasingly placed niore emphasis on conflict prevention and 
conflict management at the expense of the promotion of democracy throughout the 
1990s. Interested more in stability than democratic governance, "promoting 
democracy via aid became less and less important to the European Union", while 
developing the ESDP, with conflict prevention as a key component, became a top 
priority (Olsen 2002: 324). While this signals a widening of the concept beyond the 
development sphere, the separation of conflict prevention from the promotion of 
democracy, (which go hand in hand) does not indicate that appropriate linkage 
between structural and operational conflict prevention is taking place. Certainly, 
Olsen cites the emphasis on conflict prevention as part of the EU drive to assert itself 
% Interview, European Conunission, 25/10/04. 
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as an international security actor, in support of developments in the military crisis 
management sphere. 
This policy shift could suggest that Afhca was now the subject of strategic EU 
interest: was the geographical priority for CFSP moving beyond the confines of the 
EU's 'near abroad'? The EU's 2003 ARTEMIS operation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) is evidence of EU interest in Africa as a testing ground for new 
operational capacities. 57 Nevertheless, an emphasis on operational conflict prevention 
will not succeed in the longer-term if it remains detached from structural objectives. 
The conflict prevention/development debate highlights the tensions between the EU's 
global and regional roles. The emphasis on conflict prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa 
indicates that EU does aspire to a global conflict prevention policy. However, the fact 
remains that the EU has more influence on its borders, and more consistency between 
political, economic and security policies are evident in countries on the EU's 
periphery. The linkage between structural conflict prevention such as aid, and 
operational activities like police missions and peacekeeping, is more visible and 
pressing in Macedonia than in the DRC. This discrepancy undermines the Union's 
global ambitions, and suggests that the "range of ... 
interests and partnerships is still 
rather selective and corresponds to that of a regional power with some clearly 
identifiable overseas interests" (Missiroli 2003: 30). 
The new institutional structures in the Council, to support the ESDP, were in a strong 
position to take back the conflict prevention baton from the Commission. While 
structural conj7ictprevenfion has been effectively relegated with DG Development, 
the Union has developed an array of early warning and policy planning capacities to 
support operational activities. 
5.4 Early Warning and Analysis Mechanisms: Commission and Council 
At the EU level, early warning and analysis competences have gradually emerged in 
the framework of the CFSP, but are fragmented across the Council and the 
Commission. While the Commission is responsible for much of the fact-finding and 
analysis, the Council's capacity for planning and analysis has increased greatly with 
57 This %, as a small military force, (less than 2000 personnel) sent to the DRC in June 2003 to stabilise 
the capital, Bunia, before the arrival of UN peacekeepers in September 2003. 
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the development of the ESDP. Additionally, it is in the Council where decision- 
making power in terms of appropriate action lies. New bodies created to undertake 
early ivarning and analysis are important in the creation of an 'EU' perspective, 
which in turn is vital for the creation of a coherent and operational CFSP (MUller- 
Wille 2002: 62). 
An inventory of EU early warning and planning capacities reveals a wide and 
complex capacity. However, Council attempts to keep Commission bodies at arms 
length from new Council military structures jeopardise effective early warning 
capacities. 
5.4.1 EU institutions and eady warning 
Early warning is an essential tool in conflict prevention, and requires follow-up 
mechanisms in terms of policy planning and analysis to make an effective 
contribution to a comprehensive prevention policy. The post-Cold War trend of intra 
rather than inter-state war means that early warning systems need to pay attention to 
internal political, economic and social developments ('conflict indicators'). 
Repression based on ethnicity, religion or nationality is a particular cause of post-Cold 
War intra-state armed conflict. Since the international response to such 'low-level' 
conflict is selective, early warning systems can provide vital information on situations 
likely to escalate (Gurr 2000). Information is important; in particular, "to buy time - 
time to build political support for action, time to design and implement proactive 
strategies, time to plan for assistance and rescue" (Gurr 2000: 243). Early warning 
therefore constitutes the basis of a foreign policy claiming a proactive approach to 
crises as its core rationale (as stated by the EU in 1992 - see extract 2 in Table 5.1). 
The type of information constituting useful early warning data is difficult to 
categorise. Information sources generally consist of data obtained through espionage 
or diplomatic reporting (human intelligence); imagery intelligence obtained from 
aircrafts or satellites; signals intelligence obtained by intercepting communications; 
and publicly available published information (open-source intelligence) (Milller-Wille 
2004: 8-9). 
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The division between the planning and analysis needed for conflict prevention- 
oriented development assistance/ humanitarian aid, and early warning, is indistinct in 
practice. The European Commission in particular undertakes a variety of tasks 
designed to monitor and analyse social, political and military developments in third 
countries, which supports development projects and also provides early warning in 
support of the CFSP/ESDP. 
5.4.2 An inventory of EU capacities 
* Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) 
Situated in the Council Secretariat and operational from 1999, the PPWEU was 
designed to tackle several of the main drawbacks of the CFSP: the lack of planning 
and foresight in the development of a distinctive EU foreign policy, and the lack of 
intelligence to allow for a proactive approach to crises. The original remit for the Unit 
was wide: monitoring CFSP-relevant developments, the assessment and identification 
of foreign policy interests, producing policy option papers and the pooling of 
information (see extract 4 in Table 5.2). It has a small staff of 24, made up of national, 
Commission and NVEU officials (Smith, K. 2003: 45), and is headed by the High 
Representative, Solana. It was not clear how the Unit would coordinate work with the 
existing CFSP Unit in the Council Secretariat; this apparently caused tension between 
the established and the new body (Milller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2002: 273). Similarly, 
Solana was in a position to counter the strong role of the rotating Presidency in 
CFSP/ESDP issues (although his official role was to "assist the Presidency'). 
Critics have highlighted the lack of personnel and adequate long-term funding as a 
particular problem for the Policy Unit (MUller-Wille 2002: 65; Smith, K. E. 2003: 45). 
The Unit incorporates the intelligence-pooling Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), a 
civil/military crisis management crisis cell formed by PPEWU and Military Staff, 
mandated to support the Political and Security Committee and the Military Committee 
(Ehrhart 2002: 45). The Centre has links with crisis centers in the UN, OSCE and 
NATO, although the extent of contact and information sharing it is not clear. 
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9 Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
As outlined in chapter 3, new decision-making bodies were required to enable the EU 
to carry out Petersberg operations, and the PSC was of central importance (see extract 
5, Table 5.2, for reproduction of relevant decision at 1999 Cologne European 
Council). The PSC receives early warning reports from the PPEWLJ and the Military 
Staff/SITCEN, and makes political/strategic decisions based on information pooled 
from these sources, and from Member States. As further outlined at the December 
1999 Helsinki European Council, the Committee is composed of national 
representatives at ambassadorial level, mandated to "deal with all aspects of the 
CFSP, including the CESDP ... In the case of a military crisis management operation, 
the PSC will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and 
strategic direction of the operatiorf' (Council of the EU 1999b). It has a key role as a 
coordinating body, having access to all information relating to potential EU 
operations. This point was emphasised by the High Representative in a General 
Affairs Council meeting in November 2000 (see extract 6 in Table 5.2). Working with 
the Commission, he furthermore invited the PSC "to develop [the] role as focal point 
in developing conflict prevention policies in CFSP and CSDP" (extract 7 in Table 
5.2). 
* Military Committee and Staff 
Established as permanent bodies in 2001, the EU Military Committee (EUMC), 
supported by Military Staff (EUMS), are charged with providing military advice and 
recommendations to the PSC. The Military Staff is mandated to provide early warning 
through the integrated civil/military Situation Centre (SITCEN), linked to the 
PPEWU. SITCEN provides external intelligence'8 to support political rather than 
operational decision-making in the PSC (Milller-Wille 2004: 29). The intelligence 
division (RiTDIV) of around 30 national officers is the focus for EU military 
intelligence exchange; staff write reports based on national intelligence that then 
support ESDP decision-making (MUller-Wille 2004: 23). The Military Staff is 
composed of around 135 officials, compared to 24 at the PPEWTJ, a discrepancy that 
seems hard to justify (Smith, K. 2003: 159). 
58 ".. all source assessments drawing on military, security and criminal intelligcnce reports. " (MUller- 
Wille 2004: 8). 
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9 Commission CFSP Directorate 
The CFSP Directorate (A) in the External Relations Directorate-General is largely 
responsible for the Commission's contribution to early warning and conflict 
prevention planning and analysis, as described above in the context of structural 
conflict prevention. The directorate also manages the network of Commission 
delegations. While not originally mandated to make political reports back to Brussels, 
the utility of the delegations in information gathering for the CFSP and conflict 
prevention in particular has been recognised, and they increasingly provide diplomatic 
reports to the Commission. The 2001 EUProgrammefor the Prevention of Violent 
Conflicts called on delegations and Council Special Representatives 59 to provide 
regular information on potential conflict situations (see extract 8 in Table 5.2). 
Additionally, DG Environment includes a monitoring and information center for civil 
emergencies. However, its key task is to organise the mobilisation of civilian 
intervention teams in the event of a natural or man-made disaster, rather than to gather 
intelligence (Millier-Wille 2004: 27). 
e NVEU Transfers: EU Satellite Center and EU Institute for Security Studies 
Decisions made at the 1999 Cologne European Council led to WEU crisis 
management functions being transferred to the EU. WEU military personnel joined 
EU military structures, and the NVEU Satellite Centre and Institute for Security 
Studies became 'agencies' of the CFSP. The Satellite Centre, based in Southern 
Spain, is a misnomer; it does not own or operate any satellites, but buys commercial 
imagery and analyses it for the EU and Member States (MOller-Wille 2002). It plays a 
role in early warning by providing satellite imagery to the SITCEN for crisis 
surveillance and monitoring purposes. The EU (formerly WEU) Institute for Security 
Studies provides independent research and analysis, linked to EU institutions through 
the PSC. 
5.4.3 Coherence in early warning and analysis 
The dispersal of intelligence, planning and analysis capabilities, with some obvious 
crossover in responsibilities, does not add up to a coherent and visible early warning 
capacity at the EU level. Critics have highlighted the trend to compilation rather than 
59 Council appointed personnel posted either to long-running crises, or in the crisis build-up stage, on 
the basis of a CFSP unanimous joint action. 
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analysis, and have questioned the need for four separate analytical units in the Council 
alone (Military Staff, PPEWU, Council DG External Relations staff, and SITCEN 
(Mfiller-Wille 2002). If Commission analytical capacity is added, it seems unlikely 
that all information and analyses could be pooled and duly considered in a time of 
impending crisis. COREPER is responsible for cross-pillar coordination, and is tasked 
in the 2001 EU Progranimefor the Prevention of Violent Conflicts to pay "specific 
attention to the question of coherent preventive activities" (see extract 8 in Table 5.2). 
This is a tough call, especially in early warning, since COREPER doesn't possess the 
political and military expertise of the PSC. While the PSC is supposed to be the 
'linchpin' of the CFSP, and the single body in receipt of all crisis information, it can 
be over-ruled by the higher-ranking Political Committee (Andr6ani, Bertram and 
Grant 2001). These complex structures compound the need to coordinate military and 
civilian early warning. The Commission has much information at its fingertips, but is 
kept distant from Council politico-military structures. The SITCEN, staffed from the 
Military Staff, the PPEWU and increasingly national representatives, is charged with 
bringing military and civilian information together, but has little contact with civilian 
experts in the Commission. It also lacks the staff and resources to become the 
functioning 'European intelligence agency' that the EU needs to support the 
CFSP/ESDP (NUIller-Wille 2004: 3 7). The new integrated civil-military cell within 
EUMS (established in 2004) may contribute to more balanced early warning 
assessments. 
Intelligence for early warning in the civilian sphere is sparse because, unlike military 
intelligence, structures for this are not in place at national levels, and civilian crises 
are difficult to predict (MtIller-Wille 2002: 61). Yet while military intelligence is 
available from EU capitals, Member States have been reluctant to pool intelligence at 
the EU level. National information is closely guarded, and information that does get 
passed to the Military Staff goes directly to national representatives only (MOller- 
Wille 2002: 78). Where is the value of EU intelligence cooperation if it does not 
produce information and assessments of enhanced national quality9. Moreover, the EU 
could develop a unique role in early warning by properly integrating civil and military 
intelligence (Milller-Wille 2002: 79). Current institutional divisions would seem to 
prevent this. 
117 
5.5 Operational Conflict Prevention: The Council's Prerogative 
The EU's operational capacity is defined in terms of "humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking, " (the Petersberg tasks) introduced in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam 
(Title V, Article J. 7 (2)). The 2004 Constitutional Treaty expanded the scope of the 
Petersberg Tasks to includejoint disarmament operations, military advice and 
assistance tasks, conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilisation, and combating 
terrorism (Part III, Chapter 2 Article 111-309). 
Operational mechanisms can be described as 'acute' conflict prevention, designed to 
cover a range of activities, including, at the 'civilian' end, preventive diplomacy, 
crisis assistance, monitoring (border patrols, ceasefires), training civilian personnel 
(police, judiciary, local government officials) and at the military end, protection of 
civilian personnel and peacekeeping. A characteristic of the management of post-Cold 
War conflicts has been the difficulty in separating civilian and military responses to 
complex intra-state crises. The traditional ethoses of both civilian and military 
operations have been strained as civilian teams have relied on military protection and 
military teams have become more involved in civilian missions, such as the delivery 
of humanitarian aid. The EU needs to coordinate civilian and military capacities from 
the early planning and analyses stages through to the operational stage in any EU 
mission. This is a particular challenge. 
Operational capacities remain largely under the control of the Member States, and the 
institutional primacy of the Council in the CFSP/ESDP project was underlined with 
the creation of the post of High Representative for CFSP and the host of new crisis 
management structures. The Commission has some competence in civilian crisis 
management, but the necessary institutional coordination in civil-military operations 
is yet to be established. This section examines EU operational conflict prevention 
capacities - preventive diplomacy, civilian crisis management and military crisis 
management. 
5.5.1 Preventive diplomacy 
Preventive diplomacy has been practiced by the EU since the times of EPC by the 
'Troika' of representatives consisting of the current Council presidency, previous 
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presidency and future presidency. It still remains a key element of EU conflict 
prevention, and has been expanded beyond the Troika with the role of HR for CFSP 
and Special Representatives appointed to actual or potential crisis zones. 
The HR for CFSP is tasked with assisting the Presidency of the Council in CFSP 
matters, acting on behalf of the Council in political dialogue with third parties, and 
heading the PPEWU; the current post-holder, Javier Solana is instrumental in 
highlighting the need for Union involvement in conflict hotspots. 60 His role in 
political demarches and the Troika is also important in terms of preventive diplomacy 
and information gathering. The role of EU Special Representatives is similarly 
important. These personnel are generally posted either to long-running crises, or in the 
crisis build-up stage, on the basis of a CFSP unanimous joint action. In recent years, 
the Union has sent representatives to the Great Lakes region of Africa, the Middle 
East, Macedonia, and most recently (in July 2003) to the South Caucasus. This latest 
appointment indicates the increasing flexibility of the mandate for Special 
Representatives, more traditionally sent to implement a clear EU strategy, particularly 
in peace negotiations, now appointed in a more investigative/consultative role for a 
shorter period of time (Lynch 2003: 185). 
5.5.2 EU crisis management concept and procedures 
Before examining progress in civilian and military crisis management, it is useful to 
consider how the EU approaches crisis management generically. The Union has been 
developing a complex set of crisis management procedures, outlining sequential EU 
activities and protocols to be followed in the event of a crisis. The procedures include 
the development of a crisis-specific 'crisis management concept'. If, based on EU 
early warning and analysis reports, an EU response to a particular crisis is desired, the 
crisis management concept will "set down the EU political interest and political 
objectives as well as broad options for an overall EU response to a crisis and highlight 
the recommended comprehensive course of action" (Council of the EU 2003a: 36). 
An ad hoc 'crisis response coordinating team', comprised of officials from the 
Council Secretariat and the Commission, will prepare the draft concept, drawing on 
information and advice from the EUMOMS, the PPEWU and SITCEN, the Police 
60 For example, in his 2003 Security Strategy, Solana stressed the need for the Union to become more 
involved in the conflicts of the South Caucasus region. 
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Unit and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). This 
will ensure overall consistency in external policy, and coordination between civilian 
and military measures. The draft concept would then go to the PSC and the Council 
for decisions on the appropriate EU response. The concept would provide the 
backbone in EU crisis management procedures, and include any combination of 
measures outlined in this paper. The procedures are described in a 45-page document, 
(Council of the EU 2003a) and are staggering in their detail and comprehensiveness. 
EU action is divided into six distinct phases, from 'routine' (phase 1), to 'refocusing 
of EU action and termination of operations' (phase 6). The Council's planning and 
analytical focus on operational crisis management as opposed to longer-term 
strategies is exemplified in this document. 
5.5.3 Civilian crisis management 
While the development of EU military means has gained much public and media 
attention, it was evident that the Union was more likely and more often to be called on 
to undertake non-military crisis management tasks. The rationale for the development 
of EU civilian aspects of crisis management, as outlined in the Santa Maria de Feira 
European Council in June 2000, reflect this (see extract 10, Table 5.2). The ambition 
to 'face complex political crises' by preventing conflict, consolidating peace and 
coordinating military and civilian aspects of crisis management in fact cover the remit 
of the Pctersbcrg tasks, and all EU operations carried out to date. Civilian capabilities 
are additionally central in the Union's relationship with the UN and the OSCE, and 
EU progress in the civilian sphere has driven much of the cooperation between the 
organisations. The four priority areas for civilian crisis management missions were 
outlined at the Santa Maria de Feira European Council in June 2000. They are: 
9 Police operations 
The commitment was made to establish a pool of up to 5000 police officers for 
international missions, with 1000 to be deployable within a period of 30 days. This 
target was met, and Member States had pledged 1400 officers available within 30 
days by November 2003. To date, police missions are the operational area in civilian 
crisis management where the EU has the most experience (in Bosnia and FYROM). 
Concerned about issues of interoperability and training, the EU carried out a police 
exercise in 2003 and a handbook was developed for police personnel deployed on EU 
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missions (Council of the EU 2003b). A Police Unit operates within the Council 
Secretariat, providing advice and recommendations to the PSC on police operations. 
At an informal EU defence ministers meeting in September 2004, representatives 
from France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands announced an initiative to 
create a European Gendan-nerie Force (EGF), a rapidly deployable core of 800-900 
multinational paramilitary police. 
9 Rule of law 
Following the pledge at Feira, a commitment was made by the Member States at the 
200IG6teborg European Council to provide up to 200 officials in the field of law by 
2003. While rule of law missions are generally envisaged as supporting police 
missions (by providing advice, training and monitoring to local judicial and penal 
institutions, or actually performing these duties), they could be carried out without 
concurrent police missions. Currently, 282 officials have been pledged for 
international operations (including 72 judges, 48 prosecutors, 38 administrative 
personnel and 72 penitentiary personnel). Up to 60 officials are available within 30 
days. The EU launched its first small Rule of Law mission (8 personnel) to Georgia in 
July 2004 (Operation EUJUST THEMIS). 
9 Civil administration 
As in rule of law missions, civilian administration missions will carry out advisory, 
training, monitoring and executive services. Civilian administration missions 
potentially involve a wide variety of personnel, deployed to carry out general local 
administrative functions such as civil registration, taxation and custom services; social 
functions such as social services, education and health; infrastructure functions, such 
as water and energy supply, telecommunications and transport (Council of the EU 
2001 c). Member State contributions are still ongoing. By November 2003,248 
officials had been pledged for civil registration, local administration and custom 
services. 
* Civil protection 
Civil protection missions entail the protection of people in the event of major 
emergencies, "but also of the environment and property ... including natural, 
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technological, radiological or environmental accidents occurring inside or outside the 
Community" (European Commission 2002d: 2). Composed of national emergency 
services staff, such EU missions would also be deployed to armed conflict zones, for 
search and rescue tasks, construction of refugee camps, and to assist humanitarian 
actors. Commitment targets set at G6teborg include small teams of rapid response 
experts and civil protection intervention teams (up to 2000 personnel). 61 
5.5.4 Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) 
The development of the above civilian crisis management mechanisms is managed by 
CIVCOM, created in May 2000, and reporting to COREPER and assisting the PSC. It 
is mandated to develop procedures and common practices in EU civilian crisis 
management, identify opportunities to pool civilian resources and improve 
coordination of Community, Union and Member State resources. The Committee uses 
information provided by the Commission, and is central in the planning and 
elucidation of EU civilian crisis management mechanisms. 
Along with CIVCOM, a 'coordinating mechanism' was created in the Council 
Secretariat to enhance and better coordinate the Unions' and Member States' non- 
military crisis management response tools. As well as running capabilities initiatives, 
it has been developing an inventory of resources relevant for crisis management, 
including databases of rule of law, police, civil administration and protection 
capabilities. It works in close cooperation with SITCEN and the Commission. In the 
event of a crisis, the coordinating mechanism "may set up an ad hoc center to 
coordinate the effectiveness of EU Member States' contributions" (Council of the EU 
1999b: 3). 
5.5.5 Other civilian crisis management capabilities 
9 EU Monitoring Missions (EUMM) 
The use of EU Monitoring Missions for crisis management is being developed. This 
remains a concept rather than a specific capacity to date, although the EU has had 
monitors in the field in former Yugoslavia since the early 1990s. Led by an 
61 Numbers of personnel cited in the civilian crisis management areas reflects the situation as of 
December 2003 
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Ambassador from a Member State, (appointed by the Council), the mission comprises 
more that 100 monitors, giving special attention to border monitoring and refugee 
return. EU experience is therefore time and location specific, but it is hoped that the 
concept can be expanded to a "broader monitoring capability ... [to include] 
confidence building among fortner disputing parties ... low level conflict resolution 
and de-escalation assistance, [and] facilitating contacts between civil society and 
government and/or disputants" (Council of the EU 2003c: 5). A Joint Action would 
establish a Monitoring Mission, with Heads of Mission relaying information to the 
appropriate Council Working Group, who would then report to the PSC. The Mission 
would be under the authority of the High Representative. 
9 EU Fact-Finding Missions (FFMs). 
Like EUMM, Fact-Finding Missions are tasked with information gathering, but are 
more ad hoc, "tasked to collect and assess all required information and/or to execute 
other specified tasks (according to a given mandate) in a defined crisis area to which it 
is deployed and where a possible European Union involvement in the management of 
the crisis is envisaged" (Council of the EU 2002a: 5). As a Council CFSP mechanism, 
it can be triggered by the High Representative or the PSC. A decision to set up an EU 
FFM does not affect FFMs decided by the Commission within the framework of the 
EC, although the EU FFM may include Commission staff, and the Commission is 
informed and may be invited to make recommendations. EUMMs would help 
elucidate and confirm the crisis management concept for a particular crisis, and are 
also intended as visible signals that the EU is willing and able to act in a particular 
crisis (see extract 12 in Table 5.2). 
* The Commission's Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM). 
The RRM, established in 2001, is a Community funding mechanism allowing for the 
fast release of funds for conflict prevention and crisis management operations. It is 
intended to fund "targeted assistance, fact-finding missions, mediation or the dispatch 
of observers" (European Commission 2001 a). Funds can also be released in support of 
NGO, OSCE or UN missions. In its 2002 Annual Report, the Commission stated its 
intention of using the RRM to fund conflict prevention team deployments of 
independent experts, with specialist knowledge in security, governance, development 
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or regional issues. information gathered is then integrated into CSPs, and presumably 
the crisis management concept, if Union action is likely. The RRM has funded 
conflict prevention missions to Nepal, Indonesia and the South Pacific. The 
mechanisms can also fund civilian crisis management in Community-CFSP crossover 
areas such as civil protection/administration, rule of law, and some police missions. 
Peace Facility for Africa 
Like the RRM, the African Peace Facility (APF) is a Commission-Council managed 
mechanism designed to support peacekeeping missions undertaken by the African 
regional organisation, the African Union (AU). Unlike the RRM, however, the 
facility (worth 250 million euros in total62) is funded from the European 
Development Fund (EDF) for ACP countries, resourced directly by Member States 
rather than from the EU budget. The facility was agreed in 2003 and came into effect 
in May 2004. The facility reflects a reluctance on the part of Member States to send 
their own personnel on peacekeeping missions to Africa (Keane 2004a), and has 
raised concerns in some quarters that more money for peacekeeping will result in less 
money for development (Schneider 2004). Indeed, both the RRM and the APF are 
reactive, last minute mechanisms, indicating again that EU conflict prevention has 
lost its base in long-term policy. 
5.5.6 Civilian setbacks 
Institutional tensions exist between the Council and the Commission in the control of 
civilian crisis management mechanisms, highlighting competing views on the 
development and direction of EU crisis management (see below). The other main 
setbacks for the development of EU civilian crisis management are as follows: 
* Personnel 
Common training programmes are being developed for all aspects of civilian crisis 
management, but the Union is faced with the problem of a shortage of professionals 
willing and/or able to take part in international operations. In June 2004, the European 
62 The fund has a lifetime of thee years (until 2007). The renewal of the facility will depend on budget 
agreements after 2006 ('Securing Peace and Stability for Africa. The EU-Funded African Peace 
Facility' hqp: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/development/body/ýublications/docs/flyer Deace. en. pd 
Accessed 28/07/05. 
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Council endorsed an Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, including a Civilian 
Capabilities Conference in November 2004, indicating that the EU is taking the 
shortage of civilian personnel seriously. 
9 Financing 
Providing the funds for EU operations has stretched budgets and highlighted 
cumbersome procedures. Operations with a military component are generally 
straightforward, being charged to Member States. A permanent financing mechanism 
for common military operational costs was agreed by the Council in September 2003. 
Civilian financing is more complex, since some operations can be funded through the 
Community budget and others through the CFSP budget (i. e. pillars I and II). The 
Community budget line can be used in civilian emergency assistance, civil protection, 
human rights, institution building, rule of law, police operations, and reconstruction 
(European Commission 2001b). Many of these categories can be considered as falling 
under the CFSP. The Commission identifies financing as posing a real problem for 
EU ambitions in crisis management - "both procedural and budgetary 
constraints ... threaten to reduce the potential and credibility of 
the European Union's 
new global role" (European Commission 2001b: 5). While an agreement on 
increasing the CFSP budget has been reached, it will be some time before this is 
visible in terms of resources (Ehrhart 2002: 43). Guidelines for CFSP financing of 
civilian crisis management operations, based on the identification of cost categories, 
were adopted by the Council during the 2003 Italian Presidency (Council of the EU 
2003d). Critics have also highlighted potential problems in the voluntary nature of 
civilian crisis management contributions, since some Member States may carry more 
of the burden than others (Ehrhart 2002: 50). 
5.5.7 Military crisis management: developments and divergences 
Defence issues were naturally delicate in the EU, long seen as a 'civilian' power, 
leaving defence issues to the NATO alliance. The focus on conflict prevention and 
crisis management can be understood in this context as representing relatively 
uncontroversial EU military ambitions. Key developments were outlined in the ESDP 
section in chapter 3, and include the 'Headline Goal' (agreed at the 1999 Helsinki 
European Council - see extract 9, Table 5.2), the Berlin-Plus negotiations with NATO 
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from 1999 - 2002, and the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA), agreed 
in 2003. 
Developing military capacities at the EU level has undoubtedly been problematic. 
Internal difficulties have been compounded by external events that have put additional 
strain on the transatlantic relationship. The building of an EU defence culture has 
highlighted differences in national approaches to security and defence issues amongst 
the Member States. The financing of military missions has led to disagreements about 
whether costs should be charged to the Union budget or be met by Member States. As 
already mentioned, the negotiations over EU access to NATO assets have been long 
and drawn-out, not least because Turkey's position has been coloured and 
complicated by its EU membership bid, its relationship with Greece, and the Cyprus 
conflict. Moreover, a clear definition of the capabilities and assets the EU wants 
access to has been consistently absent since negotiations began between NATO and 
the WEU in 1996 (although commentators agree that it is the US-owned assets (i. e. 
strategic lift, intelligence, command, control and communication) rather than the 
capabilities (i. e. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) - the Europe- 
based operational planning headquarters) (Missiroli 2002: 13). 
The impact of Member State divisions over Iraq in 2003 was deeply felt. EU relations 
with the US were further strained with talk of the need for autonomous EU 
operational headquarters. The leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg 
held a mini-summit on European defence in April 2003, where they pledged to 
cooperate on defence issues and proposed the establishment of an EU operational 
planning base at Tervuren, Belgium. A compromise deal was reached between 
Britain, France and Germany in the context (although not officially) of the 2003 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) whereby a permanent EU planning cell would 
be set up in the SHAPE headquarters for Berlin-Plus operations, and national 
headquarters would be used for autonomous EU operations, with the possibility of 
creating a Brussels headquarters using national officials. 
With much of the commentary on European defence capabilities being caught up in 
transatlantic and intra-European politics and machinations, it is easy to lose sight of 
the end product and purpose of EU military crisis management. It is important that 
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progress meets projected needs so that the EU can act in a crisis situation. Doubts 
have been raised about the ability of the EU to deploy and sustain forces at the harder 
end of the Petersberg tasks. Hagman (2002) has identified three major problems likely 
to be encountered by the EU in the event of larger-scale missions: one-year 
sustainability, sixty-day readiness, and self-sustainability. 
In order to avoid a credibility crisis, the EU tested its crisis management procedures 
before taking on any operations. The first crisis management exercise, carried out in 
conjunction with NATO in May 2002, tested decision-making procedures for ESDP 
and the coordination of military and civilian instruments. The exercise highlighted the 
need for further strengthening of civil-military coordination. This military-civilian 
overlap is at the heart of EU crisis management, and indeed, conceptually and 
operationally, a strict division between the civilian and military cannot be maintained 
when managing complex crises. Nevertheless, national foreign policy and intra- 
institutional traditions are hard to break. Member States typically favour either 
conflict prevention (Sweden) or crisis management (France) (Bj6rkdahl 2002: 114). 
The artificial division between the terms is mirrored in the control of traditional 
civilian and military measures by the Commission and the Council respectively. 
The expansion of the Petersberg tasks in the context of the 2010 Headline Goal and 
the Constitutional Treaty, has arguably added to the confusion about the EU's military 
role, since a disarmament operation "could include anything from providing personal 
security to UN inspectors to a full scale invasion a la Iraq" (Cameron and Quille 2004: 
12). The EDA has been created in part to better predict and prepare for future crisis 
management needs, but also to enhance the European armaments industry. This has 
prompted some critics to argue that an arms dynamic is taking hold of Member States 
and EU institutions, including the Commission, which is undertaking defence research 
under the guise of security research (Mawdsley 2004). Others have identified a 
general militarisation of the EU, with a growing gap between the military and political 
goals and decision-making processes of the ESDP (Bono 2002: 22). In relation to 
conflict prevention, it is important that EU military power is not developed as an end 
in itself, but in conjunction with progress in civilian and longer-term capabilities and 
objectives. As we shall see below, the balance between civilian and military capacities 
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is compounded by the structure of the EU and the division of competences between 
EU institutions. 
5.6 Institutional Competition or Coherence? 
5.6.1 The complexity of EU structures: implications for coordination 
Internal and inter-institutional drawbacks permeate every stage of the conflict 
prevention process - structural, early warning and operational. Incoherency in the 
organisation of the EU can be identified on various levels of analysis, each 
contributing to a complex and obscure policy-making machine. The levels of analysis 
considered here are the overall pillar structure of the EU, the interaction between 
institutions (inter-institutionab, and finally the individual institutions themselves 
(internal institutional). 
* Yhe Pillar Structure 
The single institutional structure of the Treaty on European Union (creating the three 
pillar structure of the EC, CFSP and JHA) was designed to provide a more coherent 
EC/EU. The artificial divisions between political and economic policy could, to an 
extent, be bridged - in the implementation of sanctions, for example, and the 
elucidation of comprehensive and consistent relationships with third countries. These 
new linkages were to facilitate the emergence of conflict prevention, (a policy 
requiring economic, political and security instruments) on the EU agenda. 
However, the consequences of different rules for policy initiation and decision- 
making falling under pillar one and pillars two and three reverberate down through the 
organisational structure. For policy under pillar one, the Commission has the 
exclusive right of initiative, and decisions are not normally subject to unanimity at 
Council level. For pillars two and three, the Commission has to compete with Member 
States in putting forward policy proposals, and decision-making is subject to Council 
unanimity. Acting at a disadvantage in pillars two and three, the Commission 
understandably competes with the Council and Member States to 'own' external 
policy initiatives, such as civilian crisis management. This should be an opportunity to 
bridge the pillar gap. Instead, the Commission and the Council are set up as rivals. 
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Pillarisation artificially compartmentalises policy, and is increasingly an anachronism. 
The CFSP is a case in point. Not only does the division of external policies require 
horizontal coordination between pillars one and two, but also vertical coordination 
between Union and Member State policies. Police cooperation of some sort (for 
international missions or cooperation in anti-terrorism) takes place in the context of 
all three pillars. The frequent inability to achieve effective linkage undermines the 
EU's attempts to present a single, coherent and coordinated response to international 
events and crises. Critics are well aware of the fallibility of the EU's 'single' 
structure. Zielonka observes that "the whole institutional system lacks clarity, 
hierarchy, and coherence ... 
it hardly ever works in an accountable and effective 
manner, especially when coping with crises" (1998: 177). As well as hindering a quick 
response to crises, the structure is problematic for the development of longer-term, 
cross-pillar policies like structural con ictprevention. Dwan cites the EU's structure Ifl 
as "an impediment to the effective coordination of prevention policies within the EU 
and with other international actors" (200 1: 10). 
* Inter-institutional Problems 
The relationship between the Council and the Commission has been characterised as 
based on mutual dependence, and increasingly mutual conflict (Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace 1997). While both institutions need each other, and should be working 
together for common goals, commentators increasingly talk of 'turf battles' over 
policy responsibilities and agenda setting, exacerbated by the pillarisation discussed 
above. The objective of conflict prevention as a guiding principle in EU external 
affairs reflects an internal paradox. According to Bjorkdahl, (2002: 119) "one reason 
for the Commission's and the Council Secretariat's acceptance of conflict prevention 
could be that both perceived that they could strengthen their influence in the ongoing 
institutional turf battle within the EU. " At the same time, "the relative failure of 
conflict prevention can be attributed to deep-rooted organisational habits and 
associated vested interests" (Ehrhart 2002: 33). Conflict prevention is in danger of 
becoming a token objective claimed by both institutions, but practiced by neither. 
Coordination of conflict prevention objectives and policy between the institutions 
relies on informal contacts and ad hocery. The Conflict Prevention and Crisis 
Management Unit works with the High Representative to identify conflict issues for 
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consideration by the GAERC. This seems to have been based more on the good 
working relationship between Commissioner Chris Patten and Solana rather than any 
formalised process. At the operational stage, the Council is reluctant to involve the 
Commission in ESDP structures, with Member States wanting to retain firm control 
over crisis management capacities. This fear of supranational contamination is not 
constructive in a policy area relying on good inter-institutional relations for its 
success. 
Until recently, no clear strategy had been put forward to address the problem of 
Council-Commission incoherence in external relations, since there was no consensus 
between Member States on how to rationalise the burgeoning institutional framework 
without changing the balance of power between the Commission and the Council. The 
Constitutional Treaty proposed the creation of an EU Foreign Minister, a post 
merging the position of High Representative for CFSP with the head of the 
Commission's External Relations DG. If implemented, this will go some way towards 
ensuring more coherence between Council CFSP and Corrunission external relations 
activities. However, the post could also challenge Member State/Council control of 
foreign policy, and potentially change the balance of power in the Commission's 
favour. The lack of details relating to the post in the Treaty allows for a personal 
interpretation of the duties involved, and Council jurisdiction over the Minister is 
more likely to consolidate the stronger position of the Council in CFSP/ESDP. 
9 Internal Institutional Problems 
A further level of complexity is revealed if an attempt at dissecting institutions is 
made. The Council of the EU consists of a number of personnel, units and committees 
responsible for CFSP/ESDP. The role of High Representative was overlaid on an 
institution already consisting of a Council of Foreign Ministers (the Political 
Committee), Presidency, Committee of Permanent Representatives dealing with CFSP 
matters, a CFSP Unit in the Council Secretariat and various working groups. The 
High Representative was to manage the new PPEWU "to increase policy information 
and coordination" (Hix 1999: 345), but a clear description on how he was to do this 
was lacking. The PPEWU is also under-staffed and under-funded, limiting the High 
Representative's influence. The addition of new bodies for ESDP such as the PSC, 
CIVCOM and the EUMC/MS further complicates foreign policy - making. Where is 
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policy coming from? Who ensures policy coherence? The PSC has, in theory, overall 
political control, but the Political Committee, comprising of senior Member State 
officials from Foreign Ministeries, reserves the right to meet as the 'senior' PSC, 
implying the potential renationalisation of policy direction (Howorth 2001: 774). The 
overlapping responsibilities of COREPER and PSC in the preparation of GAERC 
meetings are also not conducive to efficient and joined-up foreign policy-making 
(Howorth 2001: 775). This concurrent institution-building and Member State 
reluctance reflects a recognisable Euro-schizophrenia, characterised by underlying 
tensions about the ownership and location of the EU foreign policy project. Moreover, 
the structures at the Council level have largely been created to support operational (if 
not exclusively military) conflict prevention activities. This puts pressure on the 
Commission to defend structural conflict prevention as a key component of EU crisis 
response, inextricably linked to operational activities. 
The role of the Commission in the CFSP, and how this relates to Community external 
policy, remains unclearly defined, and undoubtedly too ad hoc to ensure optimal 
coordination of policy. The best way of organising Commission external 
responsibilities is inevitably unclear in these circumstances, and their reorganisation 
three times since the early 1990s reflects this. 
While the 1999 Prodi Commission reduced the number of external relations portfolios 
from six to four, the benefits of a division of responsibilities based on function (e. g. 
trade, development), as opposed to a geographically-based division are subject to 
diverging views (Nugent and Saurugger 2002). Prodi changed the focus from 
geographical regions back to functions in his 1999 reorganisation, facilitating more 
coherence in separate policy fields (horizontal coherence), but less coordination 
between policy fields (vertical coherence) (Nugent and Saurugger 2002: 35 1). A 
geographical division of responsibilities facilitates better coordination between policy 
fields, reducing the possibility of contradictory policies in particular regions or 
countries. The present horizontal structure of the Commission requires internal 
coordination for coherent external policy-making. Patten, as External Relations 
Commissioner (until 2004), had responsibility for external policy coordination 
between DGs, but his power was limited beyond the confines of his own DG (Nugent 
and Saurugger 2002: 35 1). 
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The necessary focus on development policy as the Commission's key structural 
conflict prevention tool has been jeopardised by internal reorganisation. Not only do 
DG Development staff feel relegated by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office, (Nugent 
and Saurugger 2002: 361), but responsibility for development issues is dispersed 
between DG Development and DG External Relations undermining the advantages of 
a functional division of duties. This leaves scope for the marginalisation of the ACP 
countries (dealt with separately from other developing countries) and the 
fragmentation of policy considerations, since all trade matters dealing with ACP have 
been removed from DG Development (Holland 2002: 91). This will not assist the 
alleged attempts to 'mainstream' conflict prevention. The External Relations DG has 
been expanded, at the expense of DG Development. This has implications for the 
success of structural conflict prevention, and may lead to a narrowing definition of 
the concept to civilian crisis management. This trend is mirrored at the Council level. 
Structural conj7ict prevention expertise is lacking in the Council structures: CIVCOM 
has no experts in conflict prevention, and the Council of Development Ministers has 
been scrapped, leaving development issues to be dealt with in the GAERC, 
overwhelmingly preoccupied by operational crisis management. 
5.6.2 Competing crisis management visions? 
The development of ESDP has been repeatedly linked to conflict prevention in EU 
rhetoric, and is presented as one component of EU crisis response. However, if 
civilian and military analyses, planning and operations are kept separate, then the link 
between conflict prevention and ESDP becomes tenuous. Integrating civilian and 
military responses is undoubtedly problematic because of the traditionally different 
approaches and practices of the two fields, as well as national differences. 
Nevertheless, the ESDP project can only contribute to conflict prevention if 
coordination between civilian and military mechanisms is actively sought. 
Analysts tend to disagree about the implications of the EU developing a military 
role. 63 The point to be made here is that, in fact, the EU needs to develop both military 
63 Views vary widely, from those who believe this weakens the EU's traditional civilian role 
(Sangiovanni 2003), to those who assert that "militarisation" is strengthening the EU's civilian role 
(Stavridis 2001). 
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and civilian capabilities, in an integrated way, in order to consider itself able to 
undertake the full range of conflict prevention/crisis management tasks. This requires 
some re-balancing to bring resources for civilian operations to the level of those 
available for military operations. 
Problems in civil-military cooperation are not specific to the EU, but are a generic 
problem in post-Cold War crisis response. For the EU, it is not just about cooperating 
in the field with different types of actors with different mandates and approaches. The 
EU itself carries out a range of military and civilian operations, some of which will be 
simultaneous, joint, or concurrent missions (e. g. EU Police Mission in Macedonia 
taking over from EU peacekeeping mission). For successful and effective missions, 
the EU needs to integrate civilian and military advice, intelligence, analysis, training, 
strategic and operational planning, and finally field communication and command. 
The following issues mayjeopardise the EU's unique role in civil-military crisis 
management. 
* Resources 
Critics have increasingly questioned the discrepancy between resources available for 
civilian and military crisis management (Rummel 2003). Staffing levels to support the 
new Council military structures far outweigh early warning and analysis staff and 
civilian experts. It has already been noted that the PPEWU lacks personnel. Other 
than the contribution of CIVCOM, there is insufficient civilian crisis management 
input within the Council, and no humanitarian advisors at all. This discrepancy was 
highlighted in the plan to create a civilian planning and mission support unit. This 
capability was overdue. On the military side, there are up to 150 Military Staff in the 
Council Secretariat working on strategic planning, and they have recourse to high 
quality national and NATO headquarters for operational military planning. 
Conversely, while the EU is more likely to be carrying out civilian operations, there 
are only 15 staff in the Council Secretariat available to carry out civilian planning and 
mission support functions - and they are responsible for strategic and operational 
planning and mission support (Tappert 2003a: 17). 
The Commission understandably saw the creation of a civilian mission support unit in 
the Council Secretariat as an encroachment on its responsibilities in civilian crisis 
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management, as it already has experience in planning international monitoring 
missions, and managing the civil protection mechanism, not to mention a considerable 
budget available for financing civilian crisis management missions. The 
Commission's suggestion that a joint Council-Commission service should be created 
to reflect the cross-pillar nature of civilian crisis management was, however, vetoed 
by the Council. An embryonic civilian mission support unit was operating in the 
Council Secretariat by June 2004 (Council of the EU 2004a). With the civilian 
support unit and the civil-military cell in the Military Staff, the Council of the EU has 
consolidated its control of the civilian crisis management agenda. 
9 Overlapping civilian responsibilities 
Disagreements over the location of the new civilian planning unit highlights the fact 
that both the Council and the Commission can claim competence in civilian crisis 
management. Rivalry between institutions over the 'ownership' of civilian crisis 
management is not conducive to the best use of available EU resources. 
The Commission, as we have seen, has lost ground in recent years to the Council in 
the control of operations, training and recruitment. Its remaining strength lies in the 
control of the Community budget, which has funds for non-military crisis 
management operations. However, Member States might be prepared to cover 
operational costs themselves, or increase the CFSP budget, rather than allow 
Community control of civilian crisis management. This is not good news for the 
development of a comprehensive conflict prevention approach, linking long-term and 
short-term responses to crises. Cutting the Commission out of civilian crisis 
management would have the concurrent effect of undermining civil-military 
coordination. 
e Lack of mechanisms for coordination? 
The lack of resources for civilian measures is mirrored in the lack of formal 
mechanisms for civil-military coordination. There seem to be more structures in place 
for coordination at the operational stage. The Crisis Response Coordination Team 
(CRCT), for example, draws together Commission and Council General Secretariat 
services in crisis situation to ensure coherence. A Committee of Contributors, 
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(consisting of Member State/ non-EU contributors to a civilian or military operation) 
meets regularly during EU operations to review the situation. These groupings 
facilitate the coordination of civilian and military measures in the final stages of 
operational planning (coordination in the field is another matter, and subject to the 
proper training of EU civilian and military personnel). There is less evidence of 
coordination of civil-military capabilities at the early warning and analysis stage, 
particularly in terms of input on long-term considerations from the Commission. It is 
far from clear if and how the PSC balances military and civilian advice and 
information. The fact that military intelligence is more available, and Military Staff 
outnumber civilian experts, suggest that the balance is tipped in favour of military 
assessments. This could lead to missed opportunities for longer-term and civilian 
security solutions. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The European Union is undoubtedly developing a new role for itself in conflict 
prevention as one of the key guiding objectives of the CFSP/ESDP. EU foreign policy 
discourse in the 1990s increasingly featured conflict prevention as an external 
objective of EU activity. However, various internal problems highlight the 
discrepancies between the EU's rhetoric and the reality of institutional capacities 
available for the development of a comprehensive and coordinated conflict prevention 
policy. 
It is clear that the definition of conflict prevention at the EU level remains 
inadequately comprehensive. The lack of visibility of structural conflict prevention on 
the EU's agenda contrasts with the meteoric rise of crisis management in the 
Commission and the Council. Development issues have been effectively phased out of 
external relations policy in the Commission. The attention to root causes of conflict is 
marginal, and dependent on the geopolitical significance of the country in question. 
There is little input of development issues at the Council level, and therefore little 
chance that ESDP/CFSP policy will be coordinated with long-term conflict 
prevention, or even short-term humanitarian objectives. Civil-military coordination 
has been recognised as important for EU operations, but it is short-term in focus. 
Conflict prevention is becoming more and more associated with short-term crisis 
management, at the expense of long-term structural solutions to security problems. 
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Even new Community mechanisms such as the RRM and the APF are reactive, short- 
tenn instruments. Where does structural conflict prevention appear on the EU's 
agenda? While the European Security Strategy emphasises preventive engagement, it 
is ambiguous, lacks detail, and "continues to adopt a more reactive approach to crisis 
and post-conflict situations" (International Alert and Saferworld 2004: 5). 
Furthermore, a preference for reactive military crisis management over long-term 
conflict prevention may be accelerated by the defence procurement agenda of the 
European Defence Agency. Chapter 4 suggested that the EU could legitimise its 
military role through its commitment to comprehensive conflict prevention. If the 
focus on comprehensive conflict prevention is lost, then the EU's objectives as a 
military actor are likely to be questioned. 
At the early warning and analysis stage, coordination is crucial to bring together all 
the information and analysis across and within institutions. The lack of shared 
intelligence from Member States, and the lack of Commission and delegation 
contribution to early warning, undermines the EU's potential in broad information 
gathering and assessment. The possibility of a coordinated crisis management 
capacity is undermined by EU institutional rivalry and a discrepancy between 
resources available for civilian and military measures. The development of crisis 
management mechanisms has resulted in institutionalisation at the expense of 
coherence. Lack of effective coordination of long and short-term objectives and 
operations may lead to missed opportunities in structural con ictprevention. ! fl 
Conflict prevention has gained rhetorical success in EU discourse and policies, but 
this could be at the expense of a broad definition of the concept, inclusive of long- 
term commitment to addressing root causes of conflict. The evolution of EU conflict 
prevention policy features a significant commitment to cooperate with other 
international organisations, which, as argued in chapter 4, is particularly important for 
viable conflict prevention in the post-Cold War era. Problems raised in terms of the 
EU's approach to conflict prevention and EU internal coordination problems have an 
impact on the EU's ability to form effective partnerships with other organisations. 
This is what we turn to in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The EU and the United Nations (UN): Building a Partnership for 
Peace? 
"We resolve ... To strengthen the cooperation 
between the United Nations and regional 
organisations, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter. 
We resolve ... To ensure greater policy coherence and cooperation 
between the United 
Nations, its agencies, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade 
Organisation, as well as other multilateral bodies, with a view to achieving a fully 
coordinated approach to the problem of peace and development. " 
United Nations Millennium Declaration, September 2000 (UN 2000b). 
"Conflict prevention and crisis management lie at the intersection of the development 
and security agendas. They are also areas in which the EU and the UN are 
united ... The need for complementarity of purpose and operations 
is therefore beyond 
debate. " 
Communication from the Commission, 'The European Union and the United Nations: 
The choice ofmultilateralism' September 2003 (European Commission 2003c). 
"... this emerging partnership is not unfolding by design, by any pre-strategic logic, 
but rather by default and happenstance. " 
Michael Barnett (1995: 431) 
6.1 Introduction 
The United Nations (UN), as the intergovernmental organisation primarily concerned 
with the maintenance of international peace and security, is a key global partner for 
the EU, not least since all EU states are members, with two (France and the UK) 
being permanent members of the UN Security Council (Laatikainen 2004). The 
European Community (EQ has been a permanent observer at the UN since 1974. The 
relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) has 
become increasingly important in the post-Cold War era. Both organisations have 
played key roles in fostering pan-European peace, and the enhanced opportunities for 
multilateralism have led to operational partnerships in the Balkans and sub-Saharan 
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Africa. Support for the UN system is traditionally high in Europe, with smaller EU 
Member States in particular advocating support for the UN as a key foreign policy 
principle (Tonra 1997: 187). EU Member States are important contributors to the UN 
budget (about 40% of the world total before the 2004 enlargement) and have provided 
the majority of troops for UN-authorised peacekeeping operations in Bosnia (SFOR) 
and Kosovo (KFOR). 64 
The EU has understandably seen itself as a regional model for conflict prevention, and 
as a regional organisation willing to take on UN-mandated missions to relieve the 
pressure on UN resources. Recent years have seen a system of 'enhanced cooperation' 
between the two organisations, particularly at the senior level. Specific areas for EU- 
UN cooperation were outlined in an annex to the 2001 G6teborg European Council 
Presidency Conclusions. These included conflict prevention, civilian and military 
crisis management, and coordination in regional policy in the Balkans, the Middle 
East and Africa (Council of the EU 2001 a). 
Studies of EU/UN relations tend to deal with EU Member State coordination in the 
UN General Assembly or Security Council, or focus on the role of the EC/EU in the 
UN system. 65 The role of EU states is important in the UN system; a recent 
commentator reports that "nothing gets accomplished in many UN bodies unless the 
Europeans are on board" (Laatikainen 2004: 4). The EU is increasingly speaking as 
one voice in the UN Security Council through its permanent members, the LTK and 
France, and the Troika works to coordinate the EU position in the General Assembly 
(Laatikainen 2004: 4). Additionally, the EU frequently stresses the authority of the 
UN Charter, and reaffirms the EU's commitment to multilateralism in Treaties and 
policy documents. In Yhe European Union and the United Nations: The choice of 
multilateralism (European Commission 2003c: 3), the EU's commitment to 
multilateralism was cited as "a defining principle of its external policy, " while the 
European Security Strategy (EU 2003: 9) described the UN Charter as "the 
fundamental framework for international relations. " 
64 'Supporting the UN on peacekeeping, conflict prevention and peace-building' 
www. europa. cu. int/comm/extemal-relations/uii/index. htm. Accessed IS May 200 1. 
65 See Lindemann, B. (1982); Luif, P. (2003); CFSP Forum, Vol. 2 (1) January 2004: 'The Role of the 
EU within the UN'; Govaere, I., Capiau, J., and Vermeersch, A. (2004). 
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This chapter takes a different focus, and examines the inter-organisational dialogue on 
conflict prevention between the organisations in the post-Cold War period. In other 
words, what is being examined is the way in which the EU works with, (rather than 
in), the UN. The UN has led the debate on conflict prevention, and conflict prevention 
and crisis management have been identified as key areas for cooperation between the 
organisations. Section 8.2 sets the context for EU-UN cooperation. The post-Cold 
War security environment has been characterised by a reconsideration of the utility 
and value of regional organisations in the prevention of conflict (Duke 2003; Job 
2004). The EU's development of conflict prevention competences concurs with this 
trend. Section 8.3 follows with a discussion of the conceptual, legal, and practical 
difficulties inherent in the study of EU-UN cooperation. 
Sections 8.4,8.5 and 8.6 go on to examine the extent of policy coordination between 
the organisations in conflict prevention, structured around the categories identified in 
chapter I, outlined in chapter 4, and utilised in relation to the EU internally in chapter 
5: structural conflict prevention, early warning and analysis, and operational conflict 
prevention. Most studies of the UN's role in conflict prevention focus on the UN's 
operational role, and indeed the most visible cooperation between the UN and the EU 
is evident in operational partnerships such as in SE Europe, or delegation of duties, 
such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. UN conflict prevention 
competences are generally located in the Office of the Secretary-General and the 
Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO). This study looks at coordination of conflict prevention efforts across the full 
range of structural, early warning and analysis and operational tasks. 
Formal, regular EU dialogue with the UN became more important as the Union 
developed its operational role. At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, 
the EU committed itself to cooperate with the UN, as well as the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe "in a mutually reinforcing manner in stability promotion, early 
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction" 
(Council of the EU 1999b). Despite the progress in EU-UN cooperation made since 
1999 in particular, the 2004 UN Report of the High-Level Panel on threats, 
Challenges and Change (A more secure world. our shared responsibilities), instigated 
by the Secretary-General in the aftermath of UN member state divisions over the 2003 
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Iraq war, stressed the need for more consultation and cooperation between the UN and 
regional organisations (UN 2004). Michael Barnett, in the mid-1990s described the 
relationship between the UN and regional organisations as being more based on 
"default and happenstance" (1995: 43 1) than grand design. In light of the statement in 
the UN's High-Level Panel report, how much has the situation described by Barnett 
changed in recent years? This chapter examines whether increased EU-UN 
cooperation has resulted in more structured policy coordination for conflict 
prevention. 
6.2 Setting the Context: From Global to Regional Conflict Prevention? 
The post-Cold War security context has enhanced the role of regional organisations in 
the prevention and settlement of disputes. In the post-Second World War context, 
when the UN Charter was drawn up by the big powers, the creation of competitive 
regional alliances was seen to have led to two world wars (Barnett 1995: 411). The 
UN retained overall superiority over regional organisations, and although Article 52, 
clause 2 of the Charter made the provision for regional solutions to disputes before 
recourse to the UN, this rarely occurred in the Cold War years because of the 
overriding influence of the two superpowers (Barnett 1995: 411). 
The EC/EU was not generally classified as a regional organisation under Chapter VIII 
of the UN Charter. Articles 52-54 state broadly that nothing precludes the existence of 
regional arrangements in the maintenance of peace and security; that pacific 
settlement should be sought through these arrangements before being referred to the 
Security Council; that the UN will use regional arrangements for enforcement actions; 
and that the Security Council shall be kept informed of any regional action in the 
maintenance of peace and security (Charter of the UN, Chapter 8, Articles 52,53 and 
54). The EU, although established to prevent war between its members, was, during 
the Cold War, primarily an economic organisation, not explicitly mandated to oversee 
the pacific settlement of disputes between its members. While the UN Charter does 
not define 'regional arrangements', most regional groupings such as the Organisation 
for African Union (OAU, now African Union) and the OSCE are intergovernmental, 
designed to solve disputes between members. 66 The EU is not simply an 
66 NATO was not regarded as a 'regional arrangement' as understood by the UN Charter. 
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intergovernmental organisation, but an orgapisation sui generis, mixing elements of 
supranationalism with an increasingly distinctive type of intergovernmental 
cooperation. Moreover, the EU is now primarily concerned with preventing conflict in 
67 
states outside its membership, unlike other regional organisations , (although the 
prospect of membership is a key factor in determining EU action and leverage to 
prevent conflict). The external focus of EU conflict prevention is therefore likely to 
render it distinct from UN conflict prevention. The UN must build consensus among 
members to promote conflict prevention, while the EU's action outside its 
membership is more akin to a state-like foreign policy. This distinction may lead to 
different interpretations of conflict prevention: one based on building a consensus for 
long-term peace, the other inclined to impose peace from the outside. 
Nevertheless, the post-Cold War development of the CFSP/ESDP changed the nature 
of EU-UN cooperation, with the EU increasingly becoming a partner organisation 
concerned with the maintenance of peace and security. The EU took on the role of 
informal dispute settler in Eastern Europe, and formal negotiator, with the UN in the 
Balkans. By the turn of the twenty-first century the EU became an agency able to take 
on UN enforcement action. Overlapping objectives and the recourse to regional 
solutions in the post-Cold War period have led to a new partnership between the 
organisations. With the European continent being unusually rich in regional 
organisations (OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO and the EU), dialogue between the 
UN and these organisations became more pressing in the maintenance of peace and 
security in Europe. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 report 
Agendafor Peace urged the forging of new partnerships between the UN and regional 
organisations. 
There are other reasons for the return to favour of regional organisations in the 
prevention and settlement of disputes in the post-Cold War era. The growing strain on 
UN peacekeeping resources from the late 1980s, compounded by the continuing 
financial crisis of the organisation as members defaulted on financial contributions, 
led to a reconsideration of regional organisations in conflict prevention and resolution. 
Also important was the ending of the bipolar international system: "the centrifugal 
67 NATO has also moved towards "out-of-area" crisis management activities. 
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nature of post-Cold War politics has encouraged regionalism, and hence a 
reconsideration of regional security organisations" (Barnett 1995: 412). More 
conflicts were igniting within states, challenging the fundamental premise of the UN, 
established primarily to prevent conflict between states. The cultural, ethnic and/or 
religious nature of many of these 1990s conflicts more often than not had regional 
origins and implications, and therefore could best be tackled at the regional level 
(Eliasson 2000: 227). 
The UN has been under considerable reform in order to address the new security 
challenges. Traditional UN peacekeeping, based on the principles of consent and 
impartiality, was not always transferable to intra-state wars, where the actors were not 
necessarily governments and there was no ceasefire, no demarcation line to police, or 
indeed, no peace to keep, as was the case in Bosnia. Job (2004) has shown how the 
world's big military powers withdrew personnel from UN operations and increasingly 
turned to regional organisations and 'coalitions of the willing'. 68 In theory, the UN has 
always relied on either regional organisations or coalitions of the willing for 
enforcement action, since the original intention of having an autonomous stand-by 
UN military capacity was never realised (Wilson 2003: 89). In practice, a 
decentralised approach to peacekeeping, with personnel made up by members, was 
not necessarily a problem during the Cold War years, when missions were few and far 
between, and mandates relatively simple. This changed in the post-Cold War years; 
while the Security Council was no longer crippled by the veto, it didn't have the 
means to intervene successfully in complex and intractable disputes within states, and 
the norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states tied its hands (Job 2004). 
The problems the UN faced in dealing with the internal wars of the 1990s were driven 
home during the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda. The premise that regional 
organisations, with more local knowledge, with more at stake, and (in Europe) with 
more resources, should be the first port of call in any conflict between UN members 
gained currency (Barnett 1995; Mariko 2003). In his 2001 Report, Prevention of 
Armed Conflict, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, called on UN Member States 
to build on the inter-organisational dialogue from biennial meetings and support 
69 In 1992, France and the UK had 6,175 and 3,756 personnel deployed to UN missions respectively, 
making them the top two contributing countries. By 2002, these two countries don't even make it in to 
the top 10 contributors; the top two are Pakistan and Bangladesh, followed by India and Ghana (Job 
2004: 231). 
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further cooperation in conflict prevention between the UN and regional arrangements 
(UN 2001). 
The new proliferation and expansion of regional organisations has created problems 
for the world organisation, however, and has serious implications for the maintenance 
of international peace. The UN is struggling to maintain its traditional authority over 
regional organisations. The assumption that regional organisations would turn to the 
UN for support and a legitimate mandate before intervention in regional conflicts has 
been breached by NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and the US-led coalition 
attacks on Afghanistan in 2001-02 and Iraq in 2003 (Job 2004: 227). This trend shows 
a waning of universal UN legitimacy; there is a tendency to seek post-hoc 
legitimisation, often leaving the UN to pick up the pieces after military intervention 
(Job 2004: 236). Critics of the UN announced its redundancy during the high profile 
disputes preceding the US-led attack on Iraq in 2003. However, while the UN's 
credibility may have been damaged by the Iraq conflict, the unauthorised military 
action of the US and allies was followed by a return to the UN as problems of 
legitimacy emerged and the difficulties of reconstruction became clear (Berdal 2004: 
83). The Report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
included a specific recommendation for regional organisations to seek authorisation 
from the Security Council for regional peace operations (UN 2004: 89). 
Adam Smith (2003) has noted the shift in UN priorities in the mid-1990s from 
promoting democracy to preventing conflict. 69 Yet commentators tend to share the 
view that while implicit in the Charter, conflict prevention is an uphill struggle for the 
UN (Smith, A. 2003; Mack and Furlong 2004). Undoubtedly, the problems discussed 
above led to the conclusion in the mid-1990s that prevention was better than cure. 
However, just as the pursuit of conflict prevention is a challenge for the EU system, 
divisions in the UN preclude a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy. 
Development and security are separate parts of the UN system, with different cultures 
and entrenched institutional habits (Smith, A. 2003: 360), much like the 
development/CFSP gap within the EU. Moreover, the geographical divide in the UN 
General Assembly precludes a proactive conflict prevention consensus. Many African 
69 Olsen (2002) argues that the same shift from promoting democracy to preventing conflict has taken 
place in EU policy towards Africa. 
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countries associate conflict prevention with unsanctioned intervention, a view 
supported by the 1990s trend of humanitarian intervention. Likewise, Security 
Council members Russia and China oppose long-term conflict prevention for similar 
reasons (Bredel 2003: 63-64). Establishing an institutional connection between 
conflict prevention and development was also a delicate matter, with Southern 
countries wary of the neo-imperial motives that this implies (Bredel 2003: 64). 
The broad definitional problem may hinder the UN's drive for conflict prevention 
cooperation with regional organisations too. The apparent consensus on conflict 
prevention masks different interpretations of the term that may differ significantly 
from the UN's approach. The extent of EU commitment to come to a common 
understanding of conflict prevention with the UN, and to support and coordinate 
activities with the global organisation, is important in ensuring the UN's future 
credibility and utility. 
6.3 Understanding EU-UN Relations in the Post-Cold War Period 
6.3.1 The complexity of inter-organisational dialogue 
The compilation of dialogue between the UN and the EU on the full range of conflict 
prevention activities inevitably becomes a task of piecing together communication 
and commitment between different institutions of the two organisations; with the UN 
it is even more difficult to identify a coherent single organisation in the investigation 
than with the EU. Who does the EU ring at the UN to talk about conflict prevention? 
While the UN does have a clearly identifiable figurehead in the position of the 
Secretary-General, it is nevertheless a broad and complex organisation, with often 
tenuous links between its various components. The UN system consists of five 
primary 'organs' (Security Council, consisting of five permanent members and ten 
non-permanent members; General Assembly, composed of representatives from all 
Member countries; the Economic and Social Council; the Secretariat; and the 
International Court of Justice) and a plethora of connected programmes, funds and 
specialised agencies (see Figure 6.1). Many of these structures date back to progress 
in multilateralism made with the 1920s/30s League of Nations, the UN's predecessor. 
Security Council permanent membership was dictated by the balance of power at the 
end of the Second World War, and although subject to criticism, this set-up endures 
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today, with the only change being an increase in the number of non-permanent 
members. 
The other main change in the UN system has been the steady increase in membership, 
from 51 in 1945 to 191 today. This has had most effect in the General Assembly, 
resulting in a move from an East/West geographical split to a North/South (or more 
accurately rich/poor) divide. The Security Council is the decision-maker, while the 
General Assembly is effectively a discussion forum, with no power over the 
specialised agencies (Luard 1979). The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has 
its origins in the 1930s, set up to instigate international research on economic and 
social issues. Just as with the EC/EU in the 1950s, supporters hoped that cooperation 
would spill over to the more difficult arena of politics (Luard 1979). The Council has 
the difficult job of coordinating the work of the specialised agencies. 
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Figure 6.1. The United Nations System. 70 
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70Adapted from LIN Department of Information Diagram DPI/2299 - February 2003. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the organisation of EU external relations is far 
from straightforward either. Who speaks for the EU in the context of international 
organisations? While this study is not primarily concerned with the legal and political 
implications of EC/EU participation in the UN system, the question of who is 
responsible for dialogue and policy coordination, and at what level, inevitably 
becomes important. The opacity of EC/EU external representation renders this a 
difficult task. The EC has legal personality, meaning that it can become a member of 
another international organisation, and sign international agreements on behalf of the 
EC. This primarily translates to the EC being a member of an organisation (e. g. the 
UN Food and Agricultural Organisation, FAO) alongside Member States, who are 
generally reluctant to allow the EC to act fully on their behalf (Govaere, Capiau and 
Vermeersch 2004: 165). 71 
The EU, inclusive of CFSP and JHA, has no legal personality, and provisions in the 
1999-ratified Amsterdam Treaty allowing for international agreements on these issues 
did not make it clear if the Council was acting for the Union or on behalf of the 
Member States (Govaere, Capiau and Vermeersch 2004: 160). While the Commission 
is largely responsible for external representation (negotiating with third countries on 
accession and aid, with over 130 global delegations), the Presidency represents the 
EU in CFSP matters, assisted by the High Representative. It is not entirely clear who 
does the talking and in what capacity (EC, EU or Member States? ), especially on 
cross-pillar issues, such as conflict prevention. This creates an anomalous situation 
where the EC has legal personality, but no real power to act on behalf of the Union as 
a whole, while the Member States hold all the cards on CFSP and JHA issues, 
but have no clear legal mandate to make international agreements on behalf of the EU. 
The debate about a permanent EU seat on the UN Security Council highlights these 
issues; if the question of legal personality were put aside, EU Member States could act 
on behalf of the Union if a common position was agreed. However, the UN Charter 
provides for membership of states only, therefore any progress on achieving this 
would take place in the context of wider UN reform to allow for regional 
representation in the Security Council. Some experts question the utility of EU 
71 The exception is of course in economic competence: Member States allow the Commission to act on 
their behalf in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), on a Council mandate. 
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representation at the UN, arguing instead that the UN should be represented at the 
EU. 72 
The question of greater EU coordination in the UN was debated at length in the 
European Convention. The Constitutional Treaty provides some answers to the 
complexities of EU external action: it groups all EU external action in Title V of the 
Treaty, blurring the distinction between pillars I and II. It also allows the Union as a 
whole to conclude agreements with third countries and international organisations, 
effectively giving the EU legal personality (although the relevant articles do not use 
this phraseology) (EU 2003a, Article 111.323-325). However, these reforms still 
distinguish between CFSP and Community issues, maintaining the different rules for 
different policy areas. As commentators have argued, the changes "relate to the 
f wrapping' rather than 'the content... (Govaere, Capiau and Venneersch 2004: 186). 
The Council also has the monopoly in authorising the opening, adoption, signing and 
conclusion of agreements with third countries or international organisations (EU 
2003a, Article 111-235). Like many Constitutional Treaty reforms, outcomes will 
depend on the interpretation of roles by individuals, particularly the Union Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 73 The adoption of reforms will also, of course, depend on the 
future of the Treaty in the face of ratification problems. 
6.3.2 Modalities for EU-UN cooperation 
As previously mentioned, EU cooperation with the UN can be understood in the 
context of new roles for regional organisations in peace and security in the post-Cold 
War period. Biennial UN-Regional Organisation meetings to enhance cooperation 
began in 1994. It was agreed at this first meeting "that rather than a universal model 
for cooperation, it would be more appropriate to develop a flexible, pragmatic 
approach on a case-by-case basis"(UN 1996). The third meeting in 1998 discussed 
cooperation for conflict prevention, on the suggestion of Secretary-General Kofi. 
Annan. During this meeting, the need to develop a 'culture of prevention' to mobilise 
Member States was reiterated. Specific modalities for cooperation between the UN 
72 This view was expressed to the author by Dr Hanne-Margret Birckenbach. 
73 The Constitutional Treaty arrangements for the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs were described by 
a Council official as "personal rather than functional", open to interpretation by the personnel involved. 
Interview, Council of the EU, 27/10/04. 
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and regional organisations in conflict prevention were also agreed. These modalities 
include: 
9 Regular consultation at the headquarters level, including in early warning. 
9 More systematic coordination of preventive activities in the field, including joint 
missions. 
* The development of common indicators for early warning. 
9 The establishment of a database of the conflict prevention activities of the UN and 
regional organisations. 
e Better flows of infonnation. 
* Exchange of liaison officers and visits of working-level staff between 
headquarters. 
* Joint training of staff in conflict prevention. 
* Building specific links to civil society to increase awareness of the value of 
prevention (UN 1996a). 
Dialogue between the UN and the EU proceeded on the basis of these modalities 
agreed on by the UN and at least ten other regional organisations. The EU was, and 
continues to be, represented at these meetings by the Presidency and a representative 
of the Commission. 
To reiterate, in examining coordination between the EU and the UN system, we are 
not so much concerned here with EC/EU membership, or observer status in UN 
agencies, but the extent of the working relationships between roughly equivalent 
agencies of both organisations in the field of conflict prevention. Structural conflict 
prevention therefore deals with the dialogue and coordination between the European 
Commission and the UNDP and other UN entities. Early warning and analysis 
focuses on the dialogue between the Commission and the Council with the Secretary- 
General and his offices, while operational prevention primarily involves cooperation 
between the latter and EU Council bodies. This is dealt with in the following sections. 
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6.4 Coordinating Structural Conflict Prevention Policy 
6.4.1 The UN and structural conflict prevention: development aid 
Multilatcralism in development aid is a relatively recent phenomenon, and was not a 
high priority in the early years of the UN in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The UN's 
procedures for granting development assistance to developing countries accelerated 
after many colonial countries gained independence, and especially after the merging 
of the Extended Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA) and the Special Fund in 
1964 to create the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Luard 1977: 
246). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, part of the 
World Bank family), set up primarily to assist in post-war European reconstruction, 
became increasingly active as a UN Special Agency in development assistance in the 
1960s and 1970s, although much of its work was uncoordinated with other UN 
activities (Luard 1977: 244 & 249). Internal coordination of programmes was 
problematic; competition between agencies such as the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) over available resources 
was rife, and the centralisation of programmes was resisted. Increasingly, the World 
Bank became the dominant force in financial aid provisions, and was subject to 
criticism over its dominance by rich Western donors and its conservative and pro- 
capitalist lending policies (Luard 1977: 253). 
In the post-Cold War years, the role of the UN in development has been minor in 
terms of resources, but considerable in terms of the setting of international standards 
and norms in development. The UN has systematically mainstreamed conflict 
prevention considerations into development and humanitarian programmes. In 2001, 
the executive board of the UNDP stated that programming should take place through a 
"conflict prevention lens" (Griffin 2003: 204). The UNDP is funded by voluntary UN 
Member State contributions, and received a total of $2.9 billion in 2002. It has offices 
in more than 160 countries worldwide. 74 This figure is small compared to resources 
75 distributed by the World Bank, and even the EU. However, unlike the EU the UN 
74 http: //www. undp. org 73 In 2000, the Community external action budget was 5.5 billion euros (Smith, K. 2003: 57). Much of 
this goes towards UNDP projects e. g. in Kosovo and the Palestinian territories. The UN development 
budget stands at less than 10% of the World Banks' i. e. around $30 billion (Mack and Furlong 
2004: 71). 
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has incorporated conflict prevention into short-term as well as long-term 
development. The Emergency Response Division of the UNDP is now the Bureau for 
Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), and assists UNDP country offices in 
providing quicker and more effective responses to natural disasters and man-made 
violent conflicts . 
76 The bureau helps to fill the gap between short-term relief and 
longer-term development objectives. The UNDP has close links with the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), which in turn consults closely with NGOs in member 
countries (Mariko 2003: 189). This can facilitate targeted assistance and best practices 
in conflict prevention, linking local UNDP offices with local NGOs. 
Contemporary commentators highlight continuing coordination problems in the UN 
system as a particular challenge for the integration of development and humanitarian 
programmes with security policies; arguably important for a comprehensive UN 
conflict prevention approach (Hampson and Malone 2002: 78). The sprawling nature 
of the UN system makes the setting of common objectives among agencies 
problematic, and the Security Council has no control over the budgets, personnel or 
programmes of the agencies (Hampson and Malone 2002: 81). The lack of direct 
connection between the UNDP and the Security Council exacerbates linkage efforts 
(Mariko 2003: 191). Bureaucratic interests and turf wars, familiar from the discussion 
on internal EU coordination, have negative implications for cross-cutting policy areas. 
Mack and Furlong (2004: 63) argue that the renewed interest of the Department of 
Political Affairs (DPA) in conflict prevention is more to do with pessimism about 
peacekeeping operations than anything else, and that staff know little about 
development issues. 
While the UN system (discounting the World Bank group) pioneered multilateral 
development, it is a small player in terms of development resources, and therefore has 
the prospect of only a minor role in structural con ctprevention (Mack and Furlong 
2004: 71). Nonetheless, it retains credibility and respect in developing countries, and 
plays a major role in the development of norms such as human rights, sustainable 
development, and crucially, conflict prevention. This role is bolstered by cooperation 
and complementarity between the UN and other organisations. 
76 hn: //www. undp. orzlbcpr/about. htm. Accessed 21/05/04 
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6.4.2 EU-UN coordination in structural conflict prevention 
Lack of coordination between UN funds, programmes and agencies inevitably makes 
EU coordination with UN objectives and operations difficult. However, the 
development objectives and discourse of the organisations are increasingly convergent 
in the post-Cold War era. In the field of structural conj7ict prevention, both 
organisations have made commitments to improve the targeting of development aid to 
tackle root causes of conflict. The UN Millennium Declaration and the European 
Commission's 2000 Communication, The European Community's Development 
Policy (European Commission 2000) make the same commitments to sustainable 
development and poverty eradication. This reflects at least a rhetorical international 
consensus on development objectives, forged throughout the 1990s in the context of 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), in conjunction with the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (World Bank and IMF) and the UN. This consensus increasingly includes 
an awareness of conflict prevention considerations in the development and trade 
spheres. It is less clear how these rhetorical pledges translate into policy in developing 
countries and cooperation between organisations in the planning stages and on the 
ground. Indeed, the Commission's communication doesn't elaborate on how the EC 
coordinates the planning and implementation of development aid with UN bodies. 
The EU institutional drive for cooperation with the UN accelerated in 2001, 
significantly, during the Swedish Presidency, largely responsible for drafting the EU 
Programmefor the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. The Commission produced a 
Communication entitled Building an Effective Partnership with the United Nations in 
the Fields ofDevelopment and Humanitarian Affairs (European Commission 2001c) 
in May 2001, a month before the Council concluded a draft paper on EU-UN 
cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management (Council of the EU 2001a). 
The Communication proposed a strategy "to strengthen the involvement of the EC in 
the upstream policy dialogue and to build a more transparent, financially predictable 
and easier to monitor partnership with chosen UN agencies, funds and programmes" 
(European Commission 2001 c: 2). Clearly, given the emerging EU-UN modalities in 
operational conflict prevention (see below), high visibility for the Commission in EU- 
UN dialogue was important; Commissioner Patten was, of course, present at the first 
EU Troika meeting with the UN Secretary-General in New York in September 2000. 
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Consensus building on development and human rights issues between the UN and the 
EC had been taking place for many years in international forums and conferences. 
Much of this inter-institutional dialogue has its origins in contact between offices in 
Geneva, Switzerland, home to the headquarters of UN Agencies, ECOSOC, the WTO, 
a Commission delegation office and a EU Council Secretariat UN liaison office. The 
latter dates back to the 1960s and was primarily set up for GATT negotiations. Now 
the office deals with UN issues falling under the scope of the CFSP. Over one 
thousand internal EU 'coordination' meetings, covering the six main committees of 
the General Assembly, as well as ECOSOC, are held annually in Geneva and New 
York to agree on common positions so that the Presidency or the Commission can 
negotiate on behalf of the EU as a whole in international forums. 77 The Commission 
delegation has stepped up cooperation with the UN agencies in Geneva with the 
inception of more structured dialogue, particularly with the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA). The Community has been a full participant in major UN World Conferences 
- including the 1995 Conference on Women in Beijing, and the 2002 Conference on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. 
The 2001 communication therefore builds on existing dialogue with UN agencies; a 
strategy which also gains much support from the European Parliament. It also 
followed on from high-level meetings between Secretary-General Annan and former 
Commission President Prodi. Much of the 2001 communication centres on the lack of 
consistent and predictable EC funding for UN programmes, a problem exacerbated by 
insufficient internal coordination on both sides, and different institutional cultures and 
procedures. The Commission recommended a simplification of EC financial 
regulations to allow for EC funding on a UN programmatic rather than case by case 
basis. This would consolidate efforts already made under the initial EC/UN 
Framework Agreement on financing principles, completed in October 2000. Of 
course, the Commission wanted permanent representation in UN agencies responsible 
for programming and administering policy in return for more direct and effective 
funding. Explicit in EU documentation is the drive to increase the 'visibility' of the 
77 h": //www. eurol2a-eu-un. orearticies/en/article 1002. en. htm. Accessed 30/5/04 
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Community/Union as a key player in the UN system; both in terms of financing and 
policy planning and in presenting a united EU caucus in the General Assembly, 
ECOSOC and UN agencies. This suggests that the Commission and the Union as a 
whole is seeking an enhanced international status through cooperation with the UN. 
An updated Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) was 
concluded between Development Commissioner Poul Nielson and UN Deputy 
Secretary-General Louise Fr6chette in New York, April 2003. Longer-term 
programme funding was agreed, with more emphasis on transparency, the 
aforementioned 'visibility' of EU funding to UN programmes, and focus on 'output' 
rather than 'input'. 78 Yearly consultation meetings will allow for 'fine-tuning' - 
clearly an outcome falling short of Commission ambitions for permanent 
representation on UN programming boards. 
The FAFA also covered humanitarian aid. ECHO has supported the UN's call for 
more effective international funding for humanitarian crises, participating in UN 
Consolidated Appeals (CAPs) to facilitate a coordinated multilateral response 
(European Commission 2003b). ECHO also works with the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), joint-hosting the launch of the 
'Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to support UN 
Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies' (MCDA guidelines) in 2003 
(European Commission 2003b). 
The 2003 Communication from the Commission, The EU and the UN: The choice of 
multilateralism (European Commission 2003c) built on earlier EU commitments to 
work closely with, and in, the UN in issues of development, peace and security. EU 
commitments include adopting a 'front-runner' approach to negotiation and 
implementation of UN goals. The EU will take into account 'global targets' when 
negotiating agreements with third countries e. g. on human rights, sustainable 
development, organised crime. More specifically, the Commission will accelerate 
dialogue at country-level, increasing dialogue between Commission delegations and 
UNDP Offices in the field, and sharing information for the formation of EU Country 
79 hi! p: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/extemal relations/un Accessed 9/6/04 
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Strategy Papers and the UN's equivalent, Common Country Assessments. The 
Commission will also step up working level contacts with the DPA, DPKO, and the 
OCHA. Regular dialogue is promised with the UN Secretariat by the Presidency, 
Commission and the EU Council Secretariat, and common training programmes will 
be developed for personnel working in civilian crisis management in particular. 
Much of this cooperation is therefore in its early stages. However, the legacy of EC- 
UN cooperation and consensus on development issues suggests that policy 
coordination in structural conflict prevention is making considerable progress. The 
improvement in EU funding for UN agencies and EC financial and rhetorical support 
for the OCHA gives weight to this assessment. Cooperation is, however, concentrated 
very much between the Commission and the UNDP and OCHA. Other factions of the 
UN system such as the ILO and the financial institutions are still lagging behind in 
conflict prevention mainstrearning (Bredel 2003: 62; Bj6rkdahl 2002a: 107). It is 
worth noting, for example, the different approach of the World Bank, with whom the 
European Commission has various partnership programmes. Cooperation, in this case, 
does not improve the coherence of EU conflict prevention policy. Despite being part 
of the 'UN family', the World Bank does not share UN assumptions on the root 
causes of conflict (Bredel 2003: 63), and, while it has paid some attention to conflict 
prevention (see Cleves, Colletta and Sambanis 2002), it still focuses more on post- 
conflict situations (Bj6rkdahl 2002a: 109). Being in the business of encouraging 
privatisation and private investment in developing countries (which is unlikely to 
improve the lot of ordinary citizens), it is perhaps not surprising that the World Bank 
rejects inequality and poverty as root causes of conflict, and takes more interest in 
post-conflict 'restructuring' situations. Nevertheless, EU partnerships with the World 
Bank, for example, the Private Participation in Mediterranean Infrastructure (PPMI; 
launched in 1997 in the context of the Barcelona Process 79) could undermine 
perceptions of Union commitment to conflict prevention. 
79 http: //www. ppmi. or Accessed 19/5/04 
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6.5 Coordinating Early Warning and Analysis 
6.5.1 The UN early warning system 
Improvement of early warning capacity has increasingly become a key component of 
the UN reform agenda under the leadership of Secretary-General Annan, who took up 
office in 1997. Undoubtedly, the perceived UN failure to warn of the impending 
Rwandan genocide in 1994, and the operational failures in Bosnia, Somalia and 
elsewhere, highlighted the need for early warning and analysis to prevent violence and 
to prevent more damaging UN entanglements in complex civil wars (Cockell 2003: 
183). 
Provisions for early warning before the end of the Cold War were concentrated in the 
office of the Secretary-General, who has a mandate to bring potential conflicts to the 
attention of the Security Council. Envoys were dispatched to forestall violence in a 
preventive diplomacy capacity under the direction of 1950s Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskj old (Claude 197 1). Cold War politics stifled more proactive UN 
engagement in early warning, but, by the 1980s, early warning at the UN took another 
step forward with the development of fact-finding missions under SG Perez de 
Cufflar (Clingendael Conflict Research Unit 1996: 23). Fact-finding missions are 
valuable because of the transparent and consensual nature of the activity, designed to 
establish an objective account of the conflict or dispute that can then be used in 
preventive diplomacy or conflict resolution (Birckenbach 1997: 3 1). Unfortunately, 
competing Security Council Members were more interested in their own versions of 
the 'facts, giving short-shrift to proposals to institutionalise fact-finding (Clingendael 
Conflict Research Unit 1996: 24). Information gathering in general was, and is still, 
regarded with suspicion, since states in which the UN operates are members of the 
organisation, and governments often resent or forbid interference in their domestic 
affairs. The UN Office for Research and Collection of Information (ORCI) was 
established in the late 1980s in the Secretariat, to centralise information gathering. 
ORCI was disbanded in 1992, and its components distributed between the DPA and 
the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), for reasons that remain unclear 
(Clingendael Research Unit 1996: 28). Cockell (2003: 186) suggests the tendency of 
the ORCI to gather information without suggesting proactive strategies for action for 
the decision-makers, as a likely explanation. The boost to early warning given by 
Boutros Ghali's Agendafor Peace, followed by the reforms following his replacement 
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by Annan in 1997 led to the creation of the Executive Committee on Peace and 
Security (ECPS; supported by the interdepartmental Framework Team)) and the 
reformed interdepartmental Framework for Coordination; the former is designed to 
coordinate decision-making, while the latter coordinates analysis (Cockell 2003: 183). 
However, the jury is still out on the success of the diffusion of UN early warning 
activity. While the DPA is primarily responsible, the DPKO, OCHA, and UN field 
agencies like the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN 
Children's Fund (UNICEF), all play a lesser role in early warning (Cockell 2003: 
186). It is not clear how this information is channelled to and used by the DPA. 
The Department for Political Affairs (DPA), as the current focus of UN early warning 
capacity, analyses political developments and identifies potential conflicts. The 
Department was restructured by Kofi. Annan in 2000, as illustrated in Figure 6.2. It is 
organised hierarchically, headed by the S ecretary- General, and supported by the 
Under Secretary-General and two Assistant Secretaries-General, who each head 
particular units and regional divisions. The Department has a wide remit, inclusive of 
supporting the Secretary-General in the prevention, control and resolution of conflict, 
as well as post-conflict peacebuilding. It is also the focal point for Chapter VIII 
cooperation with regional organisations. Four regional divisions (two for Africa, one 
for Asia and one for Europe and the Americas) are responsible for monitoring 
potential crises and gathering information from member states (UN 2000). Despite the 
creation of a DPA Prevention Team in 1998, early warning is still inadequate in terms 
of the availability of information for DPA desk officers to make accurate assessments 
(Mariko 2003: 179). While fact-finding teams provide valuable information to the 
DPA that members may be reluctant to provide, teams cannot operate without 
permission within sovereign states (Mariko 2003: 180). 
The four-tiered early warning system has been criticised for its less than immediate 
analysis, prompting commentators to argue that the UN favours lengthy coordination 
over prompt reactions to conflict situations (Mariko 2003: 180). 
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6.5.2 EU-UN coordination in early warning and analysis 
A UN press release on the eve of the Second UN-Regional Organisation meeting in 
1996 stated that the "exchange of information on emerging crises at an early stage [is] 
the key to closer coordination between the United Nations and regional organisations" 
(UN 1996). This was reiterated in 1998 when the agreed 'modalities for cooperation' 
between the UN and regional organisations included consultation on early warning, 
the development of common conflict indicators, and better flows of information. 
Council of the EU conclusions on EU-UN cooperation in 2001 cited "the exchange of 
information and analyses concerning on-going and potential crises"(Council of the 
EU 2001 a: 3) as a key area for cooperation. Why then is there little sign of progress in 
EU-UN policy coordination for early warning and analysis? 
Whilst the sharing of information for early warning purposes is widely regarded as 
crucial in organisational cooperation for conflict prevention, the realities of 
cooperation are more problematic. As discussed in the EU context, Member States are 
often reluctant to pool national intelligence. However, for information gathering the 
EU is generally working outside its current membership, while the UN has the added 
difficulty of gathering information from its own members, with all the issues of 
sovereignty and partisanship that this entails. 
Despite the apparent emphasis on early warning, there is a dearth of information in 
Commission and Council documents about specific early warning cooperation with 
the UN. According to the Commission Communication The EU and the UN: The 
choice oftnultilateralism (European Commission 2003c), the focus for information 
sharing is in the drafting of the Commission's Country Strategy Papers. This 
consultation occurs in the country in question and between Commission officials in 
Brussels and UN officials in the DPA. In early 2003, the Commission and the UN 
Secretariat agreed on this desk-to-desk dialogue on conflict prevention and risk 
assessment 'in certain focus countries' (European Commission 2003c), confirmed in 
the June 2004 annual conflict prevention report as the sharing of early warning 
information in five pilot countries (Council of EU 2004b). Information sharing is still 
therefore fairly limited. Contact between UN and EU Special Representatives in 
certain countries is also a possibility, although it is not clear how such dialogue would 
be coordinated with dialogue between Commission delegations and UNDP offices, for 
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example. Country-specific information sharing is important for early warning, but this 
doesn't necessarily mean that there is more structured intelligence sharing between 
the organisations. The extent of dialogue between the UN and EU Council structures 
on early warning is also unclear, although Ehrhart (2002: 45) claims that the SITCEN 
has contact with the UN. The 2003 Thessaloniki European Council report on the 
Implementation ofEUProgrammefor the Prevention of Violent Conflict (Council of 
the EU 2003f) cited staff to staff meetings on early warning between the EU and the 
UN, OSCE and NATO, but is not specific about the institutions involved. The report 
also cites EU contact with the UN Framework Team for Coordination. 
The relatively recent nature of the early warning systems in both organisations, 
combined with difficulties in inforination gathering, preclude immediate progress in 
policy coordination for early warning purposes. Internal problems in the gathering, 
compilation, and coordination of information in both the UN and the EU make 
external coordination for conflict prevention particularly difficult. However, progress, 
as reported in both EU and UN documents, is being made as contacts between the 
organisations are being intensified. Whether this cooperation will result in the sharing 
of anything more than general information and post-hoc analysis, however, remains to 
be seen. 
6.6 Coordinating Operational Conflict Prevention 
6.6.1 UN operations: from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and peace 
enforcement 
The post-Cold War operational context was a challenge for the UN, as traditional 
peacekeeping was no longer sufficient in tackling conflict (Ruggie 1993: 26). 
Preventive diplomacy, however, still features strongly in UN strategies to prevent 
conflict, with an increase in fact-finding, Special Representatives, and high profile 
diplomatic visits by the Secretary-General, and the offering of his 'good offices'. The 
UN Security Council has also taken on a more proactive role in the prevention of 
conflict, sending its own missions to countries and supporting the preventive 
diplomacy of the Secretary-General and his Special Representatives (UN 1999). 
Nevertheless, the UN has had to develop a wider range of skills to cope with the 
complexities of intra-state war situations. In UN parlance, peacebuilding has emerged 
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as an additional and often alternative strategy to traditional peacekeeping, as a way of 
both averting the conditions causing violence and restoring the conditions for peace 
after war (Sens 2004: 144). While it encompasses strategies to prevent conflict and 
rebuild peace after conflict, peacebuilding employs a range of shorter-term. strategies, 
including civilian crisis management competences such as election assistance and 
police training. 
Civilian crisis management under the wide banner of 'peacebuilding' has therefore 
become an expanding area for UN action. Strategies such as election monitoring were 
traditionally seen to encroach on the domestic domain, and there was therefore not a 
great deal of support for such missions in independent countries during the Cold War 
period. However, the UN increasingly provided technical assistance for plebiscites in 
post-colonial Africa in particular, usually as an extension of peacekeeping missions 
(Morphet 1993: 237). This has expanded in recent years, and the DPA now has an 
Electoral Assistance Unit to advise on, and coordinate, electoral assistance 
programmes in Member countries. 
Military crisis management is more problematic for the UN. Peacekeeping has 
increasingly been authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter ('threat to 
international peace and security') rather than Chapter VI ('pacific settlement of 
disputes') (Morphet 1993: 23 1). This reflects a new post-Cold War complexity in 
terms of actors involved in conflict and the ability to gain consent for UN action. In 
the post-Cold War context, therefore, action to compel compliance, stop fighting and 
protect civilians has been labelled 'peace enforcement'. Military crisis management 
can be seen as a component of wider enforcement action, which may include 
sanctions, arms embargos and blockades (Osman 2002: 20). The term has also seen 
wider post-Cold War usage in acknowledgement of the inapplicability of traditional 
peacekeeping (based on non-violence and consent) in post-Cold War conflicts. 
Assumption of a peacekeeping framework in civil war situations has been damaging 
for the UN and for civilians. While the Security Council can call for the use of force 
(Article 42, Chapter VII), it relies on coalitions or regional organisations to carry out 
enforcement actions. The original Charter created a Military Staff Committee to 
provide military advice to the Security Council, and envisaged a UN standing army. 
However, Cold War divisions left the former a token body, undeveloped in the post- 
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Cold War era, and the latter a complete non-starter. The crisis in Somalia in 1992 was 
the first time that the Security Council authorised peace enforcement action in a civil 
war situation (Osman 2002: 198). The mandate in Bosnia was extended to peace 
enforcement in 1994, but the complexities of the situation on the ground left a glaring 
hole between mandate and practice (Osman 2002: 198). The UN struggled to 
reconcile experience and resources with protracted intra-state war and increased 
demand for its services. The chain of command in enforcement situations between UN 
Headquarters and Member State-commanded troops was weak and unclear. The result 
was the failure to protect civilians and a blow to UN credibility. In light of these 
problems, it is clear to see why the UN is keen to share the burden of military crisis 
management/peace enforcement missions with regional organisations. Nevertheless, 
this requires efforts on both sides to ensure that civilian/military operations are 
effectively coordinated. 
6.6.2 EU-UN coordination in operational conflict prevention 
While the EU and the UN had some ad hoc experience working together in the 
Former Yugoslavia, specific modalities for field cooperation were slow to emerge on 
the EU agenda. This was largely because cooperation in operational con ict Ifl 
prevention with the UN was not envisaged until significant progress had been made in 
the development of the EUs security and defence policy. The EU's role in the UN 
administration of Kosovo (UNMIK) from June 1999 is largely restricted to economic 
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. By contrast, EU objectives in the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan, (in the framework of the December 2001 Bonn 
Agreement) are more ambitious and wide-ranging. 80 This reflects progress in EU 
competences and ambitions as well as the smaller number of international 
organisations active in Afghanistan as opposed to SE Europe. 
The June 2001 Council Conclusions, EU- UN cooperation in conflict prevention and 
crisis management identified conflict prevention and civilian and military crisis 
management as priority areas for EU-UN cooperation. The Western Balkans, Middle 
East and Africa were cited as key regions for cooperation. The modalities outlined for 
80 EU objectives include crisis prevention, the support of civil, military and social structures, and the 
promotion of democracy, as well as economic development 
www. europa. eu. int/comm/external relations/afahanistan/intro/index. htm. Accessed 21/6/04 
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this cooperation were Troika meetings with the UN Secretary-General; meetings 
between the EU High Representative for CFSP and the External Relations 
Commissioner and the UN Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General; Political 
and Security Council (PSC) meetings with the UN Deputy Secretary-General and 
other UN officials; contacts between the Commission and the Council Secretariat and 
the UN Secretariat (Council of EU 2001 a). Preventive diplomacy coordination would 
also take place with dialogue on fact-finding, diplomatic activity and concurring 
messages/declarations. There is no indication of how the EU institutions will 
coordinate in order to present a consistent message to the UN. Neither is there any 
indication of who has the authority to make decisions on behalf of the EU in dialogue 
with the UN Secretary-General and his deputies. This could lead to a process of slow 
decision-making in the event of a crisis. 
These protocols were followed up by a Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in 
Crisis Management (Council of the EU 2003j) in September 2003. The declaration 
aimed to deepen dialogue between the organisations in light of the positive 
cooperation in Bosnia (where the EU replaced a UN police mission) and in the Congo 
(where the EU reacted promptly to UN requests to assist in stabilising the security 
situation in the capital, Bunia, - both in 2003). The organisations agreed to establish a 
joint consultative mechanism to examine how mutual coordination and compatibility 
could be established in four key areas: planning (reciprocal assistance in assessment 
missions and greater contact between mission planning units); training (including 
establishing joint training standards); communication (including between situation 
centres and the exchange of liaison officers); and best practices (including the 
systematic exchange of lessons learned) (Council of the EU 2003j) 
The G6teborg European Council of June 2001 also outlined the modalities of EU 
cooperation in civilian aspects of crisis management with international organisations 
(the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe). EU options for operational cooperation were 
cited as follows: Member States could contribute nationally to a UN/OSCE controlled 
mission; the EU could make a coordinated contribution to such a mission; the EU 
could lead a whole component of an international mission, as in Kosovo; the EU 
could lead an operation with help from other organisations; and finally the EU could 
lead an autonomous operation (Council of the EU 2001c). Joint training programmes 
163 
in civilian crisis management have also been mentioned, in line with one of the 
modalities for cooperation set at the Third UN-Regional Organisations meeting in 
1998. However, despite this, a recent document describing the EC Project on Training 
for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, (a European Commission initiative in 
partnership with a network of EU-based training institutions) does not mention any 
joint projects or dialogue with the UN on staff training (European Commission 
2003d). 
While 'joint missions' were raised as a modality for UN-regional organisation 
cooperation in 1998, it is unlikely that the EU will find itself undertaking a joint 
peacekeeping mission with the UN. What is more likely is the EU taking on a 
particular component of a UN mandated or controlled operation, such as the EU 
controlled pillar W of UNMIK in Kosovo. However, the Kosovo mission has not 
been a resounding success in inter-institutional coordination. UNMIK is one of two 
UN-headed international administration projects in the post-Cold War era (the other is 
East Timor), concurring with the organisation's new expanded role in peacebuilding. 
These projects have been a challenge, however, and UNMIK has had mixed results 
partly because it is supporting a policy of containment while Kosovo's final status 
remains unresolved (ICG 2004: 36). Internal institutional and inter-institutional 
problems are also evident. While there is little secondary analysis of the work of the 
EU's economic 'Pillar IV' of UNMIK, a recent report attributes economic failure in 
Kosovo in part to the shortcomings of the EU pillar: not only have there been 
allegations of corruption, but there are no institutional links between Pillar IV staff in 
Kosovo and Brussels, and no Commission officials are involved (ICG 2004). This 
inadequate contribution to the UN project does not concur with EU rhetoric on 
conflict prevention as central to EU external relations, and neither does it reflect a 
well-developed cooperative relationship with the UN in Kosovo. 
Other options for cooperation with the UN are EU civilian/military crisis management 
missions as a contingency before the arrival of UN peacekeepers (as in Bunia in the 
Congo); or finally EU personnel taking over a formerly UN controlled operation, such 
as the EU takeover of the police mission in Bosnia in 2003. The Congo mission was 
relatively modest, although the EU is pushing forward with a framework for EU-LJN 
military crisis management. This entails more contact between the EU Military Staff 
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(EUMS) and the UN DPKO, as well as the development of the Battle Group concept 
with UN operations in mind (Council of the EU 2004a). Commentators have cited 
potential problems with the chain of command procedure in the event of an EU 
military operation in support of the UN, as well as the danger of EU Member States 
allowing civilian crisis management to be relegated in EU-UN relations (Manca 2004: 
4). The Kosovo example illustrates that modalities for better EU-UN coordination 
outside the military crisis management sphere are required. 
The relatively recent nature of EU-UN dialogue on civilian and military crisis 
management means that coordination efforts are still in the early stages. Nevertheless, 
a lack of coordination and planning between the organisations at the early warning 
stage could mean that operational coordination remains ad hoc. Admittedly, 
'flexibility' is necessary to allow for different conflict situations with different 
regional and global implications. Yet this tentative analysis reveals unnecessarily 
complex modalities for cooperation between the organisations, involving too many 
officials in both organisations. More policy coordination across the full range of 
conflict prevention activities is required for a comprehensive partnership for peace. 
6.7 Internal EU coordination problems: Implications for coordination with the 
UN 
Lack of effective internal coordination in both the UN and the EU makes external 
coordination in conflict prevention policy difficult. Despite the apparent international 
consensus on conflict prevention, global disparities and internal instability result in a 
host of UN nations being inherently suspicious of the domestic interference that 
conflict prevention implies. Even within the more homogenous EU, the consensus on 
conflict prevention is vague in order to mask over differences of opinion about exactly 
how the term is defined and what it entails. Inevitably, the agreement to make conflict 
prevention a key component in inter-organisational cooperation would show some 
cracks in the surface when a closer look at specific modalities and progress was 
examined. This conclusion, however, belies the claims made in documents and 
declarations produced by both organisations over the past ten years that operational 
partnerships exist. 
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The UN has put much effort into tackling internal coordination in recent years. The 
UN 'Framework for Coordination' in particular has been successful in bringing 
together information and identifying conflict prevention opportunities (Bj6rkdahl 
2002a: I 11). Additionally, while many of the specialised agencies and programmes 
have yet to have their expertise and findings properly integrated into the UN system, 
the development of the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF; first used October 
2001- February 2002 in the context of Afghanistan) to coordinate the work of UN 
officials, agencies and peacekeepers in the field is a step in the right direction (Griffin 
2003: 211). If efforts to coordinate in the UN have tended to dominate over policy 
development, the opposite could be argued in reference to the EU. Conflict prevention 
policy has taken off in the EU without the necessary internal coordination 
mechanisms needed to coordinate externally with the UN. Using the three levels of 
analysis identified in the previous chapter, we now turn to how EU coordination 
problems at each level (the pillar structure, inter-institutional and internal 
institutional) may impact on the success of EU coordination with the UN in conflict 
prevention. 
6.7.1 The pillar structure 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the pillar structure of the EU artificially 
compartmentalises policy. Policy-making is subject to different rules and procedures, 
with pillar one (EQ policy being more supranational than the intergovernmental- 
based policies of pillars two and three. The different legal personalities of the 
European Commission/EC and the EU as whole present a confusing international 
picture, and there is no consensus between Member States on the extent of EC 
representation of their collective interests in UN forums. This partly reflects the 
different character of the two organisations: until the intergovernmental UN is 
reformed to allow for greater regional representation, then EU Member States will 
continue to value their national representation (particularly in the Security Council) 
over EC/EU representation. As the situation stands at present, the EU and its Member 
States do not always present a consistent and united front in the UN. This was shown 
most damagingly in the disagreements over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Neither is there an EU intra-organisational system in place to ensure consistent and 
coordinated dialogue with the UN. The division of conflict prevention competence 
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between pillars (development and humanitarian aid in pillar one, and CFSP-ESDP 
policies in pillar two) makes overall dialogue with the UN difficult. The UN 
Secretary-General has had meetings with former Commission President Prodi, former 
Commissioners Patten and Neilson, and with EU Presidencies that change every six 
months, as well as with the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana. This 
dialogue is supplemented by individual dialogue between UN agencies and different 
parts of Commission, and the Commission and Council secretariat with various parts 
of the UN Secretariat. The pillar structure dictates this situation where there is no 
institutional or personal focus for external relations dialogue with the UN. This has a 
particularly deleterious effect on the coordination of a cross-pillar policy such as 
conflict prevention. As already mentioned, the new role of European Union Foreign 
Affairs Minister (if implemented) could provide a bridge between the pillars, but will 
not necessarily provide the appropriate balance between policy areas subject to 
different EU procedures. 
6.7.2. Inter-institutional problems 
This pillar division is mirrored in inter-institutional divisions between the EU 
institutions responsible for conflict prevention policies. Just as it is not clear who is in 
charge of policy, it isn't clear who is in overall charge of dialogue between the EU 
and the UN. The large number of points of contact between the EU and the UN has 
been mentioned. Cooperation with the UN was enhanced by both institutions mid- 
2001, and conflict prevention was a central component. Yet both the Commission and 
Council of the EU seem to be wrangling for the highest visibility in this inter- 
organisational cooperation. Separate dialogue between the Commission-UN and 
Council-UN with minimal coordination at the EU level limits the chance of 
coordinating a comprehensive conflict prevention policy across the organisations. The 
internal civilian-military policy divide will be perpetuated externally. This may be 
overcome if dialogue with the UN was focused in the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC), enhanced by sufficient civilian crisis management and 
development expertise from the Commission. The lack of Commission input into joint 
projects such as the EU pillar of UNMIK represents a missed opportunity in structural 
conflict prevention: not only does the EU need to take political control of pillar IV, 
but EU institutional expertise would greatly enhance the EU's contribution to lasting 
peace in Kosovo. 
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6.7.3 Internal institutional problems 
Internal institutional problems present another layer of complexity which impacts on 
external coordination with the UN. The Council has too many points of contact with 
the UN in the Presidency, High Representative, PSC and Council Secretariat. It is also 
not clear what role the Council Working Group on the UN plays in external 
coordination with the UN. The internal fragmentation of duties in the Council renders 
early warning dialogue with the UN problematic, as does the real dearth of 
intelligence pooled at the EU level. For crisis management, the relative lack of 
capacity for civilian operations could let the EU down in the one area most in demand 
by the UN. Lack of internal coordination in this area of shared competence between 
the Council and the Commission may also jeopardise the added value of EU 
coordination in civilian crisis management with the UN. 
Commission coordination with the UN throws up a number of paradoxes. The high 
visibility of EC-UN development dialogue contrasts with the downgrading of DG 
Development within the Commission. Moreover, the internal lack of consistency 
between economic and development policy is exported in the EU's external 
relationships with the UNDP and the World Bank. Forging a consensus on poverty 
reduction with the UN, and funding many UN conflict prevention strategies via the 
Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), is not always consistent with supporting 
privatisation in partnership with the World Bank. While this might be perceived as a 
common and even inevitable contradiction in world politics, it does much to highlight 
the hollow nature of the conflict prevention consensus, particularly in the eyes of 
developing countries. In this case, internal inconsistency leads directly to 
inconsistency in external action. 
In terms of the coordination of conflict prevention strategies, the functional, rather 
than geographical division of external relations in the Commission could make 
dialogue with the UN on geographical regions for early warning purposes more 
complicated, since geographical desks are dispersed. There is no indication that the 
Commission's Check-Listfor Root Causes of Conflict" conforms with UN early 
91 Accessed at h! W: //europa. eu. int/comm/extemal relations/cl2cm/cpAist. htm 25/06/03. 
168 
warning indicators. Additionally, Commission confusion over the links between 
development and humanitarian aid is not conducive to effective ECHO coordination 
with the UN OCHA. 
The competing EU visions of crisis management could be detrimental for 
coordination with the UN in this area. The lack of linkage between civilian and 
military components not onlyjeopardises the EU's ability to provide international 
services to the UN that are desperately needed, but may result in poorly coordinated 
operations under UN authority. The Council's momentum on the development of EU 
military capacities is mirrored in progress in military crisis management modalities 
with the UN, potentially at the expense of coordination in civilian crisis management. 
Internal EU coordination mechanisms are insufficient, and the 'last minute' nature of 
coordination that does exist (the Crisis Response Coordination Team and the 
Committee of Contributors) will preclude earlier coordination of EU objectives/plans 
with the UN. 
The EU conflict prevention system is still in its infancy, and is subject to major 
revision with the effects of enlargement and the Constitutional Treaty. Nevertheless, it 
can be concluded that although the EU places cooperation with the UN at the top of 
its agenda, EU rhetoric is not matched by the current level of policy coordination in 
conflict prevention. 
6.8 Conclusion 
Undoubtedly the move towards coordination between the leading global multilateral 
organisation, and one of the most resourceful and advanced regional organisations, in 
a key post-Cold War policy area, is a positive development. Cooperation between the 
United Nations and regional organisations has emerged as a post-Cold War leitmotif 
in the maintenance of international peace and security. Cooperation with the EU in 
particular has led to the emergence of conflict prevention on the global agenda. 
This chapter has examined the extent of policy coordination in conflict prevention 
between the UN and the EU. This relationship has developed in the context of UN 
169 
increased recourse to regional organisations and EU development of a range of 
foreign policy instruments in the post-Cold War era. Both organisations have been 
challenged by pan-European security problems, particularly in SE Europe, and 
perceived organisational failures led to the development of more frequent and 
structured dialogue. Conflict prevention was central in this dialogue because it was 
perceived to be at the root of a comprehensive and cost-effective security strategy. 
However, the complexity of both organisations in terms of factions, units and 
programmes relevant to conflict prevention renders the EU-UN relationship 
particularly difficult to untangle. The organisations are also different in terms of their 
nature and the way they operate. 
EU-UN cooperation has developed over a wide range of conflict prevention tasks, 
and, to date, has not lost its momentum. However, it is concluded that while conflict 
prevention has been consistently raised as an area for enhanced cooperation, specific 
progress in the coordination of structural policy, early warning and analysis and 
operational conflict prevention (particularly civilian crisis management) has been 
slow. The logic of coordination is generally accepted; the practicalities of inter- 
organisational policy planning and implementation are far more complex. There are 
clear links between internal and external coordination in both organisations. However, 
it is in the case of the EU that this link is most acute and problematic. The pillar 
structure contributes to these problems by giving different policy areas different rules 
and procedures in terms of initiation, formation and implementation. This results in a 
situation where different institutional actors are representing the EU in different 
policy areas. This becomes confusing when the EU acts in the context of an 
international organisation, and is particularly problematic for conflict prevention since 
both pillars one and two have competence in this area. Cooperation with the UN has 
therefore been coloured by institutional rivalry between the Council and the 
Commission. 
Finally, internal complexities in both the Commission and the Council result in no 
clear focus for EU-UN coordination in terms of personnel or organisational unit. This 
is compounded by a lack of internal consensus on the focus of conflict prevention, 
with a promising partnership with the UN in structural conj7ict prevention being 
jeopardised by an institutional drive for short-term crisis management. The fast 
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development of EU military capacities has led to a focus on EU-UN coordination in 
military crisis management at the expense of coordination in civilian crisis 
management. In short, conflict prevention is hindered by the lack of internal EU 
policy coordination outlined in chapter 5. This type of problem is a common one in 
governments and organisations, but real efforts to circumnavigate the institutional 
barriers are needed if EU coordination with the UN is to lead to a fruitful partnership 
for peace. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE): Pan-European Coordination for Conflict 
Prevention? 
"We affirm that European security requires the widest cooperation and coordination 
among participating States and European and transatlantic organisations. The 
OSCE ... is particularly well suited as a forum to enhance cooperation and 
complementarity ... The OSCE will work 
in partnership with them, in order to respond 
effectively to threats and challenges in its area. " 
OSCE Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Modelfor 
Europefor the twenty-first century, December 1996. 
"We recognise ... the shared commitment of the EU and the OSCE to democracy, 
prosperity and stability in Europe as a whole, and beyond. International organisations 
like ours should not be working solely in parallel but in joint efforts towards the same 
goals ... Cooperation is not an option, it is an imperative. " 
Wie European Union and the Organisationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe: 
The Shape ofFuture Cooperation. 'Address by Javier Solana to the Permanent 
Council ofthe OSCE, Vienna, 25 September 2002. 
7.1 Introduction 
The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) began as a 
diplomatic process in the 1970s, sparked by the dual influences of d6tente and the 
desire for territorial consolidation in Cold War Europe (Hyde-Price 1998: 25). 
Renamed 'Organisation' in 1995, in tune with its institutional expansion, it emerged 
as a key player in human rights monitoring and conflict prevention in the post-Cold 
War period. Its wide membership of 55 states, spanning the Atlantic and inclusive of 
Russia and the former Soviet countries, add to its legitimacy, but also limits its 
capacity to enforce its main tenets across a wide and often politically unstable 
membership area, fraught with the legacy of Russia's 'sphere of influence' (Cottey 
2001: 43). Nevertheless, it has undergone a transformation from an intergovernmental 
agreement designed to reinforce sovereignty, to a functioning institution working to 
establish peace, democracy and human rights within and between its participating 
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states (Mychajlyszyn 2003). The OSCE's approach to security precluded the 
expansion of the concept in the post-Cold War era: it incorporated political, 
economical and environmental concerns into its security remit, creating three 
'baskets' for cooperation (politico-military, economic and environmental, and the 
human dimension). The new era of cooperation between OSCE participating states in 
the 1990s allowed for a more comprehensive and effective linkage between these 
fields. 
The European Union has strong links with the OSCE in terms of the history of 
European integration, and in ethos and objectives. EU Member States now make up 
close to half of OSCE participating states, contributing more than fifty percent of the 
OSCE budget. The EC played a critical role in the 1970s in the origins of the 
Conference. Member States coordinated their contribution through the European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) process, and cross-bloc dialogue led to the pan-European 
Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which established basic agreements on human rights 
across Cold War Europe, as well as a forum for cooperation between blocs (Von Groll 
1982). The CSCE played a significant role in the gradual ending of the Cold War by 
encouraging democratisation and supporting dissident movements in Communist 
countries. 
The Cold War focus of the organisation on arms control and confidence-building 
measures 82 was an obvious pan-European concern. Today, the OSCE, with its work in 
the field of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, endorses the 'soft" approach 
to security that the EU is developing in tandem with a military capacity. Naturally, 
political and economic stability in the OSCE area is of key interest to the EU, not least 
since OSCE field missions are, and have been, active in EU candidate countries, 
helping applicants to work towards the democratic standards and protection of 
minority rights necessary for EU accession. A cooperative and complementary 
relationship continues to be in the best interest of both organisations (Schneider 
1997). The EU is developing conflict prevention policies that can be considered as 
92 "Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) are provisions for the exchange and 
verification of information regarding the participating States' armed forces and military activities. 
ICSBMSI 
... promote mutual trust and dispel concern about military activities by encouraging openness 
and transparency" (OSCE 2002: 120) 
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OSCE tasks in the OSCE's area ofjurisdiction. Has policy coordination been 
developed to offset the discord that parallel competences could create? 
Like the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to investigate the extent of EU 
cooperation and conflict prevention policy coordination with a key organisation in the 
European security architecture. We are therefore concerned with EU coordination 
with OSCE institutions and Missions, rather than EU coordination of policy within the 
OSCE. Section 7.2 outlines the role of the OSCE in the post-Cold War era, then 
section 7.3 moves on to examine EU-OSCE relations. Sections 7.4,7.5 and 7.6 
examine EU coordination with the OSCE in structural conflict prevention, early 
warning and analysis, and finally operational conflict prevention. Following the 
outline of the previous chapter on the UN, section 7.7 examines the ways in which 
lack of internal EU coordination in conflict prevention impacts on external 
coordination with the OSCE. Is EU cooperation with the OSCE moving from an 
option to an imperative, as the High Representative for the CFSP claims? 
7.2 Setting the Context: The OSCE and Post-Cold War Organisational 
Cooperation 
Expectations that the OSCE would emerge at the centre of the post-Cold War 
European security architecture were short-lived. The politically (rather than legally) 
binding nature of the organisation, as well as the consensus-based process of decision- 
making and the lack of enforcement mechanisms were seen as procedural 
disadvantages. More crucially, the veto power of Russia in the CSCE/OSCE, and the 
increasing political instability in participating OSCE states in eastern Europe, the 
Balkans and the Caucasus left NATO and the EU as the favoured security 
organisations for Western European powers and the new states in the east (Cottey 
2001: 46). The OSCE emerged as an important 'second order organisation', with a 
functional and specialist role, rather than the successor to Cold War security alliances 
favoured by (from 199 1) the Russian Federation (Forster and Niblett 2001: 29). 
However, the OSCE did preside over the international conference widely seen to mark 
the end of the Cold War: the November 1990 Paris Summit, during which the Charter 
of Paris for a New Europe was signed. The Charter saw government leaders embrace 
democracy and market economics as the basic norms of the new Europe. Participating 
states had already declared a commitment to free and fair elections and the protection 
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of human rights in Copenhagen, June 1990, during a Conference on the CSCE human 
dimension (The Copenhagen Document). 
Arguably, the OSCE has been the most vocal in its call for cooperation between 
organisations in the pan-European area. It is the only organisation (from 1999) to 
make regular and detailed reports on its coordination and cooperation with other 
organisations working within its area ofiurisdiction. OSCE cooperation with other 
organisations is primarily concentrated in the Office of the Secretary General, 
particularly the External Cooperation section of the Secretariat. The focus is on 
dialogue at the headquarters level, although cooperation in the field and at other 
institutional levels is becoming increasingly important. 
The OSCE declared itself a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter in 1992. Its growing partnership with the UN is less complex than the EU's 
relationship with the UN: the OSCE can clearly provide specialist, 'hands on' skills in 
the pan-European area, which contrasts and complements the UN's global seniority 
and legitimacy. Both organisations share a consensus-building approach to conflict 
prevention, and aim to prevent conflict within their membership area. An effective 
division of labour (largely as a result of UN-OSCE dialogue) has developed 83 - the 
OSCE's work in Europe leaves the UN to concentrate its efforts in areas with less 
regional competence in conflict prevention, such as the Great Lakes region in central 
Africa (Hopmann 2003: 88). The OSCE signed a framework agreement on 
cooperation with the UN in 1993, and, like the EU, participates in the UN-Regional 
Organisations Biennial Meetings. 
Ad hoc cooperation between European security organisations emerged as states and 
institutions recognised the need to support democratisation and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes in Eastern and Central Europe. The Stability Pact for Europe, 
launched by the EU in Paris in May 1994, was a blueprint for inter-organisational 
cooperation for conflict prevention. Uniquely, the EU gained legitimacy for its 
objectives by combining bi-lateral political and financial agreements with the new 
83 The UN and OSCE signed a framework for cooperation and coordination in 1993, and the LIN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution on strengthening cooperation with the OSCE in 2002 (LJN 
2002). 
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democracies, with a multilateral political declaration involving east and west 
European states, Russia, the United States, EU institutions, the OSCE, Council of 
Europe and the UN. The Pact was officially entrusted to OSCE supervision in 1995, 
entailing early contact between the EU and OSCE Troikas (Rummel 1996: 216). The 
Pact encouraged a common political commitment for peaceful solutions to border and 
minority problems, which would, for the new states, lead to membership of Euro- 
Atlantic organisations. While it led to inter-organisational cooperation, however, the 
results of the Pact were mixed, and the 'Round Table' discussions between states to 
foster good neighbourly relations failed to get off the ground in the Baltic states 
(Hurlburt 2000: 106). The Stability Pact offered to the states of SE Europe in the 
aftermath 1999 Kosovo crisis used the same idea, and it was again developed under 
the auspices of the OSCE. The Pact provided a framework for organisational activity 
and assistance in the Balkan region, but the offer of EU membership was premature, 
with huge implications for the EU enlargement process. Despite intensive 
organisational cooperation and presence, much of SE Europe still lacks political and 
economic stability. Nevertheless, this sustained contact and cooperation between 
organisations, based on common political and economic objectives, underlined the 
political advantages and the practical benefits of multilateral action for conflict 
prevention purposes. The countries of former Yugoslavia now host a wide array of 
organisations (OSCE, UN, NATO, EU, Council of Europe) as well as international 
NGOs. It is the exemplification of the most concerted and comprehensive inter- 
organisational cooperation, unmatched in any other crisis-prone region. Nevertheless, 
the result of this has not been resounding success in the establishment of stability in 
the SE Balkan region. While coordination of organisational activity undoubtedly helps 
the international community to provide effective conflict prevention, it is clearly no 
miracle solution without concurrent domestic commitment to the avoidance of 
conflict, or its recurrence. 
By 1999, the OSCE Istanbul Summit was proclaiming a new Charterfor European 
Security, although the final document was more limited in scope than it sounded 
(Cottey 2001: 59). Nevertheless, the 'Platform for Cooperative Security' to strengthen 
inter-organisational cooperation was a key element of the Charter. It pledged the 
further development of partnerships with other security organisations, offering the 
OSCE platform "as a flexible coordinating framework to foster cooperation, through 
176 
which various organisations; can reinforce each other drawing on their particular 
strengths. We do not intend to create a hierarchy of organisations or a permanent 
division of labour among them"(OSCE 1999: 4). The qualifying sentence concurs 
with the agreement between the UN and Regional Organisations at the Third UN- 
Regional Organisations Biennial meeting in 1998 to maintain flexibility in 
organisational cooperation, in order to deal with the unique political circumstances of 
particular crises. The modalities for cooperation are equally similar, including regular 
contact, continuous dialogue, increased transparency and practical cooperation, and 
increased cooperation in the field. 
The EU took on the role of regional leader in conflict prevention when it organised a 
regional conference on conflict prevention in 2002 in Helsingborg, Sweden. The 
Partners in Prevention conference was the result of a request by the UN Secretary- 
General that regional organisations improve regional cooperation for conflict 
prevention. The conference was organised by the Swedish government in cooperation 
with the Spanish and Danish Presidencies, and with support from the Commission. 84 
It was the first meeting between all European organisations and the UN, attended by 
high officials from the EU institutions, the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and 
NATO, as well as practitioners and NGOs. A report of the conference in English is 
not available to the public. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs provides an 
overview of the Chairman's (the late Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh) 
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conclusions on its website. Other than the familiar 'common commitment to 
translating the conflict prevention agenda into concrete action' the conference laid 
down some practical measures to improve cooperation between organisations. These 
recommendations are: increased transparency and substantive exchange of 
information; cooperation between situation rooms; development of common 
indicators on root causes of conflict; joint fact finding and development of 'country 
teams'; establishment of ad hoc working groups in specific situations; sharing of 
conflict prevention experience; and development ofjoint training programmes for 
conflict prevention. 86 These recommendations broadly echo those established at the 
1998 UN-Regional Organisation Meeting, although they are more specific in terms of 
94 'Chairman's Conclusions: Partners in Prevention Conference' Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
): //www. ud. se/inenalish/proiects/T)artners ip/news/chairman s conclusions. htm Accessed 25/06/03. 85 Ibid. 
" 
Ibid. 
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early warning and conflict indicators. The EU and the other organisations involved 
were responsible for following up on these aims. Yet the EU has developed its own 
conflict indicators, early warning system and training programmes with no explicit 
reference to these commitments. A suggestion by Gareth Evans of the International 
Crisis Group (ICG) that a Working, or 'Contact' Group be set up to coordinate 
international efforts in a country/region of conflict prevention concern 87 seems to have 
disappeared into the ether. This tends to underline the belief that policy coordination 
for conflict prevention is all talk and little action. The plethora of 'modalities for 
cooperation' has not visibly resulted in greater coordination. 
Despite the OSCE's attempts to regulate pan-European organisational cooperation, it 
has not yet emerged as the accepted central coordinating bod Y. 88 Neither has its desire 
to avoid a hierarchy of institutions prevented the OSCE from finding itself firmly at 
the bottom of it. The OSCE is inevitably embroiled in the politics of European 
security. The development of the EU and NATO in the post-Cold War era has 
implications for the OSCE. Since accession to these organisations tends to result in 
the termination of OSCE Missions (in Estonian and Latvia, for example), the 
geographical area for OSCE activity is increasingly reduced. This OSCE withdrawal 
may result in unfinished business in new EU states, despite the political criteria of EU 
membership. Those countries ruled out of membership of these favoured 
organisations will inevitably feel more stigmatised by OSCE presence (Zagorski 
2002: 224). Writing in 2002, Andrei Zagorski argued: "the forthcoming enlargement 
is largely seen as a manifestation of the fact that the European Union and NATO are 
becoming more relevant than the OSCE'(2002: 227). 
87 t, Common Commitmenf': Moderator's Conclusion Remarks by Gareth Evans at Partners in 
Prevention" Conference. http: //www. intl-crisis-group. orp-/proiects/showreport. cfm? reportid=771. 
Accessed 25/06/03. 
88 In February 2004 the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy, further 
urged greater cooperation between European security organisations, this time in the Mediterranean 
region ('OSCE CiO proposes closer co-operation with EU and NATO on Mediterranean issues' OSCE 
Press Release, 10 February 2004. hqp: //www. osce. orpLnews/gencrate. pf j2fi23? news id=3 849. Accessed 
21/06/04. 
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7.3 Understanding EU-OSCE Relations in the Post-Cold War Period 
7.3.1 OSCE structure: strengths and weaknesses 
The CSCE began as a diplomatic process rather than a consistent and continuous 
organisation, and as such consisted of infrequent meetings between participating 
states. It retains these features, with the principal decisions being made at periodic 
Summits of Heads of State 89 and yearly meetings of the Ministerial Council. 
However, since the end of the Cold War, institutional proliferation has led to the 
establishment of permanent structures, and direct mechanisms that are not hindered by 
the lengthy decision-making associated with the consensus requirement at the political 
level. The structure of the organisation can be best understood by drawing a 
distinction between the political decision-making bodies and the operational structures 
(Cohen 1999: 16). The former consist of (in hierarchical order) the Summits, 
Ministerial Council, Senior Council, Permanent Council and the Forum for Security 
Cooperation, while the latter include the Chairman-in-Office, the Troika, the 
Secretary-General, the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), field 
Missions (including Missions of Long Duration), the Representative on Freedom of 
the Media, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Various bodies are attached to these 
structures, including the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPQ in the Secretariat (see 
Figure 7.1). 
Unlike the UN Secretary General, the office of OSCE Secretary General is largely an 
administrative rather than a political post. Political leadership is provided by the 
Chairman-in-Office, (a post taken by participating states on a rotating annual basis), 
the Troika (current, previous and subsequent Chainnen) and to a lesser extent, the 
High Commissioner on National Minorities (Max van der Stoel from the inception of 
the position in 1992 until 2001; now Rolf Ekens). For an organisation with a small 
budget, the scope and width of OSCE competence is impressive. From a focus on 
political and military confidence-building measures during the Cold War, the 
organisation has moved towards a central objective of conflict prevention within 
states. It was the first organisation to focus its attention specifically to the ethnic intra- 
89 Six Surarnits were held between 1975-2000. 
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Figure 7.1. OSCE Operational Structures 
Personal 
Representatives 
Off ice for 
Democratic Conflict 
Institutions Prevention 
and Human 
Rights 
Centre 
OSCE Missionsý 
state conflicts that characterised the post-Cold War era, creating the position of High 
Commissioner on National Minorities in 1992. Its role in economic cooperation has 
decreased as the EC/EU emerged as an economic giant, and military cooperation is 
more low-key in the post-Cold War context. 
Despite its post-Cold War adaptation to new security challenges, OSCE operations 
have been subject to criticism from host states and other interested parties. 
Operationally, the organisation suffers from understaffing, lack of resources, and 
insufficient mandates. Mission staff are seconded from participating states, and are 
therefore largely appointed on the basis of political decisions rather than expertise. 
Missions vary from ýmall teams consisting of six or seven personnel to larger 
operations of twenty or more staff. The traditional approach of seconded diplomats is 
not always appropriate in dealing with deep-seated local tensions (Cohen 1999: 87). 
Moreover, the entitlement of all participating states to contribute personnel to 
Missions means frequent changes of staff. While Missions make up the lion's share of 
the OSCE budget, resources are limited, necessitating a low-key presence. Mission 
mandates have been criticised by participating states for being vague, with no 
I Chairman-in-Office I 
I Troika I 
Secretary General High Commissioner 
on National 
Minorities 
I OSCE Secretariat I 
Representative on 
Freedom of the Media 
Strategic 
Police 
Matters 
180 
indication of likely duration (Cohen 1999: 113). However, establishing a mandate for 
an OSCE mission is a highly political process, and mandates are often vague in order 
to secure agreement from the host participating state. Furthermore, the lack of details 
in a mandate can allow the Head of Mission more room to manoeuvre and extend the 
mission as necessary. Host states, while they indeed invite the OSCE to assist them, 
often feel stigmatised by an extended OSCE presence, fearing in particular that being 
labelled a potential crisis area will discourage foreign investment (Cohen 1999; 
Zagorski 2002; Birckenbach 2000). Domestically, the host government may resent 
OSCE interference and criticism and begin to withdraw cooperation. This may, in 
turn, lead to OSCE complicity in less than acceptable human rights standards (for 
example in the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where OSCE activity has been criticised for under- 
emphasising human rights - see ICG (2002)). 
At the organisational level, the relationship between Heads of Mission and the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) is unclear, as is the freedom of Heads 
of Mission to make decisions without the consent of the Chairman-in-Office and the 
Permanent Council. Politically, the organisation is criticised by some participating 
states for concentrating its activities in transitional states, and ignoring issues of 
OSCE concern in Western democracies, such as discrimination against minorities. 
More damagingly, OSCE activities have been criticised for being selective and 
patronising to host countries, or simply not upholding expected standards in its role as 
election monitor, for instance (Meyer 2000). Fair criticism is increasingly coloured by 
the geopolitical concerns of the big powers: why should Russia allow interference in 
Chechnya when the UK refuses interference in Northern Ireland? Western states have 
continued to condone Russian military presence in Georgia and Moldova in order to 
maintain wider Russian commitment to the OSCE process (Ghebali 2004: 6). This, 
however, has not silenced Russian criticism of the OSCE. In July 2004, the 
government of the Russian Federation released a statement criticising the OSCE's 
"double standards and selective approaches" in human rights and election monitoring, 
which are undermining state sovereignty. 90 This was followed by an appeal from the 
90 'Statement by CIS Member Countries on the State of Affairs in the OSCE' [Moscow Statement], 
Moscow, July 3,2004. Press Release 16, hn: //www. g-reat-britain. mid. nýpr rel/pres 1 6-04. htm. 
Accessed 23/03/05. 
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CIS states in September echoing Russia's stance. 91 A vigorous defence of the OSCE 
was subsequently launched by a group of NGOs based in the CIS and Eastern and 
Central Europe, expressing "categorical disagreement with the negative evaluation of 
OSCE activity in the region, " considering the statement by Russia and the CIS states 
to be "an attempt at 'preventative impact' on the OSCE ... at a time when [it] has 
started paying more serious attention to the manifestations of arbitrariness and 
lawlessness on the territories of the former USSR. 502 The EU, in a December 2004 
Draft Assessment Report on the EUs role vis-6-vis the OSCE, recognised that "a well 
coordinated policy of the EU vis-A-vis the OSCE appears to be all the more important 
in a period when Russia and some CIS states express doubts on the role of the 
OSCE. " and warned of a "values and commitments gap emerging on the borders of 
the EU" (Council of the EU 2004d: 5). 
As a broad organisation acting on the basis of consensus, with no enforcement 
capabilities, the OSCE is accustomed to being the arena for the gripes, criticisms and 
rivalries of participating states. Nevertheless, this perceived weakness could be 
regarded as more of a strength in the promotion of OSCE values (Chigas 1996: 27). 
The organisation's inclusive and comprehensive approach to security aims to 
persuade participating states to establish and maintain stable democracies and human 
rights cultures, not exclude those that don't, thereby losing all influence. Similarly, 
democracy and human rights cannot be enforced militarily, but must originate in 
domestic structures and civil societies. One of the key aims of OSCE missions is to 
help foster these domestic conditions by working closely with host governments and 
representatives of local NGOs and civil society. This must be kept in mind when 
considering the OSCE's position at the bottom of the organisational heap: it is no 
reflection of its worth or potential, but more the interests of its participating states. 
91 'Appeal of the CIS Member States to the OSCE Partners', Astana, September 15,2004. Information 
and Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
httR: //www. 1n. mid, ni/brp 4nsf/0/7Of6lOccd5b876ccc3256flOO043db72? OpenDocument. Accessed 
15/03/05. 
92 Statement of Non-governmental organisations in the countries of CIS and Eastern and Central 
Europe, 'Human Rights: "No" to the Immunity of the State', released at 2004 OSCE Human 
Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw, October 14,2004. h! jj2: Hfiles. csce. vzov/45 I-en-45 I- 
01-p-df Accessed 15103105. 
182 
7.3.2 OSCE-EU cooperation: crossing competences? 
Relations between the two organisations have developed as the OSCE expanded its 
presence in Europe and as the EU began to take on a substantial role in conflict 
prevention. This relationship is decidedly different to the EU's relationship with the 
UN, since both the EU and the OSCE are regional, European-based organisations. Yet 
despite this convergence of tasks in the post-Cold War era, the OSCE is also a very 
different organisation from the EU. Like the UN, it is an intergovernmental 
organisation, with a consensus-based decision-making procedure, aiming to prevent 
disputes between and within its participating member states. The only occasions in 
which the OSCE has worked outside its area of current membership were in 
Macedonia and Kosovo while the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia- 
Montenegro) was suspended from the organisation. Its legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Russian Federation is particularly important, and this is one of the reasons why the 
OSCE is such an important partner for the EU, particularly in areas of Russian interest 
and influence such as Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
In February 2003, the Council of the EU published Draft Conclusions on EU-OSCE 
cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management andpost-corflict rehabilitation 
(Council of the EU 2003g). Similar to the EU Conclusions on cooperation with the 
UN, particular modalities were not discussed until a concrete role in EU civilian crisis 
management had emerged. This was despite the rhetoric on organisational cooperation 
evident in European Council Presidency Conclusions and other EU documents 
throughout the 1990s, as well as ad hoc cooperation with the OSCE in the Balkans in 
particular, including the Stability Pact for Central and Eastern Europe, cooperation 
between the OSCE and the EUMM in former Yugoslavia, and joint fact-finding 
missions. The document identified five key areas of 'enhanced cooperation': 
exchange of information and analyses, cooperation on fact-finding missions, 
coordination of diplomatic activity and statements (including consultations between 
special representatives), training and in-field cooperation (Council of the EU 2003g). 
These areas for cooperation draw on the recommendations made at the Helsingborg 
Regional Conference. The modalities for cooperation are concentrated on the political 
level. They are: 
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*A meeting between the EU Troika, the OSCE Troika and the OSCE Secretary- 
General during each EU Presidency. 
* Invitations of representatives of the OSCE Chainnan-in-Office, Secretary- 
General, OSCE Heads of Missions and heads of other OSCE institutions to 
informal meetings with the PSC during each Presidency. 
9 Visits by EU Troika to Vienna for meetings with the OSCE Troika, EU Permanent 
Representatives to the OSCE and third countries. 
* Briefings by the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for external 
relations to the Permanent Council in Vienna. 
Continued contacts between the High Representative, the external relations 
Commissioner and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Secretary General. 
9 Coordination among EU Member States' representatives to the OSCE and the 
European Commission delegation in Vienna and coordination between them and 
the EU institutions in Brussels in order to facilitate synergies. 
9 The invitation of representatives of the OSCE Secretary General and Chairman-in- 
Office, Heads of Missions and Heads of OSCE institutions to informal meetings 
with relevant working groups (Council of the EU 2003g). 
The remaining modalities include field level cooperation between EU Special 
Representatives, heads of EU crisis management operations, EU Member State 
embassies, European Commission delegations and OSCE field missions and personal 
representatives, and staff to staff contacts between the General Secretariat of the 
Council of the EU, the European Commission and the OSCE Secretariat and 
institutions. The first formal staff-level meeting between the OSCE Secretariat and 
EU institutions took place in Vienna in May 2003 (OSCE 2003). The general nature 
of this cooperation, combined with the fact that commitments are recent, means that 
analysis of EU-OSCE coordination is tentative, drawing on contemporary trends to 
highlight the viability of inter-organisational partnership. 
The EU's development of conflict prevention competences has encroached onto 
traditional OSCE territory. A recent commentator remarks on the concern of OSCE 
officials over a possible EU takeover of OSCE tasks (Doyle 2002). The implications 
of this development could be far reaching. Firstly, the scope for competition and 
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overlap between the organisations is increased. Secondly, the OSCE's ethos, interests 
and practices result in a particular approach to conflict prevention. In some cases, this 
may be a rather different approach from the EU, an organisation with wider interests 
and resources, including those tied up with the single market, financial assistance, and 
enlargement. It may be important to ensure that cooperation between the organisations 
starts with a common understanding of conflict prevention and the objectives in 
particular countries or regions. This could increase the chance of coordination 
resulting in reinforcing rather than conflicting policies. 
The structure of the OSCE has implications for effective coordination with the EU. Its 
structure is loose, with a distinction between its political and operational factions. It 
has a relatively small staff; personnel consist mainly of diplomats working at the 
intergovernmental level in the Permanent Council, and in the field missions. It has a 
small number of international staff working as experts and advisers in the various 
offices and institutions. Frequent changes of staff are not conducive to the 
development of longer-term partnerships on the ground. The distinction between the 
political/diplomatic and operational levels creates two different institutional cultures 
within the same organisation. The most visible forum for coordination between the 
organisations is on the ground i. e. between EC delegations/Special Representatives 
and OSCE Missions or the HCNM. Nevertheless, it is in this kind of situation that the 
organisations may have different priorities, especially in EU candidate countries. 
Estonia, for example, is a case in point, and is considered below. Another draw-back 
is the nature of OSCE reports, many of which are confidential and non-accessible, and 
also the secretive nature of dialogue, or 'hidden' diplomacy. For these reasons it is 
particularly difficult to disentangle the objectives of organisations' from those of 
member states, and to assess the impact of organisational activity in particular 
countries. 
An overview of the current extent of EU-OSCE dialogue and coordination in 
structural conflict prevention, early warning and analysis and operational conflict 
prevention follows, with a summary of OSCE activities in these categories preceding 
the discussion. We then move on to the implications of internal EU policy 
coordination for external coordination with the OSCE. 
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7.4 Coordinating Structural Conflict Prevention Policy 
While the OSCE's dialogue on economic, military and environmental aspects of 
security is relevant for conflict prevention, this chapter primarily examines EU 
coordination with OSCE bodies concerned with the political and human dimensions 
of security (i. e. the political aspects of the politico-security basket, and the third 
human dimension basket, dealing with human rights and fundamental freedoms), 
largely because cooperation in the other OSCE fields is minimal. EU-OSCE 
cooperation therefore entails cooperation between the organisations on structural 
conflict prevention (democracy and human rights promotion), early warning and 
analysis and operational conflict prevention. 
7.4.1 OSCE structural conflict prevention 
The OSCE's role in structural conflict prevention is not based on aid or targeted 
financial assistance, but in its long-term and low-key role in the promotion of human 
rights, democracy and the peaceful settlement of disputes. OSCE tasks contributing to 
structural conflict prevention overlap with its activities in early warning and civilian 
crisis management. For example, OSCE activity under the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIBR) contributes to short-term needs for election 
monitoring and longer-term training in democratisation and human rights protection. 
Similarly, the HCNM and OSCE Missions can perform early warning functions as 
well as structural conflict prevention in the promotion of long-term stability. 
The OSCE's role in long-term conflict prevention is best illustrated by its Missions of 
Long Duration - in situations of potential rather than actual conflict. 
93 Mandates for 
the Missions are drawn up by the Permanent Council, are subject to consensus, and 
reviewed every six months. Objectives of Missions are specific to particular 
circumstances, but generally tend to be concerned with improving the relationship 
between conflicting communities, and/or promoting peaceful negotiations between 
conflicting parties (for example, in Georgia, Moldova, Latvia and Estonia). 
Conversely, some missions, for example those in the Central Asian states of 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, are more limited in scope 
because of host government objections to wider OSCE involvement in human rights 
93 Preventive missions include those to Latvia, Estonia and Macedonia. 
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issues. It is in such cases, (as the EU itself recognises) that regional organisational 
coordination is particularly important in persuading governments to improve human 
rights and political freedoms (ICG 2002: ii). Operationally, OSCE staff host 
community round-table meetings, negotiate and liase with host governments and 
NGOs, and provide regular reports to OSCE headquarters. While these reports are 
normally classified information, the Missions also provide information and a support 
network to local citizens. As previously mentioned, Mission members are seconded 
from participating states, with the Head of Mission being a senior national diplomat. 
The long-term strategy is deemed to have been a success in Latvia, Estonia and 
Ukraine (Mychajlyszyn 2003), although it is debatable whether these states effectively 
resolved minority issues before the closure of OSCE Missions. Additionally, it is 
difficult to assert that violent conflict would have broken out in these states without 
OSCE intervention. This, as explained in chapter 2, is a common dilemma in conflict 
prevention, especially since, in these cases, the host governments refused to accept 
that there was conflict to prevent, and invited OSCE interference for external, rather 
than internal security reasons (Mychajlyszyn 2003: 148). Nevertheless, the stabilising 
influence of OSCE field presence is important and unique in addressing root causes of 
conflict. 
7.4.2 EU-OSCE coordination in structural conflict prevention 
On-site dialogue and cooperation between OSCE Mission offices and European 
Commission Delegations takes place in states where dual presence exists, although 
the extent of this cooperation is variable and difficult to measure. However, clearly 
most of the dialogue takes place in EU candidate or associate states, for example, 
formerly in the Baltics, and now mainly in the Balkans, including Albania. In SE 
Europe OSCE missions work with EU representatives, helping host countries in the 
context of the EU Stabilisation and Association Process - for example on issues such 
as judicial reform, civilian crisis management, democratisation, and human rights. 
According to the latest available OSCE Annual Report, EU-OSCE cooperation "has 
been successful in providing a climate conducive to stabilization, normalization, and 
ultimately integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures"(OSCE 2003: 172). EU-OSCE 
cooperation on the ground also takes place in Albania, and OSCE offices have contact 
with the new EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus. 
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The EU and the OSCE have cooperated to promote democracy and acceptable human 
rights standards on the EU's periphery. Since 1998, the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has carried out joint programmes with the 
EC, funded in part by the EC's European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
(OSCE 2003). A third joint programme started in summer 2004 in Central Asia, 
focusing on human rights monitoring, the promotion of fair trials and action to abolish 
the death penalty. 94 
While cooperation in the field for structural conflict prevention clearly takes place, it 
is difficult to assess the extent and effectiveness of this dialogue. Successful inter- 
organisational coordination will often depend on the individual diplomats and 
officials on-site. It may also depend on the nature and number of EU representatives 
on site: whether this is a delegation, Special Representative, a head of a crisis 
management or monitoring mission, or some combination of these. This is important, 
since there is likely to be various points of contact, and successful coordination with 
the OSCE may depend on internal coordination among EU actors present. The 
proposals for EU overseas representation featured in the Constitutional Treaty (EU 
External Action Service), if implemented, could vastly improve the coordination of 
EU external policy, creating EU diplomatic offices in third countries with staff from 
the Council, Commission and national diplomatic services (Everts and Keohane 2003: 
173). 
The EU and the OSCE have generally worked towards the same objectives in EU 
candidate countries with an OSCE Mission presence. The EU holds the carrots of 
membership and financial assistance, which can be very persuasive in conjunction 
with OSCE pressure for democratisation and human rights observance. However, 
cooperation in the field may not always contribute to long-term conflict prevention 
aimed at addressing root causes of conflict. In Estonia and Latvia, the European 
Commission underplayed minority problems in order to accept the countries as EU 
candidates, and then members in 2004. This had a direct and often negative effect on 
the OSCE Missions of Long Duration sent to the countries in 1993 to persuade the 
94 'External Relations Conunissioner Patten praises level of co-operation with OSCE' OSCE 
Pennanent Council Press Release, 15/07/04. 
httD: Hwww-oqce grry/ne-h-nerate. pf, php3? news id=4237. Accessed 21/07/04. 
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host governments to grant acceptable rights to the resident Russian minorities. It has 
been suggested that the European Commission gave a favourable but unsubstantiated 
opinion on the protection of Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia in order to 
accept the applications for membership in 1997, thereafter concentrating more on the 
economic rather than political criteria for membership (Van Elsuwege 2002). This 
concurred with the wider EU objective, driven by the influence of the Nordic states, to 
bring the Baltic states (already classed as Central European rather than former Soviet) 
into the EU as soon as possible. While the OSCE had a positive effect on the EU's 
agenda in Estonia by highlighting ongoing citizenship problems, the EU was not an 
impartial player, and the objectives and standards of the two organisations were not 
always reinforcing (Birckenbach 2000). The different approaches were, to an extent, 
exploited by politicians of the host government, who played off the organisations 
against each other and finally used imminent EU membership as a way of closing 
down the OSCE mission to Estonia in 2001 (Birckenbach 2000). Arguably, the 
OSCE's work in Estonia in particular was unfinished. In this case, it seems that the 
EU enlargement agenda conflicted with the human rights agenda of the OSCE. 
Unresolved issues in Estonian and Latvian society may become future conflicts that 
the EU failed to prevent. 95 
Interestingly, the OSCE was kept firrnly outside EU-Russia negotiations on 
Kaliningrad. The Russian oblast is situated on the Baltic coast between Poland and 
Lithuania, and was destined to be surrounded by EU territory after the 2004 
enlargement. Negotiations broke down in 2002, as disagreements between the EU and 
the Russian Federation arose over the issues of visas and transit for Russian citizens 
over EU territory. An international group of experts called on OSCE involvement for 
more positive and productive dialogue on the Russian enclave, especially in light of 
the wide-ranging problems in the region, including organised crime and poor 
economic performance and health services (Kiel International Group of Experts on 
Kaliningrad 2002). While an agreement on transit and visas was reached at the EU- 
Russia summit in November 2002, the issue is likely to become another hangover 
95 There are already signs of this: in April 2005, less than a year after the accession of the Baltic states, 
Taýana Zdanoka, Latvia's only Russian-speaking MEP, accused the Latvian government of 
discriminating against non-Latvian speakers in its insistence on citizenship tests. She claims that the 
Latvian government is violating European racial discrimination laws and called for EU action to protect 
human rights (Tatvia's Russians call on EU for help with human rights' Euobserver, 19/04/05 
hM: Heuobserver. con0aid= I 8885&print--l. Accessed 26/04/05. 
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from the Baltics requiring careful diplomacy with the government of the Russian 
96 Federation, arguably not one of the EVS strong points. 
In some cases, therefore, structural conflict prevention objectives may be undermined 
by conflicting organisational objectives in host countries. Coordination of activities in 
such situations will be problematic, and to an extent, success will depend on common 
interpretations of the root causes of potential conflict. The European Commission did 
not consult the OSCE when it developed the EU 'Check-list for Root Causes of 
Conflict'. The OSCE itself does not provide an explicit list of conflict indicators in its 
official publications. Nevertheless, the development of common conflict indicators 
was prioritised during the Helsingborg conference in 2002. Delivering on this promise 
may help to ensure stronger and more effective partnerships between the organisations 
in future. 
7.5 Coordinating Early Warning and Analysis 
7.5.1 OSCE early warning and analysis 
The OSCE's comprehensive definition of security leads to a broad early warning 
focus. OSCE early warning capabilities were established in the post-Cold war period, 
with the creation of mechanisms for direct action and consultation - primarily the 
Permanent Council and the post of the High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM). While the OSCE was created with early warning for conflict prevention as 
a core tenet, the term is insufficiently defined in organisational documents, and the 
distinction between early warning and preventive diplomacy remains blurred in the 
OSCE system (Clingendael Conflict Research Unit 1996: 11). Analytical capacity is 
dispersed between various offices - including the Office of the HCNM, ODIHR, and 
the Conflict Prevention Centre in the Secretariat. 
96 The EU pledged C12 million in February 2003 to meet Lithuania's costs in transiting Kalinigrad 
citizens through EU territory (see 
http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/extemal relations/north dim/news/ip03 301. htm). It is not clear how 
much Kaliningrad itself will benefit from its proximity to the EU. The oblast is in economic decline 
and has the highest HIV infection rate in Europe. According to a BBC journalist, the area is not a 
priority for the Russian government, and President Putin had to show Russian journalists where 
Kaliningrad was on a map during a press conference in 2004 (Steven Paulikas 'Kaliningrad: The 
forgotten land' BBC Radio 4, From Our Own Correspondent, broadcast 26/03/05. Accessed at 
hgp: Hnews. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/ý)rozrammes/from our own corresl)ondent/4382145. stm, 15/06/05). 
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A clear distinction can be made between early warning mechanisms in the military 
and human dimension categories. The former tends to relate to inter-state warning, 
while the latter generally refers to intra-state developments. Various confidence and 
security-building measures exist in the military sphere: the Mechanism for 
Consultation and Cooperation as regards Unusual Military Activity and the 
Mechanism for Cooperation as regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature. 
Both are designed to prevent misunderstandings and increase transparency between 
states. The intra-state nature of most contemporary conflict has increased the need for 
early warning in the human dimension. The OSCE Permanent Council, consisting of 
participating States' ambassadors and meeting weekly, is the main early warning 
forum, where states can raise issues of concern. This body is headed by the Chairman- 
in-Office, who can gather early warning information by visiting potential crisis areas 
or sending a Personal Representative. 
With a clear mandate for early warning in the human dimension field, the post of 
High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM) was established in 1992 to deal 
directly with ethno-political tensions in the OSCE area. Supported by a staff of 11, the 
Commissioner's role is described by the OSCE as follows: "first, to try to contain and 
de-escalate tensions and, second, to act as a 'tripwire', meaning that he is responsible 
for alerting the OSCE whenever such tensions threaten to rise to a level at which he 
cannot contain them with the means at his disposal" (OSCE 2002: 94). The HCNM 
operates as a direct instrument for preventive diplomacy and early warning because 
his actions are not subject to the OSCE consensus decision-making procedures, 
although his success depends on support from participating states. Activities involve 
on-site visits and the issuing of recommendations to governments. The HCNM 
provides high profile influence and support to Missions of Long Duration in host 
states. Additionally, fortnightly reports from Heads of Missions to the Chairman-in- 
Office have an early warning function (Cohen 1999). 
Fact-Finding and Rapporteur Missions, defined by the OSCE as "short-term visits by 
experts and personalities from OSCE participating States with the task of establishing 
facts, reporting on their findings, and ... making recommendations to OSCE decision- 
making bodies"(OSCE 2002: 42) have an important early warning function in 
potential conflict situations. The idea is to establish an objective and transparent 
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commentary on the conflict or dispute, which then facilitates the acceptability of 
organisational recommendations to the parties in the dispute (Birckenbach 1997: 3 1). 
The OSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna (part of the Secretariat) has had its 
early post-Cold War focus on politico-military security and mission logistical support 
adapted to more of a specific role in operation planning and early warning. It now 
consists of various units, including the Operations Centre (established in September 
2000), incorporating the Situation/Communication Room. 97 Staffed around the clock, 
the Situation Room acts as an emergency management cell (for the evacuation of 
OSCE staff, for example) and as a data gathering and analysis point. 98 
Finally, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) gathers 
some information in the human dimension field, although it remains an 
underdeveloped resource". It is far from clear how all this information is coordinated 
and analysed to enable timely political decision-making. While an internal lack of 
staff and resources is often cited as the key drawback, others assert that it is the lack 
of assertive action by participating states that renders OSCE early warning 
cumbersome and ineffective (Clingendael Conflict Research Unit 1996: 19). 
7.5.2 EU-OSCE coordination in early warning and analysis 
Cooperation for early warning purposes has been slow to develop. The OSCE 
Operations Centre held working-level meetings with representatives of the European 
Commission, the European Council Secretariat, and NATO in Brussels in May 2001, 
during which discussions took place on the development of better cooperation 
between the OSCE and partner organisations (OSCE 2001). 
At the Partners in Prevention conference in Helsingborg in 2002, both the OSCE and 
the EU agreed on the need for an increased level of information sharing between 
organisations. However, the mechanisms for information exchange and cooperation 
between the OSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre and the EU SITCEN are still largely 
ad hoc (Doyle 2002: 6). This reflects the familiar problem of how to share potentially 
97 The other units are the Mission Programme Section and the Forum for Security-Cooperation Support 
Unit (http: //www. osce. orglpublications/factsheets/cl2c- e. Rdf Accessed 21/07/04). 9g ibid. 
99 According to OSCE expert Dr Hanne Margret Birckenbach. 
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sensitive information. The OSCE's openness is not reciprocated by the Union. The 
EU receives restricted information from the OSCE but is unwilling to share 
information with non-EU/NATO members (Doyle 2002: 7). OSCE officials have 
requested greater cooperation, but the EU (the PSC in particular) is reluctant to create 
more structured dialogue and prefers to work on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis (Doyle 
2002: 7). This, in fact, could be interpreted as going against the commitments made in 
the 2003 EU-OSCE Council Conclusions for enhanced cooperation in the exchange of 
inforination and analyses. It does not bode well for the development of cooperation on 
fact-finding missions. 
As established in earlier chapters, coordination for early warning purposes should 
involve more than dialogue at the first sign of a crisis. More regular and structured 
exchanges are needed, and EU cooperation with the OSCE should include dialogue 
with other OSCE institutions, such as the HCNM and the ODIHR. This point was 
made by Max van der Stoel at the Helsingborg conference, who stated that a large 
body of information, gathered by the HCNM, was available to the EU, but that no 
dialogue had taken place between the EU and the HCNM since 2001 (during the 
Swedish presidency) (Doyle 2002: 7). 
7.6 Coordinating Operational Conflict Prevention 
7.6.1 OSCE operational conflict prevention 
Civilian crisis management emerged as an increasingly important OSCE operational 
conflict prevention activity in the post-Cold War era, although it is not generally 
associated with situations where conflict has actually erupted. 100 OSCE crisis 
management largely involves border and election monitoring, and rule of law/police 
training. The role of the OSCE is small-scale and specialist: it does not send large 
teams of police officers to crisis areas, for example, but concentrates its efforts in the 
areas of training and reform. Its civilian staff have increasingly worked in areas of 
crisis in partnership with military organisations (mainly NATO), whose personnel 
provide security and protection. This kind of arrangement with NATO allows the 
OSCE to run an important mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Hopmann 2003: 91). 
100 A notable exception to this was in Chechnya, during the first war with Russia (1994-1996), where a 
limited OSCE assistance group was established in 1995. The Mission had to leave in 1999 after an 
escalation in violence, but was reinstated in 2001 (Hopmann 2003). 
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OSCE Missions also have crisis management functions, depending on the mandate of 
particular missions, or as a result of an increase in tensions on the ground. For 
example, the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje was deployed to Macedonia 
in 1992 to monitor the border with Serbia. It therefore has a number of functions, and 
has adapted its mandate from early warning and crisis management to the fostering of 
better inter-ethnic relations between the Macedonian and Albanian populations 
(OSCE 2002: 55). 
Rule of law and police training have increasingly featured among the OSCE's 
competenccs. The decision to strengthen OSCE capabilities in police-related activities 
was taken at the Ninth Ministerial Council Meeting in Bucharest, December 2001. A 
Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) was established in the OSCE Secretariat, with a 
staff of eight providing expert advice to OSCE Missions and participating States. 101 
Election assistance is organised under the Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR). It was established as the Office for Free Elections in 1990 
and subsequently enlarged to include practical assistance in elections or referendums 
in participating states. The Office now employs more than fifty people, and deploys 
observation missions up to two months before election date to monitor the whole 
election process (OSCE 2002: 109). It also provides election training and assistance to 
participating states, organises grass roots democratisation projects and provides 
training in the rule of law. In 2004, the ODIHR deployed 3,500 personnel on 12 
election observation and assessment missions (OSCE 2004: 19). This included a 
mission to the US to observe the November 2004 presidential and congressional 
elections. In addition to election observers, the OSCE also provides impartial military 
observers, tasked with monitoring borders, cease fires, or observing peacekeeping 
operations. 
A system for the deployment of Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams 
(REACT) was developed after decisions made at the 1999 Istanbul Summit. This 
system reflected the growing role and demand of the OSCE in civilian crisis 
management, allowing for timely responses to emergency situations. An Operation 
"" OSCE Strategic Police Matters Unit Fact Sheet 
http: //www. osce. orglpublications/factsheets/Xolicina e. pdf. Accessed 21/07/04. 
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Centre was created in the Conflict Prevention Centre to assist in the planning and 
deployment of REACT and other Missions. A pledge was also made to develop an 
OSCE role in peacekeeping, either directly or in the mandating of missions to other 
organisations. While a High Level Planning Group has been established for 
peacekeeping planning, a consensus is yet to be reached between participating states 
on the extent and efficacy of an OSCE peacekeeping role (Hopmann 2003: 76). 
7.6.2 EU-OSCE coordination in operational conflict prevention 
The EU's development of civilian crisis management competences has led to 
increased cooperation with the OSCE in election monitoring and police missions in 
particular. Much of this cooperation and coordination is concentrated in SE Europe, 
and the examples cited here are from this region. There is a dearth of cooperation in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, partly as a result of the lack of a clear EU strategy in 
these areas (Lynch 2003: 172) and partly as a consequence of resistance to 
organisational intervention by local governments. 
The situation in Kosovo has arguably become a case of crisis management rather than 
post conflict reconstruction. Since the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 in response 
to the growing humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, sparked by Serb-instigated expulsions, 
the status of the territory is yet to be confirmed, and Kosovo is under UN-led 
administration, in partnership with the EU, and the OSCE (both heading 
administrational 'Pillars'), with military protection from NATO. Despite international 
efforts, stability in Kosovo is tenuous and subject to frequent outbreaks of tension and 
violence between the Albanian and Serbian Kosovars. In the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, previously a much-cited example of conflict prevention, 
tensions broke out between the Albanian and Macedonian communities in 2001. The 
UN's first preventive deployment force in 1992 prevented the overspill of violence 
from Southern Serbia during the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but the 
country's proximity to Kosovo and growing Albanian disquiet about the rights offered 
by the Macedonian government led to violence. The international community, with 
the EU playing the lead role, brokered a peace agreement in 2001 (the Ohrid 
Agreement, or 'Framework Agreement'). The situation requires acute conflict 
prevention to prevent the recurrence of violence. 
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The EU has worked closely in crisis management with the OSCE in both Kosovo and 
Macedonia. While Kosovo is primarily under UN control, both organisations play key 
roles in implementing UN Security Council resolution 1244 of June 1999, designed to 
foster the political, economic and societal stability needed for some form of future 
self-government. As mentioned in chapter 6, the EU heads the UN Mission in 
Kosovo's (UNMIK) Pillar IV, financing and carrying out economic reconstruction 
and development. The OSCE has the more political role of heading the Pillar 
responsible for institution and democracy-building and human rights. The OSCE had 
previously orchestrated two missions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: a short- 
lived Mission in 1992 to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina; and the six month Kosovo 
Verification Mission (KVM) of 1998-1999, active in monitoring the cease-fire, 
military movements and human rights on the Kosovo border with Serbia before 
withdrawal in March 1999, shortly before NATO military action (OSCE 2002: 47). 
The EU, on the other hand, had less field experience in Kosovo; other than its 
economic role in UNMIK, and the small team of EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) 
members in Kosovo, its relations with the province came to centre on the Stability 
Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the Stabilisation and Association Process for the 
Western Balkans. Additionally, EU Member State contributions make up the majority 
of the NATO force in Kosovo (KFOR), II Member States have diplomatic ('Liaison') 
Offices in Kosovo, and the European Agency for Reconstruction has an office in 
Pristina to manage the EU's primary financial assistance programme for Kosovo 
(Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation 
(CARDS)) (Council of the EU 2004c). The EU and Member State presence in Kosovo 
is therefore rather dispersed and opaque. This is recognised by the High 
Representative, but results in a confusing number of OSCE points of contact with EU 
officials on the ground. 
Nevertheless, the multinational nature of organisational activities in Kosovo has led to 
competent coordination between the EU and the OSCE, largely facilitated by high- 
level cooperation in UNMIK's Interim Administrative Council, representing the 
Heads of the various organisation-led Pillars. Additionally, the OSCE Mission in 
Kosovo receives funding for its institution-building projects from the European 
Agency for Reconstruction, allowing for working-level contact between offices, and 
the OSCE Mission regularly exchanges information with the EUMM (OSCE 2001). 
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International intervention in Kosovo has, nevertheless, been particularly controversial 
in light of the NATO bombing of Serb targets from March - June 1999. In particular, 
the impartiality of the OSCE KVM has been questioned. The Mission was dominated 
by American personnel, widely believed (by OSCE officials and the Serb community 
alike) to be gathering intelligence information on behalf of NATO (Johnstone 2000: 
162). Moreover, critics accuse the Mission of being manipulated by Kosovo 
Liberation Army members desperate to accelerate a NATO intervention on their 
behalf (Johnstone 2000: 163). The OSCE has lost credibility as a result, and the 
legacy of this incident has implications for the success of OSCE activities in Serbia- 
Montenegro, as well as in other parts of SE Europe. Close working relationships 
between organisations may therefore be used to cover up the pursuit of the interests of 
participating states, undermining stated organisational objectives and commitments. 
Close cooperation has developed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
between the OSCE and the EU, particularly in the implementation of the 2001 
internationally-brokered Ohrid Peace Agreement between the Macedonian 
government and leaders of the Macedonian-Albanian community. The OSCE had, 
however, been active in Macedonia since 1992, with the Spillover Mission to Skopje, 
mandated to monitor border developments for preventive and early warning purposes. 
The Mission then turned its attentions to improving inter-ethnic relations in 
Macedonia. The EU's relationship with Macedonia has shifted from being based 
primarily on financial assistance and diplomacy to include an operational clement. In 
March 2003, the EU took over NATO's preventive peacekeeping role in Macedonia, 
the first proper, though small-scale (350 personnel) test of its military crisis 
management capabilities (operation CONCORDIA - see chapter 8). After the mission 
ended in December 2003, the EU's operational presence in Macedonia was replaced 
by an EU Police Mission (PROXIMA) of 200 personnel to assist in reforming the 
Macedonian police service. The Union's strategy towards Macedonia focuses 
immediately on the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, coordinated by the EU 
and initially aided in implementation by the presence of the military force. This 
primary objective is encompassed in the wider context of the 2001 Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement with Macedonia and the regional cooperative framework of 
the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. 
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The EU and OSCE are working towards the same goals with their presence in 
Macedonia, and the organisations are linked by the OSCE's management of the 
Stability Pact commitments and in the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, 
coordinated by the EU, with confidence-building measures carried out by the OSCE. 
These measures include election assistance, police issues, and media and inter-ethnic 
relations. The Ohrid Framework Agreement requires regular coordination meetings 
between organisations involved (EU, UN, NATO and OSCE), and these are hosted by 
the OSCE Mission. The Mission additionally liases daily with European Commission 
officials to exchange information (OSCE 2001), and, funded by the EUs CARDS 
assistance programme, the EC works jointly with the OS CE in the reform of the 
Macedonian police service (European Commission 2002c). At headquarters level, the 
OSCE's Strategic Police Matters Unit is in regular contact with the EU Council 
Secretariat Police Unit. The OSCE Head of Mission also works with the EU Special 
Representative. A close working relationship has developed between the EUMM team 
in Macedonian and OSCE monitors attached to the Mission. The EUMM receives 
OSCE Mission reports, and joint border patrols have taken place. Additionally, the 
EUMM has a permanent seat in the joint monitoring operations centre established by 
the OSCE Mission (OSCE 2001). 
Despite extensive organisational activity, Macedonia is far from stable. According to 
an International Crisis Group (ICG) report, the new multi-ethnic police force struggles 
to gain legitimacy and maintain law and order. Corruption and organised crime 
undermine economic progress, and unemployment and ethnic tensions are high (ICG 
2003a). The ICG accuse the international community of complacency in Macedonia, 
and a lax approach to the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, which could result 
in a recurrence of violence. A more proactive mandate for the EU Police Mission i. e. 
actually assisting rather than observing incidents, is suggested, as well as a more 
concrete role for EUMM (ICG 2003a: 24). Time will tell if organisational activities 
and cooperation succeed in creating a self-sustaining stability in Macedonia. 
Coordination in these cases is facilitated by the extent and nature of international 
involvement in Kosovo and Macedonia. Not only do the EU and the OSCE focus 
most of their civilian crisis management activities in the Western Balkans, but in both 
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cases the international community has been instrumental in brokering peace 
agreements/cease-fires, and administering their implementation. This has entailed 
meetings and dialogue between representatives of international organisations from the 
beginning. The international spotlight on these countries has encouraged and 
necessitated coordination. The same cannot be said in regions where organisational 
intervention is more problematic and low-key, such as Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
If lessons in cooperation have been learned, EU and OSCE experience in coordinating 
in the Balkans should provide a firm basis for the development of coordination of 
activities in other areas. Clearly, there is scope for greater coordination of activities in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia. The OSCE is stepping up its role in police reform and 
capacity building in Kyrgyzstan, TaJikistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia. 102 The impact 
of international pressure for reform would benefit from a more proactive EU effort to 
work alongside the OSCE in these countries. 
In light of the situations in Kosovo and Macedonia, it must again be repeated that 
coordination of organisational activities is no panacea: clearly it cannot be the only 
answer for successful conflict prevention. However, it is difficult to come to firm 
conclusions about the extent of coordination in the field. Inevitably, a study relying on 
documentation and secondary material will only paint part of a complex picture awash 
with hidden diplomacy and institutional secrecy. The very nature of OSCE activity 
requires the organisation to underplay its contribution in order to encourage local 
ownership of the dispute or conflict. Critics do indeed, however, doubt the 
commitment of international actors to tackle root causes of conflict in the Balkans. A 
lack of commitment cannot result in optimal coordination. Admittedly, there is no 
easy solution to the societal and political problems still reverberating through the 
region in the aftermath of the break up of Yugoslavia. However, it can tentatively be 
concluded that greater coordinated effort to address these underlying problems is the 
only option if international actors are going to be able step back from the Western 
Balkans in the coming decades. 
102 'Conflict prevention in action: OSCE's role in police reform' 
http: //www. osce. ora/features/show feature pr. phl2? id=177 Accessed 21/07/04. 
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7.7 Internal EU Coordination: Implications for EU Coordination with the OSCE 
This section follows the structure of the previous chapter, examining how internal EU 
coordination problems impact on external coordination with the OSCE. While the UN 
study focused largely on coordination for conflict prevention at headquarters level, 
and between corresponding institutions, the nature of the OSCE's work means that 
coordination between the organisations is also vitally important in the field i. e. 
between OSCE Missions and Heads of EU civilian/military crisis management 
missions, EC Delegations, Special Representatives and also Member State embassies. 
While coordination of Member State policies is not central to this study, the role of 
EU Member State embassies in countries of OSCE presence will be considered here, 
since the actions of Member State officials in countries of EU conflict prevention 
activity may have a direct impact on how the EU is received and perceived. The three 
problems in EU coordination identified previously are the pillar structure, inter- 
institutional coordination, and internal institutional coordination. We therefore 
consider how much these coordination problems at the EU level are likely to impact 
on external coordination with the OSCE. 
7.7.1 The pillar structure 
The pillar structure of the EU frustrates attempts to present a single, coordinated and 
coherent response to international crises. This has particular implications for external 
coordination with the OSCE. 
In terms of the EU presenting a single and coordinated approach in its dealings with 
the OSCE, the CFSP arrangements under the pillar system are clearly inadequate. The 
Council, Commission, and Member States do not present a united foreign policy or 
diplomatic front. While Member States pledge to follow national foreign policies 
broadly consistent with those pledged at the European level, coordination and 
complementarity between Member States and the EU institutions is inadequate. This 
has implications for the EU's reputation and for coordination with the OSCE, and is 
particularly visible in the interplay between Member State embassies, EC delegations 
and OSCE Missions. The EU pledged to step up coordination in the field between 
these actors. Yet consistent messages are not relayed to host governments, particularly 
in transitional states. A prime example of this can be seen in the countries of Central 
Asia. Admittedly, international engagement in these countries has been problematic, 
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with OSCE mandates being restricted by governments and the EU having less 
political leverage with the absence of the offer of membership. Nevertheless, the 
region is still awash with dictatorial, corrupt regimes lacking legitimacy and frequent 
and serious abuses of human rights. The strategic importance of the region in the 
aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan and in the wider context of the 'war on 
terror' has overridden human rights concerns in Western relationships with the 
unstable states, while international financial institutions have overlooked widespread 
political corruption (ICG 2003b). In the assessment of the International Crisis Group, 
"The EU has failed to make any serious political impact in Central Asia, and its 
member-states are often too concerned about narrow commercial interests. EU 
member-states are generally weak in addressing human rights concerns... " (ICG 
2003b: 15). 
The action of Member States can undermine the EU's rhetoric on promoting human 
rights in the region. Uzbekistan, the largest and most populated republic in Central 
Asia, is a case in point. The EU recognises that "freedom of expression is today 
,, 103 severely limited" and that "basic human rights are not applied in Uzbekistan. In 
July 2004, EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten confirmed "the focus to 
promote democracy and human rights in Central Asia is a common goal we share with 
the OSCE and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. "104 Yet the 
British Ambassador in Tashkent was reprimanded by the British government as a 
result of speaking out against the human rights abuses of the Uzbek government. 
Breaking a diplomatic conspiracy of silence in the wake of the states' new strategic 
partnership with the US, Craig Murray succeeded in drawing attention to Western 
double standards, but at great personal cost (Paton Walsh 2004)1 05. While this is a 
problem of consistency between the EU and a Member State, i. e. an issue of vertical 
rather than intra-EU or horizontal consistency (Krenzler and Schneider 1997: 136), it 
impacts directly on EU coordination in third countries where the EU is in dialogue 
103 'The EU's relations with Uzbekistan', 
htti): //www. eurot)a. eu. int/comm/extemal relations/uzbekistan/intro/index. htm. Accessed 21/07/04 
104 'External Relations Commissioner Pat-ten praises level of co-operation with OSCEI OSCE 
Permanent Council Press Release, 15/07/04. 
http: //www. osce. orL, /news/zenerate. pfpbp3? news id=4237. Accessed 21/07/04. 
'05 UK military advisers were also involved in training Uzbek troops in marksmanship in 2004-2005, 
months before Uzbek forces massacred up to 500 civilians in the town of Andijan ('UK trained Uzbek 
troops weeks before massacre' The Guardian, 30/05/05. ) 
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with the OSCE. If EU Member State embassies are generally reluctant to 
acknowledge the political situation in host countries, it is difficult to see what can be 
gained from contact between Member State, EC and OSCE offices. Moreover, 
discrepancies between EU and Member State rhetoric project a poor image of the 
Union in a region where concerted and consistent dialogue is needed to promote the 
acceptance of international human rights norms, as well as stability. 
The pillar structure confuses external coordination attempts because of the different 
decision making procedures and hierarchy of institutions in different pillars. Civilian 
crisis management coordination with the OSCE is important, but the cross-Pillar 
nature of this policy at the EU level dictates that the OSCE will run into coordination 
problems at the headquarters and field level. Who is responsible for civilian crisis 
management in the EU? Responsibilities are dispersed between the Council and the 
Commission, therefore should OSCE officials contact the PSC or the External 
Relations Director-General of the Commission? Contacting both may result in more 
confusion, given the different crisis management competences and priorities of each 
institution. The dispersal of competence may also cause confusion in the field, if 
multiple EU actors are present. Likewise, police cooperation takes place in the context 
of all three EU pillars. Conflict prevention activities do not fit neatly into the pillar 
structure, and therefore external coordination attempts are likely to be unnecessarily 
complicated or stymied. As already mentioned, the creation of an EU External Action 
Service (as outlined in the Constitutional Treaty), if implemented, may help to give 
the EU and Member States greater coherence in host countries. The proposed reform 
indicates that lessons have been learned, although the divisions between Commission 
and Council competences will remain. 
7.7.2 Inter-institutional problems 
Rivalry between the European Commission and the Council of the EU over the 
conflict prevention agenda may have a detrimental effect on external coordination 
with the OSCE. Turf battles at headquarters level will be particularly damaging if 
transferred to the field context. Tensions between representatives of the Commission 
and the Council may not result in optimal coordination with the OSCE in countries 
where both organisations are active. Returning to the example of Macedonia, a report 
from the field urged the EU to better incorporate the activities of the EUMM to the 
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wider EU security presence in the country (military operation CONCORDIA) (ICG 
2003b). This suggests a lack of linkage between EU civilian and military operations 
on the ground, and reflects a division between the Commission and the Council in 
Brussels. The OSCE's expertise in civilian crisis management could be bolstered by a 
clearer EU commitment to less high profile, but vitally important, civilian operations 
and projects. Moreover, EC delegations, the Heads of military and/or civilian 
missions, and, when appropriate, EU Special Representatives, need to develop 
productive working relationships in order to facilitate the best possible coordination 
with the OSCE. 
7.7.3 Internal institutional problems 
Both the Council and the Commission consist of multiple actors, making dialogue and 
coordination with outside organisations more difficult. With the Council, OSCE 
officials meet at headquarters level with the PSC, High Representative, the 
Presidency, the Troika and Council Working Groups. Are they sending the same 
message to the OSCE? How is this facilitated internally? Despite all the frequent 
rhetoric and stated commitments to improve information sharing between the EU and 
the OSCE for early warning and analysis purposes, the PSC is not prepared to make a 
permanent arrangement to uphold these promises. No doubt this inconsistency, largely 
as a result of multiple actors and false promises, makes OSCE officials hesitate to 
consider the EU a true partner in conflict prevention. 
Commission actors relevant to OSCE activities largely consist of officials in the 
External Relations DG, although in the field the Commission could have EC 
Delegations and civilian mission members present. The Commission's ambiguous 
role in the CFSP could make the institution an uncertain partner for the OSCE. The 
Commission has a key role in outlining EU strategy and objectives towards individual 
countries in the drafting of the Country Strategy Papers. These country overviews are 
cited by the Commission as central in identifying root causes of conflict. Cooperation 
with other organisations is crucial if structural conflict prevention by the EU is to 
have a positive effect. Yet the Commission's Country Strategy Papers tend not to 
include details on other organisations working in the country in question, or what the 
EU/EC is doing to coordinate its activities with them. The inclusion of sections on 
4 other donors' only, underlines the economic priority of the EC in its external 
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relations, even in a country such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, with exceptional 
international presence. This is an oversight if the Commission wants to emphasise its 
role in conflict prevention, and is particularly noticeable in comparison with OSCE 
practices. It is impossible to assess the Country Conflict Assessments (CCAs) in terms 
of inter-organisational cooperation because of their classified status. 
7.8 Conclusion 
The EU and the OSCE are strongly linked in terms of history, membership, and 
increasingly in overlapping objectives and activities. The drive for greater cooperation 
between the organisations can be understood in the context of broadening security 
objectives in the post-Cold War pan-European area, and the Union's development of 
conflict prevention competences. The OSCE has retained its saliency, but hasn't 
acquired the elevated status of NATO and the EU, in part because it lacks the 
respective military and economic clout of these organisations. All European 
institutions were affected by a return to Cold War security thinking as the initial 
optimism of the early post-Cold War period waned (Booth 1998: 39). The social and 
political problems in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics that 
the EU and the OSCE addressed were particularly acute. Without a clear consensus on 
the best way to tackle these problems, cooperation between the organisations was not 
optimal. However, the OSCE is exceptional in its commitment to cooperate with other 
organisations, and has institutionalised this through the Platform for Cooperative 
Security. Unfortunately, OSCE efforts are not always reciprocated, and the Platform 
tends to fall in with other 'modalities for cooperation' that have yet to result in 
substantially improved organisational policy coordination. 
Despite the fact that the EU and the OSCE practice conflict prevention activities in 
the same countries in and around Europe, EU coordination and dialogue with the 
OSCE is less visible on the EU agenda than cooperation with the UN. The 
organisations have been accused of being "interblocking rather than interlocking" in 
recent years (Keane 2004b: 8). This suggests that the EU places more importance on 
being a partner of the UN, confirming the impression that the OSCE is regarded as a 
lesser organisation. This may be short-sighted in light of the growing proximity of the 
EU's borders towards the Russian sphere of influence, not to mention the political and 
societal instabilities in Central Asia and the Caucasus that need to be addressed. The 
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frozen and/or simmering conflicts in this region are not a priority for UN action, and 
therefore require better coordination of objectives and activities between the OSCE 
and the EU. The December 2004 Draft Assessment Report on the EUs role vis-a-vis 
the OSCE (Council of the EU 2004d), does, however, suggest a new internal 
momentum for increased cooperation with the OSCE. Progress in EU-OSCE 
cooperation is particularly important in light of the recent criticisms levelled at the 
OSCE from the Russian and CIS governments. 
Cooperation between the organisations has progressed from an ad hoc basis towards a 
more structured relationship in recent years, with some coordination of activities. 
However, the EU priority, visible in the Council conclusions on cooperation with the 
OSCE, seems to be dialogue at the headquarters level, between senior officials in 
Brussels and Vienna. This may be the wrong focus in light of the nature of OSCE 
activity, which is largely field-based. A pragmatic culture of cooperation needs to be 
fostered between actors on the ground, so that dialogue becomes common practice. 
High-level diplomacy at respective headquarters is not enough. 
An overview of coordination in conflict prevention activities highlighted successes 
and failures. For structural conflict prevention, the EU supports many OS CE-run 
projects, and EU officials work with OSCE Missions of Long Duration. The extent of 
cooperation in countries of dual presence is, however, variable and difficult to assess. 
Operational conflict prevention coordination is generally satisfactory in areas of 
considerable international presence, although much of the on-site cooperative 
initiative seems to come from the OSCE rather than the EU. Bearing in mind that 
coordination alone cannot guarantee success, an increase in dialogue on the 
coordination of activities in countries and regions of less international attention is 
required if organisational pressure is to have any impact. Least progress has been 
made in coordination for early warning and analysis purposes, belying commitments 
made for improvements in this area. 
Lack of internal EU coordination in conflict prevention impacts on external 
coordination with the OSCE in two key ways: firstly, the EU, at headquarters and in 
the field, fails to convey a single, coordinated line on international crises and conflict 
prevention. This can cause confusion at headquarters level, but more importantly, 
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damage to activities and reputations in the field, as EC delegations, Member State 
representatives, and EU representatives, do not convey a consistent message to the 
OSCE or to host governments. Secondly, the conflict prevention activity arguably 
most crucial in EU-OSCE coordination, civilian crisis management, has no clear 
institutional focus. It is a policy subject to institutional turf battles. While partnerships 
have emerged between the organisations because of unprecedented international 
activity in SE Europe, more widespread coordination could result from a honing and 
simplification of EU conflict prevention competences. In the meantime, the EU could 
improve its commitment to pan-European conflict prevention by taking a more 
proactive approach to coordination with the OSCE, if, after all, cooperation is an 
imperative rather than an option. 
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CHAPTER 8 
The EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): A 
Strategic Partnership in Conflict Prevention? 
"NATO and the EU are working together to prevent and resolve crises and anned 
conflicts in Europe and beyond. " NATO website. 106 
"The question is not one of creating a defence organisation which would substitute for 
NATO, but of knowing the limits of the Atlantic Alliance, and of its military 
organisation, of its competence and of its geographic area, to know that Europe must 
not miss any opportunity to build itself a common policy and its own defence. " 
President Francois Mitterrand, at the Franco-German summit in Lille, May 1991.107 
"NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests. Both institutions 
working together towards the same strategic ends will enhance security and stability 
in Europe and beyond. In the new strategic environment of the 21 st century, a closer 
and trusting partnership between NATO and the EU remains as important as ever. " 
Joint Press Statement by the NATO Secretary General and the EUPresidency, NATO- 
EU Ministerial Meeting, 4 December 2003 (NATO 2003). 
8.1 Introduction 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), after a brief period of uncertainty, 
has reinvented itself in the post-Cold War era. The organisation has been restructured 
and redesigned; its out of area missions are more visible than its original function of 
territorial defence, and, by May 2004 it had completed two membership enlargements. 
The need for a clearer EU relationship with NATO came hand in hand with EU 
commitments to develop a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). EU 
Member States did not possess the full range of military capabilities and assets to 
carry out military Petersberg tasks, and, with no increase in military spending and the 
desire to avoid any duplication of capabilities, the EU had to arrange to use NATO 
assets, a decision that was bound to be controversial. 
106. htti): //www. nato. int/issues/nato-eii/index. htmi. Accessed 26.08.04 
107 Quoted in Adrian Hyde Price (1992: 45). 
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Formal dialogue between the two organisations dates from the inception of the 
'Berlin-Plus' arrangements at the 1999 Cologne European Council. However, the 
Union's relationship with NATO had been a central feature of transatlantic relations 
throughout the 1990s, ever since the possibility of a common defence was raised in 
the 1991 Maastricht Treaty (TEU). Before 1999, NATO dialogue on the development 
of what, in the NATO context, was called the European Security and Defence Identity 
(ESDI), was with the Western European Union (WEU), linked explicitly to the EU in 
the TEU where it was named as the defence arm of the EU. Arguably it was a more 
similar organisation in terms of structure and mandate. WEU functions (apart from the 
mutual defence clause) have now been incorporated into the Council of the European 
Union. The complexity of negotiations has hinged on the problem of arrangements for 
non-EU European NATO members' participation in EU led operations, and U. S 
reaction to the development of an EU military capacity. The former problem has led 
to difficulties with Turkey in particular, a member of NATO, but as yet only an 
aspiring EU member. The latter difficulty impinges on transatlantic relations, 
especially since the EU states have consistently different and competing visions of the 
ESDP. Moreover, it has led to the U. S trying to win the right of first refusal for 
NATO, and EU assurances of action only when NATO as a whole is not engaged. 
Negotiations were successfully concluded by the end of 2002, allowing the EU to use 
NATO assets for its first military operation in March 2003 (Operation CONCORDIA 
in Macedonia). 
NATO is not naturally associated with the concept and practice of conflict prevention. 
War prevention, as the goal of Cold War nuclear deterrence, is fundamentally 
different from the definition of conflict prevention adopted in this study. However, the 
broad definition of conflict prevention used here encompasses a military element. 
NATO, as an alliance of powerful states with pooled military capacity, has emerged 
as an organisation contributing to international efforts to manage crises and prevent 
the recurrence of violence outside its membership area. While it is recognised that 
military measures can play only a minor role in pre-conflict situations (Chayes and 
Weitz 1996: 385), NATO has nevertheless declared itself as an organisation 
contributing to conflict prevention, and the EU's full range of conflict prevention and 
crisis management competences relies on use of NATO-owned capabilities. The 
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organisations therefore have the opportunity to be partners or rivals in conflict 
prevention. However, the elaboration of NATO's role in conflict prevention has not 
been without criticism and controversy. 
Academic work on NATO tends to focus less on NATO as an institution, and more as 
a theatre for transatlantic relations (Sjursen 2004: 688). Yet, in an era characterised 
by the rhetoric (if not always the practice) of multilateralism, it is an appropriate time 
to examine NATO in this context, especially, as some commentators contend, it has 
transformed itself from a defensive alliance to an instrument of collective security 
(Cottey 1998; Yost 2001). The EU's relationship with NATO also touches on deeper 
internal divisions within the Union. There is no common vision on the current or 
future military role of the EU. Member States military doctrines vary widely - from 
the strong military traditions of France and the UK, to the more civilian tradition of 
the Netherlands, and neutrality in Ireland and the Scandinavian states. Convergent 
views on the extent of the autonomy of EU military competences are another divisive 
factor, splitting the two military-oriented states, France and the UK. While the 
agreement at St. Malo in 1998 between the two states allowed for the development of 
ESDP, periodic divisions are still cropping up as the details are thrashed out. The 
European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted at the December 2003 Brussels European 
Council only indicates a loose consensus on EU foreign policy objectives, and does 
not tackle the difficult issue of when to use force. The introduction of structured 
cooperation to allow for groups of states within the EU to cooperate further on 
defence issues addresses the problem pragmatically, but does not provide a long-term 
solution to the lack of consensus on the extent of militarisation of EU structures. The 
role of the US as the most militarily powerful state in NATO adds a further 
complicating external factor, particularly in light of the Bush administration's 
controversial foreign and military policies. Will the EU be able to practice a foreign 
policy fundamentally different from that of the US and have unconditional access to 
NATO assets? Despite progress made in inter-institutional arrangements, there is no 
clear division of labour between the EU and NATO, and no clear indication of the 
conditions for EU use of NATO assets. These problems could have serious 
implications for the ability of the EU to carry out military crisis management for acute 
conflict prevention. Moreover, continued smooth cooperation between the 
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organisations is essential for stable reconstruction in the Balkans, as the EU takes over 
NATO's military role in Macedonian and Bosnia. 
This chapter looks closely at NATO as an organisation and charts its relationship with 
the European Union, focusing on cooperation for conflict prevention. Section 8.2 sets 
the context by outlining NATO's institutional structure and examining the 
organisation's role in post-Cold War European security. Furthermore, NATO's role in 
conflict prevention is discussed. Section 8.3 explains the development of NATO-EU 
relations in the post-Cold War period, from the early 1990s Western European Union 
(WEU) negotiations to the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP). Following the structure of previous chapters, NATO-EU coordination in 
structural policy, early warning and crisis management is examined in sections 8.4, 
8.5 and 8.6. Finally, Section 8.7 examines the impact of EU internal coordination on 
external coordination with the Atlantic Alliance. 
8.2 Setting the Context: NATO after the Cold War 
As a traditional defence alliance basing its strategy on 'forward defence and flexible 
response', NATO's survival in the post-Cold War era was not a foregone conclusion. 
Nevertheless, the Alliance retained its saliency in light of instability in the former 
Soviet Union, and the new Central and Eastern European states' need for security 
assurances. The early hope that military force would be less relevant after the Cold 
War was quashed with the effective display of military power in the first Gulf War in 
1991. The utility of military power was further reinforced when NATO air strikes 
were perceived to have ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, and then NATO military 
presence enforced an uneasy peace. In the aftermath of Bosnia, and then the NATO 
air strikes in response to Serb atrocities in Kosovo in 1999, commentators argued that 
the limited use of military force was often necessary to back up international 
diplomacy (Bildt 2000: 148). The use of military power to counter security threats 
remained highly relevant in the post-Cold War period, even if the relationship 
between force and diplomacy remained controversial. These developments were to 
have a key influence ori the defence debate within the European Union, underlining 
the need for the creation of an EU military crisis management capacity. Meanwhile, 
forty years of transatlantic defence collaboration provided a framework for 
transatlantic dialogue and cooperation that was regarded as valuable by member 
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nations (Hyde-Price 1992: 42). NATO's survival and transformation, for some 
commentators, was evidence that alliances can be more than just the sum of national 
power; they can be security institutions, facilitating cooperation, and therefore worth 
adapting to new international circumstances (Wallander 2000: 705). 
In 1949, when the twelve founding members signed the North Atlantic Treaty, the 
organisation's structure consisted of only the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the main 
decision-making body composed of permanent representatives from the member 
countries. Further institutionalisation took place in the 1950s, with the establishment 
of an integrated military command structure and prolonged US military presence in 
Europe (Yost 2001: 592). NATO's structure is now relatively extensive, with political 
headquarters in Brussels hosting member nation permanent representatives, high level 
policy committees (Defence Planning and Nuclear Planning) with supporting 
committees, a Military Committee supported by an international military staff and the 
Office of the Secretary General, supported by an international civilian staff (see 
Figure 8.1). NATO Headquarters host approximately 3 150 staff, with about 1300 
civilian personnel working in the various divisions of the international staff (NATO 
2001: 219). The structure of NATO's International Staff was reformed over 2003- 
2004 to create six divisions, each led, as before, by an Assistant Secretary General. 
The reforms, driven by the Secretary General, were designed to streamline the staff in 
preparation for enlargement, decentralise decision-making and improve the capacity 
of NATO structures to deal with contemporary security challenges (Monaco 2003b). 
The office of NATO Secretary General is important both within and outside the 
organisation. The Secretary General (George Robertson from 1999 to January 2004; 
now Jaap de Hoop Scheffer from the Netherlands'08) chairs the NAC and acts as the 
main spokesperson for NATO. NATO's decision-making procedures were to remain 
intergovernmental, but all member nations agreed on the need for NATO to redefine 
its purpose and reform its institutional structures. 
log Javier Solana (1995-1999); Willy Claes (1994-1995); Manfred W6mer (1988-1994) 
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8.2.1 The reform of NATO strategy and structure 
NATO's reform required a new strategy to rationalise its continuation beyond the end 
of the Cold War (with the military adjustments to support it), and a new relationship 
with non-members, including the possibility of enlargement of the Alliance. 
During the Cold War, d6tente between the East and West first encouraged the 
Alliance to extend its concerns beyond the military sphere. The Harmel Report of 
1967 underlined NATO's role in the promotion of detente and stated that "the 
ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful 
order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees" (NATO 1967). The 
end of the Cold War required fundamental changes in NATO strategy and structure. 
The London declaration of July 1990 articulated the organisation's intentions to 
extend its concept of security beyond the military sphere. NATO strategy was to be 
based on "smaller, more mobile multinational forces, with reduced emphasis on 
nuclear weapons" (Dorman and Treacher 1995: 47). The Rome Declaration of 
November 1991 further elaborated on NATO's strategic concept in the new security 
environment. NATO would extend its tasks to include out-of-area missions, on the 
authority of the UN Security Council, or the OSCE. The promotion of a network of 
'interlocking institutions' emerged as a NATO-favoured alternative to a new security 
system managed by the CSCE (Dorman and Treacher 1995: 47). New relationships 
were launched with former adversaries in the east, and the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC) was created to facilitate 'partnerships' between NATO and non- 
NATO members in the Euro-Atlantic area, leading to dialogue and consultation on 
military policy. The NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC), extending NATO dialogue beyond Partnership for Peace countries. 
212 
The main institutional reforms centred on the NACC and efforts to institutionalise 
NATO's relationship with the Russian Federation. Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
Agreements, inaugurated in 1994, allowed for cooperation in military reform and non- 
NATO member contributions to NATO-led operations. The Founding Act on Mutual 
Relations between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed in 1997, allowing 
for tentative, if limited, dialogue in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. 
Military reform centred on the need to develop multinational forces for rapid and well 
planned military crisis management interventions. This encouraged the reform of 
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Figure 8.1: NATO's Civil and Military Structures (based on figure in NATO 
Handbook 2001: 517). 
military forces at national levels, involving the professionalisation of armed forces. 
The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept was launched in 1994 as a flexible 
military force for crisis management missions. Allowing for European-only missions 
under the WEU framework, it anchored European security and defence ambitions 
within the framework of the Alliance. The idea of 'separate, but not separable' 
military capacities became a recurring theme in European negotiations for access to 
NATO assets, as EU states strove to avoid accusations firstly of unnecessary 
duplication, and secondly, of challenging NATO primacy (i. e. US leadership). 
Lack of EU consensus (until the late 1990s) on the development of an EU military 
capacity, and US leadership in the 1991 Gulf War, meant that NATO retained its 
position as primary defence and security organisation. As Forster and Niblett contend, 
"this attachment to the institutional status quo was strengthened by the divergent 
national views of the key protagonists as to the benefits and losses associated with 
change" (2001: 35). 
NATO took on its first operational out-of-area role in the former Yugoslavia, where it 
monitored naval operations in the Adriatic to support the UN arms embargo against 
Yugoslavia in 1992, and subsequently began enforcement operations in conjunction 
with the WEU. NATO gave air support to the UN mission in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) 
and carried out air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets in 1995. The organisation, 
unlike the EU, then played a key role in providing security for the implementation of 
the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (NATO Stabilisation Force, or SFOR) which 
created a new, but ethnically divided Bosnian state, propped up by the authority of the 
internationally appointed High Representative. NATO has only recently extended its 
crisis management role beyond SE Europe in its role in post-Taliban Afghanistan. 
Interestingly, although the Article 5 collective defence protocol was invoked for the 
first time when terrorists attacked the United States on September I Ith 2001, NATO 
was not chosen by the US as the forum in which to respond to the attack. 
8.2.2 NATO and conflict prevention: A difficult linkage? 
The North Atlantic Council declared in 1993 that it would 'contribute actively' to the 
new tasks of conflict prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping (Chayes and 
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Weitz 1996: 38 1). The 1999 New Strategic Concept further underlined NATO's 
intention to "contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis 
management" (NATO 1999: 3/Part 1). NATO has not elaborated at any length a 
comprehensive concept of conflict prevention. However, NATO, like other 
organisations, adopted the popular rhetoric linking crisis management to conflict 
prevention, without clarifying the meaning of either terms. 
NATO's adoption of this language of conflict prevention has been controversial. 
Some interpretations of conflict prevention would not include a military component. 
Conflict prevention, as interpreted in this study, does include military operations 
designed to prevent the escalation or recurrence of violence. Nevertheless, NATO 
operations can arguably only be characterised as contributing to comprehensive 
conflict prevention in conjunction with other organisations addressing the wider 
causes of a particular conflict. Military operations, for example, can help to provide a 
more secure environment for local communities and for civilian personnel working 
for other organisations such as the OSCE and the UN, or NGOs. Military personnel 
can keep apart warring parties, stop the overspill of violence into neighbouring 
territories, and generally discourage the recurrence of violence by their presence. Yet 
a robust military component remains controversial in peace operations, challenging 
traditional peacekeeping notions of impartiality, consent and non-violence. The 
balance between providing security for conflict prevention and humanitarian activities 
and partial intervention in civil war situations is a delicate one; NATO, it has been 
argued, can provide peacekeeping or peace enforcement, but not both simultaneously 
(Chayes and Weitz 1996: 395). The nature of military intervention means that 
NATO's individual contribution to conflict prevention is relatively marginal, although 
some commentators would argue that the organisation's normative role in the 
promotion of democracy and civilian control of the military are important longer-term 
effects of enlargement and partnerships (see below). 
NATO's potential role in conflict prevention is stymied by problems of legal and 
political legitimacy (Chayes and Weitz 1996: 395). As an organisation, NATO lacks 
the global legitimacy of the UN and the consensual basis and the expertise in human 
rights of the OSCE. By the mid-1990s, it had failed to develop an appropriate doctrine 
for peace operations, or sufficient training, to support the rhetorical shift from 
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collective defence to out-of-area crisis management (Chayes and Weitz 1996: 390). 
The difficulties of working in conjunction with the UN during the war in Bosnia has 
led to a fall in NATO commitment to support UN missions, or even to seek a UN 
mandate for NATO military action. Indeed NATO military intervention is 
increasingly interpreted as US power and will thinly disguised, particularly in the 
aflermath of the NATO bombing of Serbia during the 1999 Kosovo crisis (Ali 2000). 
Critics rightly doubted the effectiveness of aerial bombing in protecting civilians on 
the ground. Bosnia, following the 1995 US-negotiated Dayton Peace Agreement, has 
been seen as a NATO (now EU? ) protectorate, a country without the means to 
establish democracy because of the overbearing power of NATO and other 
international organisations, and the autocratic role of the High Representative 
(Chandler 2000). 
Operational trends point to deeper conceptual controversies. The Cold War approach 
to security that NATO represented was far removed from alternative interpretations 
rooted in Peace Research, where the concept of conflict prevention can arguably claim 
its origin. Even in the post-Cold War era, it could be argued that NATO and its most 
powerful members still represent a mindset where military solutions to security 
remain paramount, with the threat simply shifting in focus from the USSR to 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The dangerous trend of pre- 
emptive military strikes against terrorist targets, while not a NATO concept, is 
favoured by the current US administration, its most powerful member. This is a direct 
throwback to Cold War security thinking, and undermines competing approaches 
aimed at tackling root causes of terrorism. There is a real risk that longer-term conflict 
prevention will become detached from short-term military objectives. 
NATO's role in cooperation for conflict prevention also presents difficulties. NATO 
rhetoric, while ostensibly in support of 'interlocking institutions' does not highlight 
inter-organisational cooperation. Indeed, NATO is a distinctly different type of 
organisation from the other institutions featured in this study. While NATO has taken 
on a more political role in the post-Cold War era, its representatives (namely the 
Secretary-General) are not in the habit of making political declarations to the same 
extent as the EU, UN and OSCE. Indeed, it is more difficult to identify cooperation 
between NATO and other organisations as has been documented in earlier chapters. 
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NATO does not declare itself to be a regional organisation as defined by the UN 
Charter, and does not participate in Biennial UN-Regional Organisations meetings. 
NATO documentation acknowledges the primary responsibility of the UN in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and cites the juridicial link between 
the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty (i. e. the right of UN member states to 
form alliances for collective defence) (NATO 2001). The relationship between the 
organisations has been limited to operational cooperation in former Yugoslavia. 
Similarly, NATO cooperation with the OSCE is not visible as an Alliance objective. 
It is only relatively recently that NATO has adopted the language of inter- 
organisational cooperation. During a keynote address at a conference entitled 'The 
UN, the EU, NATO and other regional actors: Partners in Peace? ' in Paris in October 
2002, NATO Secretary General George Robertson urged organisations to be proactive 
in developing effective cooperation. 109 Significantly, he cited the threats of terrorism 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as pressing reasons to enhance 
cooperation. This renewed NATO interest in organisational partnerships appears to 
have been driven by the threat of global terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 more than 
anything else. Cooperation in earlier NATO documentation is primarily 
conceptualised in terms of cooperation with sovereign states rather than with other 
organisations (for example, the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Partnership for 
Peace Agreements). Given the centrality of military means to notions of sovereignty, 
perhaps the NATO emphasis on states is unsurprising. However, this does make 
NATO a peculiar player in post-Cold War organisational. conflict prevention. 
8.3 Understanding EU-NATO Relations in the Post-Cold War Period 
NATO and the EU are strikingly different organisations. While they both originated in 
the early days of the Cold War, NATO and the EC were far apart in terms of ethos 
and practice (although analysts of the realist school of International Relations (e. g. 
Waltz 1979) argue that the military security provided by NATO allowed the EC to 
exist). Even with the growing number of shared objectives and members in the post- 
Cold War era, the organisations are not natural partners. In contrast to the hybrid 
1091, Meeting today's security challenges: working together, learning lessons, being bold" Keynote 
address by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the Conference "The UN, the EU, NATO and 
other regional actors: Partners in Peace? " Paris, II October 2002. NATO On-line library (Speeches), 
hn: //www. nato. int/docu/speech/2002/sO2 101 a. htm. Accessed 21/05/03. 
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intergovemmental-supranational nature of the EU, NATO is more strictly 
intergovernmental; its few institutions are composed of member nation representatives 
only, and its international staff are few compared to the other organisations. While the 
UN in particular, and arguably the OSCE and the EU have an institutional drive that 
can at least be partially separated from the whims of the members, NATO's 
institutional character is often portrayed as identical to that of its most militarily 
powerful members. Indeed, NATO external objectives, for example in the Caucasus, 
are difficult to distinguish from national policies (Bhatty and Bronson 2000). Also, 
NATO's remit and competences are narrow compared to the other organisations. It 
does not have a wide role in conflict prevention, and yet the EU's relationship with 
NATO has become crucial in the elucidation of the full range of Petersberg tasks. 
Arguably, NATO negotiations with the WEU were facilitated by the similarity in 
structure and objectives between the two defence organisations. NATO negotiations 
with a largely civilian organisation such as the EU have not been without problems, 
despite the fact that after the twin EU-NATO May 2004 enlargement, EU Member 
States make up 19 of the 26 NATO member nations. 
Nevertheless, the 'Europeanisation' of NATO (Cottey 1998: 56), illustrated by the 
CJTF concept and the promise of enlargement of the NATO area across the European 
continent, tied the objectives and the fortunes of the EU and NATO together. From 
the joint objective of stabilisation in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, NATO-EU 
cooperation moved up a gear when EU ambitions to undertake military operations 
became clear. 
NATO dialogue with the EU proper began after the Union decision taken at the 1999 
Cologne European Council to adopt the crisis management role of the Western 
European Union (WEU). This decision represented the culmination of the 1990s 
debate among EU Member States about if and how to develop an EU crisis 
management capability, and was facilitated by the arrival of the UK New Labour 
Party onto the political scene. The British receptivity to an EU capacity, crystallised 
by the Franco-British agreement at St. Malo in 1998, resulted in real progress for the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
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The Berlin-Plus discussions originate in the 1996 NATO Ministerial Council meeting 
in Berlin, which allowed for WEU use of NATO assets. The Washington Summit of 
1999 extended this to EU ESDP operations, allowing for "assured EU access to 
NATO operational planning; use of NATO capabilities and assets; NATO European 
command options for EU operations; and adaptation of NATO defence planning 
system to incorporate availability of forces for EU operations" (Quille 2003: 7). One 
of the main stumbling blocks of the EU's 1999 Helsinki Presidency arrangements for 
EU consultation with NATO was the involvement of non-EU NATO members (at that 
time, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Czech Republic and Canada and the 
US) in future ESDP missions. The arrangements were finalised in 2002 after the 
Greek, and then the Turkish governments, finally dropped their objections to EU use 
of NATO assets. In the meantime, a deeper partnership between the organisations had 
been developing in joint NATO-EU ad hoc working groups, where security policies 
and modalities for cooperation were discussed. Additionally, the organisations agreed 
on regular joint Ambassadorial/ Ministerial level and NAC-PSC meetings (NATO 
2001). 
The December 2002 EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, as part of the final Berlin-Plus 
agreement, declared the establishment of a 'strategic partnership' between the 
organisations; (NATO 2002). This relationship, it was declared, is founded on a 
mutually reinforcing partnership; effective mutual consultation; equality and due 
regard for the decision-making autonomy of both organisations; respect for Member 
States' interests; respect for the principles of the UN Charter; and the "coherent, 
transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability 
requirements common to the two organisations" (NATO 2002: para. 2). The real 
extent of equality between the organisations is questionable: it is the EU that relies on 
NATO assets for crisis management, not the other way around. Furthermore, while 
U. S. governmental rhetoric frequently (and confusingly) calls for the 'strengthening 
of the European pillar', the Bush administration did not hesitate to exploit EU 
Member State disagreements in the run up to the war in Iraq in 2003. A recent 
Assembly of the WEU report claimed that the removal of the WEU as the link 
between the EU and NATO has led to a competitive relationship between the 
organisations, noting that "with few exceptions, the European Union authorities avoid 
using the word "cooperation" to describe relations with NATO and/or the United 
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States" (WEU 2004: 15). Nevertheless, it is in the interest of the US administration to 
maintain good relations with European allies, and therefore the relationship is framed 
in partnership terms by both the EU and NATO. 
The EU-NATO Security Agreement on information sharing, of March 2003, brought 
the Berlin-Plus negotiations to an end. The arrangements were tested by ajoint EU- 
NATO crisis management training exercise in November 2003. 
In July 2003, the EU and NATO agreed on a Concerted Approachfor the Western 
Balkans (Council of the EU 2003h). The agreement followed the successful EU 
takeover from NATO (using NATO assets) of military crisis management in 
Macedonia. Recognising that the endgame for the Western Balkan countries is 
integration into Euro-Atlantic organisational structures, the agreement cites the EU- 
NATO partnership as the key factor in ending conflict in the region (interestingly, no 
mention of the UN and the OSCE), and identifies conflict prevention and crisis 
management as one of six core areas for cooperation. ' 10 Cooperation will be ensured 
by regular meetings between the organisations and their institutions, and security 
information will be exchanged. This document proclaimed a partnership between the 
organisations in the Balkans that presumably could be developed for similar 
objectives in other countries or regions. A closer look at modalities for cooperation in 
structural policy, early warning and analysis and military crisis management 
examines the centrality of conflict prevention in this inter-organisational partnership. 
8.4 Coordinating Structural Conflict Prevention Policy 
8.4.1 NATO and structural conflict prevention 
NATO's role in conflict prevention is most contested in the field of structural policy. 
NATO does not distribute aid or assign personnel to address root causes of conflict. 
Nevertheless, commentators argue that NATO's enlargement and partnership agenda 
has an important long-term influence on civilian control of the military in candidate 
and partner countries, which could contribute to the prevention of intra and inter-state 
conflict (Edmunds 2003: 145). More broadly, NATO has long been cited as a vehicle 
for the promotion of democracy both within and outside its membership (Larrabee 
110 The other areas are defence and security sector reform, strengthening the rule of law, the threat of 
terrorism, border security and management and arms control and the removal of small arms. 
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2003). Karl Deutsch argued that the development of NATO "may be one of the most 
effective ways to advance the development of political community in the North 
Atlantic area, and to contribute to the eventual abolition of war" (Deutsch 1957: 203). 
More recently, NATO has been conceptualised as a 'security community' of states 
sharing the same values (Adler 1998: 143). 
NATO's enlargement agenda can be interpreted as the Alliance's contribution to 
structural conflict prevention. Membership action plans for aspiring members embed 
the norms of liberalism and capitalism (Webber et al. 2004: 13), although NATO does 
not impose strict conditions on membership, like the EU. Yet it is difficult to 
substantiate the claims that NATO embodies a commitment to democracy, or that 
NATO enlargement spreads democracy. It was not originally an alliance of 
democratic states; Portugal was a dictatorship, and Turkey's poor democratic 
credentials have delayed its EU membership bid (Sjursen 2004: 695). Reiter (2001) 
argues that NATO did not contribute to democratisation with its Cold War 
enlargements, and neither was it NATO that instigated democratic reforms in 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, who became NATO members in 1999. 
Neither does NATO practice democratic decision-making or possess civilian 
competences (Sjursen 2004: 695), although its post-Cold War role in former Soviet 
states such as Ukraine could be characterised as diplomacy. "' Indeed, NATO could 
be said to practice preventive diplomacy, particularly in the Balkans. NATO 
documents increasingly emphasise the organisation's political aims, although clearly 
the extent of NATO activity in structural conflict prevention is debatable. 
Nonetheless, the new NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, emphasised 
NATO's role in 'projecting stability' at a recent international conference 112 (a term 
also adopted by External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten and in the 
Commission's 2001 Communication on Conj7ict Prevention). De Hoop Scheffer 
highlighted the importance of strengthened relationships with states in the Balkans, 
the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Mediterranean, defining stability projection as 
1" Ukraine has contributed personnel to NATO operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Dialogue takes place in the NATO-Ukraine Commission, where the NATO SG frequently urges 
Ukrainian leaders to implement political and economic, as well as defence, reforms (Monaco 2004b: 
5). 
112 Keynote Address by the NATO SG at 'Defending Global Security, Third annual Security and 
Defence Conference of the New Defence Agenda, Palais D'Egmont, Brussels, May 17,2004. 
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building partnerships to maximise our collective ability to defend the peace. "' 13 While 
essentially a political goal, the idea of 'defending' the peace unwittingly indicates that 
NATO's agenda remains military in essence. 
8.4.2 EU-NATO coordination in structural conflict prevention 
Given the lack of a clear NATO role in structural conj7ict prevention, charting EU- 
NATO coordination in this field is problematic. The language of long-term stability 
and democracy promotion can, however, be identified in the documents of both 
organisations, indicating at least a rhetorical consensus on these issues. Documents 
such as the above-mentioned EU and NA TO Concerted Approachfor the Western 
Balkans indicate that the organisations are working together to promote long-terin 
conflict prevention, even though most joint initiatives are operational. The 
organisations'joint enlargement in May 2004 also indicates an agreement to 
coordinate to enhance stability in Europe by bringing many of the same ex-Soviet 
countries into European and transatlantic institutions. The 'return to Europe' 
phraseology of the early 1990s may have lost its intensity for the candidate states after 
years of difficult adjustments, but if enlargement is a tool for conflict prevention, then 
the EU and NATO took joint and reinforcing action in May 2004. 
8.5 Coordinating Early Warning and Analysis 
8.5.1 NATO early warning 
NATO's military credentials result in an unsurprisingly military early warning focus. 
NATO early warning is provided by the NATO Situation Center (SITCEN). The 
Center is located in the Crisis Management and Operations Directorate within the 
International Staff (Division of Defence Planning and Operations). The Directorate 
provides advice and technical expertise on crisis management, peacekeeping and 
Council operations. SITCEN has three roles: to assist the NAC, Defence Planning 
Committee and Military Committee in fulfilling functions in the field of consultation; 
to serve as the focal point for the receipt, exchange and dissemination of political, 
military and economic intelligence and information; and to act as a link with similar 
facilities of member nations and of NATO Strategic Commands (NATO 2001: 227). 
It is not clear from NATO documentation how many personnel staff SITCEN or the 
113 Keynote address quoted in Conference Report on 'Defending Global Security', published by the 
New Defence Agenda, Bibliot6que Solvay, 137 Rue Belliard, Brussels p. 13. 
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Directorate as a whole. While intelligence comes directly from member nations, the 
extent of analysis undertaken by SITCEN and associated staff is not detailed by 
NATO. The lack of transparency and secondary material on the effectiveness of 
NATO early warning means that assessment of NATO competence is hardly possible. 
NATO also has specific technology for surveillance purposes. NATO member nations 
collectively own a fleet of modified, radar-equipped Boeing 707s known as Airborne 
Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) (formerly known as NATO Airborne Early 
Warning and Control Force - NAEWF). AWACS undertake a variety of missions, 
including air surveillance, air support and reconnaissance. 114 This fleet was used in 
2004 to patrol the skies over the Olympic Games in Greece and the European Football 
Championships to protect against terrorist threats. 
8.5.2 EU-NATO coordination in early warning 
NATO SITCEN has links to the EU SITCEN, although NATO would only agree to 
information exchange with the EU after tight security arrangements were in place 
(Andr6ani, Bertram and Grant 2001: 36). This was reached in March 2003 in the EU- 
NATO Security Agreement (Council of the EU 2003i). The Agreement represents the 
final document under the Berlin-Plus arrangements, and entails the release of security 
information by the High Representative for CFSP to NATO on ESDP matters. How 
much information NATO shares with the EU is unclear, as is whether this 
arrangement brings any added value to the early warning capacity of either 
organisation. 
In the EU and NA TO Concerted Approach to the Western Balkans document, the 
organisations agreed on specific early warning consultation mechanisms, focusing on 
dialogue between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) and also between NATO's Military Committee and the EU Military 
Committee. Overlapping national memberships of the Committees undoubtedly helps 
to maintain consistency. Coordination between organisations is particularly aided by 
the 'double-batting' of military representatives; EU Alliance members send the same 
114, AWACS: NATO's eyes in the sky' h! tp: //www. nato. int/issues/awacs/index. html. Accessed 
15/10//04. 
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representative to the EU and NATO Military Committees (Andr&ani, Bertram and 
Grant 2001: 41). Indeed, the EU's military structure is modelled on that of NATO. 
While this is pragmatic and avoids duplication, it could hamper the EU in developing 
its own military doctrine, encompassing views of a wider variety of Member States 
that may go beyond the concerns of the Alliance. 
Cooperation in early warning and analysis has been boosted by the threat of global 
terrorism. NATO's objectives have become increasingly focused on supporting the 
US-led 'War on Terror', and this included enhanced intelligence sharing. In April 
2004, the 26 members agreed on a Declaration on Terrorism declaring the 
establishment of a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, to be operational by the June 
2004 Istanbul Summit. Additionally, NATO pledged to step up information sharing 
with the EU on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(Monaco 2004). It remains to be seen if this focus will be beneficial to wider conflict 
prevention. Information sharing appears to be narrowly focused on military and 
terrorist activities, and it is difficult to see how this could enhance anything but a 
restricted range of security concerns. 
8.6 Coordinating Operational Conflict Prevention 
8.6.1 NATO cdsis management 
It would be misleading to characterise NATO operations as limited to military 
peacekeeping or enforcement. While NATO does not generally practice civilian crisis 
management as defined by this study, it has increasingly found itself operating in 
areas requiring large-scale humanitarian relief. Additionally, NATO has developed 
special military police and carabinieri units for lower-key operations. NATO has 
developed a civil/military concept (CIMIC) to improve coordination between military 
missions and relief operations. This type of arrangement has been particularly 
important in SE Europe, to facilitate some synergy between military and humanitarian 
operations and objectives. Yet this has not led to the 'civilianisation' of NATO: 
CIMIC is not a partnership arrangement between the military and civilian 
organisations. In fact, humanitarian organisations are invited to integrate into a 
military mission, and "the politico-military goals have priority at all times" (Pugh 
2000: 238). The adaptation, when there has been one, has been on the side of 
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humanitarian organisations, who have had to balance the need for impartiality with 
the safety of their staff and the secure delivery of aid. NATO has only cooperated 
with civilian organisations extensively in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania 
and Kosovo. The CIMIC concept was developed in this context as NATO 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) troops found themselves contributing to larger-scale 
efforts to reconstruct the country in the aftermath of war. CIMIC experience was then 
beneficial during and after the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 (Pugh 2000). 
Operation 'Allied Harbour' in Albania (April-September 1999) was NATO's first 
humanitarian mission: NATO troops and military police erected refugee camps, 
distributed aid and then helped with the return of refugees to Kosovo. ' 15 
A better example of NATO's move beyond the military sphere is the organisation's 
frequent forays into preventive diplomacy. NATO is beginning to take on a 
diplomatic role in its own right. A NATO Special Representative was appointed to 
Macedonia (Mace 2004: 477), and NATO SG Robertson and EU HR/SG Solana went 
on ajoint diplomatic offensive in Macedonia in 2001 when violence flared up 
between Albanians and Macedonians. This is a good example of EU-NATO policy 
reinforcement to prevent conflict. 
Despite these developments, NATO does still concentrate on its military expertise in 
its out-of-area operations. This has been expanded beyond the Balkan theatre with 
NATO 'going global' in Afghanistan. Reflecting the linkage between NATO 
objectives and the US-led 'War on Terror', the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) of around 6 500 troops, sent to Kabul in the aftermath of the US 
bombing in 2001, came under NATO auspices in 2003. NATO members agreed to 
extend the mission beyond the Afghan capital at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, 
creating 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), in part to increase security for the 
first post-Taliban elections in September 2004 (Monaco 2004b). However, NATO 
members were accused of dragging their feet over Afghanistan, by not providing the 
military resources fast enough, and underestimating the situation on the ground 
(Monaco 2004b). While NATO was not the organisation through which the US 
government (and allies) pursued its assault on Iraq in March 2003, NATO members 
"' 'Operation Allied Harbour: NATO's Humanitarian Mission to Albania' 
bM: //www. afsouth. nato. int/operations/harbour/default. htm. Accessed 15103105. 
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agreed in 2004 to provide assistance and training to security forces in Iraq. The allies 
were, however, divided on the details, with France and Germany insisting that training 
be carried out on home soil rather than in Iraq itself (Monaco 2004b). Evidently the 
acrimonious disagreements of 2003 would continue to impact on NATO's potential 
role in Iraq. These problems could impact on the smooth transfer of NATO Balkan 
missions to the authority of the EU. On a more low-key level, NATO has been 
running a maritime interdiction mission in the Mediterranean since 2001 to deter and 
detect terrorist activities (Kobieracki 2004). 
Moving on to NATO's capabilities for military crisis management, plans for a NATO 
Response Force (NRF) have been underway since September 2002, on a US initiative. 
The force of 21000 troops, deployable within 7-30 days, is designed for high 
intensity missions and includes weapons and defences against biological, nuclear and 
chemical weapons (Monaco 2003c). The NRF was declared initially operational by 
NATO SG Jaap De Hoop Scheffer on 13 October 20041 16 , and will be fully 
operational by 2006. Combining elite land, air and sea units, missions may include 
"collective defence, managing the consequences of natural or man-made disasters, 
serving as an 'initial entry' force for a larger follow-on force, or to demonstrate the 
Alliance's determination and ability to act effectively in the early stages of a 
crisis. "' 17 
While the NRF is designed to improve NATO's response to crises, critics cite slow 
national decision-making as an impediment to fast deployment (Monaco 2003c). In 
terms of military decision-making, NATO has been streamlining its command 
structure in recent years for greater cfficiency. The refonns entail creating two 
strategic level commands (Allied Command Operations in Belgium and Allied 
Command Transformation in the US, the latter supervising the development of NATO 
forces and capabilities); two operational standing Joint Force Commands (reduced 
from five); and six Joint Force Component Commands (reduced from 13) (Monaco 
2003c). 
116 'Response Force ready for missions' NATO Update, 13 October 2004 at 
h": //www. nato. int/docu/ut)date/2004/10-october/eIO13a. htm. Accessed 15110104. 
117 ibid. 
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NATO has undergone considerable reform in the post-Cold War era to emerge as a 
powerful military crisis management outfit. Nevertheless, the organisation's relative 
lack of expertise in civilian measures means that cooperation with civilian 
organisations is vital. The EU is a key partner for NATO in making this link. 
8.6.2 EU-NATO coordination in operational conflict prevention 
Crisis management is the raison d'6tre of EU-NATO cooperation, and inevitably 
where the focus of this chapter lies. As already mentioned, cooperation is facilitated 
by regular contact between the NAC and the PSC, and between the NATO SG and the 
EU High Representative for CFSP. Additionally, cooperation on the ground takes 
place, for example, in Macedonia and Bosnia, where NATO maintains a residual 
presence and the EU is active. 
While the EU can provide civilian crisis management to complement NATO military 
operations, as explained, the EU currently relies on NATO-owned assets to undertake 
some military crisis management missions. The Berlin-Plus arrangements, as 
Operation CONCORDIA in Macedonia demonstrated, entail close working 
relationships between EU and NATO personnel. NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander in Europe (DSACEUR), a post always held by a European, was the 
Operational Commander of the EU mission, and EU personnel liased at the Supreme 
Headquarters (SHAPE) with NATO staff in the EU cell. Operational planning 
arrangements have emerged as one of the key issues in EU-NATO cooperation, and 
have highlighted differences between EU Member State ambitions. Frustrated at 
relying on NATO capabilities, and in the context of Constitutional Treaty discussions 
and EU Member State divisions over Iraq, the governments of Belgium, Germany, 
France and Luxembourg proposed the establishment of autonomous EU planning 
headquarters in April 2003. The initiative of the so-called 'Gang of Four' provoked a 
negative response from the US Administration and other EU Member States, 
particularly the UK, at a time of fraught transatlantic relations due to the impending 
war on Iraq (Monaco 2003c). Critics argued that the headquarters would duplicate 
SHAPE, and the existing national capacities of the UK and France. A compromise 
(brokered by the UK, Germany and France) was agreed by the December 2003 
European Council: an EU cell would be created in SHAPE, and there would be an 
option of a temporary Operations Centre for autonomous missions when national HQ 
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were not identified. The further militarisation of EU structures, resisted by the 
traditionally neutral EU countries, was avoided, but inevitably this will lead to deeper 
contacts with NATO. 
Naturally enough, given the experience of Member State defence cooperation in the 
NATO context, NATO's military structure became the model for the EU's military 
structure. The EU's military staff (comprising around 135 military officers and 
support staff) was modelled on NATO's international military staff (Andr6ani, 
Bertram and Grant 2001: 41). Double-hatting of NATO officials for EU-led 
operations means that NATO military doctrine and practices will greatly influence the 
development of the EU as a military actor. This has generated some controversy. 
Giovanna Bono (2004) suggests that NATO has too much influence in EU operational 
planning and military thinking. Others have asked, "how far should [the EU] defer to 
expertise coming from an organisation whose aims may not always coincide with its 
own? " (Andr6ani, Bertram and Grant 2001: 69). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest 
that the organisations have different crisis management visions. Mawdsley and Quille 
argue, "although the EU and NATO are not different in their global ambitions, their 
organisational outlook makes them emphasise distinctly different military needs and 
visions of combat intensity" (Mawdsley and Quille 2004: 15). The EU emphasises 
multilateralism and has a more holistic approach to security, while NATO does not 
always seek partnerships and practices operations of high intensity. It is difficult to 
imagine EU Member States agreeing to undertake an EU military operation without a 
UN mandate, as NATO member nations did in 1999 in regard to Kosovo. However, 
there has been little discussion at the EU level about such a scenario. NATO-EU 
cooperation in Macedonia can be cited as an occasion when operational differences 
came to the fore. Operation CONCORDIA, undertaken by the EU using NATO 
assets, saw close working relationships between NATO and EU personnel, especially 
since the EU took over NATO's former role and NATO retained a residual presence 
based at its Skopje Headquarters. The militarily low-key nature of the deployment, 
(designed to help the Macedonian government implement the security requirements of 
the Ohrid Agreement) meant that the EU did not actually need NATO assets to carry 
out the mission. However, the political context of the operation required the 
settlement of EU-NATO negotiations to allow for a Berlin-Plus mission, not least 
since continuity on the ground was crucial in maintaining the confidence of the 
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Macedonian government and people (Mace 2004: 480). While the EU-NATO 
relationship was reportedly good, there were some differences between the 
organisations on who was responsible for helping the Macedonian government to 
manage the country's borders. According to Mace, "NATO regarded border 
management as a military issue, which fell within the policy remit of its advisors at 
the Macedonian Ministry of Defence, while the EU argued that border management 
should be matter for the civilian authorities ... the two organisations sometimes gave 
contrary messages to the Macedonian government" (Mace 2004: 483). 
While the EU's reliance on NATO experience has impacted on operational planning, 
there is less cooperation on military hardware. Defence investment has been identified 
as the other key area of EU-NATO cooperation (Lindley-French 2003), yet despite 
rhetoric against duplication, the organisations are not developing military capabilities 
in synergy. It is still not clear how NATO's Response Force (NRF) will interact with 
the EU's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), or the planned Battle Groups. The two forces 
do not exist independently; the same national resources in EU and NATO Member 
States are allocated to both forces. To avoid a situation in which the forces are needed 
simultaneously, the EU and NATO have agreed to meet in the event of a crisis in 
order to clarify intentions. It is not clear if the latter development concurs with the 
EU's earlier agreement at the 1999 Helsinki European Council to act 'when NATO as 
a whole is not engaged. ' The 'primacy' of NATO is still the subject of dispute among 
Member States. In terms of defence procurement, both organisations have agreed on 
defence capability targets, with minimal cooperation. According to Monaco, 
"NATO's PCC [Prague Capabilities Commitment] and EU's European Capabilities 
Action Plan (ECAP) remain parallel and duplicate initiatives" (2004b: 3). 
Nevertheless, a joint EU-NATO statement in December 2003 proclaimed that the 
existing NATO-EU Capability Group tries to ensure consistency between the ECAP 
and the PCC, and synergy between the NRF and EU RRF (NATO 2003). Meanwhile, 
the EU established the EDA to deal with defence research and procurement. 
There are conflicting views within NATO about an appropriate division of crisis 
management labour with the EU. A recent NATO Parliamentary Assembly defence 
and security report suggests that it is likely that "the EU [Rapid Reaction] force will 
focus on stabilisation and humanitarian operations rather than high intensity 
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operations, while the NRF will be used more for those high intensity operations that 
require a comparatively large force at a higher degree of readiness" (NATO 2004: 
12). This has indeed been the common view, since the EU has less capabilities for 
fast, large troop deployments. Nevertheless, the development of the EU battle group 
concept, as well as the extension of the Petersberg tasks in the Constitutional Treaty, 
have prompted the NATO SG to suggest that the battle groups could 'go to war' 
rather than keep the peace, adding that "we shouldn't think the EU is for soft power 
and NATO for tough power. "' 18 
Despite the successful completion of the Berlin-Plus negotiations, NATO-EU 
cooperation in crisis management is likely to be effected by the ups and downs of 
transatlantic politics. As with other multilateral organisations, it is often difficult to 
identify institutional aims from the objectives and concerns of the Member States of 
the EU and NATO. If, as some commentators contend, the success of future EU- 
NATO cooperation relies on the maintenance of good relations between the US and 
Europe (Mace 2004: 486), then the case for 'constructive' duplication of military 
capabilities is strong (Schake 2003). If EU governments cannot meet the capability 
shortfalls at the national level, then more collaborative projects on defence 
procurement are required to fill the military crisis management gaps. The increasingly 
different strategic cultures on both sides of the Atlantic in the context of the US-led 
'War on Terror' require a readjustment of EU security thinking. Already popular 
commentators are labelling NATO a 'threat to Europe', and 'no more than a 
"coalition of the reluctant... (Steele 2004). Meanwhile the NATO SG has accused 
Europe of lagging behind the US in the fight against terror, adding "if you want to 
have a trans-Atlantic dialogue between grown-ups, any President and any American 
administration is willing to listen to the European voice as long as it is one European 
voice. If it is five different voices, they will not take the trouble to listen and they will 
wonder what is Europe (sic). "' 19 Assuming that EU Member States want NATO to 
persist, they would fare better within the Alliance by thrashing out a clearer military 
security doctrine (i. e. clearer than the European Security Strategy). Paradoxically, 
this, despite the comments made by the NATO SG, is exactly what the US and its 
118 'NATO chief would not rule out EU states going to war, ' euobserver 11.03.05, 
h : //euobserver. com/9aid=18639&sid=9. Accessed 15/03/05. 
"9 'Europe lags behind US is fight against terror', Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 12.11.04 EU Observer, 
hn: //www. euobserver. com/? sid=9&aid=17743. Accessed 12.11.04 
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closest transatlantic allies oppose. The lack of democratic accountability inherent in 
current ESDP developments only serves to prevent a wider discussion at the public 
and governmental levels about implications of the militarisation of the EU and the 
concurrent partnership with NATO. 
The EU takeover of the NATO stabilisation force in Bosnia in December 2004 under 
Berlin-Plus arrangements was a further test of EU-NATO cooperation. The EU 
HR/SG Solana at the 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit cited the operation as reflecting 
the 'NATO-EU strategic partnership, ' while more critical observers argue that the 
partnership "has yet to become strategic, but remains a mechanism for the EU to 
support NATO's withdrawal from the Balkans" (Monaco 2004b: 3). Overall, EU- 
NATO cooperation in crisis management allows the EU to carry out military 
operations, but, as the NATO SG implies above, this is far from an arrangement 
between equal institutional partners. As long as the US administration characterises 
the EU as a group of quarrelsome children, and the EU teeters on the wrong side of an 
autonomous military crisis management capacity, this situation is likely to continue. It 
undoubtedly impacts negatively on the possibility of an EU-NATO strategic 
partnership for conflict prevention. 
8.7 Internal EU Coordination: Implications for Coordination with NATO 
Following the structure of the previous two chapters, we now move on to how EU 
internal coordination impacts on external policy coordination with NATO. 
Cooperating with a military organisation has undoubtedly presented challenges for the 
EU and its Member States. While cooperation in military matters within the NATO 
framework has been common practice for some EU Member States, it is an anathema 
for Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Austria. The increasing participation of these non- 
NATO states in multi-national peacekeeping deployments (in Bosnia, where Swedish 
troops have served under NATO command since 1995, and also Kosovo and 
Afghanistan) (Giegerich and Wallace 2004: 173) indicates a commitment to 
multilateral crisis management. However, the general EU consensus on conflict 
prevention does not necessarily extend to military cooperation with NATO to allow 
for potentially controversial military interventions under the EU flag. The levels of 
coordination considered follow the pattern of previous chapters: we examine the pillar 
structure, inter-institutional coordination and internal institutional coordination. 
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8.7.1 The pillar structure 
The overall pillar structure of the EU tends to perpetuate the lack of strategic doctrine 
that makes EU dialogue and cooperation with NATO problematic. While the EU has 
the competences of all three pillars at its disposal, there is not enough synergy to 
ensure a clear and uncontested line on when economic and diplomatic means should 
make way for the use of force. A clear doctrine on the need for and use of military 
force would help to clarify the EU's relationship with NATO. The current crisis 
management procedures are not a substitute for this, and reflect a continuing lack of 
consensus between Member States. The pillar structure has been cited as hindering a 
quick EU response to crises (Zeilonka 1998: 177). This could be important time lost if 
the EU also has to make arrangements to use US-owned NATO assets. A period of 
long planning, as in the EU takeover of SFOR in Bosnia, cannot be assumed. 
The pillar structure also dictates a particularly narrow dialogue with NATO, as 
compared to EU dialogue with the UN and the OSCE. Cooperation is concentrated in 
intergovernmental pillar two, the domain of ESDP, curtailing any wider dialogue with 
the EU system as a whole. The Commission is kept at a distance from the military 
structures in the Council of the EU, and by extension is kept from dialogue with 
NATO. The emphasis on 'strategic' partnership with NATO narrows the boundaries 
of cooperation, stifling a partnership on military-civilian cooperation that could 
benefit both organisations. The government-to-government focus of NATO-EU 
cooperation leads to a situation of dependency without institutional dialogue. 
8.7.2 Inter-institutional coordination 
Lack of coordination between the Council and the Commission in the event of 
complex EU operations in crisis areas could impact on cooperation on the ground with 
NATO. The Commission's lack of input into military operations could result in poor 
civil-military coordination. It is not clear if Commission officials have any contact 
with NATO representatives in the Balkans, for example, or whether dialogue is 
restricted to NATO representatives and Council representatives e. g. EU Special 
Representatives or Heads of crisis management operations. Better inter-institutional 
dialogue on military crisis management could improve the effectiveness of EU 
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missions and increase the scope of coordination with NATO at headquarters level and 
in the field. 
The establishment of the European Defence Agency in 2004, attached to the Council, 
and the European Commission's move into security and defence research are parallel 
initiatives that may lack proper synergy because of existing inter-institutional 
divisions. According to Cameron and Quille, "considering that the [European 
Defence] Agency is looking to the future in its analysis beyond 2010 to inform 
decision makers on key defence capability choices for the future and the Commission 
is simultaneously funding research in areas that will produce technologies of the 
future available to be integrated into defence or crisis management capabilities, one 
must ask the question whether these two processes are properly integrated" (2004: 
28). If not properly integrated, dialogue with NATO on capabilities will lack a key 
EU component. The Commission cannot be kept out of defence issues without 
jeopardising the EU's most important contribution to conflict prevention: the ability to 
invoke a range of instruments across the development, civilian and military spheres. 
However, it is important that the Commission does not under-emphasise its civilian 
expertise to compete for a role in ESDP. Better Council and Member State 
engagement with the Commission, as well as with the European Parliament, would 
avoid this. 
8.7.3 Internal institutional problems 
Lack of internal coordination within the Commission barely impacts on EU 
coordination with NATO, since the Commission has little contact with NATO, except 
through its own contacts with the High Representative and the PSC. 
However, the wider implications of the Commission's role in the ESDP project, with 
its close links to NATO, can be considered. The Commission's schizophrenia about 
its role in ESDP could reinforce EU militarisation through NATO rather than 
encourage a more broadly-based security partnership. In recent years, the Commission 
has been pushing for more influence in defence industrial markets (the armaments 
industry, being so closely linked to national governments, is exempted from the 
Single Market), and is investing in defence (or 'security') research (Mawdsley 2004). 
The rush to gain a greater stake in the arms dynamic that is partially responsible for 
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driving the ESDP (Mawdsley 2004) contrasts sharply with the Commission's role of 
defending and promoting civilian crisis management and conflict prevention. There is 
a danger of a marginalisation of supporters and resources for longer-tenn security 
solutions. 120 
It cannot be assumed that the Council of the EU is internally united behind a vision 
for the ESDP project. The 2003 European Security Strategy tried to fuse the concerns 
of two men: the realpolitik of Robert Cooper, Head of DG External Relations, and the 
4softer' security solutions preferred by Christoph Heusgen, Head of the Policy 
Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU). 121 It is debatable how successful the 
Security Strategy is in integrating these concerns; certainly, the European 
Commission's civilian expertise had very little input, and some regard it as a vague 
document, open to competing interpretations. 122 Divisions over agendas could impact 
on the extent and quality of EU-NATO cooperation. This is compounded by 
competing Member State agendas. Who owns the ESDP project? It has been 
disproportionally driven by the governments of France and the UK. It lacks 
democratic accountability to the extent that defence initiatives have been fast-tracked 
from the Constitutional Treaty before national referendums, unbeknown to peace 
campaigners (Mawdsley 2004). Admittedly, the Commission has recognised this. 
ESDP's democratic deficit has recently been the subject of a Commission-funded 
research network project, engaging practitioners and research institutes. 123 However, 
internal EU divisions may prevent a single EU voice on ESDP, as called for by the 
NATO SG, for some time to come. 
8.8 Conclusion 
NATO's operational record in the post-Cold War era points to the emergence of a 
transformed military alliance that has successfully restructured, and enlarged its 
membership. The organisation, with largely military expertise, does play a role in 
acute conflict prevention, but this contribution is of wider value only in conjunction 
120 Particularly if we consider that only two people are currently working on conflict prevention in the 
Commission's RELEX DG. 
121 Interview with Council foreign policy adviser, Brussels, 27th October 2004. 
122 Interview with European Commission official, Brussels, 25h October 2004. 
123 The project ran from 2000-2004 ('ESDP Democracy: bridging the Accountability Gap in ESDP' 
http: //www. esdpdemocracy-net). 
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with other actors addressing the longer-term causes of conflict and instability. 
Additionally, NATO enlargement is considered to have a positive impact on 
democracy and the civilian control of the military, thereby promoting conflict 
prevention within the Alliance (Edmunds 2003; Larrabee 2003). 
The EU and NATO are linked by membership and history, although in Cold War 
times the organisations' functions were well delineated. In the post-Cold War era, 
both organisations have adopted conflict prevention as an objective. However, NATO 
remains an organisation with relatively narrow competences is comparison to the EU, 
and the organisations are very different in terms of structure and ethos. EU 
cooperation with NATO for conflict prevention cannot be identified in all our conflict 
prevention categories, but is largely concentrated in the sphere of military crisis 
management. The 'strategic partnership' for conflict prevention, as claimed by the EU 
HR/SG is, at best, tenuous. EU dialogue with NATO is shallow and restricted; the 
organisations, on occasion, reinforce each other rhetorically and diplomatically. In 
addition, the organisations now share information and intelligence through respective 
situation centres, although the extent and added value of this cooperation is difficult to 
assess. Cooperation in military crisis management will be maintained to allow for the 
transference of peacekeeping in the Western Balkans from NATO to the EU. 
However, the extension of cooperation to include wider civil-military cooperation is 
not guaranteed now that the Berlin- Plus arrangements are in place. According to 
Julian Lindley-French, NATO-EU institutional meetings "all too often ... appearto 
resemble summer diplomatic garden parties in which polite small talk is exchanged 
while the weeds growing in the comer are ignored. There needs to be far more 
intensive interaction between officials of the two organisations on a day-to-day basis 
across the security spectrum. " (Lindley-French 2003). 
Of course, intensive interaction need not translate as unequal dependency. The Berlin- 
Plus negotiations were largely a political exercise, driven more by transatlantic 
security sensitivities and resistance to change than a pragmatic consideration of how 
emerging crises were to be prevented or managed. The uncertainty over the future 
military role of the EU, and how this will relate to NATO's role perpetuates this 
debate. The NATO SG's suggestion that EU battle groups could be used to fight a war 
is not likely to be welcomed by traditionally neutral EU Member States in particular. 
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The extended Petersberg tasks, as included in the Constitutional Treaty, add to the 
ambiguity rather than clarifying the function of EU military capabilities. 
If the ESDP is to succeed, EU institutions and Member States need to be working 
towards the same goals and reading from the same script. Lack of EU internal 
coordination and consensus on the Union's military role prevents a single, strong EU 
position vis-A-vis NATO. This tends to perpetuate the NATO SG and US 
Administrations' assessment of the Union as weak and divided. ESDP would benefit 
from an input of democracy and legitimacy, based on a process of consensus-building 
across the EU institutions and within EU Member States. The assertion that 
cooperation with NATO in order for the EU to develop a role in military crisis 
management may not be the best way forward, has to be raised and discussed. 
Undoubtedly the Atlantic Alliance represents a crucial political link, as well as an 
important forum for dialogue and defence cooperation. Yet deferral to NATO has 
costs as well as benefits for the EU. NATO used as a US-wielded tool in the 'War on 
Terror' could not only undermine the legitimacy of the Alliance in out-of-area 
operations, but undermine the EU by association. Ironically, the development of 
European owned military assets and the emergence of a more equal transatlantic 
partnership may actually save the Alliance from more damaging fractures. 
Unfortunately, EU Member States currently lack the consensus and the will to 
develop a true and equal partnership for conflict prevention with NATO. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Conclusions: The Evolution of European Union Conflict Prevention 
Policy 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined the evolution of European Union conflict prevention: both 
as an internal policy driven by institutional development and external foreign policy 
pressures, and as an area of external cooperation with other European security 
organisations. The problem of policy coordination was explored as a theme uniting 
the internal and external problems faced by the EU in the organisation's development 
of conflict prevention policy and practice. 
Conflict prevention has been adopted as an EU external policy aim, and has become a 
commonly expressed term in EU documentation and discourse. However, it can be 
broadly concluded that EU conflict prevention policy remains underdeveloped. 
Despite the EU's history as a civilian organisation, the development of military 
capacities is overshadowing structural conflict prevention. The pursuit of military 
means divorced from a commitment to longer-term security solutions could j eopardise 
the EU's legitimacy as a military actor. The EU's elaboration and application of 
conflict prevention is constrained by the pillar structure, a lack of intra-institutional 
coordination, and internal institutional policy divisions, exacerbating the civilian- 
military policy split. Furthermore, while inter-organisational cooperation in conflict 
prevention has become a common theme and aim of European security organisations, 
EU policy coordination with the UN, OSCE and NATO in conflict prevention is 
inconsistent, and is adversely affected by poor intra-EU policy coordination. EU 
external cooperation for conflict prevention does not reflect a commitment to a 
comprehensive conflict prevention policy. 
This final chapter presents a summary of the thesis' findings and addresses the 
following questions: 1) What are the prospects for EU internal and external conflict 
prevention? 2) What are the conceptual and definitional implications of the findings? 
3) Having caught the attention of the EU and other European security organisations, 
what is the future of conflict prevention as a European security strategy? 
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9.2 Cold War and Post-Cold War Conflict Prevention 
Chapter 2 examined conflict prevention in contemporary perspective, focusing on its 
development as an idea and policy in the post-Second World War context. Chapter 4 
continued the debate, focusing specifically on the adoption of conflict prevention by 
the EU and other security organisations in the post-Cold War European security 
context. 
Conflict prevention during the Cold War was generally associated with, firstly, the 
activities of the UN, and secondly, the prevention of conflict between the two 
superpowers, the US and the USSR. The UN was mandated to prevent conflict, but in 
practice not only was the organisation constrained by the confrontation between the 
superpowers in the UN Security Council, but the anticipation of violent conflict (as 
conflict prevention is understood in the post-Cold War period), was not an overt UN 
objective (Burton 1986: 43-44). Nevertheless, the UN developed innovative 
approaches to the problem of violent conflict during the Cold War era - notably 
preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping (Claude 197 1). These activities led the way 
for the adoption of conflict prevention as an explicit objective by the UN, and other 
security organisations in the post-Cold War period (Hampson and Malone 2002; 
Carmcnt and Schnabel 2003). 
Conflict prevention was also associated with the avoidance of conflict between the 
superpowers, although the tactics propounded by strategists bare little resemblance to 
conflict prevention as practiced by international organisations today. Conflict 
prevention as a wider idea and approach to international conflict gained support from 
a reaction (in Europe and the US) to the politics of the Cold War superpowers and 
their strategists. More generally, it gained currency in the European and American 
academic research communities, spurred on by the relaxation of superpower tensions 
in the 1970s and by the growing anti-nuclear weapons movement during the 'Second 
Cold War' of the early 1980s (Burton and Dukes 1990; Dunn 199 1; Salmon and 
Alkadari 1992). 
Conflict prevention rose to prominence in Europe in the post-Cold War era (Lund 
1996; Miall, Ramsbotharn and Woodhouse 1999; Hampson and Malone 2002; 
Carment and Schnabel 2003). However, there were a significant number of difficulties 
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associated with transforming the idea of conflict prevention into substantive policy. 
What did conflict prevention mean in the post-Cold War context? Defining the policy 
was problematic and fraught with subjectivity (Lund 1996; Dwan 2001). Like all 
policy aiming to address the root causes of problems, it generated competing 
assumptions. No-one would deny the difficulties associated with addressing social 
exclusion or racism at the national domestic level, but policy-makers tend to come up 
with different solutions depending on their interpretation of the problem. Those 
advocating conflict prevention as an approach to post-Cold War instability faced the 
same challenges, with the added problem of trying to find consensus at the 
international level among a multitude of national, international and non-governmental 
actors. It was difficult to establish general rules and criteria that could be applied to 
conflict situations that were, in many ways, unique. Generally, conflict prevention 
came to denote, firstly, an outlook that was sensitive to the effects of external 
economic or development policy on particular countries or communities prone to 
conflict ('mainstreaming' conflict prevention), and secondly, an operational stratagem 
designed to limit the escalation or recurrence of violent conflict with diplomatic, 
civilian or military means as necessary. 
Violent intra-state conflict was widely perceived to be a post-Cold War problem, but 
the contested nature of conflict led to different interpretations about appropriate policy 
responses. Neo-realist commentators predicted an escalation of inter-ethnic conflict, a 
'clash of civilizations' (Huntington 1993) that could not be addressed by the 'false 
promise of international institutions' (Mearsheimer 1995). Peace researchers stressed 
the growing propensity of conflict as a result of the disparity of wealth and resources 
between the wealthy North and the poor South (Rogers and Dando 1992). Competing 
assessments of conflict patterns complicated the debate. However, by the late 1990s, it 
was apparent that the proliferation of conflict at the beginning of the decade was not 
an upward trend, although complex intra-state conflict continued to be prevalent 
(Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000). 
Conflict prevention was inevitably viewed as an unrealistic policy for those who 
believed in the inevitability of conflict and the redundancy of international 
organisations. For Stedman (1995) the rise of preventive diplomacy was a result of 
academic 'oversell' to optimistic policy-makers. The implementation problems 
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associated with conflict prevention were grist to the "knee-jerk negativism" (Lund 
1995: 160) mill, but were not shunned by its supporters. Whilst conflicts are difficult 
to predict and actors difficult to motivate, subtle changes in governmental and 
organisational structures can improve early warning, and information can contribute 
to proactive, informed policy choices (Lund 1995; Wallensteen 2002). Analysts 
challenged those who criticised conflict prevention as costly and risky, showing "the 
realism of preventive statecraft as a strategic calculation" (Jentleson 2003: 42). The 
estimated cost of prevention in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia and Haiti were convincingly 
juxtaposed against the cost of inaction, crisis management and post-conflict 
reconstruction (Brown and Rosecrance 1999). The Carnegie Commission's final 
report of 1997 concluded that "preventing deadly conflict is possible" and appealed 
for, inter alia "an international commitment to the concept of prevention" and "a habit 
of preventive investment" (Camegie Commission 1997: xvii). The ethics of 
prevention, however, have to be recognised and addressed: in particular the problem 
of legitimising interference in the internal affairs of states. However, support for 
operational conflict prevention designed to prevent the escalation or recurrence of 
intra-state violence is diluted by military interventions unsanctioned by the UN. 
Moreover, a loose international consensus supporting structural conflict prevention is 
undermined by the neo-liberal global economic regime, which protects the interests of 
rich countries and often keeps poor countries poor (Stiglitz 2002: 17). Clearly, the 
problems with prevention reflect wider problems with the international system, but 
should not be used to undercut the basic sound tenets of the preventive approach. At 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, conflict prevention is not so much "a 
concept in search of a policy" (Carment and Schnabel 2003: 1) as a policy in search of 
genuine governmental commitment. 
Chapter 4 examined the post-Cold War security context. The 1990s became the era of 
conflict prevention as the EU and other European security organisations adopted the 
term as an approach to pan-European instability. The end of the Cold War and the 
democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-1990 led to instability 
as well as the prospect of enhanced international cooperation. The idea of conflict 
prevention may not have been new, but its development as a security policy by the EU 
and other actors reflected a wider and more comprehensive approach to the problem 
of violent conflict, as well as a pragmatic response to instability on the borders of the 
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EU (Rummel 1996; Pinder 1996). Conflict prevention stood some chance of moving 
beyond theory towards practice because of the general re-thinking of security in the 
aftermath of the Cold War (Buzan et al. 1990; Booth and Wheeler 1992). Security 
was perceived in wider terms, and the end of superpower conflict led to more 
attention to root causes of conflict that could be tackled earlier through targeted 
development and humanitarian aid, and if this failed, concerted preventive diplomacy. 
The experience of failed prevention in the Balkans led to the development of conflict 
prevention policies by Western governments and organisations. The proliferation of 
intra-state conflict, with regional and global repercussions meant that they had to be 
better prepared to intervene with civilian experts, or military personnel, in order to 
prevent conflict, or contribute to post-conflict reconstruction. 
The EU found itself a part of a complex and crowded post-Cold War security system. 
Each organisation considered in this study adopted the language of conflict prevention 
as purposes and policies collided in the new political and security context of post- 
Cold War Europe. Yet while the logic of cooperation was obvious, in practice policy 
coordination between different organisations, with different histories, priorities, and 
memberships was, and still is, problematic. Different organisations have different 
strengths and expertise, and there have been no agreements on the division of labour. 
Organisations existed more independently during the Cold War, where security risks, 
as well as dividing lines between organisations, were more clearly defined. 
Overlapping membership between organisations often compounds rather than aids 
inter-organisational difficulties, as it is no longer clear which organisation, or which 
combination of Member States, is best for the job. Policy coordination relies on a 
common assessment of the causes of conflict, common purpose, and reinforcing 
operations and interventions. This has been a challenge for the EU and the other 
organisations featured in this study. The implications of poor organisational 
coordination in conflict prevention are potentially deleterious for pan-European 
security. 
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9.3 European Union Conflict Prevention 
Chapter 3 analysed the history of the EU's external relations, and outlined the 
institutions and procedures of EU external relations. Chapter 5 proceeded specifically 
to examine the substance of EU conflict prevention policy. 
The development of the EC had unavoidable external implications, and EPC and 
parallel community activity demonstrated the EU's aptitude as a long-term stability 
promoter (Hill 1992). However, the history and development of EU external relations 
policy resulted in a complex and divided policy area hovering between 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. This legacy was to have a particular 
effect on the elaboration of conflict prevention as an external relations objective in the 
post-Cold War era. 
The EU developed conflict prevention as a key aspect of its post-Cold War external 
relations agenda (Hill 2001; Duke 2003; Smith, K. E. 2003). The EU's transformation 
from internal conflict preventor to external conflict preventor gradually concurred 
with the organisation's key role in the new Europe, although it took policy failures in 
Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo for significant institutional reforni to take place. Conflict 
prevention became tied up with the EU's security objectives in the wider Europe, and 
the process of enlargement. Evidence shows a steady increase in the use of the term in 
EU discourse, reflecting its wide employment in the rhetoric of the UN, the OSCE 
and NGOs, and revealing its centrality in the expansion of the CFSP. 
Conflict prevention's development in the EU can therefore be attributed to a number 
of internal and external factors. Internally, the EU was a peace project, and 
increasingly marketed itself as such. Conflict prevention represented an achievement 
of the EU, and therefore encapsulated the EU's identity. Furthermore, CFSP 
ambitions required a rationale for external action, and 'exporting stability' was a 
relatively uncontroversial external objective. Externally, pressure was exerting on the 
EU to act to manage and prevent crises, and it proved itself not to be up to the task 
when conflict broke out in Former Yugoslavia. The EU's further failure to prevent, 
and then manage the crisis in Kosovo in 1999 drove forward the ESDP project and 
(arguably) over-emphasised the need for force to back up diplomacy. 
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In the early 1990s then, conflict prevention was a vague objective without policy 
instruments: it was the unstated aim of EU policy in Eastern and Central Europe, but 
not yet a clear policy elaborated in EU documentation. Structural conflict prevention 
was developed by the Commission in relation to EU policy in Africa in particular, and 
the Commission has mainstreamed conflict prevention considerations into 
development policy-making and general external relations with the Country Strategy 
Papers (CSPs) and Country Conflict Assessments (CCAs). Yet to some extent at least, 
conflict prevention was hijacked by the Commission External Relations DG's CFSP 
ambitions, and is now overwhelmingly dominated by Council structures and 
personnel. The EU has developed competences in early warning and analysis and in 
operational corflict prevention. However, conflict prevention in the EU context is 
increasingly associated with civilian and military crisis management, denoting a 
policy based on the response to problems such as state failure rather than a policy 
proactively addressing root causes of conflict. The problem with this outcome is a 
tendency in EU institutions to decouple structural conj7ict prevention from 
operational conj7ict prevention. A holistic definition of conflict prevention may still 
exist on paper, but given the resources available for structural conj7ict prevention (and 
current trends), in practice it is becoming more and more synonymous with crisis 
management. MEP Elisabeth Schroedter (2004: 42) concluded in a recent article on 
EU conflict prevention that the broad aim of prevention, supported by the European 
Parliament, has been reduced to reactive mechanisms. 
The Council of the EU's rapid development of institutions to support ESDP, has 
continued with the innovations for military cooperation enshrined in (and fast-tracked 
from) the Constitutional Treaty - structured cooperation for the speedy deployment of 
EU military operations and the European Defence Agency (EDA) for defence 
research and procurement. As one analyst commented, while the development of the 
ESDP was viewed as one of the greatest challenges in the drafting of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty, it was, paradoxically, the policy area in which most substantial 
progress was made (Howorth 2004: 483). 
9.3.1 EU structures and conflict prevention: a challenge for coordination 
While internaldrid external factors may have encouraged the EU's adoption of 
conflict prevention as an external objective, in practice internal policy coordination 
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was problematic. Policy coordination is a familiar problem for all types of 
bureaucracies. Conflict prevention, like other cross-cutting policies, is also a 
challenge for national governments: work needs to be divided across bureaucracies, 
but this can lead to fragmentation and a lack of 'joined-up' policy. Lying at the 
development-security inter-section, conflict prevention found no natural home in the 
EU institutional set-up. The policy requires synergy between the Commission's 
external relations and development DGs and the CFSP/EDSP structures located in the 
Council of the EU. Chapter 5 argued that the complexity of EU structures is an 
impediment for EU conflict prevention policy coordination. Coordination was 
analysed on three levels: the overall pillar structure, the interaction between the 
European Commission and the Council of the EU (inter-institutional), and the 
institutions themselves (internal institutional). 
The pillar structure, inaugurated in the TEU (ratified in 1993), does not provide a 
solid foundation for coherent and coordinated external policy. For conflict prevention 
in particular, the different policy-making and decision-making procedures for 
economic and development policy, as well as positions adopted under the CFSP, does 
not encourage synergy. Until 1999, there was no EU figure capable of effectively 
bringing together the different strands of policy relevant for conflict prevention. The 
appointment of Javier Solana as EU High Representative for CFSP improved the 
situation, since he had regular contact with the Commission, and the Commissioner 
for External Relations in particular. Nevertheless, he remains answerable to the 
Council only, and dialogue with the Commission depends on personal initiative rather 
than any role specified in EU documentation. The inability of EU Member States to 
agree on common decision-making procedures across policy areas led to the pillar 
compromise, which allowed cooperation in foreign policy and justice and home 
affairs to be brought into the EU institutional structure. The pillar system established 
with the TEU is typical of the incremental development that has characterised the EU 
since its birth, but as recognised in the reforms proposed in the Constitutional Treaty, 
it is far from optimal. 
Inter-institutional problems exacerbate coordination attempts. The European 
Commission and the Council of the EU have developed their own working cultures 
and compete for central resources. Graham Allison, in his 1971 study of the US 
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government's response to the Cuban Missile crisis, used his 'bureaucratic politics' 
conceptual model to illustrate how government action can be understood as the result 
of the "compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and 
unequal influence" (Allison 1971: 162). Alternatively, the 'organisational process' 
model interpreted government decisions "as outputs of large organisations functioning 
according to standard patterns of behavior, " (1971: 67), underlining the tendency of 
governmental units, each with its own routine and culture, to work independently, 
requiring coordination by government leaders who can not necessarily control the 
organisational output (Allison 1971). The problems identified in Allison's study of 
national foreign policy-making are recognisable in the EUs elaboration of conflict 
prevention policy, with bureaucratic politics referring to problems between the EU 
institutions and organisational processes referring to problems within institutions. 
Clearly, the Commission and the Council have developed separate and distinct 
cultures over the years, and the relationship between them is characterised by conflict 
and compromise. Tension between the institutions was already deep-seated because of 
the inherent frictions between a supranational institution representing the interests of 
the organisation (the Commission) and a hybrid intergovernmental-supranational 
institution representing the interests of Member States (and arguably its own 
institutional interests), and relying more on negotiation and compromise to find 
common positions (the Council of the EU). The incorporation of the CFSP into the 
EU in 1993 underscored the continuing intergovernmental nature of foreign policy 
cooperation, and denied the Commission its role as prime policy initiator and 
elaborator. Competition between the institutions over the ownership of conflict 
prevention has left the policy bereft of its long-term focus as the Council has 
consolidated its role in the ESDP and as the Commission has clambered for a place in 
the project. 
Internal institutional developments have tended to perpetuate the traditional division 
between the Council and the Commission. Organisational units within the 
Commission and the Council of the EU have developed their own patterns of 
behaviour, and coordination is also required within these institutions. In the 
Commission, conflict prevention was elevated from a low-key concept in the 
development sphere to a key element of the CFSP partly as a tactic to gain more 
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influence in the CFSP/ESDP. The Commission, in its 2001 Communication on 
Con/Uct Prevention, was very thorough in its spelling out of the vast number of 
Community policies and initiatives that contribute to short and long-term conflict 
prevention. However, the gradual downgrading of DG Development, and the transfer 
of its responsibilities to the EuropeAid office and the delegations, has left structural 
conflict prevention largely undeveloped in comparison to civilian crisis management. 
The Commission had competence and funding for the latter, and as the ESDP project 
gained ground in the early 2000s, DG External Relations' desire to play an important 
role in the process led to an emphasis on the development of short-term initiatives 
such as the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, EU Monitoring and Assessment missions, 
and the African Peace Facility. In short, internal divisions in the Commission have not 
encouraged a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention. 
The Council has seen major changes and institutional proliferation in support of the 
CFSP/ESDP, and conflict prevention has moved increasingly up the agenda as a way 
of rationalising and legitimising the EU's new military role. However, the Council is 
not a homogeneous unit; the High Representative may not be in agreement with other 
Council actors, such as the Head of DG External Relations, or the Presidency (further 
complicated by the six-monthly change in Presidency personnel). Furthermore, the 
institutional balance in the Council does not necessarily favour comprehensive 
conflict prevention. Input from civilian experts is lacking in the Council Secretariat; 
CIVCOM is "a political lightweight without real influence [and with] very little 
capacity to respond to emergency" (Keane 2004c: 9). Without strong council 
institutions to push for early action, conflict prevention opportunities for the EU will 
be lost. This is arguably the case with the situation in Darfur, Sudan, where an acute 
humanitarian crisis persists. According to a Commission official, Commission experts 
went to the PSC with early warning information about mass displacements and an 
impending humanitarian crisis in the country in 2003. No action was 
taken. 124 Commentators have noted the lack of EU action on Darfur, and, according to 
Rory Keane, the problem lies with the weakness of CIVCOM and the sidelining of 
conflict prevention in the Council Secretariat in favour of terrorism, defence and 
124 Interview with Commission official, 25/10/04. 
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WMD (Keane 2004c). The findings presented in this thesis concur with this 
assessment. 
9.3.2 Peace project or martial union? 
Undoubtedly the development of military capabilities fundamentally changes the 
traditional civilian identity of the EU as understood during the Cold War period. This 
was a pragmatic adaptation to post-Cold War crises, reflecting unprecedented 
progress in intergovernmental cooperation. It also shows that the EU was less attached 
to its civilian image than many commentators assumed (Smith, K. 2000: 14). 
Nevertheless, it has mixed blessings for EU conflict prevention. On the positive side, 
the EU is extending its competences by equipping itself with the appropriate means to 
intervene militarily to prevent the escalation of a conflict or to keep the peace. This in 
theory complements the array of EU civilian competences, making the EU a well- 
rounded actor in European security. However, if the development of military means 
becomes an end in itself, (whether for the benefit of the armaments industry or 
otherwise) then the purpose and utility of these military competences must be 
questioned. Not only could the military dimension "diminish the [EU's] civilian 
power image" (Smith, K. 2003: 170), but the EU faces a serious legitimacy problem if 
the trend, identified in this thesis, of a decoupling of long-term conflict prevention 
from military crisis management continues. 
According to the Head of DG External Relations in the Council, "in an age in which 
security will depend on taking early action against emerging threats abroad, 
legitimacy is more important that ever" (Cooper 2004: 167). Europe will need "more 
power, both military power and multilateral legitimacy" (ibid.: 172). These latter aims 
(military power and multilateral legitimacy) are not compatible if the EU loses its 
commitment to long-term security solutions. 
9.3.4 The impact of Constitutional Treaty reforms 
The reforms outlined in the EU Constitutional Treaty address a number of problems 
of coherency and coordination, indicating that the treaty drafters (EU, Member State 
and NGO officials) had learned lessons from the EU's post-Cold War external 
relations experience. However, the Treaty has run up against serious ratification 
problems, with its rejection by referendum in May/June 2005 by France and the 
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Netherlands. It is not yet clear whether the Treaty will be renegotiated, but treaty 
revisions are likely to be necessary for many of the reforms to take place. 
Commentators have, nevertheless, speculated at some length on the impact of the 
external relations reforms outlined in the Treaty. 
The proposed post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is of particular significance, 
since it is the first ever EU position that straddles the supranational-intergovernmental 
external relations divide (Howorth 2004: 502). The Treaty effectively abolishes the 
pillar structure, but the Cornmission loses its right of initiative in CFSP, and 
CSFP/ESDP decision-making remains solidly intergovernmental (Cameron 2003: 17). 
The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs 125 will have a large number of tasks in the 
field of CFSP, including chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, representing the Union 
in CFSP matters, conducting political dialogue and heading the European External 
Action Service (Constitutional Treaty Article 111- 296). Moreover, the post-holder will 
be charged with coordinating CFSP and Community policies, and coordinating 
Member State positions at international organisations and conferences. As Jolyon 
Howorth has contended, "the requirements of coordination in the broad field of the 
CFSP and in the more critical field of the ESDP are now so urgent that the creation of 
this post literally imposed itself'(2004: 501). The idea had been floated in academic 
and NGO circles for some time, and was a firm proposal in the European Convention 
(Missiroli 2004: 146). However, as commentators have argued, the post is a difficult 
one and will rely very much on good relations between the Minister, the new 
appointed President of the European Council and the European Commission 
President 126 (Allen 2004; Crowe 2004; Missiroli 2004b). "The Treaty makes it a 
personal rather than functional relationship", as an official in the Council of the EU 
commented to the author. 127 It can be assumed, and is indeed supported by the 
findings of this thesis, that an improvement in the EU's internal coherence will also 
result in improved external coordination with other international organisations. 
125 In 2004 the European Council decided that the first Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will be 
Javier Solana, current High Representative for CFSP, if the Treaty is ever ratified. 
126 The proposed President of the European Council will be appointed by the European Council on a 
2Y2 year, renewable basis. 
127 Interview with Council official, Brussels, 26/10/04. 
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The Constitutional Treaty states that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs will be 
supported by a European External Action Service, consisting of relevant departments 
of the Council General Secretariat, the Commission, and staff seconded from national 
diplomatic services (Constitutional Treaty, Article 111-296 (3)). The Treaty was 
vague about the details of the Service, leaving the all too important decisions about 
the organisation and functioning of the Service for a later date. Simon Duke has 
outlined the institutional and financial minefield that further decisions on the details 
of the External Action Service are likely to involve (Duke 2004: 5-6). The Treaty may 
be creating a new high-level post with institutional support, but this is also likely to 
create a whole host of new "institutional scuffles" (Duke 2004: 6), exposing the 
familiar gulf at the heart of EU external relations. 
9.4 EU External Cooperation in Conflict Prevention 
9.4.1 General conclusions 
Chapters 6,7 and 8 looked in detail at the emerging relationships between the EU and 
the UN, OSCE and NATO. Before outlining specific conclusions about the EU's 
external coordination in conflict prevention with these organisations, some general 
concluding remarks can be made. Broadly, while cooperation in conflict prevention 
and crisis response has become a central theme in pan-European security, cooperation 
in conflict prevention has not led to significant progress in EU-UN, EU-OSCE and 
EU-NATO policy coordination. There are various reasons for this lack of progress. 
The first concerns conflict prevention itself. The broad nature of the policy means that 
it is difficult to mainstream into international organisations. Bureaucratic and 
organisational politics within and between organisations compound this, and it is also 
difficult to make positive assessments of the impact of policy. Secondly, the conflicts 
of the post-Cold War period were challenging for international organisations, 
particularly the trend in intra-state conflict, which rendered intervention difficult for 
legal and practical reasons. The post-Cold War climate of institutional reform and the 
concurrent development of new policy areas (of which conflict prevention was but 
one) did not therefore lead to sufficient inter-organisational dialogue: there was no 
immediate incentive for policy coordination, and progress was made only after the 
implications of inter-organisational failures in coordination became clear. This was 
largely because organisations were not accustomed to cooperating, and in some 
instances were competing to survive as viable security organisations in the post-Cold 
249 
War context. Successive enlargements confused the policy space further. Member 
States were not clear about the future of their organisations and have not designed a 
coherent system because of lack of planning and political will. 
It is important to reiterate that, while reinforcing organisational conflict prevention 
policies is best practice, policy coordination is no panacea. International organisations 
may cooperate well at every level, but this will not prevent conflict if domestic actors 
see violent conflict rather than peace as the solution. Furthermore, while diverging 
conflict prevention policies may exacerbate tensions, coordinated policies may do the 
same if they are based on a shared false interpretation of the causes of the conflict. EU 
cooperation with the UN, OSCE and NATO has risen exponentially in the post-Cold 
War era, as this study has shown. However, the extent of EU cooperation with the 
UN, OSCE and NATO varies considerably. Overall, there is still not enough 
commitment to coordinate policy at the early warning stage; early warning 
information is not widely shared between the EU and the other organisations. The 
EU's operational priorities are reflected in the organisations' cooperation with the 
UN, OSCE and NATO - policy coordination in structural conflict prevention and 
early warning and analysis lags behind. 
9.4.2 EU-UN coordination in conflict prevention 
Cooperation between the EU and the UN reflects the new dialogue between regional 
organisations and the world organisation in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, EU 
cooperation in conflict prevention is most advanced with the UN. EU coordination in 
conflict prevention with the UN spans the conflict prevention categories used in this 
study: from structural conflict prevention through to operational conflict prevention. 
The emergence of conflict prevention in the UN context has arguably had the greatest 
influence on the EU's adoption of conflict prevention as an external relations 
objective. The European Commission has developed close links with the UNDP and 
other UN institutions, and the organisations' have developed common development 
goals. The EU has responded to the UN's requests to regional organisations to take on 
crisis management and peacekeeping duties. High-level meetings between UN 
personnel and the High Representative for CFSP, the Presidency, the External 
Relations Commissioner and the President of the European Commission are now 
common practice. This indicates that EU sees the UN as key partner in conflict 
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prevention: but does this have more to do with EU status and visibility rather than 
realities of the practice of conflict prevention? Ironically, while chapter 6 concluded 
that EU-UN coordination was too complex, involving too many personnel from both 
the Commission and the Council of the EU, more dialogue and cooperation is needed 
between a wider range of staff in the EU and the UN - not just between high-level 
officials. According to a European Commission official, there is not enough dialogue 
between EU desk officers and UN colleagues, and part of the problem is the lack of 
equivalence between EU and UN bodies and units. 128Dialogue on the ground in 
countries where there is dual presence is not yet common practice. The sharing of 
early warning information is still underdeveloped. Furthermore, the EU contribution 
to the UN's administration of Kosovo (UNMIK) has been criticised (ICG 2003), and 
the emphasis on military crisis management risks relegating EU-UN cooperation in 
civilian crisis management (Manca 2004: 4). 
9.4.3 EU-OSCE coordination in conflict prevention 
EU-OSCE coordination in conflict prevention is relatively uýderdeveloped in 
comparison to EU coordination with the UN. This is surprising considering the 
overlapping nature of the two organisations in terms of geographical area and civilian 
competences. Nevertheless, the EU has developed a relationship with the OSCE since 
it became an organisation in 1995, with particular impetus for cooperation coming 
from the EU in recent years. The EU funds many OSCE initiatives, and the 
organisations have carried out joint projects in recent years. Dialogue takes place 
between the leading external relations figures of both organisations (EU High 
Representative, Troika, External Relations Commissioner and PSC and OSCE 
Chairman-in-office, OSCE Troika, OSCE Permanent Council), and cooperation takes 
place in the field between EU Special Representatives and Heads of Mission and 
OSCE Missions, particularly in SE Europe. The network of organisations in SE 
Europe necessitates policy coordination in this region, and EU-OSCE cooperation is 
most developed in this region. Nevertheless, the EU neglects to make use of early 
warning information that the OSCE is willing to provide (Doyle 2002: 7), and the 
record of cooperation is patchier in Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
129 Interview, 25/10/05. 
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The delay in setting out modalities for cooperation with the OSCE (Council of the EU 
2003g) can be explained by the initial emphasis on military, rather than civilian 
competences in ESDP. However, the EU had an existing, and wide-ranging array of 
civilian competences before the post- 1999 progress in ESDP, and we therefore must 
question why it took so long for the EU to prioritise cooperation with the OSCE. 
There is evidence of tension between the organisations that is not conducive to 
progress in policy coordination. However, as one commentator pointed out, better EU 
cooperation with the OSCE in the pan-European area (e. g. the Caucasus and Central 
Asia) would allow the EU to focus its resources further field, such as in Africa (Keane 
2004: 8). 
The OSCE is uniquely qualified for conflict prevention (Chigas 1998; Zellner 2002). 
However, analysts note the tendency for member government reluctance to invest in 
conflict prevention before violence breaks out, and urge an improvement in 
cooperation both within the OSCE and between the OSCE and other conflict 
prevention actors (Zellner 2002: 24). The OSCE has been vocal in its efforts to 
coordinate its work with other European organisations, and it could be more 
successful in this with explicit and sustained support from the EU. 
9.4.4 EU-NATO coordination in conflict prevention 
The EU's relationship with NATO has arguably undergone the most change since 
1989, and particularly since 1999, when the EU launched the ESDP project. The EU 
has progressed from NATO's underling during the Cold War, to NATO's potential 
rival in the post-Cold War, with both organisations adopting the objective of 
'projecting stability'. The EU has successfully cooperated with NATO in order to 
secure access to NATO assets, and has taken over former NATO crisis management 
duties in Macedonia and Bosnia. The organisations have cooperated in preventive 
diplomacy, have made an agreement on information sharing, and underwent a joint 
(though uncoordinated) enlargement in May 2004, underlining their shared objective 
of pan-European stability. 
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However, it is difficult to characterise the EU-NATO relationship as a strategic 
partnership for conflict prevention, as the organisations have claimed. 
129 The EU's 
reliance on NATO assets for some military crisis management missions makes the 
relationship an unequal one, too dependent on amicable relations with the US. 
Furthermore, EU dialogue with NATO is far too restricted to the military sphere for a 
strategic partnership to exist, and even here there is evidence to suggest the 
development of parallel competences (e. g. NRF and ERRF). The EU's lack of 
consensus on the rationale of military operations complicates its relationship with 
NATO, opening the Union to accusations from the NATO SG of being weak and 
divided. NATO itself seems confused about its relationship with the EU, with the 
NATO SG and NATO Parliamentary Assembly contradicting one another (as outlined 
in chapter 8). This reflects an uneasy relationship, better characterised as rivalry than 
partnership. What seems clear is that the EU's objective of conflict prevention (in the 
widest sense) will not be enhanced, and may even be undermined by, a relationship 
with NATO restricted to narrow military cooperation. 
9.4.5 Links between EU internal and external policy coordination 
EU relations with the UN, OSCE and NATO are affected by the structure and 
procedures of EU external relations. Chapters 6,7 and 8 also examined the impact of 
EU-level coordination problems (the pillar system, inter-institutional, and internal 
institutional, as identified in chapter 5) on external cooperation with the UN, OSCE 
and NATO. Problems at the EU level were identified as impacting significantly on the 
EU's ability to coordinate conflict prevention policy with all three organisations. 
EU conflict prevention policy coordination is most advanced with the UN, but internal 
problems have a negative effect on EU-UN cooperation. The pillar structure results in 
a confusing EU presence in the UN, with the EC having a legal presence alongside 
Member States in some UN institutions. The breadth of both organisations, as well as 
the number of policy areas relevant to conflict prevention, render EU-UN cooperation 
particularly complex, and undoubtedly EU inter-institutional and internal institutional 
divisions add further stumbling blocks. As already mentioned, the vast number of EU 
129 Joint Press Statement by the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency, NATO-EU 
Ministerial Meeting, 4 December 2003 (NATO 2003). 
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points of contact with UN figures has not led to a sufficiently comprehensive EU-UN 
dialogue. Lack of internal EU coordination, for example in the context of the EU- 
managed pillar on UNMK results in a poor EU contribution to a key UN-led 
international project. Better EU civilian-military policy coordination could improve 
the EU as a viable partner for the UN. 
The EU and the OSCE have similar organisational objectives, particularly in the 
promotion of stability in the pan-European area, but internal EU divisions and EU- 
Member State inconsistency contribute to the lack of policy coordination between the 
organisations. On-site cooperation in preventive diplomacy in target countries is 
particularly important for EU-OSCE conflict prevention, but it is in this area that the 
EU often struggles to present a single, coordinated voice. The pillar structure creates 
a situation in which external relations rhetoric and policy originates from three 
sources: the European Commission, the Council of the EU, and Member States. EU- 
Member State coordination in foreign policy may be a case of vertical rather than 
horizontal consistency (Krenzler and Schneider 1997: 136), but in this case vertical 
inconsistency compounds horizontal consistency because of the nature of OSCE 
work. OSCE missions can be faced with multiple EU presences in the countries in 
which they operate: EC delegations, Member State embassies, and in some cases 
Heads of EU civilian or military missions, and they do not necessarily present a 
consistent EU line (e. g. in Uzbekistan - see chapter 7). Member State diplomatic 
positions are not always aligned with EU rhetoric and policy, and this can undermine 
statements from Brussels, as well as confuse OSCE personnel. Additionally, inter- 
institutional and internal institutional divisions can impact negatively on cooperation 
with the OSCE in the field if they result in a lack of civil-military synergy between 
the Council of the EU and Commission personnel, and multiple institutional actors 
who fail to communicate effectively. 
Conflict prevention policy coordination with NATO is affected by the EU's internal 
uncertainties about its military role. The pillar structure tends to perpetuate this lack 
of consensus, since dialogue with NATO is dominated by pillar II institutions (i. e. the 
Council of the EU). Deep-seated inter-institutional divisions lead to a reluctance of 
EU Member States to involve the European Commission in the intergovernmental 
ESDP project. This does not allow for extensive dialogue with NATO, covering all 
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aspects of conflict prevention (not just military). Additionally, internal institutional 
divergences in the Council of the EU do not indicate a consensus on the EU's military 
role, nor, by implication, on the EU's relationship with NATO. 
9.5 Definition and Theory 
9.5.1 Defining conflict prevention 
As explained in chapter 1, there is no definitive classification of conflict prevention, 
and therefore it was necessary for this investigation to adopt a particular definition of 
the term. The resulting wide definition adopted led to a broad survey of organisational 
activity, ranging from development policy to military operations. While this may have 
been at the expense of a more detailed single study, it is, in any case, debatable 
whether more conclusions could have been drawn from a detailed, but narrow case 
study in EU conflict prevention. 
Nevertheless, the wide definition adopted in this study did create some conceptual 
problems. While the study is comprehensive, it was on occasion difficult to find parity 
between the EU and the other organisations. The EU is unique in its set-up and 
institutions, and while, like the other organisations, it has adopted conflict prevention 
as an external objective, the study confronted the problem of comparing like with like. 
EU conflict prevention policy coordination could not be examined in all categories 
(structural, early warning and analysis and operational) with all the organisations. 
For example, the EU can coordinate its development objectives with the UN, but not 
the OSCE and NATO. Military crisis management cooperation is important with 
NATO, but not with the OSCE. Applying a systematic approach was therefore not 
always possible, since the organisations are not always comparable and do not 
necessarily interpret, or practice, conflict prevention in the same way. What is 
highlighted, however, is the EU's wide and varied capacity for conflict prevention in 
all the categories. If the current focus on crisis management is not matched by a 
commitment to structural conflict prevention, the EU could lose this unique 
capability. 
Of all the organisations, breaking down OSCE activities into our conflict prevention 
categories was particularly difficult. This highlighted a categorisation problem rather 
than a lack of clarity in OSCE activities and institutions. Long-term conflict 
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prevention blurs into early warning and crisis management particularly in the case of 
the OSCE, largely because of the organisation's long-term field presence in target 
regions. Missions evolve as the situation on the ground changes, and many are present 
throughout the cycle of a conflict, using the same tactics in post-conflict 
reconstruction as in pre-conflict prevention. There was therefore a considerable, and 
unavoidable overlap of OSCE functions in structural conj7ict prevention, early 
warning and operational conflict prevention in the OSCE chapter. 
9.5.2 Theoretical implications of findings 
This thesis provides evidence in support of the contention that international 
organisations both drive international agendas, and have the capacity for considerable 
autonomous action (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). The widespread organisational 
interest in conflict prevention in the early post-Cold War period was crucial in 
transforming the concept into a policy, and clearly its multilateral location, linked to 
the expanded notion of security, was seen as a way of expanding organisational action 
and influence (see Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 712). The EU and other security 
organisations featured in this study have demonstrated considerable autonomy and 
power in their classification and elaboration of the conflict prevention agenda, and 
have been supported by a large number of international non-govemmental 
organisations in their endeavours. Furthermore, as this study of the EU has shown, the 
internal workings of organisations, long ignored by some IR scholars, do have a 
significant bearing on policy outcomes. It is necessary not only to recognise the 
influence and impact of international organisations, but also to recognise, and 
investigate, the factors limiting their potential (Gallarotti 1991; Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999). 
Peace Researchers have long been interested in international organisations as creators 
of peace and security, with a more recent debate in the discipline about whether the 
EU is emerging as a "hope or a threat to peace" (Wallensteen 2001: 15; Dembinski 
and Brock 2004). This study underlines the centrality of the EU and its relationship 
with other organisations in the prevention and resolution of conflict. The EU's ability 
to further extend the zone of peace on the European continent will depend very much 
on how the military element is developed internally, and implemented and perceived 
externally. 
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Theories of cooperation, usually applied to state-state or state-organisation interaction 
(Keohane 1984), provided a useful way of thinking about the EU's cooperation with 
other organisational actors in the post-Cold War security environment. However, 
despite the considerable overlap of organisational policies and objectives (creating the 
circumstances for discord between security organisations and their members), 
cooperation between organisations has not led to significant policy coordination 
across conflict prevention categories. This finding challenges assumptions made in 
neo-liberal literature that cooperation entails a process of policy coordination. The 
progression from cooperation to policy coordination is in fact complex and 
problematic, compounded by difficulties in establishing clear boundaries between the 
processes. Neither does neo-liberal theory take account of other factors that constrain 
cooperation, such as organisational and bureaucratic politics; clearly these factors 
have a negative impact on the ability of the EU to coordinate policy both internally 
and externally. 
There is evidence to suggest a certain amount of 'externalisation' in driving forward 
EU conflict prevention (Smith, K. 2004: 20). Other security organisations (especially 
the UN) have undoubtedly exerted external influence on the EU in bringing conflict 
prevention onto the external relations agenda. The need for the EU to cooperate 
externally for conflict prevention may have provided an impetus for the EU to 
rationalise and streamline its external relations procedures and representation, 
particularly the proposed creation of an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
associated European External Action Service (EEAS). 
9.5.3 Researching the EU 
Piecing together the evolution of EU conflict prevention using primarily public 
documents and secondary sources has been a lengthy undertaking, and this work does 
not claim to be wholly comprehensive or free of errors. The changes in EU external 
relations since this work was started have been considerable, culminating recently 
with the Member State governmental agreement on the Constitutional Treaty. 
Researching an evolving (and dynamic) organisation made the project exciting and 
frustrating in equal measures: the recent years have certainly not been a stagnant 
period for European Union external relations. However, the lack of transparency and 
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complexity of the EU system is undoubtedly a setback for researchers. This inevitably 
contributes to the vast quantity of misinformation and conflicting accounts that 
anyone researching the EU comes across. 
In a recent report the International Crisis Group (ICG) concludes, 
The EU's conflict prevention and management resources remain unknown 
to most ... Had we attempted to write this report 
from public documents 
alone, it would have been a more arduous and less rewarding task (ICG 
2005: 52). 
There are two conclusions to draw from this comment and the experience gained in 
researching this thesis. Firstly, the EU needs to better inform its citizens of its wider 
potential and purpose (and not just in conflict prevention) in order to dispel the 
damaging myths disseminated by the British tabloid press and Eurosceptical 
politicians that it exists only to dictate the shape of bananas or subsidise European 
farmers. Secondly, EU information and documentation has to become more accessible 
if the Union wants to reconnect with the EU public, especially in the aftermath of the 
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands. Without these 
changes it will continue to be difficult for future researchers to take on Hazel Smith's 
challenge to "investigate the difference between what goes on paper (the treaties and 
procedures) and what the Union actually does in the world (the foreign policy 
outcomes)" (Smith, H. 2002: 275). 
9.6 The Future of Conflict Prevention in Europe and beyond 
The future of conflict prevention as a security strategy is difficult to predict. This 
study shows that while conflict prevention has achieved some rhetorical success, it 
has not reached its potential in the EU context. The European Security Strategy 
demonstrates the success of conflict prevention rhetoric, but evidence suggests that 
conflict prevention has come to mean threat prevention and has lost its crucial long- 
term focus. As a key politico-economic actor in Europe, the EU's failure to reverse 
this trend impacts negatively on the ability of other actors (particularly the UN and the 
OSCE) to carry forward a conflict prevention agenda in the pan-European area. 
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In the wider world, it is not clear what impact the focus on international terrorism will 
have on conflict prevention. According to Michael MccGwire, 
one result of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre has been an 
increased willingness to reflect on the state of the wider world, to consider 
the growing disparity between the rich and the poor, to recognize the 
stresses induced by modernity, to acknowledge the growing imbalance in 
the global economy, and to question the overwhelming dominance of 
Western political and economic orthodoxies (MccGwire 2002: 1). 
Several days after the September I Ith 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, the European- 
based and EU-affiliated Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) released a commentary 
assessing the links between conflict prevention and terrorism. Two different outcomes 
were predicted: conflict prevention would either become mainstream in order to 
prevent terrorist attacks and associated problems; or the emerging paradigm of 
conflict prevention would disappear as all 'soft' security solutions become 
discredited. 130 While the war in Iraq may be evidence that the latter scenario is 
emerging, there is also a discemable global reaction against this type of military 
response to terrorism, and a growing awareness in the West of the links between 
poverty and unfair trade, 13 1 both of which could contribute to the prevention of 
conflict. However, whether the reaction against the US' militaristic unilateralism, and 
a (no doubt) transient and superficial public campaign against poverty will result in a 
resurgence of structural conflict prevention remains to be seen. Dwan (2002: 123) 
argues that "the current approach to the prevention of terrorism risks undermining the 
entire notion of conflict prevention, " while Rogers (2001: 102) contends that, 
according to current trends, the response to violent conflict will be to regain and 
maintain control rather than to address root causes. The EU has a key role in shaping 
the future of conflict prevention as a security strategy, and it will be the responsibility 
of the Union and its Member States to ensure its persistence as a fundamentally 
realistic approach to instability on its borders and beyond. 
130 'The II September 2001 terrorist attack and conflict prevention: The need to do more prevention - 
not less' CPN Commentary, 13 September 200 1. Accessed 3/11/01 at httl2: //www. swl2-berl in. ore/On. 
Website discontinued. 
13 1 For example, the 'Make Poverty History' campaign in the UK to coincide with the July 2005 G8 
Summit at Gleneagles. 
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